HÖLDERLIN;3217040 said:
That was a great and interesting read. I never looked at the matter that way. Although I have my problems to compare the preconditions, purposes and realizations of the treaties of Vienna, Prague and Frankfurt to that of Versailles and to see a continuity from the Holy Roman Empire to the German Empire of Wilhelm ll.
On the one hand, on this forum, it has become almost inevitable that the same historical occurrence is viewed differently, radically differently, due to the application of national filters. Assuming that posts will be heavily influenced by nationalist points of view has become a dreary commonplace.
May I sincerely recommend to you the book by Julien Benda, "La Trahison des Clercs"? I keep suggesting it to people, in the forlorn hope that someone might actually read it, and understand its powerful message, but to no luck so far.
Furthermore it requires a rather anti-German comprehension of history to declare the three mentioned wars as "thrusted on their enemies"; eventhough German leadership was more than happy to seize the opportunities to become a self-determined central European power capable of acting. All apart, of course, from the difficulty of one injustice abolishing another.
Why do you say so? The war with Denmark was the second; they had fought briefly less than two decades earlier, with rather different results. Only a disposition to reverse the result could have led to another in such quick succession, surely?
It is true that Danish constitutional reforms led to a casus belli, as the Duchy of Holstein refused to endorse it, a constitutional necessity in Denmark. But it was not necessary for Prussia to pounce on the opportunity, and declare war in a matter for the consideration, strictly speaking, of the Holy Roman Empire. Neither Schleswig or Holstein was ever a Prussian protectorate.
The war with Austria-Hungary, at the time of the war the Holy Roman Empire, was rather obviously at the initiative of Prussia, was it not?
Finally, all room for reasonable doubt vanishes in the case of the French. That was an out-and-out entrapment, to the extent of fabrication and forgery. I was not aware that it was viewed as a war with equally culpable protagonists.
I don't think it was partition and occupation, which "put the German genie back in the bottle", but rather the integration into the European community of states via the European Recovery Act and forerunners of the European Union, instead of crippling Germany for immeasurable eternity while Great Britain and France enjoyed special rights - like at the end of World War I.
A point of view, a legitimate point of view in hindsight, as we enjoy the superior position of seeing the future turn into the past.
At the time of the cessation of the war, however, perspectives were rather different. All of Europe, except for bits of Scandinavia and Switzerland, had been under dictatorial and fascist repression for various lengths of time. The repression practised on the captive population exceeded even the pleasantries of Europeans with their colonial subjects, and that is saying a lot.
With this background, only the partition and stern domination of both parts seemed to have sufficient force to prevent a German revival such as the one that the world had already seen.
Since you mention the importance of integration into the European Community as being the critical factor in the harmonisation of Germany with the rest of Europe, you must already be familiar with the history of the formation of the community, and must have noted the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community first, incorporating the important coal- and steel-bearing areas of West Germany into a common union before all other measures. The parallel with the French occupation of the
Saar in the earlier instance is presumably clear.
It was possible to deal with Germany through legislation and pact because it was a truncated Germany. It is an idle historical speculation whether such a course would have been possible with an undivided Germany, however enfeebled.