Front-line fighter Su-30 MKI flies with flaws

[Stephen Cohen]

Yes only in close air dog fight with F-35 or Raptors but can't say about F-16 and Euro fighter, But defiantly the are quite inferior in electronics and BVR engagements.

That is just your Opinion NOT a fact

 

[Maarkhoor]

That is just your Opinion NOT a fact

yes opinion based on facts.

 

[NKVD]

Russian fighter Jets qualitatively not as per the standards of USA or Europe they are quite loose in maintaining or resolving issues.

Who Told you that Operational Serviceability of EuroFighter is Even Poor than Russians German Air-force Had Serviceability of 48-50 %

 

[Maarkhoor]

Who Told you that Operational Serviceability of EuroFighter is Even Poor than Russians German Air-force Had Serviceability of 48-50 %

Source pls

 

[shah1398]

Let the blame game begin. IAF blaming HAL for the said problems while HAL reciprocating.

 

[gambit]

The Su-30 MKI’s aerodynamic construction is an unstable longitudinal tri-plane that confers its unprecedented agility. Like most modern jet fighters, this highly unstable platform is manoeuvred by computer-controlled FBW system. Multi-layered backup systems are necessary as without the FBW, the aircraft cannot be manually controlled by the pilots.

Source: Front-line fighter Su-30 MKI flies with flaws | Page 5

A brief explanation of the standard quad redundancy FBW-FLCS is here...

JF-17 Thunder Multirole Fighter [Thread 6] | Page 234

To ensure near-ultimate safety, the Su-30 MKI’s FBW system is endowed with quadruple redundancy. If one of the FBW channels becomes faulty, it automatically gets disconnected from the system, suitably warning the crew to take appropriate actions.

Does not get 'disconnected' but voted out.

A level-1 failure does not jeopardise the mission,...

No, it does not. But it will -- or should -- create a cockpit level warning.

Under the Western design philosophy, the faulted (not faulty) channel is never disregarded. Not selected for voting is put into standby mode and its parameters are still monitored. If at any time those parameters came within specs, the faulted channel will be 'un-faulted' and is eligible for voting again. This is NOT a design flaw since there could be many reasons for a channel to become faulted. The only time the FLCC will flag a cockpit level warning is when a channel have a persistent fault.

With a quad channels redundancy design that uses the two-fail operability concept, am guessing that the Russian designers considered a one channel fault to be 'level-1', meaning one channel is voted out and the other three continues to operate the aircraft.

...while a level-2 failure would demand a diversion to the nearest suitable airfield.

This level-2 fault would -- or should -- be a second channel fault.

The system now have only two channels which means no voting is possible. Under the Western design philosophy, one channel will be used as primary signals provider to operate the aircraft. There will be no performance degradation such as auto-g limits. The pilot would still be able to dogfight, drop bombs, etc.

...a level-3 failure would normally be rarer than one in a million possibility which unless quickly rectified could lead to the loss of aircraft.

This is when three out of four channels are faulted.

Speaking for Western design concept, as I came from the F-16, the only time a quad channels FBW-FLCS flies with two channels is combat damages or some kind of non-combat related collisions, aka 'bird strike'. Our training demands that if there is a cockpit level FLCS warning, the pilot must RTB. This is peace time, no need to take unnecessary risk to pilot and equipment.

However, this redundancy philosophy cannot rule out hardware related issues such as manufacturing quality, of which Soviet/Russian gear do not have a good reputation. Either the IndAF have, through their training, discovered a genuine design flaw in the Soviet/Russian design of the FBW-FLCS, or the IndAF is being shafted by the Russians with shoddy remanufactured gear.

Remanufactured hardware is not bad. Basically, everything is reconditioned/remanufactured. But have no doubt the Russians keep records of which hardware go to which customer.

The aircraft crashed when a crucial FBW switch was toggled disabling the flight control system. Was it therefore, a self-inflicted tragedy?

There is no 'disabling' of the FLCS. It is not possible under the FBW concept. Whatever this switch is and what it does, it does not 'disable' the FLCS. There is a miswording here. Until someone among the Indian members here can find and post the image of this switch, this will have to remain a mystery. But there is no possible 'disabling' of the FBW-FLCS.

 

[Foxtrot-Bravo]

And that is why few days ago I argued with an Indian friend that IAF really needs to facilitate, educate and equip their crew staff, including pilots with all the modern and different types of weaponry they are availing but he called me a noob, don't know where he'll be hiding now.

 

[Syed_Adeel]

It is absolutely fun to watch fan boys from both sides (some of them are elite fan boys)........ The problem is there are N number of threads on Su 30/F 16 -LCA/JF 17, every thread has the same arguments same counter arguments....... Guys doesnt get tired of this, Every thread related to air force has the same fate.......

Its a known fact. this thread is about DoD report. any comments about that as well ?

 

[NKVD]

View attachment 281041

Here is Second Claim Faulty RWR and FBW In MKI Problem Has been Fixed MoD Answered in Query

 

[Maarkhoor]

There is no 'disabling' of the FLCS. It is not possible under the FBW concept. Whatever this switch is and what it does, it does not 'disable' the FLCS. There is a miswording here. Until someone among the Indian members here can find and post the image of this switch, this will have to remain a mystery. But there is no possible 'disabling' of the FBW-FLCS.

Wing Commander Munje, who was the senior pilot on the aircraft, had been involved in the first ever crash of a Su30 fighter in 2009 when his co-pilot was killed.

The court of inquiry into the crash had found that the officer had mistakenly switched off the fly by wire systems of the fighter, causing the crash.

Human factor behind Su-30 MKI crash in October 2014: Manufacturer - timesofindia-economictimes

 

[NKVD]

Source pls

And India cannot go ahead and purchase the Eurofighter Tyhphoon jets now because the "Typhoon has its own developmental and operational problems and its serviceability in the German Luftwaffe is some 39%," Karnad added.

In March, UK foreign secretary Philip Hammond said the United Kingdom could offer Eurofighters to India if France's delayed plan to sell Rafales falls through.

Hammond said that if the opportunity did arise, Eurofighter had a "very competitive offer" to make, according to reports.



The twin-engine, canard-delta wing fighter is Germany’s most modern warplane, of which it owns 109 in three different variants. Seventy-four were available but only 42 were deployable in 2014,

In total, Germany owned 89 Tornados, had 66 available and 38 deployable in 2014. That means less than half of Berlin’s fighter fleet is reliable in a war.



Germany’s Air Force Is Falling Apart | War Is Boring

Eurofighter and Tornado - less than 50%
@MaarKhoor Here It Is Not So Glorious As you Seems

 

[gambit]

Wing Commander Munje, who was the senior pilot on the aircraft, had been involved in the first ever crash of a Su30 fighter in 2009 when his co-pilot was killed.

The court of inquiry into the crash had found that the officer had mistakenly switched off the fly by wire systems of the fighter, causing the crash.

Human factor behind Su-30 MKI crash in October 2014: Manufacturer - timesofindia-economictimes

I cannot imagine a situation where it is desirable to 'switch off' a FBW-FLCS.

Design philosophy goes this way. For any feature, you must have a justification and a justification came from a desire and/or need. On the F-16, there is a 'Cat I/III' switch that affects either a fully loaded jet or a less heavily configured jet. This is a desire and a justification. So what desire and/or need is there to 'switch off' a FBW-FLCS, even in flight ? The article's author did not perform sufficient research.

 

[Maarkhoor]

I cannot imagine a situation where it is desirable to 'switch off' a FBW-FLCS.

Design philosophy goes this way. For any feature, you must have a justification and a justification came from a desire and/or need. On the F-16, there is a 'Cat I/III' switch that affects either a fully loaded jet or a less heavily configured jet. This is a desire and a justification. So what desire and/or need is there to 'switch off' a FBW-FLCS, even in flight ? The article's author did not perform sufficient research.

I believe only limited FBW controls stop by switch allows pilot to pull up the aircraft but again restricted by remaining FBW system to avoid stall.
Yep you are correct putting a blame on pilot to avoid inquiry which further arises many question and possible kick backs.

 

[Maarkhoor]

Because rang de basanti was a factual documentary ??

No Sir based on circumstances and few facts, You remember flying coffin term why it coined. many times the blame pilots and their training but actually faulty, substandard parts and poor maintenance is the main cause.

 

[Maarkhoor]

CASE CLOSED.

OK then don't post on closed case, why you are burning like a hell.