Destroying Myth of Indian Indengious Weapons Capability

[Paan Singh]

Pakistan's best friend = Indian domestic defence industry

it always helped you.... like in past..it will continue to help u..

 

[acetophenol]

The BEL Weapon Locating Radar (WLR) is a mobile artillery locating Phased array radar developed by India. This counter-battery radar is designed to detect and track incoming artillery and rocket fire to determine the point of origin for Counter-battery fire.
The WLR has been jointly developed by DRDO's Bangalore based laboratory, LRDE and the Government owned Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). The sub-systems have been fabricated by BEL based on the DRDO designs and delivered to LRDE for integration

 

[acetophenol]

DRDO Daksh

 

[Bossman]

Home Minister P. Chidambaram has mooted the creation of a centralised procurement board for buying small arms for the paramilitary forces. A miffed Chidambaram is understood to have suggested this after reports of deviations from tender norms surfaced in acquisitions of firearms by two paramilitary forces.
In March, the Border Security Force (BSF) signed a contract with Italian gun maker Beretta for buying 68,000 submachine guns worth over Rs 400 crore. The size of the deal raised eyebrows because few had heard of the Beretta weapon. Late last year, its sister service, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), signed an order for the purchase of 12,000 X-95 Tavor carbines from Israel costing over Rs 1 lakh apiece. This is just the tip of the iceberg.

Generous modernisation budgets after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks mean that India's military, paramilitary and police personnel will import small arms worth over $3 billion (Rs 13,500 crore). Most of these imports of weapons performing similar security roles will be from different global arms manufacturers with nothing in common in terms of ammunition, spares and training. "In a few years, India is going to resemble a salad bowl of assorted weaponry, says a senior police official. The Mumbai police's Force One commandos, raised after the 26/11, have four different types of weapons-Colt M-4 carbines from the US, Brugger and Thomet submachine guns from Switzerland, MP-5 submachine guns from Germany and AK-47 variants from eastern Europe.

The force is already believed to have a problem importing ammunition for all these weapons, one of the dangers of such a diverse menagerie. "The US army is talking about inter-operability (similar weapons, ammunition) of weapons across continents, we are unable to achieve inter-operability even between our security forces," says Lieutenant General (retd) P.C. Katoch.


Click here to EnlargeThe Indian Army has begun looking for new carbines (a shorter version of an assault rifle) and assault rifles to replace its obsolete weaponry. A lip-smacking treat of over $2 billion (Rs 9,000 crore) for foreign arms companies eyeing a piece of the action awaits.

In India, little research goes into buying such weapons. There are virtually no experts who can study or evaluate small arms. The sole evaluating agency is the army's School of Infantry in Mhow, Madhya Pradesh, which the army uses for its own requirements. Army officials call for an apex government body comprising users and technical experts from various services. "They should evaluate weapons and recommend induction for all security forces," says an army officer. This is along the lines of what the home minister has suggested for the paramilitary forces.

"Despite fighting insurgency for over two decades, the army has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of firefights with militants or any research into the type of weapons or bullets required," admits a senior army official. Most reports filed by individual field officers after encounters disappear into military-bureaucratic black holes in Delhi. A few years ago, an officer questioned the lethality of the new special forces' Tavor assault rifles bought from Israel. A group of militants ambushed by the army got away with injuries. The report was quietly buried. Importing weapons means the nation is at the mercy of foreign vendors for spares and ammunition. Austria and Germany have refused to let their firms supply weapons to Indian states like Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra citing human rights violations.

The larger problem, say officials, is the utter lack of communication between the designer, manufacturer and user. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the OFB and the army function in silos, not talking to each other. Faulty ammunition made by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) is another major cause of weapons malfunctioning in combat, but again, little thought is paid to improving quality. The DRDO's new MSMC compact carbine has the ability to address requirements of the army, police and paramilitary forces but is wrestling with weight and performance issues.

Army officials say at 4 kg, the weapon is too heavy; the DRDO says it will improve subsequent variants. The weapon undergoes final trials this month but is several years away from mass production. Meanwhile the Home Ministry is importing thousands of AK-47 variants from Bulgarian arms manufacturer Arsenal Inc. A home ministry official says the Bulgarian-made AK costs just Rs 22,000, Rs 5000 less than the indigenous INSAS rifle. The irony is hard to miss. A nation self-sufficient in making ballistic missiles imports assault rifles from eastern Europe.

DRDO Delays


Defence minister A K Antony checks out an MSMCThis month, the Army is to conduct final trials of the DRDO's Modern Submachine Carbine (MSMC).

In development for close on to a decade, it struggled with weight and performance issues. The weight has now dropped to an acceptable 3.1kg and a reliability of 99.4 per cent (3 stoppages for every 1,000 rounds fired) but the Army wants it to reach 99.7 per cent. The Army will buy 2.18 lakh of the carbines for Rs 2,183 crore if the MSMC passes the test.

The police and paramilitary are set to follow. The MSMC could potentially end the small arms confusion and put a stop to imports. The onus now lies with the DRDO to prove it can deliver.



Related link: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/st.../1/137309.html

---------- Post added at 10:16 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:16 AM ----------

A flying lemon
May 26, 2011
By Bharat Karnad

Bharat Karnad is professor at the Centre for Policy Research New Delhi.


The anger in Washington policy circles when the US fighter planes — the Lockheed-Martin F-16IN and the Boeing F-18 Super Hornet — did not make it to the Indian Air Force’s Medium-range Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) shortlist, was a thing to behold. It was as if an ungrateful India had reneged on a done aircraft deal — just rewards for easing India’s entry on to the verandah of the five-country nuclear weapons club.

The American incomprehension with the Indian decision is itself incomprehensible. Lockheed and Boeing actually believed they would win with platforms of late 1960s vintage jazzed up with a downgraded Raytheon APG-79 (or even a de-rated “81&#8221 version of the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) look-down, ground-mapping, radar. The Indian Air Force is not the most advanced but its leadership, despite its flaws, knows when it is being palmed off with yesterday’s goods. Had Washington offered the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35 Lightning II, the IAF would have jumped at it and the decision would have been hurrahed along by the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh. In the event, the French Rafale and the EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space) Company’s Typhoon Eurofighter progressed even as Lockheed and Boeing were sought to be pacified with two transport aircraft deals — the one for the C-130J making sense, the other for the C-17 not. Russia, likewise, was mollified with collaboration on the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). To my consternated friends in Washington who sought an explanation, I offered an analogy. Some two decades back, the Daimler-Benz car company entered the Indian market with older Mercedes models, convinced the cash-rich yokels would splash good money for anything with the three-cornered star on the bonnet. The old cars, remained unsold and the investment in production jigs and tools in their factory in Pune went waste. The Germans quickly corrected course, offering the newest Mercedes models, available in Dusseldorf, in Delhi.

The sale of Rafale or Eurofighter to India is a lifeline to both the Dassault Company and the French aviation sector generally and the four-country consortium producing, so far unviably, the latter aircraft that an expert acquaintance dismissed as something “Germany doesn’t want, Britain can’t afford, and Spain and Italy neither want nor can afford!” But, leverage-wise, it affords India traction with four European countries instead of just France in case Rafale is taken. But is either of these aircraft genuinely multi-role?

Dr Carlo Kopp, an internationally renowned combat aviation specialist, deems the Typhoon, a non-stealthy, short-range (300 nautical miles) air defence/air dominance fighter optimised for transonic manoeuvres, more a “lemon” than a “demon”. Italian Air Force Chief Gen. Vincenzo Camporini, moreover, declared in 2008 that this plane was incapable of an “attack role in an economically sustainable manner”, in part because EADS has no AESA radar. It hopes to develop one with the infusion of Indian monies if Typhoon is selected. Realistically, India will not get the strike variant until well into the 2020s as the Royal Air Force and the German Luftwaffe, for starters, will have the first lien on it. In short, for over a third of its lifetime, the IAF will have to make do with the more limited air defence version which, in effect, is an avionics-wise souped-up, ergonomically improved, MiG-21! Moreover, to expect timely, coordinated, supply of spares and service support from 20-odd countries (including Croatia!) roped into the Eurofighter programme will be a compounded logistics and maintenance nightmare.

Rafale is a smaller, semi-stealth plane with slightly better un-refuelled range than the Typhoon but, equipped with the RBE-22A AESA radar, can undertake ground attack, including nuclear weapon delivery. Critically, it has finessed the algorithm (patented, incidentally, by an Indian scientist) for more effective fusion of data from numerous on-board and external sensors (such as satellite) better than the Eurofighter. Except, as late as 2009, Rafale was ruled operationally inadequate perhaps because it is less agile in “dogfighting” — a role the IAF brass remains enamoured with long after advanced tactical missiles have made close-quarter aerial battle history. Rafale and Typhoon nevertheless cost a bomb, with the MMRCA eventually coming in at around $20 billion.

The F-16 was rejected because, in part, the Pakistan Air Force flies it. By this reckoning, Pakistan may also access Typhoon and Rafale. EADS is trying desperately to sell the Typhoon to Turkey. If it succeeds, PAF will end up familiarising itself with it, if not actually benefiting from surreptitious transfer of its technologies. Trying to ramp up its defence sales, France has explored the sale of Rafale to Pakistan as has Russia the MiG-35 in order to compete with China for influence in Islamabad (which is not barred by any provision in the FGFA deal with India).

The MMRCA is a rubbish acquisition. The defence ministry followed up the questionable decision with a singular display of lack of negotiating savvy. With the MiG-35 option on the table, India could have played the Europeans off against the Russians to secure the best terms, even if ultimately for Rafale/Typhoon. Instead, there’s the appalling record of defence ministry officials and service officers repeatedly muffing deals, worse, acting as patsies for, or playing footsy with, the supplier states, resulting in treasury-emptying contracts that have fetched the country little in return.

Learning from the past, defence minister A.K. Antony had better instruct his negotiators to insist on only phased payments linked to time-bound delivery of aircraft and full transfer of technology (including source codes and flight control laws for all aspects of the aircraft), and on deterrent penalties that automatically kick in at the slightest infringement or violation of clauses deliberately tilted to favour India. Considering Delhi — prior to signing the deal — is in a position to arm-twist almost anything out of the supplier firms using the threat of walking out on the deal, the litmus test of a “successful” MMRCA transaction will be whether, by way of offsets, and notwithstanding the initial problems with absorbing advanced technology, the Indian defence industry has gained top-edge technological-industrial competence across the broad combat aviation front (rather than rights to mere licenced manufacture as in past deals).



Related link: http://www.deccanchronicle.com/edito...ying-lemon-200

 

[acetophenol]

mahendra stryker:
armed with milan atgm,flame thrower etc:

 

[Bossman]

India's missiles - With a little help from our friends:

By Gary Milhollin
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - November 1989, pp. 31-35

Last May 22, India became the first country to test a strategic missile derived from a civilian space program. The missile's first-stage rocket motor, heat shield, and guidance system all came from India's space effort -- generously launched and sustained by foreign help.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi claimed that the missile, called "Agni" (fire), is "an R&D vehicle, not a weapons system." Then he qualified the assertion. "Agni is not a nuclear weapons system," he said. "What Agni does is to afford us the option of developing the ability to deliver non-nuclear weapons with high precision at long ranges."

In the May test, the missile reportedly flew 625 miles. But it is designed to carry a one-ton payload 1,500 miles, far enough to hit cities in southern China. Carrying a half-ton atomic bomb, the Agni would be able to fly about 2,200 miles, far enough to hit Beijing.

Whether Agni eventually carries nuclear or conventional weapons, the missile should destroy any illusions about sharing technology in the interest of peaceful uses of outer space. The story of the Agni's development shows how difficult it is to separate civilian and military uses of technology, and just how futile may be the recent, belated attempts to control the proliferation of military missile technology. A control regime established by seven Western nations in 1987 seeks to prevent precisely this sort of development. [See the June 1988 Bulletin.] Yet the regime has no provisions for enforcement, and the Indian program continued full speed ahead, with some foreign - particularly West German - cooperation, after the regime was adopted.

Lessons in America:

Agni's foreign ancestry dates from the 1960s. In November 1963, the United States began India's space program by launching a U.S. sounding rocket from Indian soil. (Sounding rockets fly straight up into the atmosphere to conduct scientific experiments. They are too small to launch satellites.) The United States was followed by others. Between 1963 and 1975, more than 350 U.S., French, Soviet, and British sounding rockets were launched from India's Thumba Range,[1] which the United States helped design. Thumba's first group of Indian engineers had learned rocket launching and range operation in the United States.

Among them was the Agni's chief designer, A. J. P. Abdul Kalam. In 1963-64, he spent four months in training in the United States. He visited NASA's Langley Research Center in Virginia, where the U.S. Scout rocket was conceived, and the Wallops Island Flight Center on the Virginia coast, where the Scout was being flown. The Scout was a low-cost, reliable satellite launcher that NASA had developed for orbiting small payloads.

Soon afterward, in 1965, the Indian government asked NASA how much it would cost and how long it would take to develop an Indian version of the Scout, and whether the United States would help. NASA replied that the Scout was "available . . . for purchase . . . in connection with scientific research," but warned that "transfer of this technology . . . would be a matter for determination by the Department of State under Munitions Control."[2] NASA nevertheless sent India technical reports on the Scout's design, which was unclassified. India's request should have raised some eyebrows: it came from Homi Bhabha, head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission.

But Kalam had the information he needed. He returned to India and built the SLV-3 (Space Launch Vehicle), India's first satellite launcher. Its design is virtually identical to the Scout's. Both rockets are 23 meters long, use four similar solid-fuel stages and "open loop" guidance, and lift a 40-kilogram payload into low earth orbit. The SLV's 30-foot first stage would later become the first stage of the Agni.

NASA officials say U.S. aid to India in rocketry was limited to the program in the 1960s. In 1988, however, the United States agreed to supply an advanced ring laser gyroscope to help guide a new Indian fighter plane.[3] It is not clear what will prevent India from using it to guide missiles. The highly accurate device is essentially solid state, making it easy to adapt to the demands of missile acceleration.

French lessons: liquid fuel

France also launched sounding rockets from India, and in the late 1960s allowed India to begin building "Centaure" sounding rockets under license from Sud Aviation. But France's main contribution has been in the field of liquid propulsion. Under a license from France's Societe Europeene de Propulsion (SEP), India is building its own version of the Viking high-thrust liquid rocket motor, used on the European Space Agency's Ariane satellite launcher.[4] Indian engineers helped develop the Viking in the mid-1970s, then began a program of their own. India has now built an experimental model of the Viking engine, called the Vikas.

The training in liquid propulsion seems to have paid off. Just over a year before testing the Agni, Kalam tested a smaller predecessor, the "Prithvi" (earth), which uses a liquid-propelled motor to carry a one-ton payload 150 miles. It resembles the widely sold Soviet Scud-B. Indian sources say that the Agni's second stage is a shortened version of the Prithvi.[5]

A German intensive tutorial:

The aid of the United States and France, however, was quickly dwarfed by West German help in the 1970s and 1980s. Germany gave India help in three indispensable missile technologies: guidance, rocket testing, and the use of composite materials. All were supposed to be for the space program, but all were equally useful for military missiles.

The German government's aerospace agency DLR (Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fur Luftfahrt und Raumfahrt e.V.) began tutoring India in rocket guidance in 1976.[6] The first step was to put a German interferometer on an Indian sounding rocket. An interferometer works by using antennas placed at different locations on the rocket to measure the phase of a radio signal received from the ground. The phase difference among the antennas reveals their relative positions on the rocket and thus the rocket's attitude, which can be monitored and corrected from the ground. The first launch of an Indian rocket with a German interferometer was in 1978. By 1981 the project had been expanded to include an on-board DLR microprocessor. In April 1982, India tested its own version of the same interferometer.

The next step was to make a navigation system that did not depend on signals from the ground, one that could guide a payload through space by determining its position and speed at any moment. The "autonomous payload control system," which India proposed in July 1981, would provide "full autonomous navigation capability to spaceborne sensors," determining "position, velocity, attitude, and precision time in a real-time mode." India would supply the rockets and satellites; Germany would provide the brains of the guidance system. The key component would be an on-board computer, using a microprocessor based on the Motorola family M 68000, and the software to run it.

It must be noted that an inertial navigation system that can guide satellites can also guide warheads. The United States used NASA's experience in guiding the Titan II transtage, a "bus" designed for multiple satellite launchings, to develop a bus that would accurately deliver small nuclear warheads.[7]

The German-Indian plan was carried out. By January 1982, the two countries had agreed on a series of joint projects for the program. But at the same time, India announced that it was designing a new navigation system for its own space rockets: it would replace the "open loop" system used on its first launcher, the SLV-3, with a "closed loop" system for its Advanced Space Launch Vehicle and its Polar Space Launch Vehicle. An open loop system can only correct the rocket's attitude, not deviations from the planned flight path. A closed loop system can correct both, because it senses and determines the rocket's position in space. It amounts to an autonomous navigation system.

So while India's program with Germany, called APC-Rex for Autonomous Payload Control Rocket Experiment, was developing autonomous navigation for a satellite, India would develop autonomous navigation for its own rockets. India would need a brain for its space rockets' new closed loop system, which it would provide by developing the "Mark-II" onboard processor - "based on [the] Motorola 6800 microprocessor with 16-bit word length" - the same as that used in the German program. (Although Indian reports repeatedly refer to the Motorola "6800," according to Motorola the 16-bit chip is the M 68000.) The timing of subsequent events showed continued parallel developments in the two programs.

The German aid in guidance is apparently continuing, despite the Agni launch. In May 1989, a DLR official said that "the APC-Rex program has not yet been concluded, but it will come to an end in 1989."[8] West Germany was one of the seven countries that adopted the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987, an agreement not to export items useful in making long-range missiles. That agreement barred the export of technology capable of real-time processing of navigation data, unless specific assurances could be given that the technology would not be used for, or transferred to, missile programs. If, as the evidence suggests, technology from APC-Rex has been used in India's rocket and missile programs, Germany may have violated the agreement.

India has not described the Agni guidance system. But when the missile was assembled in 1988, Indian rocket scientists had studied and developed only one brain for rocket guidance: the German system based on the Motorola microprocessor and its software. Over a decade, Germany's guidance tutorial helped India build and test a navigation package based on that system. Did that system go into the Agni, or did India invent from scratch some other system, not mentioned in any Indian space program report? If the latter, did the Indian rocket scientists block from their minds everything they had learned from the Germans? The evidence is strong that the Agni owes its brain to German engineering.

Interchangeable parts:

The Indian space program first mentions the Agni in its 1982-83 annual report as a booster rocket for the Polar Space Launch Vehicle: six identical Agni boosters will lift the missile's first stage. The boosters, in turn, are adaptations of the first stage of the SLV-3.[9] Indeed, the SLV-3 is the only large booster motor that India has: it carries nine tons of solid propellant, as does the Agni first stage; no other Indian booster carries anything close to that amount. India has used the same booster to lift the Advanced Space Launch Vehicle.[10] After the Agni launch a number of sources, Indian as well as foreign, reported that the Agni first stage was identical to the SLV-3 first stage. Thus, the main rocket for India's missile program has come from India's space program.

This same rocket, in turn, owes much to German help. Wind tunnels are essential to the design of any rocket. In 1974-75, DLR tested a model of the first stage of the SLV-3 in its wind tunnel at Cologne-Portz. DLR also helped India build rocket test facilities, furnishing a complete facility design and training Indian engineers in high-altitude testing. India has said it will use this technology to test the liquid-fueled upper stage of the Polar Space Launch Vehicle, and it may already have done so. India may also have used it to test the Agni's liquid-fueled second stage, which must have been tested somewhere.

In June 1988, two Egyptian military officers were indicted for trying to smuggle carbon fiber composites out of the United States. Export of the composites was strictly controlled: the strong, lightweight, heat-resistant materials were being used for the nozzles and the nosecone of the MX, Trident, and Minuteman nuclear missiles.

But DAR began giving Indian scientists on-the-job training in composites at Stuttgart and Braunschweig in the mid-1970s. Subjects ranged from "glass fibre reinforced plastics via impregnated materials" to "carbon fibre reinforced composites." The Indians learned "composition, manufacturing processes, quality control, and error detection."

The German training allowed India to make rocket nozzles and nosecones of its own, which could be for either missiles or space launchers. To help the Indians use the composites, DAR supplied the documentation for a precision filament-winding machine, which India built and commissioned in 1985-86.

After the Agni test, Prime Minister Gandhi affirmed that one of the goals was to test "atmospheric reentry." Lower-ranking officials were more specific. They said that the goal was to test a "domestically developed heat shield."[11]

Target: China

No country, including India, has ever spent money on long-range rockets simply to explore space. The "satellites" launched by the SLV-3 were little more than flight monitors, used to transmit data on rocket performance, which was India's true interest. To launch real satellites, India could and did hire other providers of that service. The Soviets launched India's first two satellites; France's Ariane rocket and the U.S. space shuttle have launched others.

Nor has any country developed long-range missiles simply to deliver conventional bombs. The large cost of missile development is only justified by the ability to inflict strategic blows, which conventional warheads cannot do.

The Agni, therefore, can only be interpreted as a step toward a long-range nuclear strike force. As India progresses in guidance, the Agni's range should extend gradually to most targets in China.

India apparently has the material and skill to mass produce the Agni and arm it with nuclear warheads. The result will be a new nuclear equation in Asia. Across a common border, nuclear-armed rivals will confront each other, each with missiles, one or both vulnerable to a first strike from the other.

When India exploded an atomic bomb in 1974, the world was shocked. India had taken a Canadian reactor and U.S. heavy water both imported under guarantees of peaceful use and used them openly to make plutonium for a nuclear blast. That blast destroyed illusions about the "peaceful atom" and prompted changes in nuclear export policy. It is not surprising that India has again taken advantage of civilian imports and technology to further what appears to be a nuclear weapons program. What is surprising is that, given India's record, it was so easy.

How a Satellite Guidance System gets into a missile:

(Excerpts from program reports)

1982 - 83

APC-Rex (German-Indian missile program satellite guidance program): received Motorola 68000 microprocessor

Indian space and missile program: "An engineering model of the Mark-ll based on the Motorola 6800 [sic] has been integrated and exhaustive tests are being carried out."

1983 - 84

APC-Rex (German-Indian missile program satellite guidance program): "Development of an on-board computer for autonomous payload control is in progress."

Indian space and missile program: "Design review was conducted on inertial navigation systems with the participation of international experts."

1984 - 85

APC-Rex (German-Indian missile program satellite guidance program): "Design of the on-board [guidance] packages was completed."

Indian space and missile program: "Design of on-board processors for SLV based on 16-bit microprocessors has been completed."

1986 - 87

APC-Rex (German-Indian missile program satellite guidance program): "Development and validation of hardware and software packages for APC-Rex are in their final stages."

Indian space and missile program: "Breadboard models of on-board computers based on microprocessors have been realized."


Sources:

1. P.D. Bhavsar et al., "Indian Sounding Rocket Program," Proceedings of the 4th Sounding Rocket Technology Conference (Boston: American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 23-26,1976), pp. 101-07.

2. Letter from Arnold W. Frutkin, assistant administrator for international affairs, NASA, to Homi J. Bhabha, chairman, Indian Atomic Energy Commission, March 10, 1965.

3. Steven R. Weisman, "U.S. Clears Vital Gyroscope for Indian Jet Fighter," New York Times, April 7, 1988, p. A12.

4. David Velupillai, "ISRO, India's Ambitious Space Agency," Flight International (June 28, 1980), p. 1466.

5. "India's Agni Success Poses New Problems," Defence Weekly (June 3,1989), p. 1052.

6. Many of the following details of the German-Indian space program are found in the proceedings of a January 27, 1982, colloquium of the DAR (then called DFVLR) and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in Bangalore, India, "A Decade of Cooperation in the Field of Space Research and Technology," and in annual reports of the Indian government's Department of Space.

7. Ted Greenwood, Qualitative Improvements in Offensive Strategic Arms: The Case of the MARV(Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Aug. 1973), p. 278.

8. Letter from Dietmar Wurzel, head of DAR's Washington, D.C., office, to Gary Milhollin, May 1, 1989.

9. "India The Way Forward," Spaceflight (Dec.1986), p. 434.

10. "India Aims for Self-Sufficiency in Space," Flight International (June 14,1986), p. 45.

11. Barbara Crossette, "India Reports Successful Test of Mid-Range Missile," New York Times, May 22, 1989, p. A9.

WPoNAC

---------- Post added at 10:18 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:17 AM ----------

Friday, Apr 16, 2010

India's own cryogenic rocket launch fails

T.S. Subramanian

GSLV-D3 tumbles into the sea

SRIHARIKOTA: India's ambitious quest to achieve total independence in cryogenic technology for launching satellite launch vehicles suffered a setback on Thursday, with the indigenous cryogenic engine in a Geo-synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV-D3) failing to ignite and the vehicle tumbling into the sea.

The mission to put communication satellite GSAT-4 in orbit thus ended in failure. The vehicle, however, was not destroyed in mid-flight as its trajectory was in a safe corridor over the Bay of Bengal.

The cryogenic technology is crucial to put heavy satellites in geo-synchronous transfer orbit at an altitude of 36,000 km.

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) was keenly looking forward to this flight because this was the first time that it was flying a GSLV with its own cryogenic engine.

Gloom engulfed the Mission Control Centre at the Sriharikota spaceport as the mission's failure sank in.

ISRO had worked for more than 17 years to develop its own cryogenic engine.

The earlier five GSLV flights from 2001 to 2007 were powered by Russian cryogenic engines.

ISRO Chairman K. Radhakrishnan told reporters, “We are not sure whether the cryogenic main engine did ignite. We have to confirm this after looking at the various parameters that were monitored during the flight. The vehicle was tumbling. It means it lost its control and altitude. Finally, it splashed into the sea.”


Related link: http://www.thehindu.com/2010/04/16/s...1660470100.htm

 

[acetophenol]

mahendra rakshak:

 

[Bossman]

India's Prithvi-II fails to take off
Published: September 25, 2010


BALASORE (Online) – India’s indigenously developed nuclear-capable Prithvi-II ballistic missile failed to take off during a user trial from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur off the Orissa coast on Friday apparently due to a technical problem, defence sources said.
Though the ITR authorities were not immediately available for comment, defence sources said the sophisticated missile could not take off during the planned trial from the launch Complex-III of the test range due to some “technical snag.” “The failure to lift Prithvi-II was due to a snag either in the main missile or the sub-system, including the launcher,” they said, adding the test-fire was slated to be held as part of user’s trial by the armed forces. During today’s planned trial, a noise could be heard as smoke billowed from the launch site around the time of the blasting.
The last four user’s trials of the surface-to-surface missile were successfully conducted during about one-year period, from the same site in the ITR. The last trial was conducted on June 18, this year.
The test firing of the state-of-the-art missile, which has already been inducted into armed forces, was planned as users trial by the specially formed “Strategic Force Command” (SFC), the sources said.

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-ne...ls-to-take-off

---------- Post added at 10:19 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:18 AM ----------

India’s test of Agni-II missile fails: sources
BHUBANESWAR - 10th December 2010 (9 hours ago)
By AFP

India carried out an unsuccessful maiden test Friday of an upgraded version of its nuclear-capable, medium-range Agni-II ballistic missile, defence sources said.

The surface-to-surface “Agni-II plus” was fired from a mobile rail launcher on Wheeler Island off the coast of the western state of Orissa, but dropped into the sea shortly into its planned flight, the sources said.

It was not immediately clear why the test had failed. The missile has two stages, both fuelled by solid propellants.

It has a normal range of 2,000-2,500 kilometers (1,250-1,500 miles) and India has already successfully tested an Agni-III variant with a reach of up to 3,000-3,500 kilometres.

The upgraded “Agni-II plus” has an improved navigation system and is aimed at bridging the gap between the two with a range of around 2,500-3,000 kilometres.

http://www.aaj.tv/2010/12/indias-tes...fails-sources/

 

[acetophenol]

Mahindra Marksman is India’s first armoured capsule based light bullet proof vehicle to provide protection to the personnel of Defence, Para Military and Police forces against small arms fire and under belly grenade attacks. It has capability to be used in counter terrorist as well as conventional roles.
FEATURES:

Ballistic Protection

Sides: can withstand three direct hits of 7.62 X 51mm NATO Ball M80, 7.62 X 39mm Ball PS and 5.56 X 45mm Ball M 193 at a distance of 10m at 90º angle attack.

Top: can withstand three direct hits of above ammunition at a distance of 10m at 45º angle attack.

Floor: protection against two DM 51(German norm) hand grenades detonated under the vehicle simultaneously.

Additional protection: All joints and welding have overlap. The rear stowage boxes provide protection to crew when using the rear door.

Cuppola has an machine gun mount with 270º traverse and protection.

Seven crew firing ports.

Outward facing configured rear seat and wide bulletproof windows allows total operational orientation of the crew sitting at the rear.

Search light mounted on top of the vehicle controlled from inside the vehicle by the driver/co driver.

Rear view camera and a TV screen for the driver and co driver to see the dead zone behind the vehicle.

Air conditioning option available.

Military/user specified stowage and fittings can be catered for.

 

[Bossman]

False claims on the BMD programme are detrimental to India’s security

By Pravin Sawhney

Tall claims and empty boasts seem to have become the hallmark of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The proclivity of the Director General, DRDO, Dr V.K. Saraswat and his team to exaggerate its achievements would be amusing to discerning people.

Unfortunately, this amusement has grave national security implications and Dr Saraswat, a ballistic missile expert with the indigenous Prithvi ballistic missile being his crowning glory, should know this better than most.

As the director general, DRDO, he is leading the nation’s home-grown Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme. The claims made by him about the recently tested-fired Dhanush and Prithvi II ballistic missiles on March 11 and the BMD Endo-atmospheric interceptor test on March 6 are exaggerated beyond imagination.

These should have been put into perspective by the Indian defence correspondents and experts, not only for domestic but international consumption as well, because the Pakistani establishment, while ignoring DRDO’s claims on Prithvi, utilises the boasts about the BMD to its strategic advantage.

Making use of Saraswat’s chest-thumping, Pakistan is going ahead full throttle to more than match India’s humble BMD technological achievements; if at all, the programme is decades away from fruition. According to US intelligence, while ahead of India in ballistic missiles capabilities since 2001, General Headquarters, Rawalpindi continues to increase its inventory of nuclear weapons’ land vector by citing India’s BMD claims as a destabilising factor.

This writer had first-hand experience of this a few months ago. During the alumni meet at the Cooperative Monitoring Centre (Sandia National Laboratory) at Albuquerque, US in October 2010, a former director of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, Brigadier Feroz Khan argued that India’s growing BMD capability had forced Pakistan to build more ballistic missiles.

Given its unbridled inventory, it is a matter of time before the Pakistan Army will alter its war-fighting doctrine to align it with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army thinking. While supplementing air power, the difference between combat aircraft and ballistic missiles will narrow down to tighter control of the latter.

This will upset the Indian Air Force combat numbers superiority over the Pakistan Air Force and force the Indian Army to review its operational level pro-active strategy, referred to as the Cold Start doctrine in the media, against the Pakistan Army. Given such implications, the defence minister needs to restrain Saraswat and the DRDO from making irresponsible statements. Apparently after the recent claims on the BMD project, defence minister A.K. Antony has expressed his displeasure to Saraswat.

Prithvi and Dhanush


A brief history and technological limitations of the indigenous Prithvi ballistic missile are in order. The development of surface-to-surface Prithvi ballistic missile was sanctioned by the government in 1983 under the Integrated Guided Missiles Development Programme. As Prithvi was an offshoot of ISRO’s civilian Space Launch Vehicle (SLV), its development commenced without the General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR) — technical requirements given by the user, that is, defence services, to the research organisation — implying that the defence services were neither consulted nor were they interested (ballistic missiles were still unknown to them) in the programme.

As happens with most indigenous programmes, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi personally goaded the army in 1988 to accept Prithvi in order to encourage the indigenous product. Considering the Prime Minister had intervened regarding a weapon system, it was easy for the DRDO to arm-twist the other two services, the navy and the air force to seek the missile with a few minor and not design changes to suit its medium of operations.

---------- Post added at 10:20 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:19 AM ----------

AGNI-II fails to deliver desired results

Agni-II, countrys nuclear counter strike capability ballistic missile has reportedly failed to deliver desired result.

The trial was conducted from Wheeler Island, part of the integrated test range of Orissa coast on Tuesday at about 10 am.

Reliable sources at the Wheelers Island said the countdown was normal, liftoff was smooth and then disaster struck as the 2000 kms plus range Agni-II missile instead of traveling on the pre-determined trajectory started wandering midway.

The missile deviated from its path after the first stage separation and was meandering at an angle of 180 degree midway. Though it was coordinated to cover a distance of nearly 2000 km, within just 127 seconds it covered 203 km before plunging into the sea, said the source.

The guidance system can correct the missiles midway path deviation if it behaves erratically at an angle of 40 to 60 degree but not beyond that, said a defence scientist. The disaster might have happened due to design and manufacturing faults, he added.

Similarly on July 9, 2006, the maiden test of Agni-III had failed to achieve the target as technical snags were reported during the separation of the first and the second stage.

Agni-II missile was first tested on April 11, 1999, and inducted in the Army in 2004. The trial was conducted by the Army while scientists from DRDO provided the necessary logistical support. The unfortunate development will have a telling effect on the morale of the Army, said analysts.

Several attempts to contact Agni project director, Avinash Chander and ITR director, S P Dash turned futile. There was no official word even from DRDO on the test.

We are still analyzing the statistics about the flight performance and data from the launch pad and the three tracking stations are being thoroughtly examined, said a scientist, who is part of the missile programme. Several defence analysts have criticized the DRDO for the failure.

“Agni project is an established project. In the deployment stage if the missile behaves like this, can we afford to hold the country to ransom security-wise. There should be some sort of accountability from scientists doing the research and development of the DRDO,” said an analyst.

 

[acetophenol]

tata light specialist vehicle

The new Tata 4-wheeled LSV has been supplied to the Army as well as the newly formed Anti Terrorism Squad (ATS). The Tata family itself has borne the brunt of Mumbai’s terrorist attack. Tata’s LSV satisfies the need of a high mobility armoured vehicle which is capable of transporting troops and artillery in case of counter insurgency operations.
Tata’s LSV is capable of carrying a 1.2 tonne payload and its joint platform can be altered for diverse missions reconnaissance and counter insurgency operations for special forces. The LSV has an adaptive automatic transmission with a top speed of 105 kmph. Tata’s LSV is capable of 60 percent gradeability, 45 degree approach and departure angle and 300 mm vertical climbing. The LSV massive 255 mm ground clearance helps its all terrain capabilities. The LSV can operate in very harsh climatic conditions and can withstand temperatures ranging from -20C to 55C.

 

[Bossman]

India's Strategic Planners Aren't Thinking

By Fareed Zakaria, CNN

A number of you have asked me on Facebook and Twitter what I think of India’s recent decision not to buy $10 billion worth of American warplanes.

I think it was a big mistake on India’s part. Despite what India says, defense purchases like this are about more than just planes. The Indian press has portrayed the country’s decision to buy European jets instead as a very clever strategy of hedging its bets. That’s nonsense.

First of all, the idea that India’s foreign policy elite are able to think in a strategic and wise way on behalf of the country is highly questionable. These are the people who allied India steadfastly with the Soviet Union and Communist China up until the point that Chairman Mao decided to invade India.

Then, they doubled down on the bet and backed the Soviet Union, including endorsing the invasions of Cambodia and then Afghanistan. They stood with the Soviet Union right up to the point that the Soviet Union collapsed and it became clear that New Delhi had gotten behind the wrong side in the Cold War.

This same establishment is now telling us how clever they are being.

The fundamental fact is India needs the United States more than the United States needs India. The U.S. economy is $15 trillion; I think it will survive the loss of this $10 billion deal!

For the Indians, they lost a lot of goodwill at a crucial time. The Americans felt they had bent over backwards to do favors for India. The U.S. was the indispensable force in ending India’s nuclear apartheid, for example. Then India blew an opportunity to cement that positive relationship.

India needs America. First of all, this is because India’s immediate security is entirely dependent on maintaining a stable relationship with Pakistan. India is unable to forge a stable relationship itself for all kinds of historical reasons. The Pakistan-Indian relationship is just so fraught.

America is a very useful interlocutor because India’s and America’s interests in a place like Afghanistan are identical: stability and the absence of terror groups. India could gain a very powerful ally in America who also has enormous influence over Pakistan.

Secondly, the rise of China is the big strategic problem for India over the next 25 years and once again the single most important outside power in the context of the rise of China is the United States. This is true from an economic, political and military point of view.

So looking at that strategic landscape, you have to ask yourself, “What are Indian strategic planners thinking?” My guess is they’re not thinking. This is the scratching of old, non-aligned itches. Left wing ideology, which has been beaten back and exposed as bankrupt in the economic realm, has found some place in the political realm.

Maybe it will take 20 years, but just as surely as India’s very clever strategy during the Cold War proved to be a profound mistake, people will look back on what India is doing right now and say that it had a chance to build an extraordinary and close relationship with the United States and it blew it.

I hope that’s not what happens but the Indians certainly seem on course to do just that.

Those are my thoughts. I invite you to share yours below, and to follow me on Facebook and Twitter.

---------- Post added at 10:22 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:22 AM ----------

Border Security Force Criticizes Dhruv Helicopter


(Source: Forecast International; issued May 24, 2011)



NEW DELHI --- The Indian Border Security Force (BSF) has requested that the government replace its indigenous Dhruv helicopters, saying they did not fulfill their operational requirement.

A BSF letter to the government stated that "the Advanced Light Helicopters - Dhruv - are not helpful in our operations like casualty evacuation and troop reinforcements. They are useless for us. Most of the times these helicopters are under servicing and there are issues about [their] capabilities to fly beyond a certain height."

The BSF air fleet currently has six Dhruv helicopters, and two more will soon be inducted

---------- Post added at 10:23 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:22 AM ----------

Crew ejects as Indian Sitara prototype crashes
By Radhakrishna Rao

A prototype of the Hindustan Aeronautics HJT-36 Sitara intermediate jet trainer has crashed during a routine test flight over a sparsely populated area in the south Indian state of Tamilnadu.

Initial reports say both test pilots managed to eject to safety, and that the aircraft did not cause any damage to property when it hit the ground.

Designed as a replacement for the Indian air force's obsolete HAL-built Kiran jet trainers, the Sitara is a conventional subsonic design with low swept wings, a staggered cockpit and small air intake on either side of its fuselage.

The development schedule of the HJT-36 has already been delayed because of the need to replace the design's original Snecma Larzac 04H20 engine with an NPO Saturn 55I powerplant. The programme also slipped following an accident which damaged a prototype aircraft during the Aero India show in 2007. This was subsequently returned to flight status

 

[Bossman]

US doubts HAL's capability
TNN, Feb 19, 2011, 02.50am IST


|India-US relations|Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd|HALThe remark drew a sharp response from an MoD official, who said the PSU was already producing a fighter like the Sukhoi-30MKI.NEW DELHI: The US seems to have committed a howler in the race to bag the "mother of all defence deals", the $10.4 billion project to acquire 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft for IAF, which is in the final lap now.

Washington has expressed serious doubts on the ability of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) to handle projects like the MMRCA, dubbing it "untested and suspect". This drew a sharp response from a defence ministry official, who pointed out the defence PSU was already engaged in producing a frontline "air dominance" fighter like Sukhoi-30MKI with Russia's help.

As per the MMRCA contract, which India hopes to ink this year, 18 jets will be bought off-the-shelf from the foreign vendor finally selected, while the rest will be manufactured by HAL in India after transfer of technology.

Two American fighters, F/A-18 'Super Hornet' ( Boeing) and F-16 'Falcon' ( Lockheed Martin), are in the race to bag the project, which is the largest fighter deal going around the world at this time. The other jets, which have undergone the gruelling field trials by IAF, are the Swedish Gripen (Saab), French Rafale (Dassault), Russian MiG-35 (United Aircraft Corporation) and Eurofighter Typhoon (consortium of British, German, Spanish and Italian companies).

The Financial Times on Friday reported that US ambassador to India Timothy Roemer, in a confidential cable last year, had held India's aviation industry as "two to three decades behind the US and other western nations" despite some advances.

"The potential for HAL to successfully partner with US firms on a truly advanced aircraft remains untested and suspect," said Roemer, in the cable now leaked by WikiLeaks and "seen" by the British newspaper.

After a trip to HAL facilities in Bangalore in February 2010, Roemer also expressed surprise at the lack of automation and safety precautions at the HAL plant. US companies need to "approach partnerships carefully to understand the management and technological experience of Indian firms", he said.


Read more: US doubts HAL's capability - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/i...#ixzz1ENaSZ9IR

---------- Post added at 10:25 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:25 AM ----------

LCA Tejas Falls Short of Earlier Expectations


Nov 25, 2010



By Asia-Pacific Staff
New Delhi

As India’s homegrown Light Combat Aircraft (LCA Tejas) nears critical initial operational clearance next month, Indian air force officials say the aircraft will fail to meet performance requirements laid down by the service for the limited-profile Mk.1 platform.

According to an Indian air force source associated with the long-delayed indigenous fighter program, when the Tejas passes this milestone in December, it still will not be the fighter the air force had agreed to accept for limited squadron service. Performance specifications that the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) has not been able to attain include sustained turn rate, speed at low altitude, angle of attack and certain weapon delivery profiles. Exactly how far off the performance is from the specification remains classified.

The Tejas program has enlisted EADS to help expand the flight envelope to meet service requirements.

These shortfalls come on top of a thrust deficiency that necessitated the selection of a more powerful engine, General Electric’s F414-INS6, this year for a proposed Mk.2 version.

“We are still working to get the platform on track for initial operational clearance,” says an air force officer. “It appears the exercise of resolving certain performance parameters will spill over into the post-induction phase,” he notes. “There was a very committed effort toward envelope expansion, though we have fallen short in certain key specifications, which we will continue to work on.”

Former air force chief Srinivasapuram Krishnaswamy, who first pushed the idea of a limited induction of the homegrown fighter even if it did not fully meet service requirements, argues that the aircraft needs to be delivered without any further delay. “Once it is delivered, all outstanding issues can be ironed out and our pilots can get a chance to see what it is capable of. It is important to get it into service. That is the key.”

Initial deliveries of the aircraft early next year will be to the Indian air force’s Aircraft & Systems Testing Establishment in Bangalore, where the platforms will be tested before formal induction into squadron service for a year-long exercise in defining a role for the Tejas. The service has ordered 20 Tejas Mk.1 jets (and is processing an order for 20 more), powered by the GE F414-IN20 for two inaugural squadrons that will be established at peninsular air bases after the Aero India show in February.

The Tejas program has embarked on putting the ostensibly more capable Tejas Mk.2 on track, as well. An ADA team is optimizing the Tejas airframe for the F414 powerplant and has initiated studies on the aircraft’s proposed operational envelope, fluid dynamics studies of new components and analysis of new engine components. The team is also producing fresh numerical master geometry and inboard drawings, a new digital mock-up of the entire Mk.2, and a wind tunnel model in collaboration with the National Aerospace Laboratory.

The Tejas Mk.2 is scheduled to make its first flight in 2014, with full-rate production to follow two years later.

---------- Post added at 10:26 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:25 AM ----------

Turbulence ahead for Indian fighter jet: analysts
Thu Jan 20, 3:25 am ET

NEW DELHI (AFP) – India's homegrown fighter jet, the Tejas, has finally been cleared for operations but analysts say any celebration of India's entry into an elite club of military hardware producers is premature.

Initial operational approval for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) has taken 26 years -- the result of endless developmental delays, technological hiccups and massive cost overruns.

First conceived as a direct replacement for the Indian Air Force's (IAF) ageing fleet of Russian-made MiG-21s -- tagged "flying coffins" for their abysmal safety record -- the LCA was hyped as a milestone in India's bid to reduce its dependency on military imports.

Although conceived, designed and assembled in India, its "indigenous" label is somewhat misleading as 40 percent of its components are foreign-made, including the radar and US-built engine.

Formal induction of the Tejas is still two or three years away, and questions remain over its eventual suitability.

"Only after the aircraft is put in use by the pilots will its strength and limitations become clear," said Ajey Lele, a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi.

"India's peculiar security requirements demand a very capable air force with state-of-the-art platform and weapon systems. Naturally, the Tejas will have to fulfil major expectations," he added.

"Its too early to pop the bubbly," warned military aviation specialist Kapil Kak, saying procuring engines for a second generation of Tejas could become a headache for India.

Accepting the LCA's operational clearance certificate last week, Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik seemed less than enthused, noting that the aircraft was really a "Mig-21, plus, plus" and not the fourth generation fighter it was conceived as.

"There are some areas where work still needs to be done. There are aspects that need to be improved," Naik said. "We've waited a long time for the Tejas. We don't want a partial platform."

The LCA is a single-seater, single-engine, supersonic tactical jet equipped with the latest avionics, weaponry and advanced multi-mode radar. It can be armed with an array of weapons including freefall and laser guided bombs, air-to-air, air-to-ground and anti-ship missiles.

Developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation and manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd in conjunction with a host of public and private sector firms, the first prototype took to the skies in 2001 and since then 1,500 test flights have been conducted.

From an initial budget of 5.6 billion rupees ($123 million), the cost of developing the fighter has snowballed over the years to around 180 billion rupees.

While acknowledging the LCA's troubled history, Arun Sharma, a former chief of naval staff and chairman of the National Maritime Foundation think-tank, said the project should still be applauded for overcoming major challenges.

Among them was the imposition of US-led sanctions in the wake of India's 1998 nuclear tests, which put crucial technologies out of reach and contributed to the delays.

"Only a handful of countries can claim the ability and competence to successfully bring a project of such complexity to fruition," Sharma said.

"So it would be churlish not to acknowledge the achievement of our aircraft designers and scientists for having delivered -- albeit belatedly -- a state-of-the-art combat aircraft."

And John Siddharth, a South Asia defence analyst with consultancy Frost & Sullivan, said India would have learned useful lessons from the sometimes painful experience of the LCA project.

"Indigenous production will help companies to be self-dependent on weaponry systems and the successful development of Tejas programme has certainly boosted the perspective of Indian aerospace companies," Siddharth said.

In 2009, India launched its own nuclear submarine, the Arihant, to similar plaudits and talk of the country's growing military self-sufficiency.

But like the LCA, the Arihant is still years and many arduous trials away from full induction into the armed forces.

In the meantime, India's dependency on foreign hardware is set to continue.

New Delhi is likely to finalise a $12 billion deal in July for 126 fighter jets for which six global aeronautical giants including companies from the United States, France, Europe and Russia are competing.

And last month it signed an agreement with long-time supplier Russia for the joint production of up to 250 advanced stealth fighter jets which experts say could be worth $25 billion.

 

[Bossman]

Tuesday, April 13, 2010
A Pakistani Trainer Jet For The Indian Air Force?


Here is a chance that India blew to send a strong message for peace with both Pakistan and China. An Egyptian diplomat based in New Delhi apparently offered recently to help Indian Air Force overcome its shabby pilot training program.

According to a report by the Indian magazine Business Standard, the Egyptian official offered a novel solution: An Egyptian Air Force training crew flown from Egypt to India to train Indian pilots using Karakoram-8, the multirole trainer jointly developed by both Pakistan and China and now used by a growing list of countries, including Egypt, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Namibia, not to mention the air forces of both Pakistan and China.

Says the Indian magazine: "Since the offer was not followed up in writing, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was spared the embarrassment of having to reply."

But the Egyptian diplomat was not playing dumb. He knew what he was saying. The Egyptians are no novices in diplomacy. Maybe he was just hoping to make a small indirect breakthrough in India's tense relationship with both Pakistan and China. Cairo enjoys excellent relations with Islamabad and Beijing.

It would have been a smart move had the Indian air force accepted the offer. New Delhi has close ties to Egypt and extensive military-to-military relations. So there is no question of trust deficit. Using a trainer developed by Pakistan and China would have said a lot about how confident India is about itself. The move would have also made financial and practical sense. Despite India's massive military procurement program, it's pilot training record is downright embarrassing. Again, here's a quote from the same report: "... the IAF’s notoriously unreliable basic trainer, the HPT-32 Deepak, was grounded after a horrific crash that killed two experienced pilots. In 17 Deepak crashes so far, 19 pilots have died."

This move would have done good where Indian diplomacy in recent years has done little to improve relations with its two neighbors.

The list of Indian hostile messages to Pakistan and China is long [acquiring Pakistan-specific weapon systems, building Pakistan- and China-specific bases near the two borders, quietly supporting terrorism inside China in Tibet in Xinjiang and Inside Pakistan's Balochistan and in cities close to Pakistan's border with India.

The Karakoram-8, and its several recent upgraded models, is jointly developed and produced by China Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex. The plane is called K-8 Karakorum after the mountain range that separates China and Pakistan. Although it is a trainer, the jet can be used for light air-to-ground combat roles with easy modifications. [See specifications here].


Source: http://aq-lounge.blogspot.com/2010/0...ndian-air.html

---------- Post added at 10:29 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:28 AM ----------

An advanced light helicopter Dhruv of the Indian Air Force crash-landed in Rajasthan’s Jaisalmer district while rehearsing for the ‘Vayu Shakti’ air power show to be held there on Sunday.

The helicopter was part of the Sarang helicopter display team of the IAF and was rehearsing for Sunday’s air show, when the incident occurred, IAF officials said here.

“Both pilots are safe after they had to make a controlled crash-landing due to loss of power in the chopper,” they added.

The IAF has ordered a Court of Inquiry to look into the reasons behind the incident, the officials said.

In 2005, the entire ALH Dhruv fleet had been grounded for several months after a similar incident in Andhra Pradesh and the subsequent probe had found a fault with the tail rotor blades of the choppers.

On whether the display team comprising four ALH Dhruvs will take part in the air show, for which the President and the Defence Minister are also coming.

 

[acetophenol]

mahendra axe: