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Electronic Warfare.

What is the 'beaconing effect' ?

A beacon is a signal of some form that is designed to attract attention. A flag is a visual beacon. A trumpet is an auditory beacon. Both are essentially long range communication devices. Long range as in outside of physical contact.

The keywords here are 'to attract attention', which indicate an effect. Hence, the phrase 'beaconing effect'. Attracting attention can be either intentional or unintentional. A bald man in a group of men with full heads of hair is -- usually -- unintentionally attracting attention to himself. When low tide revealed a small reef, the observers' eyes are usually drawn to the reef. A model wearing colorful clothes is intentionally drawing attention to herself. A opera tenor hitting an extraordinary low note is intentionally attracting attention to his effort.

Electronic counter-countermeasure - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This mode, called 'home-on-jam', actually makes the missile's job easier. Some missile seekers actually target the enemy's radiation sources, and are therefore called "anti-radiation missiles" (ARM). The jamming in this case effectively becomes a beacon announcing the presence and location of the transmitter.
One area of EW is the avoidance of radar focus, meaning the desire to NOT attracting the attention of a radar seeker.

In radar detection, only a small fraction of the total transmitted power returned from a reflection, aka 'target'. By the time the penetrator became a target, any activation of EW countermeasure will be to overwhelm the sensor, thereby denying the seeking radar the precise spatial location of the penetrator. Unfortunately, this attempt to deny the seeking radar of the penetrator's spatial location also create -- unintentionally -- the 'beaconing effect'.

So how can the penetrator uses EW to advantage ? The answer lies in understanding the foundation of radar detection physics and targeting principles.

In radar detection, any body that is outside of 75% of maximum distance is usually problematic for targeting. So assume for simplicity's sake a maximum distance of 100 km, any body that produces a reflection at greater than 75 km will be difficult for the seeking radar to process that reflection as a valid, meaning consistent, target. It will be difficult, not impossible. For the seeking radar, this body may produce a reflection in one millisecond, nothing in the next millisecond, and generally inconsistent over time. Approaching the maximum distance, this body may or may not produce reflections from pulse to pulse in a pulse train, making detection even more problematic. The seeking radar may process this amorphous body as worthy of revisiting in the next sweep, meaning to keep in memory, or to dismiss it completely, meaning to erase from memory. Either way depends on the radar's system design.

In EW, if the penetrator activate his countermeasure at the moment of detection of the seeking radar's transmission, which assume to be that 100 km maximum distance, the penetrator's countermeasure would create that 'beaconing effect'. In essence, the penetrator unwittingly aided the seeking radar to his own general direction of entry, if not precise spatial location. Remember that a countermeasure signal power is always greater than reflected signal power because the desire is to deny the seeking radar any precise spatial location.

The decision to activate countermeasure falls under understanding targeting principles AFTER understanding the foundation of radar detection physics. Since physics already imposed a certain level of uncertainty upon the seeking radar, the penetrator wanting to avoid attention upon himself can exploit that 'greater than 75% of maximum distance' vulnerability. He can safely assume that upon detection of a seeking radar's transmission, he is at the edge of that maximum distance, so there should NOT be any automatic activation of countermeasure to avoid creating that 'beaconing effect'. He would know that his own reflections are themselves small beacons, no matter how weak their power or how inconsistent over time, so any additional power generated by him will be counterproductive to his mission, which is to penetrate an airspace undetected.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) greatly aids the penetrator in mapping out those maximum distances of radar transmissions from multiple radars providing detection coverage for important surface locations. No radar network, meaning multiple radars working together, have perfect coverage. It is 'perfect' only in the sense that a penetrator is ignorant of the maximum distances of all the radars in that network, thereby continually going below that 75% threshold from one radar to the next, thus revealing himself by his reflections, from one radar to the next.

This does not mean the 'beaconing effect' is a negative in EW. The effect can be used as a diversion tactic to cover for a different penetrator who may approach the area from a different direction. The countermeasure transmission power does not have to be at maximum level, but maybe just enough to create a 'target' for a seeking radar. Overwhelming the seeking radar indicate countermeasure is in play and will create one response, but creating a false target will create a different response, one that can be exploited to the penetrator's advantage.
 
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Lawmaker Says Air Force Delaying Electronic Warfare Missile
Apr 29, 2015 | by Bryant Jordan

A Florida lawmaker's bid to push the Air Force to develop new electronic weapons failed on Tuesday when the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said the effort was technically flawed.

Rep. Richard Nugent, R-Florida, said the Air Force "has been dragging its feet" on preparing the weapon for deployment and instead redirecting $10 million the service received in 2015.

"The Air Force has really been skating around this congressional intent a lot lately, and almost everyone has experienced frustration [with their] tactics," Nugent said, citing the service's determination to retire the A-10 Thunderbolt over the will of Congress.

Nugent hoped to remedy that by including an amendment in the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act ordering the Air Force to direct $10 million to the Counter-electronics High-powered Microwave Missile Project.

The missile is considered non-lethal because it is designed to knock out electronics systems but not directly harm people or destroy structures.

The Air Force started developing the $40 million program in 2009. Service officials completed what was called a successful test in 2012 when the missile was flown on the wing of a B-52. The program is led by Boeing.

The amendment failed to get a vote, however, after HASC Chairman Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, opposed it on technicalities, "not because I disagree with anything that [Nugent] said about the program itself," Thornberry told the hearing.

Nugent first pitched using the CHAMP system on a cruise missile in June 2014, arguing the Air Force could have it ready for combat within 18 months.


He said the Air Force appears to be holding off developing the system for use until they can put it onto a reusable vehicle.


"The problem is, they can have the best of intentions in wanting something reusable, but they have nothing in design now and no idea of what it would be," he told Military.com. "By the time they do the development and testing, and then get to procurement, it'll be way down the road."

Combatant commanders have asked for this capability, he said.

"And we're saying use it, on short term put them on cruise missiles that we have that are sitting there in warehouses because we've removed the nuclear devices off them" he said.

Nugent told the committee the Air Force can place the system onto cruise missiles while developing a reusable vehicle.

Lawmaker Says Air Force Delaying Electronic Warfare Missile | Military.com
 
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Aselsan ECMS on Cobra

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Aselsan HEWS on BlackHawk

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Aselsan HEWS on Atak-B
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Koral Land based Electronic attack jammer

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Naval surface platform electronic warfare system called ARES-2N

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Submarines electronic warfare system called ARES-2SC

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Protection against RF guided missiles, MEHPOD

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AirSoj jammer project

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Multi-int project
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Aselsan Hizir Torpedo counter measure system for surface warships

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Decoys
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Aselsan's Tork poised to enter hard-kill torpedo countermeasures market
Menno Steketee, Amsterdam - IHS Jane's Navy International
13 July 2015


Key Points
  • New Aselsan concept enters hard-kill 'anti-torpedo' market
  • The torpedo countermeasures market, long-dominated by soft-kill methods, is evolving with new hard-kill concepts emerging
Turkey's Aselsan has recently revealed a new weapon concept that joins the growing number of hard-kill system approaches designed to kinetically destroy an incoming torpedo.

Tork is a surface-based 'anti-torpedo' torpedo that draws on Aselsan's soft-kill torpedo countermeasures expertise (in systems such as Hizir for surface vessels and Zargana for submarines). Fired from standard torpedo tubes, it uses an active acoustic homing system to detect an incoming weapon. Tork will be integrated into the Zargana and Hizir systems.

Aselsan's Tork poised to enter hard-kill torpedo countermeasures market - IHS Jane's 360
 
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