Evolution of Military Processes : British Indian Army

[third eye]

I have been doing some reading on the evolution of the system of governance of Armies. To begin with I looked at the British Indian Army. I am reproducing some of what I have found through numerous sources.

This shall be continued as the subject is vast , fascinating, dynamic and forms the basis of HR practices as followed by the Corporate world today.

The Indian , Pakistani & BD armies still follow these processes today with some modifications.

Feedback/ comments would be appreciated.



The British military domination of the subcontinent was mainly possible because Indians
joined the colonial army and remained loyal to it. This was partly because the British
introduced an innovative bureaucratic structure for constructing the colonial military.

One of the principal elements introduced by the British for structuring the army, was the welfare
package for the soldiers. This package included a series of incentives with which the
imperialists' attempted to purchase the soldiers loyalty. This policy enabled the colonial
army to attract and retain Indian manpower and to prevent any large-scale military rebellion
after 1857. The incentives offered to the soldiers probably created bonds of loyalty between
the troops and the army’s high command. An impersonal loyalty structure replaced the
personal loyalty of the soldiers to their clan and tribal chiefs, which was present in pre
British armies.


The British conquest of India was mainly possible because of the low military
effectiveness of the Indian potentates' military forces. In India, the jagirdars (landlords)
were responsible for raising military contingents in exchange for the assignment of land
revenue by the monarchies. Since the jagirdars enlisted and maintained the troops who were
from their own clans, the soldiers were loyal to them. In the Rajput Army, the jagirs were
more or less hereditary. When the jagirdars died, then their sons served in the force and
enjoyed the revenue assignments, even if they were incompetent.

This hereditary principle implied the absence of professionalism. Due to the absence of a regular bureaucracy, the welfare schemes for the soldiers remained ad hoc, and the jagirdars lined their pockets. The lack of cohesiveness of these forces was because the distribution of rewards in such armiesremained chaotic.

Pay and pension remained in arrears. Medical facilities and the
commissariats were non-existent. Promotions were based on nepotism. To avert defeat,
Mahadji Sindia and Ranjit Singh tried to Europeanize their armies by bureaucratizing the
distribution of incentives to the soldiers. They tried to eliminate the jagirdars and bring the
armies under their direct administration, so that the soldiers would be loyal to the state.
But their reforms were too few and too late.

To construct the Indian Army, the British depended on two sources: the
professional military forces of Europe, and indigenous military traditions. One of the chief
instruments, which enabled the British to craft a new type of army, was the systematic
supply of incentives to the soldiers. The British imitated these incentives from the Western
standing armies. The professional armies, which emerged in the West from 1700 onwards,
had regular wages, graduated-wage scales, uniforms, and a hierarchy of ranks.


The statetook over from the private contractors the responsibilities of feeding, clothing and
equipping the military personnel. This introduced the concept of contract between the
impersonal armed forces' establishments and the military labourers, which replaced the
feudal concept of hereditary service among the landlords and the retainers. As the troops
shifted their loyalty from the intermediary lords to the polities, the armies from quasi-private
enterprises became public institutions. A similar transformation in the armed forces
occurred in India. However the colonial setting modified some of the incentives which were
provided to the troops. Since the British could not utilize Indian soldiers' national
sentiment, it became very important to supply them with monetary and non-monetary
incentiv.es, at the right time and right place, and in adequate quantities. So the colonial army
created an administrative machinery to provide various types of rewards to the soldiers.

The bureaucratic mechanism was geared towards supplying items for the troops' welfare, is
called here the 'welfare mechanism'. The welfare bureaucracy was flexible, and responded
to the soldiers grievances. We could infer that by caring for its personnel, the army integrated
the troops and prevented desertions, mutinies and treacheries that were endemic in the pre
colonial militias.

Benefits available to the Soldiers


The imperial aim was to raise the. combat efficiency of the army by inculcating bravery and
loyalty among the rank and file. The British assumption was that valour and faithfulness could be awakened and sustained by distributing rewards among the troops. So they provided a series of benefits which were absent in the pre British armed forces. The incentive scheme evolved from the late 18th century onwards, and underwent modifications and expansion in the 1857 Mutiny's aftermath. Greater rewards were reaped by the units destined for the battle zones and overseas service as those activities involved greater stress
and strain, long separation from families and physical hardships.

Tangible benefits can be classified into monetary and non-monetary incentives. The
most important monetary benefits were wages. The Indian Army, from the late 18th century
onwards, paid the soldiers regularly in cash, because the British assumed that such
continuity and regularity gave the troops a sense of loyalty, in other words that their sense
of security tied them to the army. Paying salaries punctually in cash was an important
innovation introduced by the British in the subcontinent. Even in the 19th century, Nepal,
though trying to model her troops on the West, paid them by granting land. Many months
of arrears of pay were common in the Khalsa Army, and caused successive mutinies. Extra
money was allotted to the colonial soldiers for encouraging overseas service.

After 1859,those irregular cavalry units which went to Aden, had their pay increased by one-third.

Were the wages of privates adequate? One School of opinion felt that the soldiers' pay was so high that they were able to save a lot from their wages. They sent their savings home, and these remittances
reinvigorated the rural economy. Others like R.G. Fox argued that the small peasants sent their younger
sons to the army to supplement their families' income. But others point out that the
soldiers' pay was inadequate even for the basic amenities of life. The salaries of the
privates were actually adequate only for the basic necessities of life.

Till 1911, the privates were paid Rs 7 per month. In 1861, the government had to spend to Rs 9 per month for
each soldier's ration. The commissariat did not supply the soldiers except in abnormal
times. Even if we assume that the privates took a less varied diet than that provided by the
commissariat, their salaries, after various deductions for clothing etc., were just enough for
subsistence.

To tide over the price fluctuations of foodgrains, the army paid extra money, known
as batta, to the soldiers. In the first half of the 19th century, batta was paid to the soldiers for
service in 'foreign' areas like Punjab and Sind. But when the Company annexed these two
regions, batta for the units deployed there was abolished, despite the high price of
food grains there. This angered the soldiers and was one of the factors in the upheaval in
1857.Bartle Frere, the Commissioner of Sind, argued that abolition of batta was a
mistake as a private could serve in the Ganga valley for Rs 7 per month, but it was
impossible for him to serve in Sind even for Rs 10 per month. Sir George Clerk, a civilian
official argued against this, saying that batta should not be paid for service in northwest
India as foodgrains costs in that region had declined.12 However Frere carried the day,
probably because the British were nervous after the Great Mutiny, and after 1857 batta was
paid for service inside as well as outside India.

To prevent the possibility of any mutiny when soldiers who were not needed were
discharged, the army sweetened the pill by offering them gratuities: the greater the length of
service for the Raj, the bigger the reward offered. When the 13th Punjab Infantry's
personnel were invalided at Meerut in 1861, those with 20 years of service got pensions as
well as gratuity which amounted to 9 months' pay, and those with less then 20 years of
service were awarded pensions plus gratuity equivalent to 6 months' pay

In the pre colonial Hindu armies, family pension was available only for the officers.
When they died, their relatives were given villages by the king. The British converted this
welfare measure into cash and extended it to the privates. The imperial aim was that the
scheme of family pensions would attach not only the soldiers, but also their families to the
service of colonialism. If the heirs were women or old men, the pensions were paid till their
death. If dead soldiers had no surviving parents, then the pensions were paid to their sons
till they became adults, or to their daughters till their marriages. If soldiers died fighting
gallantly, then an extraordinary lump sum, instead of a mere family pension, was granted.

In 1860 the mother of one brave Resaldar Wachan Singh, received Rs 1000 after his
death. Such payments were designed to generate aggressiveness among the soldiers
during combat, as the troops were sure that, even if they died fighting, their loved ones
would be cared for by the government.

The army hoped to activate the soldiers' combat ardour through the wound
pension, which was introduced in 1852. This sort of pension was given to personnel who
lost their limbs while fighting, or became so seriously wounded that they had to be
discharged from the army. The magnitude of this pension depended on the nature of
wounds. Privates with minor injuries received Rs 4 per month while those with serious
wounds received Rs 5 per month.


To enhance group morale among the soldiers, and to make them more amenable to
discipline, the Western professional armies provided uniforms to them. Uniforms for
soldiers were a novelty in India. The Maratha Army had no uniforms. The Indian army
supplied uniforms annually, free of cost, to soldiers who went abroad. In 1859, each of the
5000 soldiers who went to China got 2 pairs of greatcoats. An allowance was provided to
the soldiers, for maintaining their uniforms.

To be continued.

@Icarus @waz @nair

 

[waz]

Good thread, I'll contribute as well.

 

[third eye]

Continued from Post # 1

Before combat, the Rajputs used to take opium to reduce their nervousness. The
British replaced opium with alcohol~ because contemporary British medical opinion
believed that alcohol cured many diseases. So during epidemics, liquor flowed freely.

John Keegan writes that drink was an important palliative of nervous tension while waiting for
action. Just before battle, it was a psychological necessity. Taking alcohol before battles was
common in the European armies, and this trend the British introduced in India. When the
Indian soldiers faced extra strain, as during campaigns or overseas deployments, they were
provided with extra amounts of rum and malt liquor to keep their morale intact

Each soldier generally was supplied with 1 dram of rum per day; but during war and epidemics,
the army provided each soldier with 2 drams per day. Sick soldiers were allowed to buy
rum at a subsidized price from the army canteens. Alcohol was also the best antidote to the
boredom inherent in the long garrison duties.

When it was not possible to provide cooked food to soldiers during emergencies,
the army provided, at controlled prices in the bazaars set up under military supervision, raw
food grains which the men had to cook. Bazars were an indigenous tradition which the
British absorbed. When local supplies were not forthcoming, such markets were set up and
they had at least 3 days supplies. The commanding officers maintained registers which
contained the names of all the baniahs (Hindu businessmen) who were allowed to join the
market. The baniahs had to pay a certain sum to the regiments for being allowed to do
business. One baniah supplied either a company or half a squadron of cavalry. The baniahs ·
occasionally supplied on credit. No mahajans (moneylenders) were allowed in the bazaars,
because the army feared that the soldiers might get into debt. Indian officers were
appointed as kotwals, who saw that baniahs supplied proper quantities of cereals to the
soldiers.

 

[third eye]

In continuation to posts #1 & 3..

Some aspects of the Indian Army's reward structure were unique by European standards because the British absorbed some indigenous elements. Land-grants to the soldiers, which the British retained for the Indian Army, had no place in the professional European armies. This incentive was a continuation of the pre colonial military tradition of
issuing hereditary land grants (jagirs) to the soldiers. Most of the soldiers came from small peasant families, and had a stake in the land. The army encouraged them by dangling the prospect of jagirs in front of them.

For exceptional performances, like raising soldiers for the Raj, saving the lives of British officers, suffering wounds in battles etc., the army awarded such personnel land. Aitah Mohammed Khan was a Resaldar in the Bunoo (Banu) Police
Cavalry. During 1857, he volunteered for service in Hindustan along with 112 of his tribesmen. They were in the Multan Horse and fought against the rebels in Delhi. After the rebellion, he and his followers were granted jagirs (each worth Rs 1 000), in perpetuity.

When it was not possible to provide cooked food to soldiers during emergencies,the army provided, at controlled prices in the bazaars set up under military supervision, raw food grains which the men had to cook. Bazars were an indigenous tradition which the British absorbed. When local supplies were not forthcoming, such markets were set up and
they had at least 3 days supplies. The commanding officers maintained registers which contained the names of all the baniahs (Hindu businessmen) who were allowed to join the market.

The baniahs had to pay a certain sum to the regiments for being allowed to do business. One baniah supplied either a company or half a squadron of cavalry. The baniahs · occasionally supplied on credit. No mahajans (moneylenders) were allowed in the bazaars, because the army feared that the soldiers might get into debt. Indian officers were
appointed as kotwals, who saw that baniahs supplied proper quantities of cereals to the
soldiers.

The history of warfare shows, however, that soldiers were not willing to die just for tangible incentives. The missing link was symbolic rewards. Such tokens conferred honour and glory: the intangible factors that led men to war. The pre colonial armies had at their disposal robes of honour, daggers etc. which were awarded to exceptional warriors. But
the British replaced these with rewards like medals imported from the West. Charles I in 164 3 first introduced the silver medal for those men who had performed well under difficult circumstances. Individual loyalty and gallantry were honoured by supplying Distinguished Service Medals to the Indian soldiers after extraordinary performances. 29 For honouring regimental pride, the 2nd Gurkha Rifles, which participated in the successful KabulKandahar
march, was awarded bronze stars in February 1882. Though such medals were of little intrinsic value, they had value within the armed forces: It was rightly surmised that the cultural ethos of the military organizations was different from the civilian world.

Ranks were a sort of carrot which, the British believed, encouraged the soldiers to risk their lives repeatedly. This was because higher ranks meant greater prestige, along with financial perquisites.

Good Conduct Pay was another scheme introduced in 1837 for disciplining the soldiers. Those who served obediently received extra pay. The army's plan was to encourage long-term loyalty. The longer the soldiers remained loyal, the greater was their Good Conduct Pay. After 6 years of service it became Rs 1 per month and for 10 years of
service, it increased to Rs 2 per month. However, the commanding officers could deny this extra pay on grounds of misconduct.

There was disagreement in the army over this scheme: some officers wanted to link discipline with combat effectiveness. They argued that the higher pay should depend, not merely on the proper conduct and length of service, but also
on the tactical efficiency of the troops.

The breakdown of discipline in 1857 forced the army to strengthen the link between obedient behavior and wages. The Punjab School argued that ambition and satisfaction could be induced among the soldiers by a graduated scale of pay for each rank. The authorities hoped that this would satisfy the loyal veterans, and would discourage rebelliousness among the junior troops, as they were bound to gain economically by remaining loyal in the long run. This scheme was geared to encourage loyalty among the younger soldiers, as the life pension scheme had attractions only for the old soldiers who
were going to retire (and most of the rebels of 1857 had been newly enlisted recruits).

Under this scheme the privates got Rs 6 per month for the 1st year of service, Rs 7 per month from the 2nd year of their service, and Rs 8 per month after 15 years of service. Finally, after 20 years of service, they received Rs 8.8 per month. Graduated scales of pay existed for the Indian officers also, but they were based not only on seniority, but also on
merit as assessed by the British officers.36 The power of assessing the capabilities of the Indian officers, enabled the British officers to control them.

The underlying assumption was that the troops, in the hope of getting a pension after retirement, remained obedient (as 'misbehaviour' would result in discharges). But as the pension had remained the same for the last hundred years, it should be raised. W Meyer, a civilian official, challenged this line of thinking. Meyer argued that it was improper to pamper the soldiers, who were mercenaries. Moreover, he continued, in the civil departments, one received a pension after 30 years of service while conditions in the army were improving. Before 1857, soldiers received a pension after 40 years of service. In 1878, they received pension after 32 years of service. And now they were receiving it after 25 years of service. Aylmer argued against this that the soldiers' job was more arduous than that of the civilians were and there was no other option than to keep the mercenaries contented. However, in the end, due to the army's penny-pinching policy, the pension was not raised despite the threat to discipline.

To be continued..