Are you going to even attempt to engage in a constructive conversation? You're repeating the same nonsense over and over again. "Everyone's a baighairat, apart from you, because you can shout the loudest to prove your patriotism and cry crocodile tears". Irony is that a REAL patriot will stop looking at people to curse and come up with solutions.
So when will you be joining the army Areesh? Have you signed up yet? Or are you worried that you may actually have to do something real for your country other than typing on a keyboard from the comfort of your own home?!
@Areesh @Reddawn Gents lets tone the temperature down a bit.
@Areesh Reddawn is not gloating over the death of these soldiers. I am certain he is as upset about this as anyone else. Some people have a different way of processing grief and anger. From what I am reading off his posts he is un-emotionally stating that the mechanics of counter insurgency ops at a command level think/operate in very different terms than people who are not in that position. In all honesty strategic command level thought process is often very different from tactical command and group formations and down to unit. Each processes things very differently (which is often the cause of friction - a natural outcrop of the layered command structure). You'll often hear the refrain coming from on the ground units "what do they know sitting in GHQ". Replace GHQ with any centralized command structure in any army and you'll find this dynamic consistently exhibited in all wars bar none. I think and I dont want to speak for Reddawn but he is just making an observation that in the calculus of war fighting there is a prism of views and we should not be quick to just one view as being superior to others. They all have their place.
Having said that Reddawn I think Areesh is only expressing his raw emotion that I am sure you can relate to as well. I think we can process Areesh's view with perhaps some introspection of unit level tactics. I guess given none of us are in the front, but it might be fair to ask for tactics at play at the unit or formation level. IF these units indeed are now more proactive, then perhaps the question to ask might be force protection, support functions, and intel.
Are there areas for improvement that might reduce casualties. Having said that Areesh, what you must know is that given the terrain it is very difficult to avoid casualties. However every casualty as a function of enemy contact, must operationally have a component to completely root out the enemy. The bad part of the terrain is also the good part. If population areas are mapped and delimited then it becomes easy to identify friend from foe. The same terrain that gives the enemy the ability to attack (remote, barren), enables a freer hand for the army. However this is where it is critical that every purposeful contact of tactical operating units have the ability to coordinate with nearby units. That upon enemy contact air support and drone units (alongwith nearby units) are brought into play to track the enemy as well as identify their hiding spots. This would hence allow complete eradication once a contact is established, and I hope these are the tactics they are operating with.
@Areesh we are all sad to see our soldiers die, but their death should not be in vain. PK Army should not be taking prisoners this time around. The mistake they made a decade or so ago was taking prisoners, who were quickly cycled through the court systems thanks to our unflappable "judiciary".
PS: From what I know of the Army (cannot speak to FC), even one injury let alone fatality, results in an inquiry. A complete report is made and it becomes a permanent part of the commanding chain's file. Callousness, and failure to take adequate care of one soldier under command is the quickest way to a short military career, and no officer of the PK Army wants to be in this position.
One last thing to add here is: Balouch insurgency (tactics) follows a very similar pattern as it did in the 70s. This is not an insurgency that will survive. It will be taken care of. The difference between the 70s and now is there was a political rapprochement. These days there is none. The 70s insurgency was in large measure instigated and run by the sardars. So when they were walloped they came to the table and things cooled down. The insurgency of today is run and primarily handled by foreign intel agencies. Which means it is bound to last longer. Some ideas to consider:
1) All generic COIN efforts
2) De-population and sweep ops
3) Interdicting money flows
4) Across border assassinations of handlers and enemy intel agents
5) Massive population migrations to and from the province (for permanent change)
6) More bases and cantts in the province (get army out of plush city postings and build a new crop of Cantts in the middle of nowhere - this will help stabilize areas while reducing the mil-civ interaction which is horrible for mil discipline
7) Complete population mapping and non-population zones
www.uasvision.com
