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EMALS and AAG delays and cost increases have hit a point where theyre creating problems for the new Ford Class carriers, driving up costs to $12.8 billion for the 1st ship, adding risk, and impairing initial capabilities.
Costs: Since 2008, EMALS-related costs for the first-of-class Gerald R. Ford [CVN 78] have risen by 133.7%, from $317.7 $742.6 million. AAG costs have also spiked, though its 124.8% jump is only from $75 $168.6 million. This is so despite the Navys 2010 firm fixed-price contracts to produce these systems for CVN 78. Even with cost caps, however, late delivery and testing means that changes have to be made to a partially-complete ship. EMALS configuration changes have already forced electrical, wiring, and other changes within the ship; and instead of just being hoisted into place, the Advanced Arresting Gear will now have to be installed in pieces via a hole cut in the flight deck. AAG continues to undergo redesigns, most recently to its energy-absorbing water twister, and limited EMALS testing with the delayed F-35C risks forcing further changes after the ship has been built. The Navy says that all future changes will take place within the components allotted space and weight, but GAO doesnt think they can possibly know that.
Risk: Beyond redesign risks, the Navy needs to confront larger ship delivery risks. At present, EMALS isnt scheduled for TRL 7 level maturity until FY 2014, with AAG to follow in FY 2015. The ship is due for delivery in FY 2016. Systems are already maturing so late that comprehensive testing must wait until the ship is at sea, so further schedule delays have nowhere else to go. Launch delays would mean delays to post-launch test programs, which are closely synced with ship delivery.
Capabilities: Once CVN 78 is built, EMALS and AAGs reliability will continue to hamper operations. As of March 2013, both systems are far below where theyre supposed to be, with critical failures every 2-3 cycles. Since Initial Operational Test & Evaluation requires certain reliability levels between critical failures (MTBCF), continued problems could endanger the ships entry into service. GAO points out that the Navys Duane model for reliability growth doesnt match their long-standing data, and even under optimistic planned growth levels, AAG isnt supposed to hit the ~100 cycle MTBCF minimums before 2027. EMALS will take even longer, to 2032.
Unless and until they succeed, theyll destroy the new carriers key 2007 promise of generating 25% more aircraft sorties per ship than the Nimitz Class. As things stand, even meeting the USS Enterprises OEF wartime record of 2,970 combat missions and a 99.1% sortie completion rate seems unlikely. Sources: GAO Report #GAO-13-396 | Virginian-Pilot , The costs and doubts keep growing for carrier Ford.
EMALS/ AAG: Electro-Magnetic Launch & Recovery for Carriers
Costs: Since 2008, EMALS-related costs for the first-of-class Gerald R. Ford [CVN 78] have risen by 133.7%, from $317.7 $742.6 million. AAG costs have also spiked, though its 124.8% jump is only from $75 $168.6 million. This is so despite the Navys 2010 firm fixed-price contracts to produce these systems for CVN 78. Even with cost caps, however, late delivery and testing means that changes have to be made to a partially-complete ship. EMALS configuration changes have already forced electrical, wiring, and other changes within the ship; and instead of just being hoisted into place, the Advanced Arresting Gear will now have to be installed in pieces via a hole cut in the flight deck. AAG continues to undergo redesigns, most recently to its energy-absorbing water twister, and limited EMALS testing with the delayed F-35C risks forcing further changes after the ship has been built. The Navy says that all future changes will take place within the components allotted space and weight, but GAO doesnt think they can possibly know that.
Risk: Beyond redesign risks, the Navy needs to confront larger ship delivery risks. At present, EMALS isnt scheduled for TRL 7 level maturity until FY 2014, with AAG to follow in FY 2015. The ship is due for delivery in FY 2016. Systems are already maturing so late that comprehensive testing must wait until the ship is at sea, so further schedule delays have nowhere else to go. Launch delays would mean delays to post-launch test programs, which are closely synced with ship delivery.
Capabilities: Once CVN 78 is built, EMALS and AAGs reliability will continue to hamper operations. As of March 2013, both systems are far below where theyre supposed to be, with critical failures every 2-3 cycles. Since Initial Operational Test & Evaluation requires certain reliability levels between critical failures (MTBCF), continued problems could endanger the ships entry into service. GAO points out that the Navys Duane model for reliability growth doesnt match their long-standing data, and even under optimistic planned growth levels, AAG isnt supposed to hit the ~100 cycle MTBCF minimums before 2027. EMALS will take even longer, to 2032.
Unless and until they succeed, theyll destroy the new carriers key 2007 promise of generating 25% more aircraft sorties per ship than the Nimitz Class. As things stand, even meeting the USS Enterprises OEF wartime record of 2,970 combat missions and a 99.1% sortie completion rate seems unlikely. Sources: GAO Report #GAO-13-396 | Virginian-Pilot , The costs and doubts keep growing for carrier Ford.
EMALS/ AAG: Electro-Magnetic Launch & Recovery for Carriers