Foreign assistance in China's Nuclear missile and Reactors

[imran iqbal]

Allright, I am sick of Chinese trolling on Indian defense section over how India received help in weapons from foreign countries and China has home grown arsenal. Here is a reality check over China's "indigenous" Missiles and Reactors.

Chinese Missiles: Threat and Capability

China may be the only country in the world that targets U.S. cities with nuclear missiles. And it is the only country still conducting nuclear tests, in part to develop lighter missile warheads.

China's missiles were conceived to target U.S. forces and allies but were later aimed at Soviet targets during the Cold War. "One has to regard China as a potential threat," says a senior U.S. official. "We have no knowledge that they have detargeted us." Former U.S. Ambassador to China James Lilley concurs: "My sense is that we target them, and they target us."

In 1956, Chairman Mao Zedong urged Chinese industry to start building atomic bombs and long-range missiles because, he said, "If we don't want to be bullied, we must have these things." The same year, China's Ministry of Defense created its Fifth Academy to develop ballistic missiles. Within ten years, China had exploded its first atomic bomb and tested a nuclear-capable missile. Today, China is believed to have roughly 450 nuclear weapons, a modest arsenal compared to that of the United States and Russia, but larger than that of Great Britain.

Russia was China's main missile tutor. According to the Natural Resources Defense Council's Nuclear Weapon Databook, Moscow sent scores of specialists in 1957 to help China build its main missile test center at Shuangchengzi. With them came Russian missiles, blueprints and know-how that enabled China to test its first nuclear missile, the Dong Feng-2, in 1964. China would build a series of DF missiles, each with a different target in mind.

The DF-2 was initially aimed at U.S. military bases in Japan, according to the Databook. A copy of the Soviet R-5 missile, it was turned against the Soviet Union when Sino-Soviet relations soured in the late 1960s.

The DF-3, tested in 1966 and destined to become China's mainstay, more than doubled the DF-2's range to 3,000 kilometers. The DF-3 engines are used in the DF-4 missile and to power China's Long March-1 space launcher. It also earned China nearly $3 billion from sales to Saudi Arabia in 1988.

The DF-4 was designed to target U.S. forces in Guam, but it could strike Moscow and the Middle East. Its successor, the DF-5, brought China its first intercontinental-range missile in 1981, with the capability of carrying a nuclear warhead to any city in the United States, Europe or the former Soviet Union. China also has a submarine-launched ballistic missile that could reach targets in North America, and is working on a new one.

China is now "trying to make its capability world class," says a U.S. official. It is building a new solid-fuel ICBM, the DF-41, and trying to reduce the weight of its nuclear warhead to extend the missile's range. It is also trying to earn money with its space launch program. Because China uses the same rockets to power both its missiles and space launchers, the U.S. Commerce Department controls U.S. exports to both programs. To reach its goal, China is shopping for better technology, especially American goods. A Pentagon study ranking countries' military potential says China has "limited capability" in several areas, including navigation and guidance, electronics, and composite materials.

A larger question is how China will use its growing capability. China already has massive conventional strength that intimidates its neighbors. But its generals view China's "sovereignty" as extending to Taiwan and disputed territories such as the Spratly Islands, which China seized in February. "The Chinese are pursuing a policy of calculated ambiguity," says one State Department official. "On the one hand they will assert themselves forcibly, but not in a decisive way, just to keep the pressure on."

Defense planners say America will keep its defenses in East Asia, but it probably won't be enough to outweigh China's ambitions. If China's military-owned companies continue to sell missile and chemical weapon technology to the Middle East, China will destabilize the region and undermine the international effort to stop proliferation. Such exports, combined with China's budding missile capabilities, lead at least one senior U.S. official to conclude that "China is a country that we will have to reckon with in the long run."

 

[imran iqbal]

China: Can it Build Power Reactors on its Own?

China, like the United States and other nuclear weapon states, is using its experience with military production reactors to launch a civilian power program. China has still not proved, however, that it can build nuclear power stations without foreign help.

China's first power reactor at Qinshan in Zhejiang province experienced a series of technical problems before it started to produce electricity in 1993. "For years, the Chinese have said that the Qinshan reactors were made entirely in China, which is a lie," says a U.S. government expert who tracks China's nuclear progress. The first Qinshan reactor includes a pressure vessel forged in Japan and primary coolant pumps supplied by a German firm, he says.

China is openly importing all its other reactors. The French nuclear giant, Framatome, has been building two large units at Daya Bay in Guangdong province, with the first starting operation in early 1994. Russia has agreed to build two 1,000-megawatt reactors near Wafangdian as part of a 1992 nuclear cooperation agreement, and the Russian firm Zarubeshatomenergostroy may also help China build a commercial centrifuge uranium enrichment plant. The plant would apparently produce low-enriched fuel for the Qinshan power reactors, and perhaps for the French reactors at Daya Bay.

The second reactor at Qinshan will use equipment from Framatome and the American firm Westinghouse, and the third Qinshan reactor will rely on French, Canadian and Japanese technology, according to official Chinese press reports. "The recent press statements are an open admission that China can't build these reactors entirely on its own," says the U.S. expert.

To help pay for all this, China needs to sell its nuclear wares abroad. China has agreed to build a Qinshan-style reactor in Pakistan, but U.S. officials question whether China can complete the reactor without incorporating Western technology. Japan and Germany say they will not sell significant nuclear equipment to Pakistan until Islamabad opens all its facilities to international inspection. In September 1992, China also agreed to supply Qinshan-style reactors to Iran, but the status of the deal is uncertain.

The China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation, a subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), was formed in 1980 to market Chinese uranium and enrichment services worldwide. In January, China sold enriched reactor fuel to India. CNNC aims to produce and export a family of 600-, 900- and 1,200-megawatt power reactors. But to do so, China must expand its technological base, largely through imports. According to Zhoa Ren-kai, Vice President of the Commission of Science and Technology at CNNC, China's new generation of reactors will include several joint ventures with foreign companies.

 

[Speeder 2]

^^^^ It was an article in 1995, 15 years old wet rag when the US media was packed with utter anti-China propagandas immediately after 89' Student Movement in China.

Nonetheless, on you typical troll post, mind you that after mid 50s, China and Soviet were at odds with each other. Technically, China developed almost all her nuclear, ballistic missile -related tech on her own, with only a small part coming from Soviets' limited assistance at the very beginning for a few years, immediately after the WWII.


Also you mind want to read up Qian Xuesen - the Father of Space(missile) Programme of China.



* Qian, being called "undisputed genius" by Theodore von Kármán, Professor of Aeronautics and Director of the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, started teaching at MIT and Caltech still in his 20s, being the youngest professor in MIT history and one of a few leading pioneers in Jet Pulpusion technologies in the world.


* Qian served on the Scientific Advisory Board that advised the US military during and after the WW2



* At the end of WW2, Qian was sent to Germany as part of the technical mission to interrogate Nazi scientists including Nazi V2 rokect designer Wernher von Braun ---> quote magazine Aviation Week 2007 "No one then knew that the father of the future US space program [Wernher von Braun] was being quizzed by the father of the future Chinese space program [Qian] ."


* Qian also contributed to the Manhattan Project, which developed the world's first atomic bomb, and in 1949 Qian was made the first director of the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Jet Propulsion Centre at Caltech.



* Qian, as the director of Jet Propulsion Centre at Caltech, led the US army Project Code named "Private A", the first US solid-propellant missile to perform successfully - a rare-known FACT!





Qian retured to China in 1955 and single-handedly started China's rocket programme




Starting from 1960 towards 1962, Sino-Soviet Split!





* Qian finalised plans for what was to become the Dongfeng missile, launched in 1964.


* Through Qian's foundation work, and with some assistance at the earlier stage from the Soviet Union, China made great strides and tested its own nuclear bomb in October 1964.


* Qian's pioneering programme was also responsible for the Silkworm missile. ,the first Chinese ballistic missiles launched in mid/late 60s. Even though it was based on Soviet R-2 (SS-2) design, itself based on the German V-2 rocket, the programme was hugely successful mainly due to Qian's advanced knowhow in rocket technologies at a time.


* Spurred on by Qian, China built progressively larger designs, including the Dongfeng 4 ballistic missile, whose three-stage space launch version, Long March 1, put the first Chinese satellite into orbit, in 1970. With the ability to construct nuclear weapons China had become a super-power, no longer fearing the Soviet Union or US.



Above are all undisputed FACTS - based on Chinese Acadamy of Scieces, Aviation Week, Wiki, BBC archive, etc.


Knowling the immense contributions to sciences from the remarkable persons such as Qian, one can easily see how much China really needed the Western "assistance", which was insignificantly close to NIL at majority of the entire course of the Cold War.

 

[imran iqbal]

^^ Here is more detailed report

Nuclear Weapons - China Nuclear Forces

By 1953 the Chinese, under the guise of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, had initiated research leading to the development of nuclear weapons. The decision to develop an independent strategic nuclear force was made no later than early 1956 and was to be implemented within the Twelve-Year Science Plan presented in September 1956 to the Eighth Congress of the CCP. The decision to enter into a development program designed to produce nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems was, in large part, a function of the 1953 technology transfer agreements initiated with the USSR.

In 1951 Peking signed a secret agreement with Moscow through which China provided uranium ores in exchange for Soviet assistance in the nuclear field. In mid-October 1957 the Chinese and Soviets signed an agreement on new technology for national defense that included provision for additional Soviet nuclear assistance as well as the furnishing of some surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. The USSR also agreed to supply a sample atomic bomb and to provide technical assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Soviets provided the Chinese with assistance in building a major gaseous diffusion facility for production of enriched uranium. Subsequently the Chinese accused Moscow of having abrogated this agreement in 1959, and having "refused to supply a simple atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture."

China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with substantial Soviet assistance. Before 1960 direct Soviet military assistance had included the provision of advisors and a vast variety of equipment. Of the assistance provided, most significant to China's future strategic nuclear capability were an experimental nuclear reactor, facilities for processing uranium, a cyclotron, and some equipment for a gaseous diffusions plant.

 

[intelarpit]

Allright, I am sick of Chinese trolling on Indian defense section over how India received help in weapons from foreign countries and China has home grown arsenal. Here is a reality check over China's "indigenous" Missiles and Reactors.

Chinese Missiles: Threat and Capability

Very well said..Truth should be known to everyone

 

[Speeder 2]

^^ Here is more detailed report

It's nothing. Your troll post is pathetic nevertheless.

No one denies that China received Soviet's assistance such as weapon-grade uranium, etc. after WWII at early 1950s.

However, China's first N bomb took place in October 1964 mainly due to a group of Chinese scientists such as Qian, etc., while China and Soviet split at 1960 - 1962!

 

[imran iqbal]

TIME.com - 5/25/99: The Cox Report

The Peopleís Republic of China (PRC) has stolen classified information on all of the United Statesí most advanced thermonuclear warheads, and several of the associated reentry vehicles. These thefts are the result of an intelligence collection program spanning two decades, and continuing to the present. The PRC intelligence collection program included espionage, review of unclassified publications, and extensive interactions with scientists from the Department of Energyís national weapons laboratories.

The stolen U.S. secrets have helped the PRC fabricate and successfully test modern strategic thermonuclear weapons. The stolen information includes classified information on seven U.S. thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal. Together, these include the W-88 Trident D-5 thermonuclear warhead, and the W-56 Minuteman II, the W-62 Minuteman III, the W-70 Lance, the W-76 Trident C-4, the W-78 Minuteman III Mark 12A, and the W-87 Peacekeeper thermonuclear warheads. The stolen information also includes classified design information for an enhanced radiation weapon (commonly known as the "neutron bomb"), which neither the United States, nor any other nation, has ever deployed.

In addition, in the mid-1990s the PRC stole from a U.S. national weapons laboratory classified U.S. thermonuclear weapons information that cannot be identified in this unclassified Report. Because this recent espionage case is currently under investigation and involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods, the Clinton administration has determined that further information cannot be made public.

The W-88 is a miniaturized, tapered thermonuclear warhead. It is the United Statesí most sophisticated strategic thermonuclear weapon. In the U.S. arsenal, the W-88 warhead is mated to the D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile carried aboard the Trident nuclear submarine. The United States learned about the theft of the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead information, as well as about the theft of information regarding several other thermonuclear weapons, in 1995.

On two occasions, the PRC has stolen classified U.S. information about neutron warheads from a U.S. national weapons laboratory. The United States learned of these thefts of classified information on the neutron bomb in 1996 and in the late 1970s, when the first theft -- including design information on the W-70 warhead -- occurred. The W-70 warhead contains elements that may be used either as a strategic thermonuclear weapon, or as an enhanced radiation weapon ("neutron bomb"). The PRC subsequently tested the neutron bomb. The U.S. has never deployed a neutron weapon.

In addition, the Select Committee is aware of other PRC thefts of U.S. thermonuclear weapons-related secrets. The Clinton administration has determined that further information about these thefts cannot be publicly disclosed.

The Select Committee judges that the PRC will exploit elements of the stolen U.S. design information for the development of the PRCís new generation strategic thermonuclear warheads. Current PRC silo-based missiles were designed for large, multi-megaton thermonuclear warheads roughly equivalent to U.S. warheads of the late 1950s. The PRC plans to supplement these silo-based missiles with smaller, modern mobile missiles that require smaller warheads. The PRC has three mobile ICBM programs currently underway ñ two road-mobile and one submarine launched program ñ all of which will be able to strike the United States.

The first of these new Peopleís Liberation Army (PLA) mobile ICBMs, the DF-31, may be tested in 1999 and could be deployed as soon as 2002. The DF-31 ICBM and the PRCís other new generation mobile ICBMs will require smaller, more compact warheads. The stolen U.S. information on the W-70 or W-88 Trident D-5 will be useful for this purpose.

The PRC has the infrastructure and technical ability to use elements of the stolen U.S. warhead design information in the PLAís next generation of thermonuclear weapons. If the PRC attempted to deploy an exact replica of the U.S. W-88 Trident D-5 warhead, it would face considerable technical challenges. However, the PRC could build modern thermonuclear warheads based on stolen U.S. design information, including the stolen W-88 design information, using processes similar to those developed or available in a modern aerospace or precision guided munitions industry. The Select Committee judges that the PRC has such infrastructure and is capable of producing small thermonuclear warheads based on the stolen U.S. design information, including the stolen W-88 information.

The Select Committee judges that the PRC is likely to continue its work on advanced thermonuclear weapons based on the stolen U.S. design information. The PRC could begin serial production of advanced thermonuclear weapons based on stolen U.S. design information during the next decade in connection with the development of its new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Select Committee judges that the PRCís acquisition of U.S. classified information regarding thermonuclear warhead designs from the Department of Energyís national weapons laboratories saved the PRC years of effort and resources, and helped the PRC in its efforts to fabricate and successfully test a new generation of thermonuclear warheads. The PRCís access to, and use of, classified U.S. information does not immediately alter the strategic balance between the U.S. and PRC. Once the PRCís small, mobile strategic ballistic missiles are deployed, however, they will be far more difficult to locate than the PRCís current silo-based missiles. This will make the PRCís strategic nuclear force more survivable. Small, modern nuclear warheads also enable the PRC to deploy multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs or MIRVs, multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles) on its ICBMs should it choose to do so.

The PRCís collection of intelligence on smaller U.S. thermonuclear warheads began in the 1970s, when the PRC recognized its weaknesses in physics and the deteriorating status of its nuclear weapons programs. The Select Committee judges that the PRCís intelligence collection efforts to develop modern thermonuclear warheads are focused primarily on the U.S. Department of Energyís National Laboratories at:

* Los Alamos
* Lawrence Livermore
* Oak Ridge
* Sandia

The FBI has investigated a number of U.S. National Laboratory employees in connection with suspected espionage.

The Select Committee judges that the U.S. national weapons laboratories have been and are targeted by PRC espionage, and almost certainly remain penetrated by the PRC today.

The United States did not become fully aware of the magnitude of the counterintelligence problem at Department of Energy national weapons laboratories until 1995. A series of PRC nuclear weapons test explosions from 1992 to 1996 began a debate in the U.S. Government about whether the PRCís designs for its new generation of nuclear warheads were in fact based on stolen U.S. classified information. The apparent purpose of these PRC tests was to develop smaller, lighter thermonuclear warheads, with an increased yield-to-weight ratio. In 1995, a "walk-in" approached the Central Intelligence Agency outside the PRC and provided an official PRC document classified "Secret" that contained specific design information on the W-88 Trident D-5, and technical information on other thermonuclear warheads. The CIA later determined that the "walk-in" was directed by the PRC intelligence services. Nonetheless, CIA and other Intelligence Community analysts that reviewed the document concluded that it contained U.S. warhead design information.

The National Security Advisor was briefed on PRC thefts of classified U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information in April 1996 (when he was the Deputy National Security Advisor), and again in August 1997. In response to specific interrogatories from the Select Committee, the National Security Advisor informed the Select Committee that the President was not briefed about the issue and the long-term counterintelligence problems at the Department of Energy until early 1998. The Secretary of Energy was briefed about the matter in late 1995 and early 1996. At the writing of this report, the Secretary of Defense has been briefed, but not the Secretaries of State and Commerce.

Congress was not provided adequate briefings on the extent of the PRCís espionage program.

Under Presidential Decision Directive 61 issued in February 1998, the Department of Energy was required to implement improved counterintelligence measures. In December 1998, the Department of Energy began to implement a series of recommended improvements to its counterintelligence program approved by Secretary Richardson in November 1998. Based on testimony by the new head of the Department of Energyís counterintelligence program, the unsuccessful history of previous counterintelligence programs at the Department of Energy, and other information that is not publicly available, the Select Committee judges that the new counterintelligence program at the Department of Energy will not be even minimally effective until at least the year 2000.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and continuing today, Russia is cooperating with the PRC in numerous military and civilian programs, including the PRCís civilian nuclear program. The Select Committee is concerned about the possibility of cooperation between Russia and the PRC on nuclear weapons. The Select Committee judges that Russian nuclear weapons testing technology and experience could significantly assist the PRCís nuclear weapons program, including the PRCís exploitation of stolen U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information. This is especially true if the PRC complies with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which does not permit the physical testing of nuclear weapons.

The Peopleís Republic of Chinaís penetration of our national weapons laboratories spans at least the past several decades, and almost certainly continues today.

The PRCís nuclear weapons intelligence collection efforts began after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, when the PRC assessed its weaknesses in physics and the deteriorating status of its nuclear weapons programs.

The PRCís warhead designs of the late 1970s were large, multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons that could only be carried on large ballistic missiles and aircraft. The PRCís warheads were roughly equivalent to U.S. warheads designed in the 1950s. The PRC may have decided as early as that time to pursue more advanced thermonuclear warheads for its new generation of ballistic missiles.

The PRCís twenty-year intelligence collection effort against the U.S. has been aimed at this goal. The PRC employs a "mosaic" approach that capitalizes on the collection of small bits of information by a large number of individuals, whic h is then pieced together in the PRC. This information is obtained through espionage, rigorous review of U.S. unclassified technical and academic publications, and extensive interaction with U.S. scientists and Department of Energy laboratories.

The Select Committee judges that the PRCís intelligence collection efforts to develop modern thermonuclear warheads are focused primarily on the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories.

As a result of these efforts, the PRC has stolen classified U.S. thermonuclear design information that helped it fabricate and successfully test a new generation of strategic warheads.

The PRC stole classified information on every currently deployed U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The warheads for which the PRC stole classified information include: the W-56 Minuteman II ICBM; the W-62 Minuteman III ICBM; the W-70 Lance short-range ballistic missile (SRBM); the W-76 Trident C-4 SLBM; the W-78 Minuteman III Mark 12A ICBM; the W-87 Peacekeeper ICBM; and the W-88 Trident D-5 SLBM. The W-88 warhead is the most sophisticated strategic nuclear warhead in the U.S. arsenal. It is deployed on the Trident D-5 submarine-launched missile.

In addition, in the mid-1990s the PRC stole from a U.S. national weapons laboratory classified U.S. thermonuclear weapons information that cannot be identified in this unclassified Report. Because this recent espionage case is currently under inve stigation and involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods, the Clinton administration has determined that further information may not be made public.

The PRC also stole classified information on U.S. weapons design concepts, on weaponization features, and on warhead reentry vehicles (the hardened shell that protects a warhead during reentry).

The PRC may have acquired detailed documents and blueprints from the U.S. national weapons laboratories.

The U.S. Intelligence Community reported in 1996 that the PRC stole neutron bomb technology from a U.S. national weapons laboratory. The PRC had previously stolen design information on the U.S. W-70 warhead in the late 1970s; that earlier theft, w hich included design information, was discovered several months after it took place. The W-70 has elements that can be used as a strategic thermonuclear warhead or an enhanced radiation ("neutron bomb") warhead. Following the initial theft of W-70 design information, the PRC tested a neutron bomb in 1988.

Classified U.S. Nuclear Weapons Information Acquired by the PRC

Designation Design Laboratory Weapon Platform

W-88 Los Alamos Trident D-5 SLBM

W-87 Lawrence Livermore Peacekeeper/M-X ICBM

W-78 Los Alamos Minuteman III Mark 12A ICBM

W-76 Los Alamos Trident C-4 SLBM

W-70 Lawrence Livermore Lance SRBM

W-62 Lawrence Livermore Minuteman III ICBM

W-56 Lawrence Livermore Minuteman II ICBM

The PRC may have also acquired classified U.S. nuclear weapons computer codes from U.S. national weapons laboratories. The Select Committee believes that nuclear weapons computer codes remain a key target for PRC espionage. Nuclear weapons codes are important for understanding the workings of nuclear weapons and can assist in weapon design, maintenance, and adaptation. The PRC could make use of this information, for example, to adapt stolen U.S. thermonuclear design information to meet the PRCís particular needs and capabilities.

During the mid-1990s, it was learned that the PRC had acquired U.S. technical information about insensitive high explosives. Insensitive high explosives are a component of certain thermonuclear weapons. Insensitive high explosives are less energet ic than high explosives used in some other thermonuclear warheads, but have advantages for other purposes, such as thermonuclear warheads used on mobile missiles.

The PRC thefts from our national weapons laboratories began at least as early as the late 1970s, and significant secrets are known to have been stolen as recently as the mid-1990s. Such thefts almost certainly continue to the present.

The Clinton administration has determined that additional information about PRC thefts included in this section of the Select Committeeís Report cannot be publicly disclosed.

The PRCís Next Generation Nuclear Warheads

The PRC has acquired U.S. nuclear weapons design information that could be utilized in developing the PRCís next generation of modern thermonuclear warheads.

The Department of Energy identifies two general design paths to the development of modern thermonuclear warheads:

* The first path, which apparently has been followed by the Russians, emphasizes simplicity and reliability in design
* The second path, which the U.S. has taken, utilizes innovative designs and lighter-weight warheads

The Select Committee judges that the combination of the PRCís preference for U.S. designs, the PRCís theft of design information on our most advanced thermonuclear warheads, and the PRCís demand for small, modern warheads for its new generation of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles will result in the PRC emulating the U.S. design path to develop its next generation of thermonuclear warheads.

The PRC has already begun working on smaller thermonuclear warheads. During the l990s, the PRC was working to complete testing of its modern thermonuclear weapons before it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.1 The PRC conducted a se ries of nuclear tests from 1992 to 1996. Based on what is known about PRC nuclear testing practices, combined with data on PRC warhead yield and on PRC missile development, it is clear that the purpose of the 1992 to 1996 test series was to develop small , light warheads for the PRCís new nuclear forces.2

These tests led to suspicions in the U.S. Intelligence Community that the PRC had stolen advanced U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information. These suspicions were definitely confirmed by the "walk-in" information received in 1995.

The Select Committee judges that the PRC is developing for its next generation of road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles smaller, more compact thermonuclear warheads that exploit elements of stolen U.S. design information, including the st olen design information from the U.S. W-70 Lance warhead or the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead.

The following graph shows an unclassified history of the PRCís thermonuclear weapons development and its acquisition of classified information from the United States.

Completing the development of its next-generation warhead poses challenges for the PRC. The PRC may not currently be able to match precisely the exact explosive power and other features of U.S. weapons. Nonetheless, the PRC may be working toward this goal, and the difficulties it faces are surmountable. Work-arounds exist, using processes similar to those developed or available in a modern aerospace or precision-guided munitions industry. The PRC possesses these capabilities already.

The Impact of the PRCís Theft of U.S. Thermonuclear Warhead Design Information

Mobile and Submarine-Launched Missiles

The main application of the stolen U.S. thermonuclear warhead information will likely be to the PRCís next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The PRC is developing several new, solid-propellant, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. These include both road-mobile and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Road-mobile ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles require smaller, more advanced thermonuclear warheads. The Select Committee judges it is likely that the PRC will use a new, smaller thermonuclear warhead on its next generat ion road-mobile, solid-propellant ICBM, the DF-31.

The DF-31 is likely to undergo its first test flight in 1999, and could be deployed as early as 2002. Introduction of the PRCís new, smaller thermonuclear warhead into PLA service could coincide with the initial operational capability of the new r oad-mobile DF-31 ballistic missile system.

The Select Committee judges that the PRCís thermonuclear warheads will exploit elements of the U.S. W-70 Lance or W-88 Trident D-5 warheads. While the PRC might not reproduce exact replicas of these U.S. thermonuclear warheads, elements of the PRC ís devices could be similar.

Acceleration of PRC Weapons Development

The PRCís theft of classified U.S. weapons design information saved the PRC years of effort and resources in developing its new generation of modern thermonuclear warheads. It provided the PRC with access to design information that worked and was within the PRCís ability to both develop and test. And it saved the PRC from making mistakes or from pursuing blind alleys.

The loss of design information from the Department of Energyís national weapons laboratories helped the PRC in its efforts to fabricate and successfully test its next generation of nuclear weapons designs. These warheads give the PRC small, modern thermonuclear warheads roughly equivalent to current U.S. warhead yields.

Assessing the extent to which design information losses accelerated the PRCís nuclear weapons development is complicated because so much is unknown. The full extent of U.S. information that the PRC acquired and the sophistication of the PRCís indi genous design capabilities are unclear. Moreover, there is the possibility of third country assistance to the PRCís nuclear weapons program, which could also assist the PRCís exploitation of the stolen U.S. nuclear weapons information. Nonetheless, it i s patent that the PRC has stolen significant classified U.S. design information on our most modern thermonuclear warheads.

While it is sometimes argued that eventually the PRC might have been able to produce and test an advanced and modern thermonuclear weapon on its own, the PRC had conducted only 45 nuclear tests in the more than 30 years from 1964 to 1996 (when the PRC signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), which would have been insufficient for the PRC to have developed advanced thermonuclear warheads on its own. This compares to the approximately 1,030 tests by the United States, 715 tests by the Soviet Union , and 210 by France.3

The following illustrates the evolution of smaller U.S. warheads.4

Effect on PRC Nuclear Doctrine

Deploying new thermonuclear weapons provides the PRC with additional doctrinal and operational options for its strategic forces that, if exercised, would be troublesome for the United States.

Smaller, more efficient thermonuclear warheads would provide the PRC with the opportunity to develop and deploy a multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) should it decide to do so. These smaller designs would allow the use of ligh ter and faster reentry vehicles that may be better able to stress and to overcome ballistic missile defenses.

The PRC has expressed considerable opposition to U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defenses.

Other advantages of increased warhead yield-to-weight ratios include extended missile ranges and accuracy improvements. Smaller warheads result in a more compact missile payload, extending the range of ballistic missiles. This permits the use of smaller-diameter sea-launched ballistic missiles and mobile missiles to strike long-range targets. Longer range could enable PRC ballistic missile submarines to strike the U.S. from within PRC waters, where they can operate safely.

Multiple Warhead Development

The deployment of multiple warheads on a single missile requires smaller warheads that the PRC has not possessed.

The Select Committee has no information on whether the PRC currently intends to develop and deploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle systems. However, the Select Committee is aware of reports that the PRC has undertaken efforts rel ated to multiple warhead technology.

Experts believe that the PRC currently has the technical capability to develop and deploy silo-based ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) and multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Experts also agree that t he PRC could develop and deploy its new generation of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles with MRVs or MIRVs within a short period of years after a decision to do so, and consistent with the presumed timeframe for its planned deployment of its next -generation intercontinental ballistic missiles.

 

[imran iqbal]

China's Ballistic Missiles Update - 1999

China's missile program has long benefitted from the acquisition of foreign technology and know-how. One important source of that help has been the United States. A select committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, chaired by Representative Christopher Cox, recently issued a 700-page classified report which concluded that China has obtained sensitive American military technology over the past 20 years. One of the main issues before the Committee was whether US missile technology was transferred to China as part of the satellite launch contracts of Hughes Electronics and Loral Space and Communications.

An investigation of Hughes by the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency and National Air Intelligence Center determined that the company directly aided China's rocket program when it collaborated with Chinese engineers to assess the causes of the 1995 failed launch of the Apstar II satellite. This help included the provision of specific details on modifying the fairing design and launch operations of Chinese rockets to improve their performance. It also included insight into US diagnostic techniques that would allow Beijing's engineers to detect flaws in launch vehicles, whether they were used to launch satellites or missiles. This insight was sufficient to help the Chinese to perform more accurate Coupled Loads Analysis and to improve the Chinese Finite Elements Model.

Outside help may also contribute to the Chinese capability to develop MIRV technology. It has been reported that several Chinese engineers were arrested for trying to steal SS-18 blueprints from the Yuzhnoye missile plant in Ukraine in the summer of 1996. The two-stage SS-18 can deliver up to 10 reentry vehicles, so acquisition of SS-18 technology could help China resolve its remaining hurdles to achieving MIRV capability.

The United States may also be helping China in its attempt to develop MIRV capability. According to the Washington Times, in an article citing a secret report by the Air Force National Intelligence Center, China's new rocket stage developed for a Motorola Iridium satellite created a "technology bridge" that could help China deploy multiple warheads on missiles. The new Chinese rocket booster, called a "smart dispenser" was built in 1996 for the Long March 2C/SD rocket. The dispenser has its own solid and liquid fuel propulsion, avionics and guidance package, and communications that could provide China with maneuvering capabilities "not previously available with past Chinese space launch vehicles." The Air Force report noted that with a few minor modifications, the dispenser could "easily become a credible post-boost vehicle." Air Force intelligence analysts estimated the dispenser could be used on CSS-4 (DF-5) ICBMs or on the new DF-41 missile.

 

[imran iqbal]

http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/editorials/2000/outfittingchina.html

Just over two months ago, CATIC, the Chinese military and aviation giant, was indicted for diverting American machine tools to a Chinese cruise missile and military aircraft plant. The powerful machines had produced parts for the B-1 strategic bomber and the MX nuclear missile, and CATIC was charged with lying to get the machines out of the U.S. in 1995 by promising to restrict them to civilian use.

Yet with the ink barely dry on the indictment, the Clinton administration has begun to undermine it. According to U.S. officials, the Commerce Department wants to allow one of CATIC's sister companies to buy the same kind of American machine tool that CATIC is accused of diverting. "Even in the face of an indictment," said one government official familiar with the case, "there is no behavior change. It is still business as usual." If the deal goes through, it will show that there are no real limits on high-tech exports to China.

The export in question is a five-axis milling machine, a computer-controlled marvel similar to the machines listed in CATIC's indictment. It is capable of making high-precision parts for China's next generation of fighters, bombers and missiles.

A company in Milford, Mass., named Bostomatic has requested permission to sell the machine to China's Xian Aero Engine Co., which makes engines for China's military aircraft, including the nuclear-capable H-6 strategic bomber. Bostomatic was purchased last year by the Agie Charmilles Group, a Swiss concern. And in January 1999, Gen. Alexander Zdanovich, a spokesman for Russia's foreign intelligence services, said that Agie also had supplied Iran with equipment for making liquid-fueled ballistic missiles.

Why does the Commerce Department want to allow a suspect Swiss conglomerate to sell a sensitive American product to a Chinese military aircraft plant? The Commerce Department is supposed to protect the American public from such risks but, instead, is trying to promote trade no matter what the cost to national security.

The Pentagon is fighting the export license. The same officials who tried to block the export of the machines that CATIC diverted in 1995 are objecting to this one. The officials were right the last time, but got overruled. Xian Aero Engine is pledging to use the milling machine only to make civilian aircraft. That is what CATIC promised. Since Xian and CATIC are part of the same state-owned organization, no one should be fooled.

Nor should anyone be fooled by the CATIC indictment. It took more than four years for the Justice Department to get around to it, and Justice is dragging its feet in a string of other apparently illegal exports of U.S. high technology.

In 1996, Silicon Graphics Inc. of Mountain View, Calif., sold four supercomputers to one of Russia's leading nuclear weapon laboratories without the required export license. The U.S. computers were 10 times more powerful than anything the Russians had. After the deal was done, Russia's nuclear chief told the press that Russia would start designing its warheads with simulated explosions using the American computers. There is considerable evidence that Silicon Graphics broke the law. It knew it needed a U.S. export license and did not get one. The case was sent to a a federal grand jury in 1997, where it has languished.

Also in 1996, Silicon Graphics sold a powerful supercomputer to China's Academy of Sciences, which develops nuclear warheads and long-range missiles

The Cox committee on Chinese spying found that Hughes Electronics and Loral Space and Communications, two big American satellite makers, "deliberately acted without the legally required licenses and violated U.S. export control laws" when they helped China improve its rockets in 1995 and 1996. To boost their profits, these U.S. firms gave China technology that could, in the committee's words, increase "the reliability of all PRC ballistic missiles." A federal grand jury has had these cases for more than a year and a half.

The message from these cases is the same: Get the exports out, and don't worry about the law. The Justice Department probably won't indict you, and even if it does, the Commerce Department will help you get what you need.

 

[RiazHaq]

There is plenty of evidence and documentation from sources such as the Wisconsin Project to show that the Indian missiles and bombs are no more indigenous than Pakistan's. The fact is that neither India nor Pakistan were first to split the atom, or to develop modern rocket science. The Industrial Revolution didn't exactly start in India or Pakistan or China, or even in Asia; it began in Europe and the rest of the world learned from it, even copied it.

Haq's Musings: India's "Indigenous" Copies of Foreign Nukes, Missiles

 

[vision+]

There is plenty of evidence and documentation from sources such as the Wisconsin Project to show that the Indian missiles and bombs are no more indigenous than Pakistan's. The fact is that neither India nor Pakistan were first to split the atom, or to develop modern rocket science. The Industrial Revolution didn't exactly start in India or Pakistan or China, or even in Asia; it began in Europe and the rest of the world learned from it, even copied it.

Haq's Musings: India's "Indigenous" Copies of Foreign Nukes, Missiles

Why are you spamming the thread. Is it about India or Pakistan?

 

[gpit]

It's nothing. Your troll post is pathetic nevertheless.

No one denies that China received Soviet's assistance such as weapon-grade uranium, etc. after WWII at early 1950s.

However, China's first N bomb took place in October 1964 mainly due to a group of Chinese scientists such as Qian, etc., while China and Soviet split at 1960 - 1962!

One correction, Bro. Qian is not involved in nukes. He himself confirmed that. He's a purely missile guy.

 

[gpit]

Guys, nothing is new in so many posts from Wisconsin org. Everything is well know.

China received some Soviet help in missile and nuke technologies, no question about it. But Soviet withdrew their support in early 1960’s, because the Chinese refused to yield to Soviet bull$hit, unlike India who keeps accepting Russia B$ such as 2 billion more charges.

It is hundreds of Western trained, world-renowned Chinese scholars, who answered the call of motherland, combined with local genius and trained yet tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of young Chinese to keep the projects going on and succeeding.

If India had so many hundreds of world-renowned scholars, who dared to ditch their good life in West and return India to contribute to the motherland, India would perhaps be in the same league as China is today.

A cruel reality for India is that majority of your trained people seem like to stay in West and enjoy the infrastructure of West.

That is a big difference.

 

[Raghu]

There is plenty of evidence and documentation from sources such as the Wisconsin Project to show that the Indian missiles and bombs are no more indigenous than Pakistan's. The fact is that neither India nor Pakistan were first to split the atom, or to develop modern rocket science. The Industrial Revolution didn't exactly start in India or Pakistan or China, or even in Asia; it began in Europe and the rest of the world learned from it, even copied it.

Haq's Musings: India's "Indigenous" Copies of Foreign Nukes, Missiles

Haven't u created separate thread for that ...Then overload it ere why??

Share ur information if u can about foreign assistance both over and covert received, by China to boost its nuclear and missile program.

 

[Speeder 2]

One correction, Bro. Qian is not involved in nukes. He himself confirmed that. He's a purely missile guy.

I know. But the fact remains that he was an official member of the Mahantten Project, which amazed me as well. Later I figured that probably he was consulting on the delivery system or sth...

Edit: China's first N bomb was mainly due to the contribution of other western-trained world-class nuclear physicists that China had. But only having nukes worths nothing. Unlike the n-bombs used in Japan delivered by bombers, the nukes in 60s onwards had to be combined with a precise, reliable and long-range delivery system to be far more effective - here came Qian.