For Holbrooke, Situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan Is 'Dim and Dismal'

[muse]

The Holbrooke visit
Najmuddin A Shaikh



In what has been an eventful week, there have been significant developments in the US-Pakistan dialogue, foremost being the visit of President Barack Obama’s special representative Richard Holbrooke. This visit may well set the stage for the further discussions and consequent actions that the two nations take to further their common interest in eliminating the terrorist threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi had a conversation with US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg in Munich, where, according to a State Department spokesperson, the latter sought assurances that the Pakistani government would take every step available to ensure that AQ Khan did not pose a proliferation risk.

In his press conference after his meeting with Holbrooke, Qureshi referred to this conversation with Steinberg and said that what he had told the secretary had been found reassuring. Other reports indicate that Holbrooke did not raise the issue during his meetings with the Pakistani leadership on February 9 and 10.

While there has been American involvement in the Mumbai investigations and frequent mention of the American lives lost in the attack, this subject was not brought up by the American special representative despite the fact that his tour of the region includes a visit to New Delhi and discussions with Indian officials.

There has also been a reiteration, if press reports of Holbrooke’s meetings with Pakistani leaders are correct, that the Obama administration would work to get the $1.5 billion annual economic assistance package for Pakistan passed through Congress; implement the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones project for the tribal areas; and meet the requirements — weapons and training — of the armed forces for counterinsurgency operations.

The blunt assertion by President Obama in his February 9 press conference that “there is no doubt that in the FATA region of Pakistan...there are safe havens where terrorists are operating”, and that “one of the goals of Ambassador Holbrooke...is to deliver a message to Pakistan that they are endangered as much as we are by the continuation of those operations, and that we’ve got to work in a regional fashion to root out those safe havens.”

He added reassuringly that “I believe that the new government of Pakistan...and Mr Zardari care deeply about getting control of this situation, and we want to be effective partners with them on that issue.” But he went on to deliver the veiled warning that ‘we have to make sure that Pakistan is a stalwart ally with us in battling this terrorist threat.”

Obama’s press conference was primarily designed to solicit support for the economic stimulus bill he had present to Congress, and get bipartisan support for its passage. He recounted the efforts he had made to garner Republican support and to set a new tone in Washington, but ended with what he called his bottom line: “I can’t afford to see Congress play the usual political games. What we have to do right now is deliver for the American people.”

Late on Wednesday, Obama got his bill, and he got it close to the figure he wanted. He made some compromises, but when he did not get bipartisan support beyond that of three Republican senators, his Democrat colleagues in Congress pushed it through.

We should perhaps perceive this as the Obama philosophy: establish a bottom line, keep an open mind, and be flexible in efforts to build a consensus if possible, but if that does not come about within a specified timeframe, be prepared to go it alone.

The bottom line for Obama in our region is the elimination of terrorist safe havens along the Pak-Afghan border, and he will go the extra mile to arrive at a regional consensus on how best to achieve this. If this consensus is not reached, he will go it alone.

We should also keep in mind that while the focus appears to be on Afghanistan, it is the fear of a destabilised Pakistan that is America’s worst nightmare. When Senator John Kerry made this point recently, he was not saying anything new: even before 9/11, then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage had talked of building a relationship with the people of Pakistan to prevent the ‘Talibanisation’ of Pakistan; and western intelligence agencies had maintained that every terrorist incident in the West traced back to Pakistan, specifically Peshawar, with only a rare onward connection to Afghanistan.

Lastly, perhaps most importantly, Pakistan’s internal situation is distressing, to say the least. No matter what gloss we place on it, we are near bankruptcy and desperately need the $5 billion assistance that our adviser on finance has spoken of. There are doubts about the army’s willingness to take on the insurgents in Swat and the tribal areas, but equally importantly, it appears ill trained and ill equipped to handle the task.

If terrorism and extremism are perceived as a common enemy and their elimination is in the interest of both the US and Pakistan, and if this is reflected in our actions, American assistance will be forthcoming in full measure. For the moment, this is not apparent to those reviewing US policy in the region. Too many of them share the belief of one noted analyst, who says:

“The top Pakistani army officers must end their obsession with bleeding India by using an Islamist strategic doctrine entailing support of jihadists...” and that “until firm action is taken against all such groups, and training camps are closed down, the slow collapse of the Pakistani state will continue, and with it the safety of Western interests in the region.”

A false belief; an exaggerated belief? Perhaps, but one that permeates thinking in Washington.

Holbrooke’s visit coincided with an article in the New York Times that highlighted once again the question of the existence of the Taliban Shura in Quetta, maintaining that, according to the Obama administration and military officials, from that city “Taliban leaders including Mullah Muhammad Omar, a reclusive, one-eyed cleric, guide commanders in southern Afghanistan, raise money from wealthy Persian Gulf donors and deliver guns and fresh fighters to the battlefield.”

The article maintains that American officials believe that sending 30,000 fresh American troops into Afghanistan could be a futile effort “unless there is a concerted effort to kill or capture Taliban leaders in Quetta and cut the group’s supply lines into Afghanistan.” It quotes an analyst as saying that “some elements of the Pakistani government continue to support the Taliban as a proxy organisation in Afghanistan.”

While it concedes that the importance of the Shura in determining the conduct of the Taliban in Afghanistan may be exaggerated, it makes what seems to be the most important point: the removal of the dozen or so Taliban leaders now sheltered in refugee camps or the Afghan neighbourhoods of Quetta would make possible overtures to the moderate Taliban.

This is the backdrop to the Holbrooke proposal that a Pakistani inter-agency task force led by our foreign minister should meet with a similar American taskforce to provide inputs for the ongoing review of America’s Afghan policy and to plot the future course of US-Pakistan relations. The focus will be on the principal goal — the elimination of terrorism and extremism — and to allow this focus to remain, the US will use its good offices to prevent the Mumbai issue from boiling over and will, despite the media hype, accept assurances with regard to AQ Khan.

The political forces of the country and the other centres of power must now get together and set a clear direction from which would also flow the mandate that our delegation will receive for this most important (and for the first time, civilian-dominated) dialogue. More on this direction and the mandate next week.

The writer is a former foreign secretary

 

[S-2]

"The political forces of the country and the other centres of power must now get together and set a clear direction from which would also flow the mandate that our delegation will receive for this most important (and for the first time, civilian-dominated) dialogue. More on this direction and the mandate next week."

Perhaps he's a hell of an actor but Mr. Shaikh's commentary had an absolute air of authority to his revelations.

Very valuable op-ed in my view.

I've long wrote at def.pk that it's clear your nation is in need of a nat'l dialogue here. It will be painful and might contribute to acerbating bad conditions to worse but seems absolutely imperative.

Mr. Shaikh's observations about B.O's decision-cycle were particularly salient. It remains to be seen just how true but they're premised soundly. If so, my expectation is we're going to do everything necessary to reverse this should we believe that Pakistan is on board.

I don't think that will change aid scrutiny. The issue is too known to avoid. That may be a good thing for everybody concerned. Proper oversight by both us and you should generate greater efficiencies per dollar and is demanded by our congress so we'll (and you) need their satisfaction.

We may not stop asking for you to "do more". Nor do we expect that you should silently absorb admonitions either undeserved nor equivocal to our own poor conduct. Still, there is the "red line" to which Mr. Shaikh alludes with B.O. If true, it suggests a point at which duplicity will fracture matters.

Nice find. I look forward to his commentary relative your nat'l dialogue. That should prove equally or better reading.

 

[muse]

The decision to be on board is a done deal for the government- it's how, that's the real problem. Essentially it's a political problem. Perhaps American friends will not understand this but in Pakistan evolving a consensus is costly ($$$) business and the PML-N have decided to be even more asertive. It's curious these Talib have threatened everybody and thei rmothers but not Nawaz.

 

[S-2]

"It's curious these Talib have threatened everybody and thei rmothers but not Nawaz."

Well, I was just now reminded of one thing and offered something altogether new upon which to speculate.

I'd forgotten about the ruling parliamentary coalition. Nawaz and Zardari aren't close personally, are they? Politics indeed makes for strange bedfellows.

I'd not thought of your militant/PML-N allusion and now wonder too.

Nice add.

 

[muse]

Dr. Saleem, also notes the coming fireworks, The delivery of "Victory", followed by Alvida, however; is he correct about Pakistan having no plan? or does he mean no agreement on a plan?




Superman + bulldozer



Sunday, February 15, 2009
Dr Farrukh Saleem

Petraeus was nicknamed 'Peaches' by his classmates at Cornwall Central High School. Petraeus was labeled 'Colonel Betrayus' by the soldiers of the 'Devil Brigade'. Petraeus is called 'Superman' by some of his partisans for his overreaching nature. Iraqis call him 'King David' for his "intellect, ego and ambition".

Holbrooke is simply the 'Balkans Bulldozer' for his "confrontational approach in bringing the warring leaders of Bosnia to the negotiating table". Holbrooke is also the only person on the face of the planet to have held the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Asia as well as Europe (under Jimmy Carter and then under Bill Clinton, respectively).

General David Howell Petraeus carries a big stick while Ambassador Richard Charles Albert Holbrooke has a large stock of carrots (albeit right behind his hydraulic, razor-sharp blade). Petraeus is Failure-in-Charge, First Imbecile, Furious George's gift to us while Holbrooke is Barack O'Change Obama's self-selected present to this blood-soaked theatre of war. Carrots and sticks is what the new ballgame is all about.

Superman is all sticks and Bulldozer is all carrots and that's double 'D' in action; deterrence and diplomacy. Superman has two jobs: One, to manage the upcoming Afghan troop surge. Two, to cut down Pakistan's leverage over the U.S. (by stitching-up alternative supply routes to NATO troops). Bulldozer must, at the same time, bulldoze Pakistan to submit to America's will and, second, keep India from distracting Pakistan.

Barack O'Change Obama has won on a platform of change but American foreign policy has never been about personalities; it has always been America's permanent interests as viewed by America's permanent institutions (the intelligentsia, the think-tank community, the media, the Pentagon, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Department of State and Defense).

Superman has to take America from just one combat brigade currently in Afghanistan to a total of four combat brigades before the year is out. Superman's exit strategy calls for a dialogue from a position of strength causing a split between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. But before that happens, Humvees need oil to roll and so do infantry fighting vehicles, cavalry fighting vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, A-10 Thunderbolts, B-1 strategic bombers and military transport aircraft. Superman has to feed some 60,000 GIs fresh food (A-ration), Tray ration or T-***, chocolate energy bars and mineral water.

Khyber and Chamman may be the least expensive and the most efficient routes but are neither safe nor secure. The western corridor through the Caspian will be awfully expensive. The northern corridor will be outrageously expensive and Russia has already put up a whole array of concessions. Superman has reportedly stuck deals with two Kazak-owned refineries, the Shymkent and the Atyrau refineries. Superman has also convinced Latvia to transport 100 containers a day through a 2,000-mile rail link to Afghanistan. Superman has also told the U.S. Institute of Peace--with Chabahar in mind--that the U.S. and Iran have "common objectives" in Afghanistan.

Remember, 'Henry the Kiss', the German-born, Jewish-American Nobel Peace Prize winner (some even refer to him as '*** Hungry')? Well, Barack O'Change Obama has secretly brought him back to sit down and covertly negotiate with the Russian Bear that's just coming out of its 20-year hibernation.

Once Superman has his additional combat brigades in place the real bloodbath will begin. To be certain, Islamabad has other priorities, not a plan in sight to plug the bloody spill over.

Pakistan beware; Superman, Bulldozer, *** Hungry and Chemical Bill (Ambassador William Wood in Afghanistan) are all eyeballing us. Honourable Superman and Respectable Bulldozer, welcome to the 'graveyard of empires'. Pakistan, welcome to little carrots and big sticks.

P.S. The idiom, 'carrot and stick', was first used in 1948 by The Economist when the magazine meant to imply an attempt in "trying to induce a donkey to move by alternately rewarding it with carrots and punishing it with a stick". Then there's 'carrot on a stick' whereby a carrot is tied to a long stick and then "dangled in front of a donkey, just out of its reach. As the donkey moves forward to get the carrot, it ends up pulling the cart but the carrot always remains out of reach."



The writer is the executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS). Email:farrukh15@hotmail.com

 

[maraetiny]

"The political forces of the country and the other centres of power must now get together and set a clear direction from which would also flow the mandate that our delegation will receive for this most important (and for the first time, civilian-dominated) dialogue. More on this direction and the mandate next week."

Perhaps he's a hell of an actor but Mr. Shaikh's commentary had an absolute air of authority to his relevations.

Very valuable op-ed in my view.

I've long wrote at def.pk that it's clear your nation is in need of a nat'l dialogue here. It will be painful and might contribute to acerbating bad conditions to worse but seems absolutely imperative.

Mr. Shaikh's observations about B.O's decision-cycle were particularly salient. It remains to be seen just how true but they're premised soundly. If so, my expectation is we're going to do everything necessary to reverse this should we believe that Pakistan is on board.

I don't think that will change aid scrutiny. The issue is too known to avoid. That may be a good thing for everybody concerned. Proper oversight by both us and you should generate greater efficiencies per dollar and is demanded by our congress so we'll (and you) need their satisfaction.

We may not stop asking for you to "do more". Nor do we expect that you should silently absorb admonitions either undeserved nor equivocal to our own poor conduct. Still, there is the "red line" to which Mr. Shaikh alludes with B.O. If true, it suggests a point at which duplicity will fracture matters.

Nice find. I look forward to his commentary relative your nat'l dialogue. That should prove equally or better reading.

S2, I totally agree with you. And if this indeed is the line of thinking of the Obama administration, it is a win-win situation for all

1. Pakistan gets the aid it desperately needs and the taliban destabilizing the country are gone.
2. US's WoT will see a lot of progress
3. Lastly there will be an end to terrorism in India originating from Pakistan soil and will help Pakistan in getting India off its back.

 

[muse]

Weird and Wonderous -- infotainment where is meaningless.



For Holbrooke, Pakistan 101
Sunday, February 15, 2009
Ghazi Salahuddin

Figuring out Pakistan in the context of its ground realities has never been easy. And what you decipher as ground realities can serve as loose pieces of coloured glass in a kaleidoscope. Turn it a little and the picture will completely change. Then, it becomes hard to explain or interpret a particular image. Try Swat. Or the pompous line-up of federal ministers in a cabinet meeting.

Well, President Obama's special envoy Richard Holbrooke was here for three nights this week for a crash course on the reality of Pakistan. He landed in Islamabad on Monday and said: "I am here to listen and learn the ground realities of this critically important country". This he sought to do in a breathtaking schedule of engagements. All his encounters, one can be sure, were carefully minuted by the staff that accompanied him.

But I wonder if he had time to look at the English dailies on three mornings that he spent in this country. It is fair to assume that these newspapers were available on his breakfast table and that he gave them a hurried look. This could be the basic course in his study of a "critically important country", some kind of Pakistan 101. (This, 101, is the number of the first, beginning-level, course on any subject at colleges and universities in the United States.)

Hence, reading my newspapers on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, I thought about the stories that may have caught Holbrooke's attention. After all, his capacity to grasp the details of a situation must be astounding, considering the reputation that he has as a diplomat and negotiator. It is not for nothing that one source in the US media called him the "diplomatic equivalent of a hydrogen bomb". Does this mean that his involvement with Pakistan-Afghanistan is going to be highly explosive?

At this initial stage, however, he has to do a quick recce of this treacherous region. The newspapers, when he had the hard copy, would obviously be a source of some information. Now, he may not have been distracted by editorials and opinion pieces because they reflect views that are very familiar and must have reverberated in his conversations with high functionaries, politicians and well-known analysts. He would, perhaps, be more interested in the news – including in items that are buried in the inside pages.

So, did he find this item headlined: "MPA claims he got fertilizers at gunpoint"? According to the report published on Wednesday, this admission was made in the Punjab Assembly and the excuse was the non-availability of fertilizers in his constituency. Reports about the bombing of girls' schools in Swat would not be surprising, considering that the number of such schools has come close to about 200. Ah, but there was this single-column headline: "Taliban torch boys' school in Swat".

Some reports may have intrigued him because they demand a certain perspective or background. For instance, take this short letter to the editor in this newspaper about the number of ministers in the Balochistan cabinet. It said: "Barring the doorman at the entrance to the provincial assembly, just about everyone is a minister".

In the same vein, someone not initiated into the mysteries of our bureaucratic government would find it hard to follow the significance of this headline: "Finance secretary yet to relinquish post". Yes, it is somewhat useful to read that "the finance division has seen changes at the top four times since the Pakistan People's Party came to power in March last year". Similarly, explanations would be required to grasp this latest reference to a running saga: "Farah Dogar case: plea dismissed".

Considering the importance of the status of women in a country, there was a report datelined Lahore: "'Unbelievable' violence against women". Its intro: "Violence against women in Punjab has risen to 'unbelievable levels' in the last months of 2008, according to a report issued by Aurat Foundation here on Tuesday". Figures have been quoted in this media study.

More scary in its implication was this Hamid Mir exclusive in this newspaper on Wednesday: "Taliban threaten attack on Islamabad". It said: "The local Taliban leadership has decided to send its fighters to Islamabad as a reaction to the operations in Darra Adamkhel and Swat Valley and in this regard chalking on the walls of Islamabad is already appearing, forcing the Islamabad administration to whitewash these messages quickly".

This Taliban story may be called speculative but Holbrooke may have noticed a three-column picture published on Tuesday, his first morning in this country. Without attempting to describe a chilling image, let me just reproduce its caption: "The picture, released by the Taliban, shows Polish geologist Piotr Stanczak before his beheading at an unknown location". On Wednesday, a report from Warsaw quoted Polish foreign minister's assertion that internal divisions within Pakistan's government hampered efforts to save the life of the hostage.

So much more can be gleaned from the English newspapers that Holbrooke could possibly read when in Pakistan. At one level, there were numerous reiterations of subjects and issues that have almost become the staple of our journalism. Political statements constitute a separate category. There are the usual crime stories, generally devoid of the necessary human angle. Also, the mandatory declarations by the government about what it wants to do. Just one example: "Govt considering to change Thana culture: PM".

As if to underline another major issue that Pakistan is sometimes identified with, there was this headline in a daily on Tuesday: "Man kills teenage sister over karo-kari". But the reporting of these matters is usually quite perfunctory and the stories are poorly drafted and displayed as if nothing shattering has happened when a man is persuaded to kill his own sister.

Finally, Holbrooke perhaps checked the reporting of his own engagements. He was obviously all over the media. In one instance, however, he made news for his visual absence from two news bulletins on the official television channel. I am not sure if he saw this report published in a daily on Wednesday: "PTV official suspended over 'mistake'".

The report, quoting inside sources, said that director news, PTV, was suspended from his position. Why? His "suspension occurred…in the background of crucial mistake that took place in the bulletins of 6 and 7 pm…Actually in these two bulletins some visuals of Richard Holbrooke's meeting with President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani were slipped". And the report added that "the presidency took serious notice of the gross mistake".

A "gross mistake"? Holbrooke may not have had time to judge the professional standards of the Pakistani media and whether it provides sufficient coverage to major events and issues with expert analyses and interpretations. But he should be told about the great photo opportunities that he provided for our rulers.



The writer is a staff member. Email: ghazi_salahuddin@hotmail.com

 

[muse]

The American way of war
Shahzad Chaudhry


Russell F Weigley’s "The American Way of War" is a historical record of all American wars till Vietnam, detailing the evolution of America’s strategy of war. Perhaps the most telling account of this evolution is the centrality of the ‘Strategy of Annihilation’ that Ulysses Grant’s General Sherman practiced in the civil war against General Robert Lee’s forces; terms like ‘torching’, ‘scorching’, and ‘smoking’ the earth and the countryside became part of the American military lexicon.

In recent times, former President Bush reminded us all that the US military will “smoke ‘em out”. We need to understand that this isn’t simple bravado, the American military actually believes in it.

The US military’s ‘Roboman’ is programmed into various modes of functioning; thus when applied in the role of initial employment, he is in the burn, break, kill, destroy mode — simply ‘kicking ***’.

After dominating the military scene begins the ‘Win the Hearts and Minds’ mode, and when in this form, trust him to actually believe in it: he shall build hospitals, schools and roads, cradle babies, and, of course, distribute cookies and chocolates.

Because of this combination of America’s dominating military presence and the accompanying development projects, the vanquished acquiesce to almost a submission. Relative peace ensues; the American military having conquered yet another piece of real estate.

Soon after, dissent among the populace begins to emerge, with the American mind entirely unable to understand what else a people could hope for. To cement gains and to ensure that the natives continue to live free from tyranny and evil, democracy as the ultimate antidote is put in place. Mostly an ‘out of station’ individual with significant American schooling is traced, briefed and enthroned to continue the American saga. The Americans beat retreat; a fast-food solution to another global irritant.

It is amazing how quickly the experiment fails, and another enigma, surreal to the American mind, haunts it: why does the world hate America?

Many find fault with the primitive, oriental mind and its lack of understanding of what the West offers in terms of freedom. That is also when missions have to be curtailed, and untimely exits executed. The follow-up has never been tasteful for the US: those that they wanted to win over intensified their hostility. Issues that endangered American interests in the first place returned with even greater ferocity.

Compare this to the British approach: they set their minds and their foot to a land, and ruled for centuries, leaving behind an enriched society, culture, systems of governance, infrastructure, and some astounding railways. They assiduously avoided the ‘break’, ‘burn’ and ‘kill’ syndrome at the outset, and travelled the route with patience, assimilating the local trends, culture, politics and ways, before formalising their presence in any shape. That in itself is instructive.

Imperialism in any shape and form cannot be condoned, but the above is to illustrate the monumental difference in approaches to imperialism by two global powers.

Fast-forward to Afghanistan and the American dilemma. A news report states that President Obama has suspended the transfer of more troops till the defence chiefs can state clearly the end-game that US is planning to achieve.

Perhaps the calculus will include American interests in Central Asia where the ‘stans’ are the arena for the current Great Game. The US, China and Russia are striving to establish their control over the political and economic potential of the region.

To further complicate the situation, India too has moved in with a base in Tajikistan, with the ability to support its agenda in Afghanistan. For the moment, such Indian presence complements American interests. Both are, however, riding the wrong horse: they tend to show faith in the Persian and Tajik belt, leaving out the much larger Pakhtun population out. This is a recipe for further instability.

Another American interest is to remain in the vicinity of the Sistan-Baluchistan province of Iran and continue to exert pressure on Iran. This will be enabled by the planned increase in military presence in southern Afghanistan.

But that will only be an intermediate objective for the US. This will have to be coupled with a parallel and expeditious determination of how the US wants to handle Iran in the future. It is thus likely that a mini-surge in Afghanistan will accompany a more sustained diplomatic engagement with Iran.

As this new Great Game unfolds, it becomes instructive to see how Pakistan is placed. Its stability will be a priority higher even than the pursuit of Al Qaeda. However, for the moment, Pakistan shall lie outside the grand American strategic design; their immediate objectives being the elimination of Al Qaeda and continued security of Pakistani nuclear assets.

For stability in Pakistan, conditions in Afghanistan must be improved through a pragmatic, realistic and inclusive political process, one that helps the moderate Afghan Taliban become part of the mainstream socio-political processes. A Pakhtun-dominated disposition in Afghanistan will encourage the Taliban to sever their linkages with Al Qaeda, and find a more promising existence. This will be key to any significant success in the American policy to pursue their longer term interests in West and Central Asia. By implication, one strategic correction in American policy will placate the Pakhtuns in the Pakistani tribal areas, who, with socio-economic support from Pakistan and the US, can find succour from their misery.

The American mind shall have to learn the British art of engagement with the native, permitting the majority Pakhtuns to run their government without imposing any novelties such as Jeffersonian democracy.

Freedom to the Afghan is precious — on that the Americans need not consternate; their only serious concern should be to learn to coexist with the Afghan disposition without overt interference and with discreet presence.

Pak-Afghan stability is also linked to bit part players like India to closing shop in Afghanistan. Given all else is achieved, this may remain as the only irritant.

A ‘Strategy of Intelligent Engagement’ may be the newest way America needs to fight her future wars. It is time to revise the American way of war.

The writer is a retired air vice marshal of the Pakistan Air Force and a former ambassador. He can be contacted at shahzad.a.chaudhry@gmail.com