FLASH: ADMIRAL MULLEN

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Well the Hindutva *** kissing trolls is a given - but these others OoE, Deltacamelately, Shek, S-2, Zraver - I use to think that these people had a measure of honor in the sense that could help peole understand the issues better - I was absolutely disappointed that that for the most part, no tonly are they ignorant but also just a bunch of bigots.

Anyway - I don't think these need interaction, just can't believe Matt and Ira would let that happen to that board.

I realize that this is completely off topic - but I would still argue that the atmosphere that one is surrounded in skews perceptions and views.

Religious and cultural views aside, I think the problem you see (and I saw) in many of the 'professionals' is the same problem we see in US policy currently.

I am generalizing but, military men know how to wage war, they know how to win battles - long term geo-strategy and geo-politics is not necessarily at the top of the list.

They see Afghanistan, and US problems in Afghanistan, conclude Pakistan is not doing as much as it should, and the mindset that has trained them for victory in the battlefield will prompt the responses you see.

Where I would butt heads with them was always over the point that US policy was not serving long term goals of 'winning hearts and minds', nor getting the people behind the effort, nor looking at the issue from a regional perspective that addressed the concerns of all stakeholders.

This was always countered by "pakistan needs to do more" - as military men, their current priority is winning militarily in Afghanistan, and therefore the more nuanced and comprehensive approach I believe just doesn't play a part, and Pakistan's approach (which hasn't been really much either for a long time, though it is improving) is looked at as part of the problem, in terms of short term tactical goals.

 

[muse]

That's the ignorance I was talking about - it's as if they think problems can be resolved simply by demanding their solution. Of course as long as Pakistani interests are in jeopardy it makes it difficult to proceed and I am now convinced U.S/Nato is not a solution. After the Afghan jihad the U.S left Afghanistan and it's social problems to us, that along with our own social problems and compulsions led into even more trouble.

The larger problem of course is this GWOT - it simply has got to end or to evolve in to something smarter - and I realize that if it ends it can mean a problem for us, but right now the effects of the cure is worse than those of the disease.

And the sheer numbers of players - it's a giant mess. I was speaking with a local Afghan and he was telling me about weddings and happiness in a area near Angoor adda - that there is not a family who has not lost at least one dear one and that even weddings have become events that one cannot get past the sadness -- belive me there are, especially Nato but also some US personnel who get it, that this thing is going south by the day - and you will see some innovative ideas that are being tried out in Iraq make their way to the other side.

But so long as U.S is wedded to karzai and NA, this effort is going nowhere, there are a million displaced Pashtun in the North East, have you ever heard about them?? How are they supposed to feel about that in their own country? How is the majority supposed to feel about being number 2 or 3 in their own country? As long as the $$ flow, for th most part peole will see their self interest, but the place needs stability and narmalcy on it's own terms and not some Western liberal dispensations - not because they are inherently bad or abything like that, but because it is alien, on ce the novelty part wears out, people yearn for the familiar and that is a mostly tribal culture that really wants a chance to make some money and be left alone, especially from cultural influences they are not comfortable with.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I should add one last thing - some of them in private exhibit a more nuanced view than they do on the forum.

 

[Neo]

US official makes public demand for reforming ISI​

By Anwar Iqbal

WASHINGTON, Sept 16: A proposal for reforming the ISI – now publicly articulated by a senior US official – was discussed thoroughly between Pakistani and American authorities during Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s visit to Washington in July.

CIA chief Michael V. Hayden had an exclusive meeting with the prime minister during his visit, presenting him with a “charge-sheet” on the spy agency’s alleged involvement in jihadi activities.

Later, in an interview to Washington Times, Mr Gilani said that CIA deputy director Stephen R. Kappes and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael G. Mullen visited Islamabad in mid-July with reports of some ISI officials’ alleged links with the militants.

And on Monday, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Richard Boucher said at a private luncheon in Washington that the controversial spy agency needed reform but there’s no indication this was happening.

“It has to be done,” said Mr Boucher in his speech at the Thomson Reuters Bureau. Asked if he had seen signs of reform, he told Reuters: “No, I don’t have anything in particular I would point to right now.”

Asked why the new Pakistani government was more likely to act than its predecessor, Mr Boucher replied: “It’s sad to say, but the problem has become more and more acute.”

Mr Boucher warned that “as long as you have organisations, or pieces of organisations, that work in different directions, then it’s harder for the government to accomplish the goal” of defeating terrorists based in the tribal region and elsewhere in Pakistan.

According to diplomatic sources here, the United Stats is trying to work out an arrangement with Pakistan for curtailing ISI’s power.

Under this new arrangement, the ISI wing which deals with internal security is to be transferred to the interior ministry and the agency is to be asked to reduce its role in the war on terror.

The US administration believes that this arrangement should be acceptable to the new civilian government in Islamabad as well because it can end the agency’s interference in Pakistan’s domestic politics and thus prevent future military takeovers.

Taking away the authority to deal with the militants, a power the ISI has enjoyed since the Afghan war, could help the United States meet its goal of severing the agency’s alleged links to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

When the proposal was first discussed with Pakistan’s civilian government, they were not sure they could accomplish this task. They felt that the civilians were still too weak to take on the ISI.

Mr Boucher’s decision to go public with a demand so far discussed privately between the two governments, however, is an attempt to tell the civilians that Washington expects them to act now.

It is also linked to Washington’s decision to increase the heat on the militants and is part of the same policy that has led to renewed US military actions against militant hideouts in Fata.

The Americans feel that while Pakistan’s civilian government may not have been strong enough to take on the ISI when the prime minister visited Washington in July, it is now. They believe that Asif Ali Zardari’s thumping victory in the presidential elections earlier this month has created a civilian set-up in Islamabad which has all the powers it needs to reform the ISI.

 

[Neo]

I should add one last thing - some of them in private exhibit a more nuanced view than they do on the forum.

I second that.

 

[blain2]

I should add one last thing - some of them in private exhibit a more nuanced view than they do on the forum.

Americans and specially the Pentagon and state department folks definitely understand Pakistan's compulsions and work well with Pakistan for the most part. The problem is the media. In private, Pakistan's point of view can be advanced, but these ill-timed and misplaced editorials, and specials are pretty much one sided and do not provide the needed forum to dispel or explain Pakistan's limitations and considerations.

Every single CENTCOM commander has appreciated (in earnest) the efforts put in by Pakistan and the difficulties that Pakistan faces. Most of the Pakistani commanders and their Centcom colleagues actually get along quite well. The problem is the politics on the Hill and the games being played out inside of Afghanistan. If Americans think that they are being played by Pakistan, they don't understand half the game being played around them in Afghanistan.

 

[Neo]

Audio report: NPR Media Player

 

[Neo]

Well the Hindutva *** kissing trolls is a given - but these others OoE, Deltacamelately, Shek, S-2, Zraver - I use to think that these people had a measure of honor in the sense that could help peole understand the issues better - I was absolutely disappointed that that for the most part, no tonly are they ignorant but also just a bunch of bigots.

Again this is the result of failed moderation. Most of them (Wab members mentioned above) understand the dynamics and political climate of SA affairs and they're capable to lead a good and productive debate but its the trolls who derail and hi-jack each and every Pakistan related thread. With a little moderation they could gained a lot of valuable knowledge from moderate Pakistani members who've now left the board.

Too bad but its their loss!

A new thread's been just opened there...called An average Pakistani Citizen's Perception on War with the US. Its based on a post from our forum which for the record does not reflect the views of an average Pakistani! Its just his personal opinion.

Just give it a few days and see how the topic is hi-jacked to bash Pakistan.
Expect to see:
- 1965 ans '71 war
- Kargil
- Proliferation
- Terrorist attacks in India
- ISI
- And a lot of usual rhetoric not related to the topic.

 

[Neo]

US ground force option may be limited in Pakistan​

* Analysts say US forces operated inside Pakistan in small numbers for years
* Former US ambassador says use of US ground forces in Pakistan can inflame Zardari-Nawaz rivalry​

WASHINGTON: The George W Bush’s administration is unlikely to use commando raids as a common tactic against militant safe havens in Pakistan due to the high-stake risks to

US policy in the region, officials and analysts say.

Bush approved a US commando assault in South Waziristan on September 3, without Islamabad’s permission, as part of a presidential order on clandestine and covert operations, officials and sources familiar with the matter said.

Bush’s authorisation for the use of ground forces without Pakistani approval was part of a larger ramp-up in US strikes against militant safe havens along the shared border with Afghanistan. Pakistan had complained that the attack killed at least 20 people and vowed to defend its sovereignty against foreign forces.

Days later, Pakistani officials and villagers near the site of the initial attack said US helicopters crossed the border from Afghanistan in a second incursion but were forced back by Pakistani ground fire. The incident was denied by both Pakistani and US military officials.

As a sign of growing tensions, US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen paid an unannounced visit to Pakistan on Tuesday – his second meeting with Pakistani officials in three weeks. But officials and sources said any future raids must be approved on a mission-by-mission basis by a top US administration official because of the political sensitivities involved and the calculated risk of US troops being killed or captured on the Pakistani soil.

It was not clear whether permission must be given by the president or can be relegated to the defence secretary.

“This is extremely sensitive. You can’t have soldiers in the field, or even their commanders, making this kind of decision,” said an official on condition of anonymity.

Operation inside Pakistan: Analysts said US special operations and paramilitary forces had operated inside Pakistan in small numbers for years, mainly in conjunction with the Pakistani military.

But US involvement escalated on September 3 when about two dozens US special operations forces backed by an AC-130 helicopter gunship raided a suspected Al Qaeda compound near the village of Angoor Adda in what US officials privately described as a stepped-up campaign to disrupt increasingly dangerous militant safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal region.

The Bush administration had grown impatient at Pakistan’s reluctance to take military action against militant bases. “The US military and intelligence community in Afghanistan was getting increasingly concerned that the Pakistani government was not only unable but unwilling to conduct operations against the militants,” said an analyst involved in US government deliberations.

“This meant that if we were to deal effectively with one of the most serious concerns about the Afghan insurgency, we needed to step up activity. And that meant we needed a presidential order,” the analyst said.

The US has 33,000 troops in Afghanistan and plans to send fresh forces that will increase the overall number by nearly 2,000 by next year, a fraction of the 10,000 troops sought by US commanders on the ground.

Inflaming rivalry: Former US ambassador to Sri Lanka Teresita Schaffer said the use of US ground forces could increase political turmoil by inflaming the rivalry between President Asif Ali

Zardari and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz chief Nawaz Sharif.

“If this is a one-off or two-off, you can get past it. But as a regular modus operandi, I don’t think the Pakistani government can sustain it,” she said.

Steve Coll of the New America Foundation said the use of US ground forces posed particular problems for the Pakistani military, which the Bush administration is pressing for more assistance against militants. reuters

 

[Neo]

Unilateral airstrikes unacceptable: Pakistan: US ‘committed to respect’ Pakistan’s sovereignty: Mullen​

​

* Gilani says Pakistan to continue co-operation in war on terror
* State Department says US has close relationship with Zardari govt​

ISLAMABAD/WASHINGTON: The visiting United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen on Wednesday reiterated US commitment to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty, while Pakistan made it clear that unilateral airstrikes in its territory are not acceptable.

Sources said the top US commander was informed that Islamabad would not compromise on national sovereignty and only Pakistan had the right to operate against the militants and terrorists on its side of the Pak-Afghan border. In an official statement by the US embassy, spokesman Lou Fintor said, “Admiral Mullen reiterated US commitment to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty and to develop further US-Pakistani co-operation and co-ordination on these critical issues that challenge the security and well-being of the people of both countries.” The statement said the talks were “extremely frank, positive and constructive”. Mullen “appreciated the positive role that Pakistan is playing in the war on terror and pledged...support to Pakistan,” it said.

Co-operation: In a meeting at the Prime Minister’s (PM) House, PM Yousuf Raza Gilani told Mullen Pakistan would continue to co-operate with the US in the ongoing war on terror. He said Washington should share intelligence with Islamabad, as the Pakistan Army was fully capable of dealing with terrorism. Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani and US Ambassador Anne W Patterson also attended the meeting.

Earlier, in a meeting at the General Headquarters, Gen Kayani protested over unilateral strikes by US forces and said no agreement on such strikes existed between the two countries, sources said.

State department: According to APP, the State Department said that the US wanted to work with Pakistan and Afghanistan to ensure regional security.

“We do have a close working relationship, not only through military-to-military channels but political-to-political channels with the leadership of President Zardari and his government, as well as with the military,” State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said. He said the US would co-operate with Islamabad in dealing with issues on the Pakistani side of the border. sajjad malik/app

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Americans and specially the Pentagon and state department folks definitely understand Pakistan's compulsions and work well with Pakistan for the most part. The problem is the media. In private, Pakistan's point of view can be advanced, but these ill-timed and misplaced editorials, and specials are pretty much one sided and do not provide the needed forum to dispel or explain Pakistan's limitations and considerations.

Every single CENTCOM commander has appreciated (in earnest) the efforts put in by Pakistan and the difficulties that Pakistan faces. Most of the Pakistani commanders and their Centcom colleagues actually get along quite well. The problem is the politics on the Hill and the games being played out inside of Afghanistan. If Americans think that they are being played by Pakistan, they don't understand half the game being played around them in Afghanistan.

So would you say that the allegations attributed to officials in the CIA and DoD (the former primarily) that not only rogues, but "Pakistani military leadership', and in one case specifically Gen. Kiyani, were complicit in the Embassy bombing, have no impact on the relationship between the PA and CENTCOM?

Those reports were perfectly timed to coincide with Gillani's visit to presumably put pressure on him, and the allegations about Gen. Kiyani surfaced soon after the US raid that caused an outcry in Pakistan and he took a strong stance against the US raid.

This would imply that the allegations through the media may have been made with the complete approval of the Admin.

Perhaps these just officials disgruntled with the way things are going and want their POV to be out there, or perhaps a tussle between the CIA and Military commanders and State Dpt.

I believe there was an article in the NYT that quoted a senior military official who dismissed the CIA reports as 'seeing AQ under every rock'. Some reports have also suggested that the CIA Afghan branch holds almost diametrically opposed views to the I-Bad branch.

That difference raises the question of how badly CIA information is compromised by biased Afghan intel - knowing that the current GoA is virulently anti-Pakistan, and I believe the secretive Afghan intel chef is a former NA member as well.

Other reports have indicated that the massive collateral damage inflicted by NATO forces has been because the intel was led up the garden path by sources who had grudges with other Tribes/individuals, and NATO was essentially used to settle scores. This does not paint a very good image of an agency with things under control as far as accurate intel and analysis goes.

Is it the ISI that is out of control, paranoid and flailing, or the CIA?

 

[batmannow]

So would you say that the allegations attributed to officials in the CIA and DoD (the former primarily) that not only rogues, but "Pakistani military leadership', and in one case specifically Gen. Kiyani, were complicit in the Embassy bombing, have no impact on the relationship between the PA and CENTCOM?

Those reports were perfectly timed to coincide with Gillani's visit to presumably put pressure on him, and the allegations about Gen. Kiyani surfaced soon after the US raid that caused an outcry in Pakistan and he took a strong stance against the US raid.

This would imply that the allegations through the media may have been made with the complete approval of the Admin.

Perhaps these just officials disgruntled with the way things are going and want their POV to be out there, or perhaps a tussle between the CIA and Military commanders and State Dpt.

I believe there was an article in the NYT that quoted a senior military official who dismissed the CIA reports as 'seeing AQ under every rock'. Some reports have also suggested that the CIA Afghan branch holds almost diametrically opposed views to the I-Bad branch.

That difference raises the question of how badly CIA information is compromised by biased Afghan intel - knowing that the current GoA is virulently anti-Pakistan, and I believe the secretive Afghan intel chef is a former NA member as well.

Other reports have indicated that the massive collateral damage inflicted by NATO forces has been because the intel was led up the garden path by sources who had grudges with other Tribes/individuals, and NATO was essentially used to settle scores. This does not paint a very good image of an agency with things under control as far as accurate intel and analysis goes.

Is it the ISI that is out of control, paranoid and flailing, or the CIA?

Dear AgNoStIc MuSliM, sir
nicly,executed post sir !
the real part of problum, is CIA, which is not in the control of US admin & it was never been, the crunt situation in pakistan was due to CIA's criticle role scince 80s. if ever been investigated freely, there could be lot of shocking surprises, would be found.

lawyers uprising, Lal masjid opreation, NRO, Benazir bhotto's assination, musharf's uniform issue, appointmet of new COAS, lies to Musharf as (promises) media's underground revolt against musharf, ASIF(ghadari's) nomination, ASIF (ghadari's) selection, all were the gift of the unidentifyed hands of CIA.

CIA's drug bussiness in latin ammerica, & latin american nations revolt against satilite rule of CIA, no body knows the real agenda of this dangerous & the strongest, the biggest intelligence orginization on earth.
even, g.w.BUSH cant ask, more than what ever CIA wants to brief him, even most of the USA's politicians had thier files being created scince a decade & thier standings, their elections every thing, all are in the hands of CIA.
the TALIBANS, AFGHAN JIHAD, ARAB FIGHTERS, KALSHANKOV CULTURE,
And most recntly, AFGHAN DRUG MAFIA's joint drug bussiness, which CIA uses for its, as a financial budgt, for its diferent type of opreations around the world.

 

[T-Rex]

US official makes public demand for reforming ISI​

By Anwar Iqbal

WASHINGTON, Sept 16: A proposal for reforming the ISI – now publicly articulated by a senior US official – was discussed thoroughly between Pakistani and American authorities during Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s visit to Washington in July.

CIA chief Michael V. Hayden had an exclusive meeting with the prime minister during his visit, presenting him with a “charge-sheet” on the spy agency’s alleged involvement in jihadi activities.

Later, in an interview to Washington Times, Mr Gilani said that CIA deputy director Stephen R. Kappes and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael G. Mullen visited Islamabad in mid-July with reports of some ISI officials’ alleged links with the militants.

And on Monday, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Richard Boucher said at a private luncheon in Washington that the controversial spy agency needed reform but there’s no indication this was happening.

“It has to be done,” said Mr Boucher in his speech at the Thomson Reuters Bureau. Asked if he had seen signs of reform, he told Reuters: “No, I don’t have anything in particular I would point to right now.”

Asked why the new Pakistani government was more likely to act than its predecessor, Mr Boucher replied: “It’s sad to say, but the problem has become more and more acute.”

Mr Boucher warned that “as long as you have organisations, or pieces of organisations, that work in different directions, then it’s harder for the government to accomplish the goal” of defeating terrorists based in the tribal region and elsewhere in Pakistan.

According to diplomatic sources here, the United Stats is trying to work out an arrangement with Pakistan for curtailing ISI’s power.

Under this new arrangement, the ISI wing which deals with internal security is to be transferred to the interior ministry and the agency is to be asked to reduce its role in the war on terror.

The US administration believes that this arrangement should be acceptable to the new civilian government in Islamabad as well because it can end the agency’s interference in Pakistan’s domestic politics and thus prevent future military takeovers.

Taking away the authority to deal with the militants, a power the ISI has enjoyed since the Afghan war, could help the United States meet its goal of severing the agency’s alleged links to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

When the proposal was first discussed with Pakistan’s civilian government, they were not sure they could accomplish this task. They felt that the civilians were still too weak to take on the ISI.

Mr Boucher’s decision to go public with a demand so far discussed privately between the two governments, however, is an attempt to tell the civilians that Washington expects them to act now.

It is also linked to Washington’s decision to increase the heat on the militants and is part of the same policy that has led to renewed US military actions against militant hideouts in Fata.

The Americans feel that while Pakistan’s civilian government may not have been strong enough to take on the ISI when the prime minister visited Washington in July, it is now. They believe that Asif Ali Zardari’s thumping victory in the presidential elections earlier this month has created a civilian set-up in Islamabad which has all the powers it needs to reform the ISI.

Pakistan should make an official demand to reform the CIA. The CIA has been sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan and the Pak government should disclose the evidence to the public and bring formal charges against the american government. Failure to do so will only make things worse for Pakistan, this is not the time to be soft.

 

[muse]

Several issues come to mind with regard to this situation - Why did the US undertake armed incursions and why did the US government make public th fact that the US president had authorised such action - below is a piece from Asia Times that attempts to further understand the issues involved - it has been said of wars that do not go well, that escalation is a strategy to deal with such a problem, another word for it may be, Surge:

Sep 19, 2008



Vested interests drive US's Pakistan policy
By Gareth Porter

WASHINGTON - The George W Bush administration's decision to launch commando raids and step up missiles strikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda figures in the tribal areas of Pakistan followed what appears to have been the most contentious policy process over the use of force in Bush's eight-year presidency.

That decision has stirred such strong opposition from the Pakistani military and government that it is now being revisited. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Pakistan on Tuesday for the second time in three weeks, and US officials and sources told Reuters that any future raids would be approved on a mission-by-mission basis by a top US administration official.

The policy was the result of strong pressure from the US command in Afghanistan and lobbying by the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Central Intelligence Agency's operations directorate (DO), both of which had direct institutional interests in operations that coincided with their mandate.

State Department and some Pentagon officials had managed to delay the proposed military escalation in Pakistan for a year by arguing that it would be based on nearly non-existent intelligence and would only increase support for Islamic extremists in that country.

But officials of SOCOM and the CIA prevailed, apparently because Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney believed they could not afford to be seen as doing nothing about bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the administration's final months.

SOCOM had a strong institutional interest in a major new operation in Pakistan.

The Army's Delta Force and navy SEALS had been allowed by the Pakistani military to accompany its forces on raids in the tribal area in 2002 and 2003, but not to operate on their own. And even that extremely limited role was ended by Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf in 2003, which frustrated SOCOM officials.

Former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, whose antagonism toward the CIA was legendary, had wanted SOCOM to take over the hunt for bin Laden. And in 2006, SOCOM's Joint Special Operations Command branch in Afghanistan pressed Rumsfeld to approve a commando operation in Pakistan aimed at capturing a high-ranking al-Qaeda operative.

SOCOM had the support of the US command in Afghanistan, which was arguing that the war in Afghanistan could not be won as long as the Taliban had a safe haven in Pakistan from which to launch attacks. The top US commander, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, worked with SOCOM and DO officers in Afghanistan to assemble the evidence of Pakistan's cooperation with the Taliban.

Despite concerns that such an operation could cause a massive reaction in Pakistan against the US war on al-Qaeda, Rumsfeld gave in to the pressure in early November 2006 and approved the operation, according to an account in the New York Times on June 30. But within days, Rumsfeld was out as defense secretary, and the operation was put on hold.

Nevertheless, Bush and Cheney, who had been repeating that Musharraf had things under control in the frontier area, soon realized that they would be politically vulnerable to charges that they weren't doing anything about bin Laden.

The July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was the signal for the CIA's DO to step up its own lobbying for control over a Pakistan operation, based on the Afghan model - namely, CIA officers training and arming a local militia while identifying targets for strikes from the air.

In a Washington Post column only two weeks after the NIE's conclusions were made public, David Ignatius quoted former CIA official Hank Crumpton, who had run the CIA operation in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US, proposed a DO operation: "We either do it now, or we do it after the next attack."

That either-or logic and the sense of political vulnerability in the White House was the key advantage of the advocates of a new war in Pakistan. Last November, the New York Times reported that the Defense Department had drafted an order based on the SOCOM proposal for the training of local tribal forces and for new authority for "covert" commando operations in Pakistan's frontier provinces.

But the previous experience with missile strikes against al-Qaeda targets using Predator drones and the facts on the ground provided plenty of ammunition to those who opposed the escalation. It showed that the proposed actions would have little or no impact on either the Taliban or al-Qaeda in Pakistan, and would bring destabilizing political blowback.

In January 2006, the CIA had launched a missile strike on a residential compound in Damadola, near the Afghan border, on the basis of erroneous intelligence that al-Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri would be there. The destruction killed as many as 25 people, according to residents, including 14 members of one family.

Some 8,000 tribesmen in the Damadola area protested the killing, and in the southern port city of Karachi tens of thousands more rallied against the United States, shouting "Death to America!"

Musharraf later claimed the dead included four high-ranking al-Qaeda officials, including Zawahiri's son-in-law. The Washington Post's Craig Whitlock reported last week, however, that US and Pakistani officials now admit only villagers were killed.

It was well known within the counter-terrorism community that the US search for al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan was severely limited by the absence of actionable intelligence. For years, the US military had depended almost entirely on Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, despite its well-established ties with the Taliban and even al-Qaeda.

One of the counter-terrorism officials without a direct organizational stake in the issue, US State Department counter-terrorism chief General Dell L Dailey, bluntly summed up the situation to reporters in January. "We don't have enough information about what's going on there," he said. "Not on al-Qaeda, not on foreign fighters, not on the Taliban."

A senior US official quoted by the Post in February was even more scathing on that subject, saying, "Even a blind squirrel finds a nut now and then."

Meanwhile, the Pakistani military, reacting to the US aim of a more aggressive US military role in the tribal areas, repeatedly rejected the US military proposal for training Frontier Corps units.

The US command in Afghanistan and SOCOM increased the pressure for escalation early last summer by enlisting visiting members of the US Congress in support of the plan. Texas Republican congressmen Michael McCaul, who had visited Afghanistan and Pakistan, declared on his return that it was "imperative that US forces be allowed to pursue the Taliban and al-Qaeda in tribal areas inside Pakistan".

In late July, according to The Times of London, Bush signed a secret national security presidential directive which authorized operations by special operations forces without the permission of Pakistan.

The Bush decision ignored the disconnect between the aims of the new war and the realities on the ground in Pakistan. Commando raids and missile strikes against mid-level or low-level Taliban or al-Qaeda operatives, carried out in a sea of angry Pashtuns, will not stem the flow of fighters from Pakistan into Afghanistan or weaken al-Qaeda. But they will certainly provoke reactions from the tribal population that can tilt the affected areas even further toward the Islamic radicals.

At least some military leaders without an institutional interest in the outcome understood that the proposed escalation was likely to backfire. One senior military officer told the Los Angeles Times last month that he had been forced by the "fragility of the current government in Islamabad" to ask whether "you do more long-term harm if you act very, very aggressively militarily".

Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in 2006.

 

[fatman17]

lets summarize:

US:

1. the US tried to escalate the border incursions to see if they will get international support for this atrategy.it has not been forthcoming. china, france and germany immediately did not support this strategy and finally the UK (which was the key) has now come out against the unilateral action strategy. the US will need to come to a new agreement with pakistan on RoEs. the US/NATO must share intelligence to co-ordinate ops.

2. as i said in another post, the US/NATO logistic life-line goes through pakistan. they dont have any other option at this time. the northern route is in cold-storage as long as the US/Russia relations remain strained. so they cannot antagonise pakistan any further.

3. the GoP stands to lose the presidential elections to the Dems. so with 4 months left before 'W' leaves the white house, they want to capture / eliminate some high profile al-qaeda leadership to show their determination in the WoT.

4. US/NATO/AA must do more on their side of the border. US/NATO must force the AA to come down hard on the afghan narcotics trade.

pak:

1, pakistan needs a determined effort to eliminate the militants esp TTP. if the US offers CT help then it should be welcomed and joint-ops of SFs should be conducted against high-profile targets.

2. pakistan must ensure that the US/NATO supply lines are secure. this will be a good CBM.

3. pakistan must not try to de-stabalise afghanistan. the ISI 'rogues' must be restrained from creating situations where blame is directed towards pakistan (with or without evidence). (we must accept this weakness) this will be another CBM.

4. our in-domitable ambassodor in US must do his job. he should strongly defend pakistans PoV in the US Congress and use the pak caucus in the Congress to defend pakistans position. start working with key leaders of GoP/Dems who maybe in the next admin.

5. US/PA military relations are still strong but Gen. Kiyani should now try to re-build this very key relationship.

at the end whatever happens in the future in this WoT, the actions of our GHQ will determine the right path for pakistans future.