Fight Maoist strategy and not the forces

[kurup]

The ‘Gandhians with Guns’ as they may be referred by the people like Arundhiti Roy, however the fact is that they are armed rebels working against the interestsof the union of India and its democratic fundamentals. There may be a many flaws in our system and various policies of the successive governments at the centre and the states can be the reason for overall discontentment amongst the tribal population in India’s heartland, nevertheless an armed rebellion cannot be tolerated as an answer.

Since the year 2009, going by the media reports, more than 834 policemen have been killed by these Maoists apart from 703 civilian casualties. The recent attack on the Congress Party’s parivartan yatra in Darbha valley of Chittisgarh stands as a grim reminder and underlines the challenge to the State in wresting its control over the red corridor. The counter Naxal operations, unleashed after the deadliest attack on 06 April 2010, by the Maoists on CRPF patrol near Chintainar village in Dantewada district of Chittisgarh that left 75 jawans killed and 55 wounded, is yet to manifest in any worthwhile victories.

Without getting into miscellaneous aspects of Maoist insurgency its causes or the much articulated counter measures, which appear to be mere semantics, I would rather focus upon military action being carried out by the Central Para Military forces in this region. The Maoist insurgents have their area of influence spread across eight states, plaguing over 60 districts covering approximately 33 percent of the total geographical area of India. These insurgents are very well organised, highly motivated and indoctrinated. To their advantage is the terrain with thick forest cover and virtually non-existent infrastructure, supported by an aggrieved tribal population a resultant of corrupt and week civil administration.

The disadvantages of poor equipment and obsolete weaponry are dwarfed by other advantages accrued in their favour. On the contrary our Para military forces are far superior in weapons, equipment and training, however they suffer from low morale, poor leadership, week organisation, non-existent centralised operational command and ineffective civil administration, further aggravated by detrimental and divisive local politics. The pseudo human right activists, intellectuals and professionals bearing Maoist leanings, further contribute towards an ever expanding sphere of the Red sympathisers through a well drafted and meticulously executed propaganda. This has resulted in constantly weaning away the poor and the innocent tribal population from the national main stream ideology, thus presenting a larger challenge. The Para Military Forces and largely the CRPF is playing a major role in this fight against the Naxalites and the sacrifices made by their officers and men need to be lauded in all the aspects.

The Indian experience in counter insurgency is almost as old as our independence, starting from the Naga insurgency that surfaced in late fifties to the militancy in Punjab of the eighties and the on-going proxy war in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The expertise acquired by the Indian security apparatus in combating insurgency has encouraged our friendly foreign countries to get their armed forces personnel trained in Indian counter insurgency training schools. Our army has participated in a number of exercises and training schedules along with the Americans, French, British and the Maldives armed forces personnel. India over the years has established its credentials internationally in combating terrorism and insurgency. If this is true, then where is the effort lacking and why we have not been able to contain the Maoist menace in the red corridor? It is also true that no military action alone can eradicate insurgency, but it can certainly bring down the level of violence as it has been demonstrated in the North and the North East, enabling democratic institutions and the civil administration to firm in. The government machinery can there after carry out developmental activities which are essential to bring the misguided youth back into our main stream, denying the insurgents much needed support base.

The Chintainar ambush on the CRPF patrolling party not only highlighted the severity of the situation, but worked as a catalyst in our fight against these Maoists. Amidst growing rhetoric in media and mounting pressure on the government to deploy army in Red Corridor, the political masters listened to the military leadership and decided against deploying the army, which would have been counterproductive towards overall defence preparedness of the nation. Instead it was decided to deploy additional CRPF battalions in countering the Red menace, over a period of time. The Army was however entrusted upon training the paramilitary personnel before being sent in harm’s way.

I as an Infantry battalion commander got a first-hand experience in not only training a CRPF battalion before its deployment in Naxal effected region but also got an insight into their psychological makeup and functioning, both operational and administrative. My observations are enumerated below:

-- There existed a feeling of being a second rate cadre amongst the CRPF officers owing to the fact that the top senior level posts in their organisation were reserved for the IPS cadre officers who lacked real ground level knowledge.

-- A wide spread feeling that they are trained and equipped to support the State police in carrying out law and order duties, hence they are not suitable for high intensity Counter Insurgency operations.

-- The sanctity of the battalion was never respected and the deployment was generally carried out in company groups rather than the battalion as a whole. This had an adverse effect on the overall operational efficacy.

-- The commanding officer in a CRPF battalion was reduced to an administrative coordinator only ensuring logistics and other administration aspects. The operational control was always with the district and the state administration which dictated the deployment of these troops.

-- The administrative convenience was always an overriding factor in deployment rather than any worthwhile tactical considerations.

-- The general mind set and training was more oriented towards policing activities like crowd control, lathi charge, tear gassing the mob etc.

-- Cross country movements on foot were feared and all efforts were made to keep confined to the roads and tracks that also vehicle based.

-- The age profile of the NCOs and senior constables was anywhere from 50 – 60 years, adversely affecting the agility and mobility of the body of troops that they commanded.

-- There existed no bonding and camaraderie amongst the men and their officers. Lack of regimentation added to the overall deterioration in leadership standards.

-- Not to discount the fact that the troops have an unsettled family life. The organisation lacks infrastructure to provide medical, residential and education facilities for their families, this accompanied by continuous long spells of deployment in remote and harsh places further contributed towards the low morale.

These fundamental shortcomings contribute towards an overall low morale of this force. These need to be addressed, before we start expecting miracles out of the PMF soldiers. Apart from these issues our home ministry should focus upon building a higher organisation which is independent of the state administration and is guided by the central agenda. The complexity involved in the nature of counter insurgency operations warrants an operational model which is responsive and responsible to its hierarchy and organisation. There is an urgent need to put in place an organisation that is operationally effective and administratively sound on the lines of our armed forces. The home ministry should draw the expertise from our armed forces initially to create and staff a higher organisation that is designed to tackle insurgency all across the Red Corridor.

It is recommended that a unified Para Military Force Headquarters be raised for exercising complete operational coordination and command and control over the Central Forces deployed in the Red Corridor. The existing trend of allocating forces to the insurgency effected states and there subsequent deployment at the disposal of district administration should be reviewed. This unified force head quarter should be given overall responsibility for coordinating and carrying out complete operations in the Maoist effected region. The Para Military forces available, should be organised into Ranges and the Sectors on the lines of Divisions and the Brigades of the Indian Army and operate under the operational control of this unified force headquarters. For better planning and coordination, this headquarters has to be staffed by the police officers and representatives from the civil administration of the effected states. To ensure sound operational planning, effective training and logistic support the staff should also include officers from the Army and the Air Force as well. The Central Govt in addition to these recommended changes should ensure insulation of these Para Military personnel from political interference and also provide them with legal protection like the AFSPA.

As Sun Tzu says “ Fight the enemy’s strategy and not the forces”. The enemy will thus be forced to come out and get on to offensive, at this time manoeuvre and strike at the weak points leaving his elite units to be defeated easily later. Here the enemy is the Maoist and his strategy is to isolate the masses from government sponsored development and administration through propaganda and coercion, simultaneously target the state machinery to render it in effective. In this fight the weak points would be its central leadership and over ground workers. Post Dantewada incident of 6 April 2010, we did succeed to some extent in line with this strategy but we have failed to defeat him when he was on the offensive, like the one on 25 may 2010 in Darbha valley.

Fight Maoist strategy and not the forces… » Indian Defence Review

 

[Parul]

India has been molly coddling the Maoists for too long. We keep repeating inanities like "They are our people" or "They are misguided youth". The truth is that these guys are interested in the violent overthrow of the state. No communist state has been democratic and none have had any semblance of human rights and freedoms. They must be dealt with firmly.

 

[Dillinger]

The ‘Gandhians with Guns’ as they may be referred by the people like Arundhiti Roy, however the fact is that they are armed rebels working against the interestsof the union of India and its democratic fundamentals. There may be a many flaws in our system and various policies of the successive governments at the centre and the states can be the reason for overall discontentment amongst the tribal population in India’s heartland, nevertheless an armed rebellion cannot be tolerated as an answer.

Since the year 2009, going by the media reports, more than 834 policemen have been killed by these Maoists apart from 703 civilian casualties. The recent attack on the Congress Party’s parivartan yatra in Darbha valley of Chittisgarh stands as a grim reminder and underlines the challenge to the State in wresting its control over the red corridor. The counter Naxal operations, unleashed after the deadliest attack on 06 April 2010, by the Maoists on CRPF patrol near Chintainar village in Dantewada district of Chittisgarh that left 75 jawans killed and 55 wounded, is yet to manifest in any worthwhile victories.

Without getting into miscellaneous aspects of Maoist insurgency its causes or the much articulated counter measures, which appear to be mere semantics, I would rather focus upon military action being carried out by the Central Para Military forces in this region. The Maoist insurgents have their area of influence spread across eight states, plaguing over 60 districts covering approximately 33 percent of the total geographical area of India. These insurgents are very well organised, highly motivated and indoctrinated. To their advantage is the terrain with thick forest cover and virtually non-existent infrastructure, supported by an aggrieved tribal population a resultant of corrupt and week civil administration.

The disadvantages of poor equipment and obsolete weaponry are dwarfed by other advantages accrued in their favour. On the contrary our Para military forces are far superior in weapons, equipment and training, however they suffer from low morale, poor leadership, week organisation, non-existent centralised operational command and ineffective civil administration, further aggravated by detrimental and divisive local politics. The pseudo human right activists, intellectuals and professionals bearing Maoist leanings, further contribute towards an ever expanding sphere of the Red sympathisers through a well drafted and meticulously executed propaganda. This has resulted in constantly weaning away the poor and the innocent tribal population from the national main stream ideology, thus presenting a larger challenge. The Para Military Forces and largely the CRPF is playing a major role in this fight against the Naxalites and the sacrifices made by their officers and men need to be lauded in all the aspects.

The Indian experience in counter insurgency is almost as old as our independence, starting from the Naga insurgency that surfaced in late fifties to the militancy in Punjab of the eighties and the on-going proxy war in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The expertise acquired by the Indian security apparatus in combating insurgency has encouraged our friendly foreign countries to get their armed forces personnel trained in Indian counter insurgency training schools. Our army has participated in a number of exercises and training schedules along with the Americans, French, British and the Maldives armed forces personnel. India over the years has established its credentials internationally in combating terrorism and insurgency. If this is true, then where is the effort lacking and why we have not been able to contain the Maoist menace in the red corridor? It is also true that no military action alone can eradicate insurgency, but it can certainly bring down the level of violence as it has been demonstrated in the North and the North East, enabling democratic institutions and the civil administration to firm in. The government machinery can there after carry out developmental activities which are essential to bring the misguided youth back into our main stream, denying the insurgents much needed support base.

The Chintainar ambush on the CRPF patrolling party not only highlighted the severity of the situation, but worked as a catalyst in our fight against these Maoists. Amidst growing rhetoric in media and mounting pressure on the government to deploy army in Red Corridor, the political masters listened to the military leadership and decided against deploying the army, which would have been counterproductive towards overall defence preparedness of the nation. Instead it was decided to deploy additional CRPF battalions in countering the Red menace, over a period of time. The Army was however entrusted upon training the paramilitary personnel before being sent in harm’s way.

I as an Infantry battalion commander got a first-hand experience in not only training a CRPF battalion before its deployment in Naxal effected region but also got an insight into their psychological makeup and functioning, both operational and administrative. My observations are enumerated below:

-- There existed a feeling of being a second rate cadre amongst the CRPF officers owing to the fact that the top senior level posts in their organisation were reserved for the IPS cadre officers who lacked real ground level knowledge.

-- A wide spread feeling that they are trained and equipped to support the State police in carrying out law and order duties, hence they are not suitable for high intensity Counter Insurgency operations.

-- The sanctity of the battalion was never respected and the deployment was generally carried out in company groups rather than the battalion as a whole. This had an adverse effect on the overall operational efficacy.

-- The commanding officer in a CRPF battalion was reduced to an administrative coordinator only ensuring logistics and other administration aspects. The operational control was always with the district and the state administration which dictated the deployment of these troops.

-- The administrative convenience was always an overriding factor in deployment rather than any worthwhile tactical considerations.

-- The general mind set and training was more oriented towards policing activities like crowd control, lathi charge, tear gassing the mob etc.

-- Cross country movements on foot were feared and all efforts were made to keep confined to the roads and tracks that also vehicle based.

-- The age profile of the NCOs and senior constables was anywhere from 50 – 60 years, adversely affecting the agility and mobility of the body of troops that they commanded.

-- There existed no bonding and camaraderie amongst the men and their officers. Lack of regimentation added to the overall deterioration in leadership standards.

-- Not to discount the fact that the troops have an unsettled family life. The organisation lacks infrastructure to provide medical, residential and education facilities for their families, this accompanied by continuous long spells of deployment in remote and harsh places further contributed towards the low morale.

These fundamental shortcomings contribute towards an overall low morale of this force. These need to be addressed, before we start expecting miracles out of the PMF soldiers. Apart from these issues our home ministry should focus upon building a higher organisation which is independent of the state administration and is guided by the central agenda. The complexity involved in the nature of counter insurgency operations warrants an operational model which is responsive and responsible to its hierarchy and organisation. There is an urgent need to put in place an organisation that is operationally effective and administratively sound on the lines of our armed forces. The home ministry should draw the expertise from our armed forces initially to create and staff a higher organisation that is designed to tackle insurgency all across the Red Corridor.

It is recommended that a unified Para Military Force Headquarters be raised for exercising complete operational coordination and command and control over the Central Forces deployed in the Red Corridor. The existing trend of allocating forces to the insurgency effected states and there subsequent deployment at the disposal of district administration should be reviewed. This unified force head quarter should be given overall responsibility for coordinating and carrying out complete operations in the Maoist effected region. The Para Military forces available, should be organised into Ranges and the Sectors on the lines of Divisions and the Brigades of the Indian Army and operate under the operational control of this unified force headquarters. For better planning and coordination, this headquarters has to be staffed by the police officers and representatives from the civil administration of the effected states. To ensure sound operational planning, effective training and logistic support the staff should also include officers from the Army and the Air Force as well. The Central Govt in addition to these recommended changes should ensure insulation of these Para Military personnel from political interference and also provide them with legal protection like the AFSPA.

As Sun Tzu says “ Fight the enemy’s strategy and not the forces”. The enemy will thus be forced to come out and get on to offensive, at this time manoeuvre and strike at the weak points leaving his elite units to be defeated easily later. Here the enemy is the Maoist and his strategy is to isolate the masses from government sponsored development and administration through propaganda and coercion, simultaneously target the state machinery to render it in effective. In this fight the weak points would be its central leadership and over ground workers. Post Dantewada incident of 6 April 2010, we did succeed to some extent in line with this strategy but we have failed to defeat him when he was on the offensive, like the one on 25 may 2010 in Darbha valley.

Fight Maoist strategy and not the forces… » Indian Defence Review

Note that the article is calling for an unified HQ for the counter insurgency force so as to treat the areas as an unified theater. As I had mentioned in my previous post when I quoted you in the other thread.

Won't happen though..I personally know the person who mooted the idea to certain administrators.."too cumbersome and logistically complicated" came back the reply. I am paraphrasing of course.

 

[Dillinger]

@On topic..there is another thing Sun Tzu said

"Shichi ni sunawachi, tatakae"

Before anyone wants to go learn from our Chinese friend..might as well wrap your head around the above.

 

[SPFG]

Note that the article is calling for an unified HQ for the counter insurgency force so as to treat the areas as an unified theater. As I had mentioned in my previous post when I quoted you in the other thread.

Won't happen though..I personally know the person who mooted the idea to certain administrators.."too cumbersome and logistically complicated" came back the reply. I am paraphrasing of course.

PN: Naxals are active NOW in Jharkhand , chattisgarh and odisha border regions. Unko khatam karne me do saal lag jayenge.

 

[Dillinger]

PN: Naxals are active NOW in Jharkhand , chattisgarh and odisha border regions. Unko khatam karne me do saal lag jayenge.

Sure thing. Two years hunh? Please tell that to the zilla prishad people in the region..it will be a relief for them. Don't be surprised though if they stare at you as if you've grown two heads.

 

[SPFG]

Sure thing. Two years hunh? Please tell that to the zilla prishad people in the region..it will be a relief for them. Don't be surprised though if they stare at you as if you've grown two heads.

Remember ULFA, BLA , LeT and Mullah Co.

 

[Dillinger]

Remember ULFA, BLA , LeT and Mullah Co.

My friend you are comparing an LIC/infiltration situation marked by cross border influence with a classic "people's war" fought by people who could care less about the people but still run a HUMINT network that would boggle you to the core.

It does one no good to rush in conflate things which should not be conflated.

By all means carry on.

 

[SPFG]

My friend you are comparing an LIC/infiltration situation marked by cross border influence with a classic "people's war" fought by people who could care less about the people but still run a HUMINT network that would boggle you to the core.

It does one no good to rush in conflate things which should not be conflated.

By all means carry on.

HUMINT was same case in Veerappan . Notice a pattern? No Maoists in S India all moving to chattisgarh fringe Jharkhand fringe, odisha , bihar fringe zones? Govt. despite it's lazy *** is doning sumthin underwraps.

Top surrendered Naxal says govt plan of development with crackdown working

A top Naxal leader who surrendered recently has said that the government's twin strategy of security with development has begun to hurt the Maoists, leaving the morale of their cadre affected.

"The senior leadership of the party (CPI Maoist) is worried over setbacks due to Operation Greenhunt and the various developmental works undertaken by the government in remote areas of districts like Gadchiroli," Badarpu Mallaiyya alias Shekhar, the in-charge of the South Gadchiroli divisional committee of the CPI (Maoist), who surrendered before the Andhra Pradesh police in November, told The Indian Express here on Wednesday.

Originally from Macchupetha village of Karimnagar district in Andhra, Shekhar, 48, was in Gadchiroli for questioning by the local police. He had been heading the Maoist operations in Bhamragarh, Perimili, Aheri and Sironcha from 2008 onwards till his arrest.

"The morale of the party has been affected by the pressure created by Operation Greenhunt. A lot of areas have been lost to the police," Shekhar said, adding that with people getting employment in government works like road construction, digging of wells, forest jobs etc as well as under the MNREGS, fewer people were joining the CPI

He admitted that the lucrative surrender offers had also enticed many to lay down arms, even as police had stepped up their combing operations. "Barring parts of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the situation elsewhere is more or less equally bad for the party."

Shekhar specifically cited loss of many parts of Aheri, Perimili and Sironcha in south Gadchiroli that he commanded, along with Bhamragarh and areas of Kurkheda and Korchi in the north.

Asked what the biggest concern of the Maoists was, Shekhar said: "That the party isn't growing. Fresh recruitment has virtually stopped and the Dalam strength has gone down from about 15 to 10." He added that Maoists were trying to counter this by exhorting cadre to increase contact with people.

Shekhar, who had been part of the encounter at Lahiri that killed 17 policemen, defended targeting cops. "The pressure of police was growing and the party had suffered a lot of losses. So there was directive from the top leadership for big action," he said.

A veteran of many bloody encounters in Andhra and Maharashtra during his 24 years as a Maoist, Shekhar surrendered along with wife Ponnam Saroja alias Vijaya partly because he is suffering from "kidney and liver" ailments and also because of "disillusionment" following the suicide last year by senior Maoist Divakar.

About the allegation that cadres from Andhra have an upper hand over tribals in the CPI (Maoist), Shekhar said: "The promotions in the party are generally according to seniority. But there is some discrimination against tribals. At least the tribals do complain about it."

He admitted handing down death to 12 alleged police informers in Gadchiroli, but claims he was asked to do so by the leadership. Asked if any evidence is sought before an "informer" is killed, Shekhar said: "People's opinion is considered as valid. If later it is found that someone has been wrongly killed, we go and apologise to the family."

Talking about funding, Shekhar said each divisional committee chief gets Rs 20 lakh annually for spending. "I used to collect Rs 2 crore during tendu season in my division. The bamboo extraction charge is collected by the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee, which is a higher body."

Shekhar, who joined the Manthni Dalam in Karimnagar district in 1988 at the age of 24 allegedly under pressure from landlords, claims that when he visited his village after his surrender, everyone, including the landlord families, came to see him. "They were all very happy to see me. It's no more the kind of village it used to be."

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/indian...urgency-news-discussion-76.html#ixzz2WehWqjZw

 

[Dillinger]

HUMINT was same case in Veerappan . Notice a pattern? No Maoists in S India all moving to chattisgarh fringe Jharkhand fringe, odisha , bihar fringe zones? Govt. despite it's lazy *** is doning sumthin underwraps.

Top surrendered Naxal says govt plan of development with crackdown working

A top Naxal leader who surrendered recently has said that the government's twin strategy of security with development has begun to hurt the Maoists, leaving the morale of their cadre affected.

"The senior leadership of the party (CPI Maoist) is worried over setbacks due to Operation Greenhunt and the various developmental works undertaken by the government in remote areas of districts like Gadchiroli," Badarpu Mallaiyya alias Shekhar, the in-charge of the South Gadchiroli divisional committee of the CPI (Maoist), who surrendered before the Andhra Pradesh police in November, told The Indian Express here on Wednesday.

Originally from Macchupetha village of Karimnagar district in Andhra, Shekhar, 48, was in Gadchiroli for questioning by the local police. He had been heading the Maoist operations in Bhamragarh, Perimili, Aheri and Sironcha from 2008 onwards till his arrest.

"The morale of the party has been affected by the pressure created by Operation Greenhunt. A lot of areas have been lost to the police," Shekhar said, adding that with people getting employment in government works like road construction, digging of wells, forest jobs etc as well as under the MNREGS, fewer people were joining the CPI

He admitted that the lucrative surrender offers had also enticed many to lay down arms, even as police had stepped up their combing operations. "Barring parts of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the situation elsewhere is more or less equally bad for the party."

Shekhar specifically cited loss of many parts of Aheri, Perimili and Sironcha in south Gadchiroli that he commanded, along with Bhamragarh and areas of Kurkheda and Korchi in the north.

Asked what the biggest concern of the Maoists was, Shekhar said: "That the party isn't growing. Fresh recruitment has virtually stopped and the Dalam strength has gone down from about 15 to 10." He added that Maoists were trying to counter this by exhorting cadre to increase contact with people.

Shekhar, who had been part of the encounter at Lahiri that killed 17 policemen, defended targeting cops. "The pressure of police was growing and the party had suffered a lot of losses. So there was directive from the top leadership for big action," he said.

A veteran of many bloody encounters in Andhra and Maharashtra during his 24 years as a Maoist, Shekhar surrendered along with wife Ponnam Saroja alias Vijaya partly because he is suffering from "kidney and liver" ailments and also because of "disillusionment" following the suicide last year by senior Maoist Divakar.

About the allegation that cadres from Andhra have an upper hand over tribals in the CPI (Maoist), Shekhar said: "The promotions in the party are generally according to seniority. But there is some discrimination against tribals. At least the tribals do complain about it."

He admitted handing down death to 12 alleged police informers in Gadchiroli, but claims he was asked to do so by the leadership. Asked if any evidence is sought before an "informer" is killed, Shekhar said: "People's opinion is considered as valid. If later it is found that someone has been wrongly killed, we go and apologise to the family."

Talking about funding, Shekhar said each divisional committee chief gets Rs 20 lakh annually for spending. "I used to collect Rs 2 crore during tendu season in my division. The bamboo extraction charge is collected by the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee, which is a higher body."

Shekhar, who joined the Manthni Dalam in Karimnagar district in 1988 at the age of 24 allegedly under pressure from landlords, claims that when he visited his village after his surrender, everyone, including the landlord families, came to see him. "They were all very happy to see me. It's no more the kind of village it used to be."

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/indian...urgency-news-discussion-76.html#ixzz2WehWqjZw

Ah yes...the boots on the ground and the money from the coffers.

Let me be frank now.

Every single thing that has been mentioned in the article you just put up has indeed occurred..it is factually hundred percent correct..unfortunately the conclusion you've drawn from it is not.

I shall be more direct..in 2 years we shall not even be able to clear their influence out of the more populated rural hubs leave alone all the forests. The time frame you're banking on is severely miscalculated.

As to whether we will win or not? The Indian Union already has won the fight..the naxals just don't know it and when they do come around to seeing it that way..my quote by Sun Tzu might begin to sound very tempting for them.

 

[vK_man]

India has been molly coddling the Maoists for too long. We keep repeating inanities like "They are our people" or "They are misguided youth". The truth is that these guys are interested in the violent overthrow of the state. No communist state has been democratic and none have had any semblance of human rights and freedoms. They must be dealt with firmly.

And that 'firm' dealing aka genocide/ethnic cleansing for the sake of corporates on tribals is what that gave Maoists influence over a platter in less than 10 years.

Your ideas are similiar to what the chinese nationalist party on Chiang Shek attempted and look what happened.

 

[IND151]

HUMINT was same case in Veerappan . Notice a pattern? No Maoists in S India all moving to chattisgarh fringe Jharkhand fringe, odisha , bihar fringe zones? Govt. despite it's lazy *** is doning sumthin underwraps.

Top surrendered Naxal says govt plan of development with crackdown working

A top Naxal leader who surrendered recently has said that the government's twin strategy of security with development has begun to hurt the Maoists, leaving the morale of their cadre affected.

"The senior leadership of the party (CPI Maoist) is worried over setbacks due to Operation Greenhunt and the various developmental works undertaken by the government in remote areas of districts like Gadchiroli," Badarpu Mallaiyya alias Shekhar, the in-charge of the South Gadchiroli divisional committee of the CPI (Maoist), who surrendered before the Andhra Pradesh police in November, told The Indian Express here on Wednesday.

Originally from Macchupetha village of Karimnagar district in Andhra, Shekhar, 48, was in Gadchiroli for questioning by the local police. He had been heading the Maoist operations in Bhamragarh, Perimili, Aheri and Sironcha from 2008 onwards till his arrest.

"The morale of the party has been affected by the pressure created by Operation Greenhunt. A lot of areas have been lost to the police," Shekhar said, adding that with people getting employment in government works like road construction, digging of wells, forest jobs etc as well as under the MNREGS, fewer people were joining the CPI

He admitted that the lucrative surrender offers had also enticed many to lay down arms, even as police had stepped up their combing operations. "Barring parts of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the situation elsewhere is more or less equally bad for the party."


Shekhar specifically cited loss of many parts of Aheri, Perimili and Sironcha in south Gadchiroli that he commanded, along with Bhamragarh and areas of Kurkheda and Korchi in the north.

Asked what the biggest concern of the Maoists was, Shekhar said: "That the party isn't growing. Fresh recruitment has virtually stopped and the Dalam strength has gone down from about 15 to 10." He added that Maoists were trying to counter this by exhorting cadre to increase contact with people.

Shekhar, who had been part of the encounter at Lahiri that killed 17 policemen, defended targeting cops. "The pressure of police was growing and the party had suffered a lot of losses. So there was directive from the top leadership for big action," he said.

A veteran of many bloody encounters in Andhra and Maharashtra during his 24 years as a Maoist, Shekhar surrendered along with wife Ponnam Saroja alias Vijaya partly because he is suffering from "kidney and liver" ailments and also because of "disillusionment" following the suicide last year by senior Maoist Divakar.

About the allegation that cadres from Andhra have an upper hand over tribals in the CPI (Maoist), Shekhar said: "The promotions in the party are generally according to seniority. But there is some discrimination against tribals. At least the tribals do complain about it."

He admitted handing down death to 12 alleged police informers in Gadchiroli, but claims he was asked to do so by the leadership. Asked if any evidence is sought before an "informer" is killed, Shekhar said: "People's opinion is considered as valid. If later it is found that someone has been wrongly killed, we go and apologise to the family."

Talking about funding, Shekhar said each divisional committee chief gets Rs 20 lakh annually for spending. "I used to collect Rs 2 crore during tendu season in my division. The bamboo extraction charge is collected by the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee, which is a higher body."

Shekhar, who joined the Manthni Dalam in Karimnagar district in 1988 at the age of 24 allegedly under pressure from landlords, claims that when he visited his village after his surrender, everyone, including the landlord families, came to see him. "They were all very happy to see me. It's no more the kind of village it used to be."

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/indian...urgency-news-discussion-76.html#ixzz2WehWqjZw

Very good if true