H2O3C4Nitrogen
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Yup and that would definately would'nt be good for Pakistan Either.
Exit Strategy From Afghanistan
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Yup and that would definately would'nt be good for Pakistan Either.
H2O3C4Nitrogen
SENIOR MEMBER
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- Dec 3, 2007
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Q+A - Can the war in Afghanistan be won?
By Paul Eckert, Asia Correspondent
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - With the Obama administration set to release a policy review on Afghanistan and Pakistan, views on the U.S.-led international campaign's prospects in that war range from dire to hopeful.
Following are some questions and answers on the cases made by pessimists, those who call for setting the standard of success lower, and the rare optimists.
WHAT DO THE PESSIMISTS SEE?
Afghanistan's mountainous terrain, tribal population and history work against strong central government and against achieving Western goals. Add to this poor governance, corruption, a rampant drug trade and failure is certain.
The United States, NATO, Afghanistan and Pakistan are not just stalemated, they are losing the war against the Taliban despite the militants' weakness, wrote Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Weak performance by the Kabul government and political strife in Pakistan are compounded by NATO and other international forces' failure to deploy enough troops. International aid efforts are run in a chaotic, wasteful fashion, subject to much local corruption.
Pessimists point to statistics showing a sharp rise in violence -- civilian deaths jumping about 40 percent from 2007 to 2008 -- as well as rising U.S. troop deaths and spectacular terror attacks such as that on the Indian embassy in Kabul.
Political wrangling, economic distress and ever more brazen militant attacks in Pakistan add to the concerns of those who question that key neighbour's will to fight militants who attack Afghanistan from havens on Pakistani soil.
SHOULD SUCCESS BE REDEFINED BY LOWERING THE BAR?
Proponents of trimming back U.S. goals argue that eliminating the Taliban is an unattainable goal and that the U.S. focus should shift to containing the threat and reducing the threat of attacks on the West from Afghan soil.
This approach would draw down U.S. forces while building up the counter-insurgency capacity of the Afghan National Army, induce some Taliban to split with their hard-line leadership and enlist Afghanistan's neighbours, including Iran, in containing the Taliban and helping curb the inflow of funds.
This argument, criticized as "reductionist" by top Afghan officials, holds that building democracy in Afghanistan is neither achievable nor a compelling U.S. interest. As long as the country is not a haven for jihadists, Washington could hold its nose and live with a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
Pakistan, with its political turmoil, weak governance, ethnic divisions and nuclear weapons, is the proper U.S. focus because its loosely governed tribal regions are havens for al Qaeda and Taliban extremists.
IS THERE ROOM FOR OPTIMISM?
U.S. Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman argued in an op-ed that victory in Afghanistan can be achieved with more resources and broad set of security, governance and development policies. A minimalist focus on counter-terrorism would mean "losing slowly at tremendous cost," they wrote in The Washington Post.
A robust show of U.S. resolve would win over wavering segments of the populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan, where memories of abandonment by the Americans after the 1980s anti-Soviet war run deep. More popular support would pay off in better intelligence and shrink the havens militants enjoy.
Winning in Afghanistan will require some of the same mix of military and political policies that helped stabilise Iraq -- attacking hard-core militants while negotiating or buying off the less committed.
Comparisons of statistics on militant attacks in Afghanistan with those in Iraq during the 2006 peak of violence show them to be only a fraction of the Iraqi carnage. Kabul and vast parts of Afghanistan are relatively tranquil and Afghan militants are far less effective and well-organized fighters than those in Iraq were.
The Obama administration's plan to add 17,000 U.S. troops to the 38,000 there now will help the war effort, as will a major boosting of intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. Most of the extra resources will go to troubled southern Afghanistan.
The burden of fighting can shift from international forces to the multiethnic Afghan National Army, which enjoys trust across the country. But that 80,000-strong force must be trebled with major funding from the United States and allies.
(Editing by Eric Walsh)
Q+A - Can the war in Afghanistan be won? | Politics | First 100 Days | Reuters
By Paul Eckert, Asia Correspondent
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - With the Obama administration set to release a policy review on Afghanistan and Pakistan, views on the U.S.-led international campaign's prospects in that war range from dire to hopeful.
Following are some questions and answers on the cases made by pessimists, those who call for setting the standard of success lower, and the rare optimists.
WHAT DO THE PESSIMISTS SEE?
Afghanistan's mountainous terrain, tribal population and history work against strong central government and against achieving Western goals. Add to this poor governance, corruption, a rampant drug trade and failure is certain.
The United States, NATO, Afghanistan and Pakistan are not just stalemated, they are losing the war against the Taliban despite the militants' weakness, wrote Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Weak performance by the Kabul government and political strife in Pakistan are compounded by NATO and other international forces' failure to deploy enough troops. International aid efforts are run in a chaotic, wasteful fashion, subject to much local corruption.
Pessimists point to statistics showing a sharp rise in violence -- civilian deaths jumping about 40 percent from 2007 to 2008 -- as well as rising U.S. troop deaths and spectacular terror attacks such as that on the Indian embassy in Kabul.
Political wrangling, economic distress and ever more brazen militant attacks in Pakistan add to the concerns of those who question that key neighbour's will to fight militants who attack Afghanistan from havens on Pakistani soil.
SHOULD SUCCESS BE REDEFINED BY LOWERING THE BAR?
Proponents of trimming back U.S. goals argue that eliminating the Taliban is an unattainable goal and that the U.S. focus should shift to containing the threat and reducing the threat of attacks on the West from Afghan soil.
This approach would draw down U.S. forces while building up the counter-insurgency capacity of the Afghan National Army, induce some Taliban to split with their hard-line leadership and enlist Afghanistan's neighbours, including Iran, in containing the Taliban and helping curb the inflow of funds.
This argument, criticized as "reductionist" by top Afghan officials, holds that building democracy in Afghanistan is neither achievable nor a compelling U.S. interest. As long as the country is not a haven for jihadists, Washington could hold its nose and live with a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
Pakistan, with its political turmoil, weak governance, ethnic divisions and nuclear weapons, is the proper U.S. focus because its loosely governed tribal regions are havens for al Qaeda and Taliban extremists.
IS THERE ROOM FOR OPTIMISM?
U.S. Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman argued in an op-ed that victory in Afghanistan can be achieved with more resources and broad set of security, governance and development policies. A minimalist focus on counter-terrorism would mean "losing slowly at tremendous cost," they wrote in The Washington Post.
A robust show of U.S. resolve would win over wavering segments of the populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan, where memories of abandonment by the Americans after the 1980s anti-Soviet war run deep. More popular support would pay off in better intelligence and shrink the havens militants enjoy.
Winning in Afghanistan will require some of the same mix of military and political policies that helped stabilise Iraq -- attacking hard-core militants while negotiating or buying off the less committed.
Comparisons of statistics on militant attacks in Afghanistan with those in Iraq during the 2006 peak of violence show them to be only a fraction of the Iraqi carnage. Kabul and vast parts of Afghanistan are relatively tranquil and Afghan militants are far less effective and well-organized fighters than those in Iraq were.
The Obama administration's plan to add 17,000 U.S. troops to the 38,000 there now will help the war effort, as will a major boosting of intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. Most of the extra resources will go to troubled southern Afghanistan.
The burden of fighting can shift from international forces to the multiethnic Afghan National Army, which enjoys trust across the country. But that 80,000-strong force must be trebled with major funding from the United States and allies.
(Editing by Eric Walsh)
Q+A - Can the war in Afghanistan be won? | Politics | First 100 Days | Reuters
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