There was a legitimate point made in this video about aid. Civic aid in these communities must follow on military operations. It must do so quickly. The footage from Loe Sam is doubly disheartening.
First, of course, is the amount of destruction which was necessary. To hear it explained by the army officer, each compound was discreetly targeted for destruction by a bull dozer at some point in the battle.
Nothing remains. Literally. We've had brutal urban battles in Iraq. Certainly, the second Fallujah operation revealed the extent to which a determined resistance can be fashioned in an urban setting. Still, the battles never reached the levels of destruction seen in Loe Sam.
Second is the absence still of civic aid. These people have spent an entire winter in refugee camps outside Peshawar. I would, at a minimum, task your combat engineer companies, battalions, and brigades from around the country to these tasks. Anything so basic as clearing rubble, re-establishing electrical lines, basic sewage and water-these are issues that can be tackled by engineer and pioneer units while providing their own security.
On a larger scale, though, your government appears to have no plan to either infiltrate the army or openly attack in Waziristan. After that lies Quetta. Bajaur was miniscule by comparison in both area and populations. SWAT smaller again. Neither operation appear to have received adequate troops though I recall that there were four brigades in SWAT. That's probably 12 battalions of troops in addition to the local and provincial security forces. We've heard the numbers 12,000 vs. 3,000 or so.
Clearly the smaller force moves with a greater purpose.
I'm dismayed by the reports of "garrison" behavior. Your military has a propensity to return to barracks in the evening. That, of course, is when things get most interesting in these afflicted neighborhoods. Everybody has heard of the afghan taliban "Shabnamah" (night letters) placed in community markets.
Not here. Nope. They place bodies for your awakenings.
I believe that your troops should be in the field. I believe that your artillery, military police, engineers, ADA, and signal troops should carry local patrol and security responsibilities. I think that they should be trained and organized by the infantry to do so as provisional units. I think that your infantry need to be in COPs (Combat Outposts). You have much higher population densities on your side of the mountains and this strategy works well in those situations. Platoon-sized and with local police. Armed to the teeth and living in these locations-fortified and with radio comms as well as land-line.
Reaction forces identified and primary/alternate routes identified and discreetly reconnoitered-but not rehearsed except by resupply vehicles which should have alternating crews so everybody becomes familiar with the reinforcement routes. Things look different after dark if you're not a local and bad guys are shooting at your vehicle.
COPs should be within patrol distance of one another. This permits the possible reinforcement from other locations. Finally, your soldiers must understand that surrender isn't acceptable and that they are expected to fortify their locations sufficient to hold out until relieved.
"Hold Until Relieved..."
Most of all, you must convince them, rain or shine, day or night, that you're coming to get them if they get hit. Nobody will stand alone. Convince your men of that and they'll stand and fight. I'm not certain they believe that now.
You can't stay in the barracks and commute to a COIN war.