batmannow
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 28, 2008
- Messages
- 18,830
- Reaction score
- -19
- Country
- Location
Pakistan army staying 'hands-off' amid Musharraf crisis
Military leaders say they are determined to remain apolitical to help their formal general make a graceful exit.[/B
]By Laura King, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
11:13 AM PDT, August 16, 2008
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN -- This country's impeachment crisis has once again thrust the powerful Pakistani military into the political spotlight. But unlike in decades past, when any show of disarray within a civilian government practically guaranteed that a coup would follow, the army has stayed firmly on the sidelines.
Pakistan has spent half of its 61-year history under military rule, including eight under former Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the civilian president who is under concerted attack by foes who want to drive him from office.
High-stakes talks continued today aimed at reaching an accord under which Musharraf would agree to step down voluntarily in exchange for various guarantees, including a promise that he would not face prosecution for acts while in office. But Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the man Musharraf handpicked to succeed him at the helm of the military late last year, has made it clear that he will not intervene to preserve the presidential tenure of his onetime superior officer and mentor.
"Let us rededicate ourselves to the military tradition of sacrifice," a solemn-faced Kayani told an Independence Day gathering Thursday in a speech widely interpreted as closing the door to any army effort to stave off the impeachment process.
"The constitutional role of the army is what it is, a nonpolitical one," said Shaukat Qadir, a retired brigadier general turned analyst. "And the position of the army in all this has emerged with perfect clarity -- they are saying, 'We are hands-off.' "
If the army had lent him its support, Musharraf could theoretically have used his constitutional authority as president to dissolve the ruling coalition, which last week declared it would launch an impeachment drive against him. But Kayani and senior generals decided almost immediately against helping him preserve his power through military means, a step that would have been tantamount to a coup.
Ranking generals feared that propping up the widely loathed Musharraf, or once again ushering in military rule after only five months of civilian leadership, would irreparably damage the army's standing in the eyes of the public, said analysts and a senior officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Although it remains a highly respected institution, the military's reputation has suffered in recent years. Many ordinary Pakistanis were angry that senior generals acquiesced when Musharraf, then still the army chief, declared emergency rule, suspended the constitution and threw thousands of opponents into jail.
Now, army leaders appear determined to preserve an apolitical stance in the current crisis. "They haven't come this far in order to turn back," said Ikram Sehgal, a journalist and commentator who was once a senior officer.
As the crisis drags on, the army does have one powerful interest to protect. Analysts and news reports say senior generals have signaled to the civilian leadership that they have no wish to see their former chief humiliated -- or, in the most drastic scenario, put on trial, imprisoned or even executed.
"That would cast a cloud over the entire institution. The army itself would be seen as being in the dock," Sehgal said. "Soldiers are taught to look up to the army chief as an example."
The main instigator of putting Musharraf on trial for treason is Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister who heads the junior party in the ruling coalition. Sharif has very personal reasons for resisting a graceful exit; in 1999, Musharraf overthrew him, imprisoned him and threatened him with execution before sending him into nearly a decade of exile.
Sharif insists he is not motivated by a desire for revenge, but he has nonetheless kept up the fiery anti-Musharraf rhetoric even while sensitive negotiations have gone on in recent days, aimed at striking terms of a deal for Musharraf's voluntary departure.
"How can safe passage be given to someone who has done this to Pakistan?" Sharif demanded in a speech this week in the eastern city of Lahore in which he excoriated Musharraf for what he called high crimes against the state.
The president's camp, according to those involved in the talks, has demanded full legal immunity in exchange for his resignation. If the negotiations aimed at securing Musharraf's resignation drag on, news reports have suggested the civilian government might look to Kayani to deliver the news to Musharraf that his continued presence is untenable.
Sehgal said he thought that asking the army chief to give Musharraf a final push to resign would set a bad precedent for a civilian government that wants to preserve its independence. And in any event, he said, the time for such a gesture had probably passed.
"As for Musharraf and Kayani," he said, "I suspect the two of them have already had this conversation."
laura.king@latimes.com
If Musharraf Steps Down, Will Pakistan Step Up?
By Haider Ali Hussein Mullick
Expecting Pakistan to step up to its responsibilities to its people and the international community if Musharraf steps down is wishful thinking.
Further still, Pakistan's bombastic democrats, surprisingly united against Musharraf and equally incompetent in dealing with staggering oil and food prices, and a rising militancy, should expect little with Musharraf's ouster. Al-Qaeda or the Taliban will not lay down their weapons, the budget deficit will not magically disappear, and the thousands protesting high food and energy prices, and rein of Supreme Court justices will not return home happily. For all of that to happen Islamabad's political leaders will have to set their priorities straight and work simultaneously, effectively and strategically toward policies to eradicate terrorism, poverty and a collapsing educational and health system. Without an effective multifaceted approach Islamabad will face failure and so will Kabul, Delhi and Washington.
Principally, the impeachment of an unconstitutional (albeit quasi-effective) president via an elected parliament would be a first in the country's ravaged constitutional and political history. The last military dictator was killed in a mysterious plane crash. Musharraf's constitutional ouster would set an important precedent, possibly deterring future military takeovers. After his exit, however, the civilian government's longevity and stability will depend on its ability to weather the gathering storm of rising inflation, unemployment, and terrorism.
A Pakistan with a recalcitrant and autocratic Musharraf would impede its constitutional and democratic growth, but a Pakistan with a worsening economic and security situation could make it the perfect threat for the entire civilized world: a nuclear-armed military state with a weakening economy and fading central authority. In that situation, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq would have a hard time competing for the headlines.
While more work is needed, Pakistan is changing. First, al-Qaeda has successfully relocated its base of operations in Pakistan's tribal border lands; however, the limited network of logistics and training camps in Pakistan is a sharp contrast from resources available in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda and affiliates are constantly interdicted by U.S.-trained and recently well-equipped Pakistani forces using highly successful air and ground search-and-destroy tactics. Most areas lost to the militants have been regained, and recent operations show more signs of reliable intelligence, creativity and better success rates. Strikes by unmanned U.S. drones, however, have inflamed local denizens, and weakened Islamabad's fledging coalition government despite some success in interdicting high profile terrorists.
Second, propping up militant organizations as proxies to weaken India's conventional war advantage in Afghanistan and the disputed region of Kashmir is losing currency. A significant number of military and political leaders are realizing that stabilizing Afghanistan, increasing trade with India and Afghanistan, and improving collaboration between security forces across the Afghan-Pakistan and India-Pakistan border are the best ways to provide stability and reach Pakistani national interests.
Third, steering the economy out of present recession is not impossible. In the past, when Musharraf was exercising direct control, the economy experienced inconsistent growth that pivoted on a steady flow of foreign aid and investment. But no one considered what would happen if that investment stopped. Today the real estate, capital and stock markets are in decline, made worse by rising food and energy prices and a weakening rupee. The recent Biden-Lugar U.S. Senate legislation committing $15 billion in development aid to Pakistan might be a good move - but it also might just be pushing drugs to a recovering addict. In other words, the new government must channel incoming funds and loans toward creating a stable economic system not chronically dependent on an intravenous drip of foreign aid and investment. Such reforms will also bring socio-economic opportunities to militancy-infected areas. If the economy takes off, along with political reforms and military action, al-Qaeda will have a very hard time recruiting and educating the disenfranchised.
In conclusion, Pakistan faces a plethora of problems that require political compromises, geopolitical negotiations, and a united civil-military front against militants. The United States, in turn, will have to find a middle ground between micromanaging Islamabad's politics and continuing to give the Pakistanis a carte blanche on the war on terror. The political parties must come together on these issues as they have on impeaching Musharraf. The Pakistani military must clean house by eliminating competing power centers, such as elements of its intelligence establishment. A unified sovereign and effective foreign policy equally independent of American aid and homegrown militant groups will bring domestic and international stability. If political and military leaders show the will and tenacity to bring such a strategic shift in national and foreign policy, then we can certainly hope that when Musharraf steps down, Pakistan will step up.
Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, is a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University, focusing on US-South Asia Relations. He can be reached at haider.mullick@gmail.com
Please e-mail PostGlobal if you'd like to receive an email notification when PostGlobal sends out a new question.
Military leaders say they are determined to remain apolitical to help their formal general make a graceful exit.[/B
]By Laura King, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
11:13 AM PDT, August 16, 2008
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN -- This country's impeachment crisis has once again thrust the powerful Pakistani military into the political spotlight. But unlike in decades past, when any show of disarray within a civilian government practically guaranteed that a coup would follow, the army has stayed firmly on the sidelines.
Pakistan has spent half of its 61-year history under military rule, including eight under former Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the civilian president who is under concerted attack by foes who want to drive him from office.
High-stakes talks continued today aimed at reaching an accord under which Musharraf would agree to step down voluntarily in exchange for various guarantees, including a promise that he would not face prosecution for acts while in office. But Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the man Musharraf handpicked to succeed him at the helm of the military late last year, has made it clear that he will not intervene to preserve the presidential tenure of his onetime superior officer and mentor.
"Let us rededicate ourselves to the military tradition of sacrifice," a solemn-faced Kayani told an Independence Day gathering Thursday in a speech widely interpreted as closing the door to any army effort to stave off the impeachment process.
"The constitutional role of the army is what it is, a nonpolitical one," said Shaukat Qadir, a retired brigadier general turned analyst. "And the position of the army in all this has emerged with perfect clarity -- they are saying, 'We are hands-off.' "
If the army had lent him its support, Musharraf could theoretically have used his constitutional authority as president to dissolve the ruling coalition, which last week declared it would launch an impeachment drive against him. But Kayani and senior generals decided almost immediately against helping him preserve his power through military means, a step that would have been tantamount to a coup.
Ranking generals feared that propping up the widely loathed Musharraf, or once again ushering in military rule after only five months of civilian leadership, would irreparably damage the army's standing in the eyes of the public, said analysts and a senior officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Although it remains a highly respected institution, the military's reputation has suffered in recent years. Many ordinary Pakistanis were angry that senior generals acquiesced when Musharraf, then still the army chief, declared emergency rule, suspended the constitution and threw thousands of opponents into jail.
Now, army leaders appear determined to preserve an apolitical stance in the current crisis. "They haven't come this far in order to turn back," said Ikram Sehgal, a journalist and commentator who was once a senior officer.
As the crisis drags on, the army does have one powerful interest to protect. Analysts and news reports say senior generals have signaled to the civilian leadership that they have no wish to see their former chief humiliated -- or, in the most drastic scenario, put on trial, imprisoned or even executed.
"That would cast a cloud over the entire institution. The army itself would be seen as being in the dock," Sehgal said. "Soldiers are taught to look up to the army chief as an example."
The main instigator of putting Musharraf on trial for treason is Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister who heads the junior party in the ruling coalition. Sharif has very personal reasons for resisting a graceful exit; in 1999, Musharraf overthrew him, imprisoned him and threatened him with execution before sending him into nearly a decade of exile.
Sharif insists he is not motivated by a desire for revenge, but he has nonetheless kept up the fiery anti-Musharraf rhetoric even while sensitive negotiations have gone on in recent days, aimed at striking terms of a deal for Musharraf's voluntary departure.
"How can safe passage be given to someone who has done this to Pakistan?" Sharif demanded in a speech this week in the eastern city of Lahore in which he excoriated Musharraf for what he called high crimes against the state.
The president's camp, according to those involved in the talks, has demanded full legal immunity in exchange for his resignation. If the negotiations aimed at securing Musharraf's resignation drag on, news reports have suggested the civilian government might look to Kayani to deliver the news to Musharraf that his continued presence is untenable.
Sehgal said he thought that asking the army chief to give Musharraf a final push to resign would set a bad precedent for a civilian government that wants to preserve its independence. And in any event, he said, the time for such a gesture had probably passed.
"As for Musharraf and Kayani," he said, "I suspect the two of them have already had this conversation."
laura.king@latimes.com
If Musharraf Steps Down, Will Pakistan Step Up?
By Haider Ali Hussein Mullick
Expecting Pakistan to step up to its responsibilities to its people and the international community if Musharraf steps down is wishful thinking.
Further still, Pakistan's bombastic democrats, surprisingly united against Musharraf and equally incompetent in dealing with staggering oil and food prices, and a rising militancy, should expect little with Musharraf's ouster. Al-Qaeda or the Taliban will not lay down their weapons, the budget deficit will not magically disappear, and the thousands protesting high food and energy prices, and rein of Supreme Court justices will not return home happily. For all of that to happen Islamabad's political leaders will have to set their priorities straight and work simultaneously, effectively and strategically toward policies to eradicate terrorism, poverty and a collapsing educational and health system. Without an effective multifaceted approach Islamabad will face failure and so will Kabul, Delhi and Washington.
Principally, the impeachment of an unconstitutional (albeit quasi-effective) president via an elected parliament would be a first in the country's ravaged constitutional and political history. The last military dictator was killed in a mysterious plane crash. Musharraf's constitutional ouster would set an important precedent, possibly deterring future military takeovers. After his exit, however, the civilian government's longevity and stability will depend on its ability to weather the gathering storm of rising inflation, unemployment, and terrorism.
A Pakistan with a recalcitrant and autocratic Musharraf would impede its constitutional and democratic growth, but a Pakistan with a worsening economic and security situation could make it the perfect threat for the entire civilized world: a nuclear-armed military state with a weakening economy and fading central authority. In that situation, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq would have a hard time competing for the headlines.
While more work is needed, Pakistan is changing. First, al-Qaeda has successfully relocated its base of operations in Pakistan's tribal border lands; however, the limited network of logistics and training camps in Pakistan is a sharp contrast from resources available in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda and affiliates are constantly interdicted by U.S.-trained and recently well-equipped Pakistani forces using highly successful air and ground search-and-destroy tactics. Most areas lost to the militants have been regained, and recent operations show more signs of reliable intelligence, creativity and better success rates. Strikes by unmanned U.S. drones, however, have inflamed local denizens, and weakened Islamabad's fledging coalition government despite some success in interdicting high profile terrorists.
Second, propping up militant organizations as proxies to weaken India's conventional war advantage in Afghanistan and the disputed region of Kashmir is losing currency. A significant number of military and political leaders are realizing that stabilizing Afghanistan, increasing trade with India and Afghanistan, and improving collaboration between security forces across the Afghan-Pakistan and India-Pakistan border are the best ways to provide stability and reach Pakistani national interests.
Third, steering the economy out of present recession is not impossible. In the past, when Musharraf was exercising direct control, the economy experienced inconsistent growth that pivoted on a steady flow of foreign aid and investment. But no one considered what would happen if that investment stopped. Today the real estate, capital and stock markets are in decline, made worse by rising food and energy prices and a weakening rupee. The recent Biden-Lugar U.S. Senate legislation committing $15 billion in development aid to Pakistan might be a good move - but it also might just be pushing drugs to a recovering addict. In other words, the new government must channel incoming funds and loans toward creating a stable economic system not chronically dependent on an intravenous drip of foreign aid and investment. Such reforms will also bring socio-economic opportunities to militancy-infected areas. If the economy takes off, along with political reforms and military action, al-Qaeda will have a very hard time recruiting and educating the disenfranchised.
In conclusion, Pakistan faces a plethora of problems that require political compromises, geopolitical negotiations, and a united civil-military front against militants. The United States, in turn, will have to find a middle ground between micromanaging Islamabad's politics and continuing to give the Pakistanis a carte blanche on the war on terror. The political parties must come together on these issues as they have on impeaching Musharraf. The Pakistani military must clean house by eliminating competing power centers, such as elements of its intelligence establishment. A unified sovereign and effective foreign policy equally independent of American aid and homegrown militant groups will bring domestic and international stability. If political and military leaders show the will and tenacity to bring such a strategic shift in national and foreign policy, then we can certainly hope that when Musharraf steps down, Pakistan will step up.
Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, is a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University, focusing on US-South Asia Relations. He can be reached at haider.mullick@gmail.com
Please e-mail PostGlobal if you'd like to receive an email notification when PostGlobal sends out a new question.
