Prodigy17
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Here is a befitting reply to Mr Sanger from a Pakistani journalists and it pretty much sums up the mood in Pakistan about Sanger's hogwash.
INSIGHT: Leave us alone and worry about yourself! Ejaz Haider
Pakistan is and will remain a Muslim country; its problem of terrorism which worries the US is, for the most part, begotten of US policies in the region and beyond. While we will try and keep our arsenal secure and safe, how about the US doing a bit of rethink about why some people hate it
And now to David Sangers January 11 write-up in The New York Times, adapted from his book, and titled, The Worst Pakistan Nightmare for Obama.
Let it be said upfront that the tone and tenor of Sangers piece is neither new nor surprising for those of us who monitor such writings and also write on the subject. This scenario has been painted and repainted constantly, as Sanger himself mentions when he talks about every few months someone in Washington...runs a simulation of how the United States should respond if a terrorist group infiltrates the Pakistani nuclear programme or manages to take over one or two of its weapons.
Sanger is also right that In these exercises, everyone plays to type and that Most of them dont end well. But where he is right is exactly where he goes wrong. He merely repeats the scenario(s) without contextualising issues especially when he attempts to create a linkage between Pakistans nuclear arsenal and the problem of terrorism.
Frankly, I would not entirely fault Sanger or his sources in the US government for conjuring up worst-case scenarios regarding Pakistans strategic arsenal. For them, given as they are to looking at the world from the American ideological prism, this is unfortunately the only mainstream way to go about things blessed by God, America cherishes its values and is surrounded by enemies who hate it for what it stands for.
Yet, there is much that is wrong with the US/Sanger approach. Lets consider.
It is both amusing and distressing that Sanger does not differentiate between safety and security of nuclear arsenal, two different problems. The first deals with the safe working mechanism of various parts of a nuclear warhead (accidents etc) and authorised use only, the second with the physical security and storage of a warhead and its components.
The only reason I can think of is that he is trying to build a case that there is greater likelihood of an insider or insiders getting their hands on the weapon(s) than someone trying to breach security from outside to steal and possess weapon(s). Hence, more than security, safety is the issue that comes up.
There is only one place where Sanger talks about actual possession of weapons by some terrorist outfit what happens when they [Pakistanis] move the weapons. As one of his sources put it, some groups could try to provoke a confrontation between Pakistan and India in the hope that the Pakistani military would transport tactical nuclear weapons closer to the front lines, where they would be more vulnerable to seizure.
First, the reference is to TNWs and manifests the Cold War mindset when artillery shells posed a command and control dilemma. Without going into too much detail, let it be said that Pakistans main forte is ballistic missiles, not artillery shells or low-yield TNWs. (Incidentally, centralisation and dispersal pose their own dilemma which is built into possession of nuclear weapons by any state. Sanger is, of course, not talking about that!)
Second, regardless of yield, an important factor for a weapon to be qualified as TNW is the role tactical or strategic in which it is being employed. The bomb dropped over Hiroshima could be used as a TNW if it were used away from a city in the desert or on sea over a strategic military target to maximise damage to that target with minimum collateral damage (Ejaz Haider, Does Pakistan have tactical nuclear weapons?; The Friday Times, June 21-27, 2002).
Third, Sangers piece, for obvious reasons, conveniently ignores Pakistans doctrinal position on nuclear deterrence and the fact that a conventional force build-up cannot and should not be assumed to lead to an automatic escalation to the nuclear dimension even if one or both sides are wedded to first use (Kargil and the 2001-2002 standoff are cases in point).
At another place, Sanger talks about The highly restricted reports which describe how foreign-trained Pakistani scientists, including some suspected of harbouring sympathy for radical Islamic causes, were returning to Pakistan to seek jobs within the countrys nuclear infrastructure presumably trying to burrow in among the 2,000 or so people who have what Kidwai calls critical knowledge of the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure.
At another place, however, he mentions that In Pakistan, the problem is made worse by the fact that the universities where the nuclear programme draws its young talent are now more radicalised than at any time in memory, and the nuclear programme itself has greatly expanded.
Damned we are by returning foreign-trained scientists trying to burrow in among the nuclear workforce and damned we are because the indigenously educated are radicalised.
Corollary: Pakistan should not possess nuclear weapons. Period.
The question is, if there are indeed reports about those returning from abroad, perhaps those findings can be shared with Pakistan where the SPD, since the AQ Khan episode, has a rigorous US-style PRP (personnel reliability programme) and all incoming and serving personnel throughout the nuclear establishment are constantly screened and monitored at all levels and for a broad range of activities.
As for local universities, while radical elements cannot be discounted, there is a tendency among Americans to equate a practicing Muslim with a radical or extremist. There can be any number of practicing Muslims in the nuclear establishment, but that per se makes them about as radical as church-going Christians or synagogue-attending Jews.
Much the same can be said about terrorists placing sleepers within the nuclear establishment. Of course, the very fact that Pakistan put in place a National Command Authority three years ahead of India and built the entire C2 system around C4I2SR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance) is meant to guard against various security and safety hazards that any state with nuclear weapons is likely to face.
I do not need to explain why a writer would focus more on threats than the system meant to neutralise them.
The giveaway, of course, is Sangers (and the general American) suggestion that India is not a threat to Pakistan and that the country should focus on the internal threat. Since Pakistans nuclear arsenal is meant to hold the inter-state military balance, just like the US, the implication seems to be that Pakistan no longer has a justification to have nuclear weapons.
But the fact is that while nuclear weapons are irrelevant to fighting asymmetric and irregular conflicts and this is true for possession of such weapons by all nuclear-weapons states nuclear weapons do provide the inter-state balance of terror. If there has been no war between India and Pakistan following Mumbai, much of the credit for that must be given to where it belongs.
Let it also be said that so far, despite much talk about it, there is no solid evidence of any Al Qaeda capability on the nuclear side. Similarly, one wonders why Sanger would express scepticism regarding Pakistani-built PALs (permissive action links). There is much Pakistan can do and it is not necessary for the country to inform the world about how.
As for Pakistan lying about developing the capability through the eighties, closer to home Sanger would do well to read up on lying by the Bush administration on Iraq and also read Avner Cohens book on Israel and its bomb. Also, for the purposes of describing Pakistan, it seems the US suddenly loses its Realism and Realists!
Finally, as should be evident from Sangers own quote of Robert Gates there is no human vetting system that is entirely reliable the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is as safe or unsafe as the US arsenal. As they say about foolproof, for every proof there is always a fool.
The fact is that Pakistans nuclear arsenal is here to stay; Pakistan is and will remain a Muslim country; its problem of terrorism which worries the US is, for the most part, begotten of US policies in the region and beyond. While we will try and keep our arsenal secure and safe, how about the US doing a bit of rethink about why some people hate it. As Robert Fisk put it, ...let us not say we do not know the answer.
Tailpiece: Away from the awesome nuclear weapons, Sanger in his opening paragraph described a lone, bored-looking guard loosely holding a rusting rifle manning the entrance to Chaklala Garrison. While I mentioned in my first piece that I have never seen an RP or MP sentry holding a rusted or rusting rifle, I must say that about Type 56 and its mother weapon, the AK, Sanger would do well to recall the words of Colonel David Hackworth of the United States Army. This is what Hack had to say about the AK:
One of the bulldozers uncovered the decomposing body of an enemy soldier, complete with AK-47. I happened to be standing right there, looking down into the hole and pulled the AK out of the bog. Watch this, guys, I said, and I will show you how a real infantry weapon works. I pulled the bolt back and fired 30 rounds the AK could have been cleaned that day rather than buried in glug for a year or so. That was the kind of weapon our soldiers needed, not the confidence-sapping M-16.
Finding: sometimes non-Americans can also manufacture things that actually work, and work better!
Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
Plus just to add to what the author said, americans better worry about their own nuclear weapons because it was US airforce which carried nuclear bombs in the airplanes over major american cities and these weapons kept laying in the airplanes while they stood on the tarmac. Looks like, some people have more reason to look inwards before they start mudslinging on others.
INSIGHT: Leave us alone and worry about yourself! Ejaz Haider
Pakistan is and will remain a Muslim country; its problem of terrorism which worries the US is, for the most part, begotten of US policies in the region and beyond. While we will try and keep our arsenal secure and safe, how about the US doing a bit of rethink about why some people hate it
And now to David Sangers January 11 write-up in The New York Times, adapted from his book, and titled, The Worst Pakistan Nightmare for Obama.
Let it be said upfront that the tone and tenor of Sangers piece is neither new nor surprising for those of us who monitor such writings and also write on the subject. This scenario has been painted and repainted constantly, as Sanger himself mentions when he talks about every few months someone in Washington...runs a simulation of how the United States should respond if a terrorist group infiltrates the Pakistani nuclear programme or manages to take over one or two of its weapons.
Sanger is also right that In these exercises, everyone plays to type and that Most of them dont end well. But where he is right is exactly where he goes wrong. He merely repeats the scenario(s) without contextualising issues especially when he attempts to create a linkage between Pakistans nuclear arsenal and the problem of terrorism.
Frankly, I would not entirely fault Sanger or his sources in the US government for conjuring up worst-case scenarios regarding Pakistans strategic arsenal. For them, given as they are to looking at the world from the American ideological prism, this is unfortunately the only mainstream way to go about things blessed by God, America cherishes its values and is surrounded by enemies who hate it for what it stands for.
Yet, there is much that is wrong with the US/Sanger approach. Lets consider.
It is both amusing and distressing that Sanger does not differentiate between safety and security of nuclear arsenal, two different problems. The first deals with the safe working mechanism of various parts of a nuclear warhead (accidents etc) and authorised use only, the second with the physical security and storage of a warhead and its components.
The only reason I can think of is that he is trying to build a case that there is greater likelihood of an insider or insiders getting their hands on the weapon(s) than someone trying to breach security from outside to steal and possess weapon(s). Hence, more than security, safety is the issue that comes up.
There is only one place where Sanger talks about actual possession of weapons by some terrorist outfit what happens when they [Pakistanis] move the weapons. As one of his sources put it, some groups could try to provoke a confrontation between Pakistan and India in the hope that the Pakistani military would transport tactical nuclear weapons closer to the front lines, where they would be more vulnerable to seizure.
First, the reference is to TNWs and manifests the Cold War mindset when artillery shells posed a command and control dilemma. Without going into too much detail, let it be said that Pakistans main forte is ballistic missiles, not artillery shells or low-yield TNWs. (Incidentally, centralisation and dispersal pose their own dilemma which is built into possession of nuclear weapons by any state. Sanger is, of course, not talking about that!)
Second, regardless of yield, an important factor for a weapon to be qualified as TNW is the role tactical or strategic in which it is being employed. The bomb dropped over Hiroshima could be used as a TNW if it were used away from a city in the desert or on sea over a strategic military target to maximise damage to that target with minimum collateral damage (Ejaz Haider, Does Pakistan have tactical nuclear weapons?; The Friday Times, June 21-27, 2002).
Third, Sangers piece, for obvious reasons, conveniently ignores Pakistans doctrinal position on nuclear deterrence and the fact that a conventional force build-up cannot and should not be assumed to lead to an automatic escalation to the nuclear dimension even if one or both sides are wedded to first use (Kargil and the 2001-2002 standoff are cases in point).
At another place, Sanger talks about The highly restricted reports which describe how foreign-trained Pakistani scientists, including some suspected of harbouring sympathy for radical Islamic causes, were returning to Pakistan to seek jobs within the countrys nuclear infrastructure presumably trying to burrow in among the 2,000 or so people who have what Kidwai calls critical knowledge of the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure.
At another place, however, he mentions that In Pakistan, the problem is made worse by the fact that the universities where the nuclear programme draws its young talent are now more radicalised than at any time in memory, and the nuclear programme itself has greatly expanded.
Damned we are by returning foreign-trained scientists trying to burrow in among the nuclear workforce and damned we are because the indigenously educated are radicalised.
Corollary: Pakistan should not possess nuclear weapons. Period.
The question is, if there are indeed reports about those returning from abroad, perhaps those findings can be shared with Pakistan where the SPD, since the AQ Khan episode, has a rigorous US-style PRP (personnel reliability programme) and all incoming and serving personnel throughout the nuclear establishment are constantly screened and monitored at all levels and for a broad range of activities.
As for local universities, while radical elements cannot be discounted, there is a tendency among Americans to equate a practicing Muslim with a radical or extremist. There can be any number of practicing Muslims in the nuclear establishment, but that per se makes them about as radical as church-going Christians or synagogue-attending Jews.
Much the same can be said about terrorists placing sleepers within the nuclear establishment. Of course, the very fact that Pakistan put in place a National Command Authority three years ahead of India and built the entire C2 system around C4I2SR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance) is meant to guard against various security and safety hazards that any state with nuclear weapons is likely to face.
I do not need to explain why a writer would focus more on threats than the system meant to neutralise them.
The giveaway, of course, is Sangers (and the general American) suggestion that India is not a threat to Pakistan and that the country should focus on the internal threat. Since Pakistans nuclear arsenal is meant to hold the inter-state military balance, just like the US, the implication seems to be that Pakistan no longer has a justification to have nuclear weapons.
But the fact is that while nuclear weapons are irrelevant to fighting asymmetric and irregular conflicts and this is true for possession of such weapons by all nuclear-weapons states nuclear weapons do provide the inter-state balance of terror. If there has been no war between India and Pakistan following Mumbai, much of the credit for that must be given to where it belongs.
Let it also be said that so far, despite much talk about it, there is no solid evidence of any Al Qaeda capability on the nuclear side. Similarly, one wonders why Sanger would express scepticism regarding Pakistani-built PALs (permissive action links). There is much Pakistan can do and it is not necessary for the country to inform the world about how.
As for Pakistan lying about developing the capability through the eighties, closer to home Sanger would do well to read up on lying by the Bush administration on Iraq and also read Avner Cohens book on Israel and its bomb. Also, for the purposes of describing Pakistan, it seems the US suddenly loses its Realism and Realists!
Finally, as should be evident from Sangers own quote of Robert Gates there is no human vetting system that is entirely reliable the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is as safe or unsafe as the US arsenal. As they say about foolproof, for every proof there is always a fool.
The fact is that Pakistans nuclear arsenal is here to stay; Pakistan is and will remain a Muslim country; its problem of terrorism which worries the US is, for the most part, begotten of US policies in the region and beyond. While we will try and keep our arsenal secure and safe, how about the US doing a bit of rethink about why some people hate it. As Robert Fisk put it, ...let us not say we do not know the answer.
Tailpiece: Away from the awesome nuclear weapons, Sanger in his opening paragraph described a lone, bored-looking guard loosely holding a rusting rifle manning the entrance to Chaklala Garrison. While I mentioned in my first piece that I have never seen an RP or MP sentry holding a rusted or rusting rifle, I must say that about Type 56 and its mother weapon, the AK, Sanger would do well to recall the words of Colonel David Hackworth of the United States Army. This is what Hack had to say about the AK:
One of the bulldozers uncovered the decomposing body of an enemy soldier, complete with AK-47. I happened to be standing right there, looking down into the hole and pulled the AK out of the bog. Watch this, guys, I said, and I will show you how a real infantry weapon works. I pulled the bolt back and fired 30 rounds the AK could have been cleaned that day rather than buried in glug for a year or so. That was the kind of weapon our soldiers needed, not the confidence-sapping M-16.
Finding: sometimes non-Americans can also manufacture things that actually work, and work better!
Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
Plus just to add to what the author said, americans better worry about their own nuclear weapons because it was US airforce which carried nuclear bombs in the airplanes over major american cities and these weapons kept laying in the airplanes while they stood on the tarmac. Looks like, some people have more reason to look inwards before they start mudslinging on others.
