Dynamics of China Bangladesh Relations

[Lankan Ranger]

Dynamics of China Bangladesh Relations

It is difficult to characterise the China-Bangladesh relations in the conventional mould. Dhaka has been heavily depending on Beijing for its defence requirements and development needs. This has made Bangladesh easily vulnerable to Chinese pressure and persuasions. China sees its foothold in Bangladesh as a part of its quest to establish its regional power profile; and as a means to challenge India in its own South Asian backyard. Bangladesh looks to China because of Myanmar factor as well.

Successive governments which came to office in Dhaka after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib-ur – Rehman in 1975 have contributed to cementing of ties with China. Their own anti-India approach, some deft foot-work by Pakistan and China’s willingness to open the purse strings led to the upswing in the ties and resulted in China emerging today as a very important factor in Bangladesh’s foreign relations.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite the popular mandate won by her Awami League, may not tinker with the foreign policy in the short to medium term. Firstly pro-India image limits her turf space. Secondly, she cannot let her immediate predecessor, Khaleda Zia, steal the ‘Bangladesh first and foremost’ thunder. Hasina gave ample demonstration of this resolve in her earlier term itself when the Bangladesh Rifles under the command of a trusted aide delivered a bloody nose to the Indian Border Security Force.

Whatever are the political ifs and buts, Hasina government cannot gloss over the reality that Bangladesh armed forces are dependent on China’s military hardware. The Army is equipped with Chinese tanks, the Navy with Chinese frigates and missile boats, and the Air Force with Chinese fighter jets. Both countries have a defence cooperation agreement in place since 2002. It covers military training and defence production also.

In 2006, China supplied 65 artillery guns and 114 missile and related systems. Most of the tanks (T-59, T-62, T-69 and T-79), armoured personnel carriers (APCs), artillery pieces, small arms and personal weapons in the Bangladesh army are of Chinese origin. Plans are afoot to acquire 155mm PLZ-45/Type -88 (including transfer of technology) and 122mm Type-96 as well as MBRLS from China by 2011.

The Chinese wares with the Bangladesh Navy are truly wide-ranging. These raise questions on the scope, direction and intentions of Bangladesh navy. The Chinese platforms in its possession include the 053-H1 Jianghu I class frigates with 4x HY2 missiles, Huang Feng Class missile boats, Type-024 missile boats, Huchuan and P-4 class torpedo boats, Hainan class sub chasers, Shanghai class gun boats and Yuchin class LCUs.

The BNS Khalid Bin Walid has been retrofitted with HQ-7 SAM from China. Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, former Commander of PLA Navy had promised during a one-on-one meeting with his Bangladesh counterpart full cooperation in the sophisticated naval management.

In so far the Air Force is concerned, it has been getting steady supplies from 1977 – the year Bangladesh-China relations graduated from a state of total negation into which the ties were pushed as a result of China siding with Pakistan during the ‘Liberation War’ in 1971 and using veto to block the new nation’s entry into the UN. It has thus far received 16 F-7BGs, F7 and Q 5 fighters and PT 6 trainers.

Bangladesh set up a missile launch pad near the Chittagong Port with assistance from China. The maiden test was carried out on May 12, 2008 with active participation of Chinese experts. Land attack anti-ship cruise missile C-802A was test fired shortly afterwards from the frigate, BNS Osman near Kutubdia island in the Bay of Bengal. This missile is said to have a strike range of 120kms.

What strikes the test is the Chinese signature. BNS Osman (commissioned 1989) is a 1500-ton Chinese built Jianghu class warship. The C-802A missile is a modified version of Chinese Ying Ji-802 (western version SACCADE). The weight was reduced from 815kg to 715 kg to increase the strike range.

China has been eying Chittagong Port to supplement its hold over Gwadar port in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Some spadework was completed by the time Awami League led Grand Alliance trounced Bangladesh National Party (BNP) led four-party alliance in 2008 parliamentary elections.

China is adopting the time tested East India Company route to gain access to Chittagong Port. It has promised development of the port for ‘enhanced’ trade’. Perched here it should be easy for China to monitor Indian missile tests at Chandipur-at-sea near Balasore (on the Indian east coast). Also keep tabs on naval activity in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal by inter-linking its electronic listening systems at Coco Island (Myanmar) and the staging/listening systems deployed on the Bangladesh soil.

PLA Navy can be expected to ‘pamper’ and ‘pressurise’ Bangladesh Navy to open its facilities for use as a countervailing force against the Indian Navy. The wide disparities in the India-Bangladesh naval order of battle provide a perfect setting for the friendly entry. It in turn will greatly facilitate smooth operation of Chinese frigates and submarines in the North Andaman Sea.

There is a talk of China getting ‘military basing rights’ in the Chittagong belt. As and when the ‘wish’ is fulfilled, China stands to acquire the ability to monitor army deployment in North-east India. Additionally, several strategic Indian Air Force bases at Bagdogra, Hashimara and Tezpur, to just name a few, and Indian military aircraft deployed in the region will come under a Bangladesh-China electronic and radar surveillance network.

Chittagong is already serving as ‘delivery’ port for Chinese arms meant for various Indian insurgent groups particularly, the United Liberation Front of Asom ULFA) which have sanctuaries in Bangladesh. ULFA has reportedly shifted its base to China in the recent months though its leadership continues to nurture business interests set up in Dhaka with the patronage of ISI and Bangladesh intelligence over two-three decades ago.

China has maintained contacts ULFA in Dhaka. It is also in touch with another North-east Indian outfit, National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which is fighting for ‘independence’ in the province of Nagaland. NSCN has been in talks with Delhi for over seven-years. Yet, China has been allowing them (as also ULFA) to procure arms, ammunition and communication equipment from Yunnan.

From a regional security perceptive, China’s engagement with Bangladesh for access and bases has the potential to alter the security scenario, trigger regional tensions and much more. From an Indian perspective, the growing Bangladesh – China military contacts will make the Siliguri corridor vulnerable for the first time since India became independent in 1947.

Often described as the ‘Chicken Neck’, this 200 km long and 40 km wide corridor connects mainland India by rail, road and air with its North-eastern region of seven provinces. One of these provinces is Arunachal Pradesh. China has been claiming some 90,000 sq. kms of Arunachal as its own and this has become a constant source of tension in the China-India relations.

China has also been claiming Tawang, the home to an ancient Buddhist monastery, in Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese army marched into Tawang during the 1962 war. Though much water has since flown into the Brahmaputra, the very claim over Tawang increases Siliguri corridor’s vulnerability.

There is a significant PLA deployment along the borders, on the Arunachal side, which is to the east of Siliguri, and on the Bhutan side to the north of Siliguri. It is in the South of Siliguri, PLA has never had a direct or indirect presence. The Sino-Bangladesh friendship is bridging the ‘void’, in a manner of speaking, because Siliguri corridor figures prominently in the Sino doctrine and in its friendship with Bangladesh what with the arm-twisting of India to allow a trade route through the corridor.

There is empirical evidence to show that China is not worried of Islamic radicalism in Bangladesh. In fact, it perceives the deepening hold of Islamists under Pakistan patronage as a strategic advantage in its relations with India.

Read against this backdrop, the ‘unofficial’ China paper on severing India from its north-eastern region makes eminent sense. Pakistan, which has never ‘forgiven’ India for its 1971 tragedy, has been working through the jihadi route to settle its own scores. It has developed ‘jihadi’ launch pads in Bangladesh and Nepal. Whether it is working with them or not, the Siliguri corridor contains elements that destabilise the region.

Illegal migrants from Bangladesh and North-east India’s insurgent groups criss-cross the Chicken Neck and through the porous borders; they can act as catalysts for social disorder, unrest and increased insurgency calling for a denovo exercise on security doctrine.

One additional dimension of China-Bangladesh relations needs close examination. It relates to nuclear tie-up. As of now, after toying up with the Chinese offers, Dhaka has turned to Moscow to set up a nuclear power plant. By this decision Hasina government has pushed into cold storage the carefully worked out plans of Khaleda Zia regime. China’s interest in the Bangladesh nuclear establishment goes back to the year 2000, when Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation offered to supply a 300 MW nuclear power plant under its technical collaboration programme. It also offered supplier’s credit to import Chinese equipment and electro-mechanical products.

How Russia pipped China is a different story. China is not known to take a no for a no particularly when its stakes are so high. It can be expected to sugar coat its offer in a bid to grab a large share of the Bangladesh N-market since Dhaka has big plans to over come power shortages that have been plaguing infrastructure development.

Policy Research Group - Dynamics of China-Bangladesh relations

 

[Lankan Ranger]

 

[eastwatch]

Dynamics of China Bangladesh Relations

Policy Research Group - Dynamics of China-Bangladesh relations

Thanks for posting the article above. For China, BD is located in a very important location. Prime Minister is not the only source of power in BD, there are other pockets of power, too. A too friendlly attitude towards India by the govt of BD may not be seen kindly by these other pockets of power, specially in the military.

Govts will keep on changing in BD, but friendship with China will remain as it is. People trust China because it does not interfere in the internal affairs of BD. So, BD will have a long lasting friendship with China.

I am not sure about the naval facility that the article says BD wants China to use, but a deep sea port near Chittagong will have a great effect on Chinese economic activities if Burma allows a trade route through its territories. This new port will handle much of China's external trades that include also oil. AL leaders went to visit China's Yunnan Province at the end of last year to check out that possibility.

 

[Veer]

Dynamics of China Bangladesh Relations

It is difficult to characterise the China-Bangladesh relations in the conventional mould.

Dhaka has been heavily depending on Beijing for its defence requirements and development needs. This has made Bangladesh easily vulnerable to Chinese pressure and persuasions.​

China sees its foothold in Bangladesh as a part of its quest to establish its regional power profile; and as a means to challenge India in its own South Asian backyard. Bangladesh looks to China because of Myanmar factor as well.

Successive governments which came to office in Dhaka after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib-ur – Rehman in 1975 have contributed to cementing of ties with China. Their own anti-India approach, some deft foot-work by Pakistan and China’s willingness to open the purse strings led to the upswing in the ties and resulted in China emerging today as a very important factor in Bangladesh’s foreign relations.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite the popular mandate won by her Awami League, may not tinker with the foreign policy in the short to medium term. Firstly pro-India image limits her turf space. Secondly, she cannot let her immediate predecessor, Khaleda Zia, steal the ‘Bangladesh first and foremost’ thunder. Hasina gave ample demonstration of this resolve in her earlier term itself when the Bangladesh Rifles under the command of a trusted aide delivered a bloody nose to the Indian Border Security Force.

Whatever are the political ifs and buts, Hasina government cannot gloss over the reality that Bangladesh armed forces are dependent on China’s military hardware. The Army is equipped with Chinese tanks, the Navy with Chinese frigates and missile boats, and the Air Force with Chinese fighter jets. Both countries have a defence cooperation agreement in place since 2002. It covers military training and defence production also.

In 2006, China supplied 65 artillery guns and 114 missile and related systems. Most of the tanks (T-59, T-62, T-69 and T-79), armoured personnel carriers (APCs), artillery pieces, small arms and personal weapons in the Bangladesh army are of Chinese origin. Plans are afoot to acquire 155mm PLZ-45/Type -88 (including transfer of technology) and 122mm Type-96 as well as MBRLS from China by 2011.

The Chinese wares with the Bangladesh Navy are truly wide-ranging. These raise questions on the scope, direction and intentions of Bangladesh navy. The Chinese platforms in its possession include the 053-H1 Jianghu I class frigates with 4x HY2 missiles, Huang Feng Class missile boats, Type-024 missile boats, Huchuan and P-4 class torpedo boats, Hainan class sub chasers, Shanghai class gun boats and Yuchin class LCUs.

The BNS Khalid Bin Walid has been retrofitted with HQ-7 SAM from China. Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, former Commander of PLA Navy had promised during a one-on-one meeting with his Bangladesh counterpart full cooperation in the sophisticated naval management.

In so far the Air Force is concerned, it has been getting steady supplies from 1977 – the year Bangladesh-China relations graduated from a state of total negation into which the ties were pushed as a result of China siding with Pakistan during the ‘Liberation War’ in 1971 and using veto to block the new nation’s entry into the UN. It has thus far received 16 F-7BGs, F7 and Q 5 fighters and PT 6 trainers.

Bangladesh set up a missile launch pad near the Chittagong Port with assistance from China. The maiden test was carried out on May 12, 2008 with active participation of Chinese experts. Land attack anti-ship cruise missile C-802A was test fired shortly afterwards from the frigate, BNS Osman near Kutubdia island in the Bay of Bengal. This missile is said to have a strike range of 120kms.

What strikes the test is the Chinese signature. BNS Osman (commissioned 1989) is a 1500-ton Chinese built Jianghu class warship. The C-802A missile is a modified version of Chinese Ying Ji-802 (western version SACCADE). The weight was reduced from 815kg to 715 kg to increase the strike range.

China has been eying Chittagong Port to supplement its hold over Gwadar port in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Some spadework was completed by the time Awami League led Grand Alliance trounced Bangladesh National Party (BNP) led four-party alliance in 2008 parliamentary elections.

China is adopting the time tested East India Company route to gain access to Chittagong Port. It has promised development of the port for ‘enhanced’ trade’. Perched here it should be easy for China to monitor Indian missile tests at Chandipur-at-sea near Balasore (on the Indian east coast). Also keep tabs on naval activity in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal by inter-linking its electronic listening systems at Coco Island (Myanmar) and the staging/listening systems deployed on the Bangladesh soil.

PLA Navy can be expected to ‘pamper’ and ‘pressurise’ Bangladesh Navy to open its facilities for use as a countervailing force against the Indian Navy. The wide disparities in the India-Bangladesh naval order of battle provide a perfect setting for the friendly entry. It in turn will greatly facilitate smooth operation of Chinese frigates and submarines in the North Andaman Sea.

There is a talk of China getting ‘military basing rights’ in the Chittagong belt. As and when the ‘wish’ is fulfilled, China stands to acquire the ability to monitor army deployment in North-east India. Additionally, several strategic Indian Air Force bases at Bagdogra, Hashimara and Tezpur, to just name a few, and Indian military aircraft deployed in the region will come under a Bangladesh-China electronic and radar surveillance network.

Chittagong is already serving as ‘delivery’ port for Chinese arms meant for various Indian insurgent groups particularly, the United Liberation Front of Asom ULFA) which have sanctuaries in Bangladesh. ULFA has reportedly shifted its base to China in the recent months though its leadership continues to nurture business interests set up in Dhaka with the patronage of ISI and Bangladesh intelligence over two-three decades ago.

China has maintained contacts ULFA in Dhaka. It is also in touch with another North-east Indian outfit, National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which is fighting for ‘independence’ in the province of Nagaland. NSCN has been in talks with Delhi for over seven-years. Yet, China has been allowing them (as also ULFA) to procure arms, ammunition and communication equipment from Yunnan.

From a regional security perceptive, China’s engagement with Bangladesh for access and bases has the potential to alter the security scenario, trigger regional tensions and much more. From an Indian perspective, the growing Bangladesh – China military contacts will make the Siliguri corridor vulnerable for the first time since India became independent in 1947.

Often described as the ‘Chicken Neck’, this 200 km long and 40 km wide corridor connects mainland India by rail, road and air with its North-eastern region of seven provinces. One of these provinces is Arunachal Pradesh. China has been claiming some 90,000 sq. kms of Arunachal as its own and this has become a constant source of tension in the China-India relations.

China has also been claiming Tawang, the home to an ancient Buddhist monastery, in Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese army marched into Tawang during the 1962 war. Though much water has since flown into the Brahmaputra, the very claim over Tawang increases Siliguri corridor’s vulnerability.

There is a significant PLA deployment along the borders, on the Arunachal side, which is to the east of Siliguri, and on the Bhutan side to the north of Siliguri. It is in the South of Siliguri, PLA has never had a direct or indirect presence. The Sino-Bangladesh friendship is bridging the ‘void’, in a manner of speaking, because Siliguri corridor figures prominently in the Sino doctrine and in its friendship with Bangladesh what with the arm-twisting of India to allow a trade route through the corridor.

There is empirical evidence to show that China is not worried of Islamic radicalism in Bangladesh. In fact, it perceives the deepening hold of Islamists under Pakistan patronage as a strategic advantage in its relations with India.

Read against this backdrop, the ‘unofficial’ China paper on severing India from its north-eastern region makes eminent sense. Pakistan, which has never ‘forgiven’ India for its 1971 tragedy, has been working through the jihadi route to settle its own scores. It has developed ‘jihadi’ launch pads in Bangladesh and Nepal. Whether it is working with them or not, the Siliguri corridor contains elements that destabilise the region.

Illegal migrants from Bangladesh and North-east India’s insurgent groups criss-cross the Chicken Neck and through the porous borders; they can act as catalysts for social disorder, unrest and increased insurgency calling for a denovo exercise on security doctrine.

One additional dimension of China-Bangladesh relations needs close examination. It relates to nuclear tie-up. As of now, after toying up with the Chinese offers, Dhaka has turned to Moscow to set up a nuclear power plant. By this decision Hasina government has pushed into cold storage the carefully worked out plans of Khaleda Zia regime. China’s interest in the Bangladesh nuclear establishment goes back to the year 2000, when Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation offered to supply a 300 MW nuclear power plant under its technical collaboration programme. It also offered supplier’s credit to import Chinese equipment and electro-mechanical products.

How Russia pipped China is a different story. China is not known to take a no for a no particularly when its stakes are so high. It can be expected to sugar coat its offer in a bid to grab a large share of the Bangladesh N-market since Dhaka has big plans to over come power shortages that have been plaguing infrastructure development.

Policy Research Group - Dynamics of China-Bangladesh relations

This explains all.

China wants to exploit and use Brother Bangladesh for its pity politics and cheap games.

 

[shchinese]

let's think about this from another aspect:

why india's only contribution to these neighbouring countries is the war india had with them? why Bangladesh can't get the same investment/weapons from india?

it is not like india doesn't want to do these, check its involvment in Sri Lanka's civil war. the difference is : india failured to project such influences.

 

[eastwatch]

This explains all.

China wants to exploit and use Brother Bangladesh for its pity politics and cheap games.

To tell you frankly, BD people would love to see more of a Chinese involvement in BD. On the contrary, we want a minimal involvement of DADA India. All the India's neighbours think the same way. Only a change in the mindset of India and small-minded Indians will change the attitudes of India's neighbours.

 

[kallol]

I can understand India is slow to react and act, as it is a young unmatured democracy still (US took more than 100 years to mature).

So India might not have produced the results immediately as can be done by authoritarian government of China. But it feels bad that, India, after supporting millions during the holocast days of rampage and massacre (till 1971), is today seen as villain. Is it due to the culture of Bengalees or the culture of religion ?

Can some one quote the following with examples and proof :

1. China's contribution to Bangladesh liberation vis-a-vis India's contribution. Or should I take that majority of Bangladesh was against liberation ?

2. What meddling India has done after liberation which was not possible during the liberation ?

3. How many people from Bangladesh go a illegal migrant / migrant to China ? (In India it is supposed to be in millions : I am from Bengal and I have direct proof).

4. Which agreement India has gone against ?

5. How many of Bangladesh would like democracy versus authoritarian rule of communism which does not allow religion ?
On one side you have a democracy (India) which strives for secularism and on the other you have another religion called communism governing the country (which does not respect religion). The choice is yours and the fate is yours (as the Uighurs or Tibetians).

6. Chinese model of friendship starts with sweet first and then it will only be sucking out all. If you bother see around - look at US, Europe, India, etc - see the balance of payment. Their controlled currency will kill your industry and you will be totally dependent on China for anything and everything. They will start controlling you (they have now the capability of arm twisting USA). Will you choose such an opaque model of economics whic will ruin your industry in long term ?

7. Can you name any country which has seen prosperity because of China ? But you can see a plenty which have out of democratic countries.

Go ahead my friend, yes as a fellow bengalee, I am aligned to the common culture we have. But when you become muslim and anti-Indian first, the goodwill becomes hidden to you.

Again choice is yours and the fate is yours. We will only hope to have better relations.

&

 

[damiendehorn]

Kallol

I think you need to study international relation before you make, statements like those below. If you intend to ask questions, then try asking logical ones without loading them.

But against my better judgment I will try to enlighten you…

1. China's contribution to Bangladesh liberation vis-a-vis India's contribution. Or should I take that majority of Bangladesh was against liberation ?

Answer: Nobody denies India’s assistance in our liberation, why she did is debated through many threads; I leave it to each to make up their own mind. Now because India helped does that mean we have to be grateful to them for eternity, does it mean automatically that we have to be allied to Indian interests?
As an independent nation we have to look after our own national interests first, right now China provides the best terms, and their historical support for Pakistan has nothing to do with our relation with China now, China is our biggest trading partner, and it is based on commercial interests, in fact India has a bigger trading relation with China then we do.

2. What meddling India has done after liberation which was not possible during the liberation ?

Answer: Well you need to read up on your regional history. First there is the issue of Indian support for the Shanti Bhaini terrorists, Indian occupation of the south talpatti islands, cutting our water using the Farakka Barrage or dam (though a water sharing agreement was signed India has to this day not fully abided by it) which causes devastating draughts during the dry season and flooding during the rainy seasons when they open the gates, the border enclaves that were supposed to be resolved under the 1974 agreement still not adhered to, maritime boundary issues the list goes on and on.
Here are a few links so you can read up, and get some understanding…

Farakka Barrage - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
South Talpatti Island - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Shanti Bahini - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

3. How many people from Bangladesh go a illegal migrant / migrant to China ? (In India it is supposed to be in millions : I am from Bengal and I have direct proof).

Answer: really, where did you get that figure of millions? You say you have direct proof; considering even the Indian government has no exact figures, I would love to see this direct proof you talk about please provide it.
In England we have loads of illegal Indians here, and scores coming in each day, why don’t you talk about them? Understand poor people will migrate to where they think they can get better opportunities (just like the illegal Indians coming here).
The reason they don’t go to China is simple, there is no border between Bangladesh and China, have a close look at the map.

4. Which agreement India has gone against ?

Answer: the truth is which agreement have they implemented, just read answer to question 2.

5. How many of Bangladesh would like democracy versus authoritarian rule of communism which does not allow religion ?
On one side you have a democracy (India) which strives for secularism and on the other you have another religion called communism governing the country (which does not respect religion). The choice is yours and the fate is yours (as the Uighurs or Tibetians).

Answer: So trading with and having good relations with China, means choosing between communism and our religion/democracy? If that is the case why is China one of India’s biggest trading partner? Is China about to invade and occupy Bangladesh as you imply about the Uyghur’s and Tibetans?

6. Chinese model of friendship starts with sweet first and then it will only be sucking out all. If you bother see around - look at US, Europe, India, etc - see the balance of payment. Their controlled currency will kill your industry and you will be totally dependent on China for anything and everything. They will start controlling you (they have now the capability of arm twisting USA). Will you choose such an opaque model of economics whic will ruin your industry in long term ?

Answer: If that is the case then you’re in a bigger problem than we are, just have a look at your trading partners, I am not even going bother to answer this stupid question, and you obviously haven’t done much economics.

7. Can you name any country which has seen prosperity because of China ? But you can see a plenty which have out of democratic countries.

Answer: Yes Bangladesh, just have a closer look at the facts about our relation with China, your nearest Bangladesh high Commission will provide you with all you need.

 

[toxic_pus]

First there is the issue of Indian support for the Shanti Bhaini terrorists...

The support was nowhere close to the scale that some members would have us believe.

...Indian occupation of the south talpatti islands...

From the wiki link you have provided:

A 1981 detailed survey of water depths showed the main and much deeper channel and main flow on the east side of South Talpatti, favoring India. This survey data was printed on a 1990 British Admiralty chart and reprinted on the 1991 US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) chart number 63330 Edition 9 at 1:300,000 scale. Both are available for public sale.

Since the Jury is still out on this lets not start making unsubstantiated accusations.

...cutting our water using the Farakka Barrage or dam (though a water sharing agreement was signed India has to this day not fully abided by it) which causes devastating draughts during the dry season and flooding during the rainy seasons when they open the gates...

Horsemanure. Provide proof that India 'to this day not fully abided' by the water sharing agreement. By proof I don't mean some newspaper report making some allegation.

...the border enclaves that were supposed to be resolved under the 1974 agreement still not adhered to...

O really. How many enclaves have BD tried to 'resolve'.

...maritime boundary issues the list goes on and on.

Yeah right.

 

[TopCat]

A 1981 detailed survey of water depths showed the main and much deeper channel and main flow on the east side of South Talpatti, favoring India. This survey data was printed on a 1990 British Admiralty chart and reprinted on the 1991 US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) chart number 63330 Edition 9 at 1:300,000 scale. Both are available for public sale.

Only few months back BD proposed a joint survey in the meeting of maritime boundary and India said it was unnecessary as they already did that. Indian result is unacceptable to us as we have our own data.

 

[Sanchez]

In the eyes of Indians the smaller neighbours need to either depend on India or on China. With or without the presence of China factor they would still stick their noses into their neighbours businesses, have a say and grasp things from their smaller neighbours. Sikkim, Maldives, Bhutan, Sri lanka, and Bangladesh, all the same stories. The remaining neighbours, Pak and China are their enemies, and Burma might be the only exception. On the other hand India is quite submissive and humble to the world powers. India simply needs to behave like a normal and rational country.

 

[toxic_pus]

Only few months back BD proposed a joint survey in the meeting of maritime boundary and India said it was unnecessary as they already did that. Indian result is unacceptable to us as we have our own data.

A link would be appreciated.

 

[eastwatch]

A 1981 detailed survey of water depths showed the main and much deeper channel and main flow on the east side of South Talpatti, favoring India. This survey data was printed on a 1990 British Admiralty chart and reprinted on the 1991 US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) chart number 63330 Edition 9 at 1:300,000 scale. Both are available for public sale.

Since the Jury is still out on this lets not start making unsubstantiated accusations.

Do not wait for the juri verdict, we already know what it will be. But, see the map in the wiki link to know the South Talpatty's location. India has no chance. South Talpatty will remain part of BD until hell freezes.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:South_Talpatti_Island.jpg

 

[TopCat]

A link would be appreciated.

AFTER 28 years our big neighbour India extended her hands in discussing maritime boundary inclusive of the South Talpatti vs. New Moore island issue. But the outcome was only 'diplomatically successful', in actuality it was just a failure.

Bangladesh is encircled by India on three sides. We have anthropologically the same origin, have the state languages (Bangla and Hindi) derived from the same Sanskrit roots, were governed by Britishers together for 190 years, partitioned in 1947 based only on religion, and during our Liberation War in 1971, she generously helped us in very many ways for which our nation is grateful. However, all are not going well between tiny Bangladesh and big India- the largest democracy in the world. Let us call a spade a spade.

Although Bangladesh instantly completed the handover of enclaves to India following Indira-Mujib accord of 1974, India did that late in 1992, yet partially. Still in the border area, there is frequent intrusion and killing of our nationals because they sometimes need to enter into the 'no man's land' for some obvious reasons (they have relatives and even members of the same family on two sides of the unnatural politically-placed border).

The case of the newly formed island in the bordering river Hariabhanga's estuary is being dealt with by India on the same way. According to Radcliffe plan, the aquatic demarcation line in between the two sovereign countries is the deepest part of the river bed. The island in question was formed as a delta, by definition, having two streams of the river flowing by two sides of the island under formation. Now the question is which channelthe western or the eastern to the islandis the main stream. Bangladesh claims that the main stream is the western one, so the island belongs to Bangladesh and she duly named it South Talpatti since she has a northern Talpatti along the same latitudinal line. But India's claims that the eastern channel is the main one and as a result the island belongs to her. She named the new island New Moore though the northern Moore island is much in the west as defined by latitudinal line.

The formation of the island is a natural process and the formed land is a part of the natural ecosystem. But manmade boundaries made the island's natural position disputed, causing a socio-environmental thorn. Since the island is now under sociopolitical dispute, both India and Bangladesh should have followed the social and international norms. Neither Bangladesh, nor India should physically own this land before the dispute is resolved through joint venture survey or by international legal procedure.

However, India didn't have the patience of waiting for such 'socio-environmental' solution. She hoisted the Indian flag there and established a base of Border Security Force (BSF) on the island regularly visited by her naval gunships perhaps guarding against imaginary invasion. This act is apparently an instance of 'power-coerced' strategy. In the last meet held during third week of September this year, Bangladesh again urged for arranging a joint survey, but Indian counterpart negated on the ground that they were sure the island was theirs. Bangladesh has enough evidence that the island is hers.

One explanation to one-sided occupation of the disputed island India provides is that her force and navy stationed in the island are for testing the soil thereof to see its origin. This is such an unfounded logic that no knowledgeable man can agree to. Such a study on most of Bangladesh's islands can find Indian, and even Nepalese or Chinese soil because the river-eroded soil even from those countries upstream.

Why does India disagree to conduct a joint survey and keep this dispute alive just as another thorn in Indo-Bangla good neighbourly relations? The island under formation is a big one having still underwater extension towards northwest. This means that possession of the island is rather a lucrative one. But how much lucrative? Does this worth more than unhindered friendly relations with a neighbour?

Now let us see the actual geographical position of the island in the map. Thanks to our Banglapedia editors and the contributor (Masud Hasan Chowdhury) the map has been published even in the Indian press (e.g., one in “Headlines India” published on 18/09/2008). The map shows that bordering river Hariabhanga comes down obliquely towards southeast. It is clearly seen that the river channel on the east of the island is mainly that of Raymangal and Jamuna rivers having only the eastern branch from Hariabhanga. So the eastern wider channel is contributed mainly by two decidedly Bangladeshi rivers and partly by bordering Hariabhanga having, only about 1/5th.

The last meeting between the two sides was of medium level, rather a technical one. The highest state authority of India needs to look into the matter wisely, not cleverly. After all, the case is between two parts of the same greater Bengal. As the bigger neighbour India must come forward to establish a further congenial relation. Otherwise, Bangladesh may raise the issue at the United Nations for a first solution according to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Then the survey will be international and the outcome would be based on actual data.

http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=60141

 

[toxic_pus]

Do not wait for the juri verdict, we already know what it will be. But, see the map in the wiki link to know the South Talpatty's location. India has no chance. South Talpatty will remain part of BD until hell freezes.

File:South Talpatti Island.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

If only things were that easy. From what I understand India's understanding of the flow of Hariabhanga river is more to the east.

If I were you, I would prefer to count my eggs, not the chickens.