Demonising Pakistan will not solve Afghanistan

[S-2]

Mr. Burke reassures the Brits that you're not circling the drain. Fine. Nobody thought your "failure" would manifest itself now...like, RIGHT NOW. It's how he began this piece-

"First for the good news: Pakistan is not about to explode."

and how it finished-

"Worrying about the imminent collapse of Pakistan is not going to help us find answers to the really difficult questions that Pakistan poses."

In-between was the meat. He nails his assessment here-

"Recent years have seen the consolidation of a new Pakistani identity between these two extremes. It is nationalist, conservative in religious and social terms and much more aggressive in asserting what are seen, rightly or wrongly, as local "Pakistani" interests. It is a mix of patriotic chauvinism and moderate Islamism that is currently heavily informed by a distorted view of the world sadly all too familiar across the entire Muslim world. This means that for many Pakistanis, the west is rapacious and hostile... you have a nuclear armed nation with a large population that is increasingly vocal and which sees the world very differently from us."

I've seen it reflected verbatim ad infinitum at pk.def. I'm not so convinced here-

"Our interest in Afghanistan has been reduced to preventing it from becoming a platform for threats to the west."

There's far more here than that and he places the imprint of a C.T. war upon the U.N. mandate. I believe the exact opposite. OBL remains a target for my nation. He doesn't dominate our operational nor strategic thinking. Not as a personality. There he's simply a guy on a "wanted" poster.

His organization, however, remains a viable operational and, worse, strategic threat. That said, A.Q. is only a modest part of the current milieu. Change the host status and that may change too.

This premise drives our efforts. We realize a holistic solution is needed internally with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Equally, there's emerging a recognition that a broad and holistic solution is needed regionally.

Afghanistan offers unique issues and challenges but America doesn't carry the same baggage as Great Britain so our view isn't the same.

We don't view Iraq as a rejection of our values. We see hope in our mission there and believe that we've achieved much already. Great Britain's experience in Basra was far different. Their troops have battled material and manpower supply issues and their final outcome was not to their expectations nor past standards.

This owed NOTHING to their soldiers, Keysersoze and Shiny Capstar. Superb levels of soldierly professionalism in the ranks. I notice no difference in tone nor attitude between our troops and theirs-a very businesslike and calm approach to "getting on with it".

Among British field-grade officers, commanders, political leaders, and parliamentarians? Far different. Clearly, the gulf between their desires and abilities to deliver are evident-depressingly so to them. It shows in their public comments.

I think that the comments expressed by key American policy-makers, past and present, show great candor. Whether General Hayden, Robert Gates, or Bruce Riedel, nobody is denying immense challenges. What's not seen though is the abjectly morose assessments of failure that I've read from the other side of the pond. We're undaunted by the sacrifice necessary.

"Western values" are interesting. Let me know when the "orient" isn't interested in trading goods and services and being sufficiently educated to write the supporting contracts.

Upon that foundation, even an Afghanistan can find a basis for our values and develop a society worth protecting from the likes of OBL.

Some preliminary thoughts...

 

[roadrunner]

Neo and I have the same environment so he can probably share the feelings we have about western lack of average intellectual capacity.

We often hear here in the Netherlands about freedom of speech which practically means bashing Islam and foreigners. They (Verdonk/Wilders) see as lower grade and want to destroy our heritage and identity and we should have degraded rights. The electorate that supports them are failed people that are jealous. No education, no intellectual capcity... I can imagine that. Here we have foreigners that move within their generation from low labour to directors. Here I am born in Pakistan and able to do highest university. But you will never get the same if you were a Dutch. The Dutch should be proud of their heritage... Yep, they introduced robbing of colonies. They introduced mass slavery. And yes, they were the best delivered of jews to the Nazi's. Yet now they tend to forget their black past. They forget that they raped Indonesia and called it police action.

Now with their government that was so happy to join coalition iof the willing to attack Irac (so called WMD) is trying to manipulate everything so they can not be blamed. They joined Afghanistan to rebuild. Yet everyone knows that there is zero rebuilding. For what? Cause they got their Dutchmen Scheffer joining the Nato leadership. So everytime I hear that the superiority nonsense here I show them a few parts and you get to hear it over and over again that I am different... I am not the typical foreigners. Well, I am not going to be a terrorist or Dutch hater but it shows that the Dutch should understand that their superiority is hardly based on facts. Stealing identity of people or degrading them might be an option but they should understand that most of the rebuilding is done by foreigners. And people that post reactions on "telegraaf.nl" are morons that should be educated. Maybe one should force intellectual tests before they get the right to vote.

Sounds a bit of a vitriol, and picky on Dutchy, though there's definitely anti-Islamic sentiment in Holland, generally brought about by their media (obviously with the likes of Wilders and so on). Liberal, not true, imo, not as far as religious freedom is concerned.

I do agree with the point about colonialism though.

 

[ajpirzada]

Adrian Hamilton: Demonising Pakistan will not solve Afghanistan

The reality is that Pakistan has never had authority over the tribal areas


Thursday, 30 April 2009

It's gang up on Pakistan time.The US Secretary of State, Mrs Clinton, has declared it "poses a mortal threat to the security and safety of our country and the world" and now Gordon Brown has joined the party, flying to Kabul and Islamabad to show that he too regards the two neighbours as one region and making that the centrepiece of his so-called "new" Afghan policy in the Commons yesterday. There was, he claimed, a "chain of terror" stretching from the mountainous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan to the capitals of the world.


If this reminds you of the language of the Raj, when the North-West Frontier obsessed our administrators and took up a disproportionate part of our military resources, so it should. Just as the British failed to control the area in Victorian times, so we are back in the same exercise again, only this time we're demanding that the Pakistanis act as the redcoats bringing order to the wild tribal lands. Now leave aside the question of whether this really does amount to a new strategy and whether Brown needed to use up his carbon allowance by flying for the day to the region. It's his headlong rush to join up with the US ****** approach, however, that is so worrying.

In a geographic sense, of course he is right. You cannot divorce the insurgency in Afghanistan from the safe havens of Pakistan any more than you can divide the Pashtun tribes that straddle the border. If the Taliban have now been able to come back with such force in Afghanistan, it is because they can arm, equip and draw men from across the border. It is also true that, in terms of terror, the major part of activity here – three-quarters according to Brown – originates from this area.

Even if you accept the recent diagnosis of Hillary Clinton that Pakistan is basically a failed state without the will or means to exercise control of its own country, however – and the view is far too simplistic for so complex a country – it is difficult to see how it helps beating the Pakistan government over the head and demanding that it acts to reassert central control over the country, any more than it helps accusing the Karzai government in Kabul of failing in its duties of democracy and security.

The reality is that the Pakistan government and military has never really exercised authority over the tribal areas of the north-west. It has tried far more than anyone outside has been prepare d to credit it and reached only stalemate at heavy losses to its own forces.. Its hope in the Swat deal was that it could contain the problem to one area.

But the other part of the truth is that Pakistan isn't a failed state in the full sense of the word. It has a functioning judiciary, an open press (more open than India, arguably), an educated middle class and a population that, provided it is not faced with the appearance of outside interference from the West, wants nothing more than to get rid of the external forces which have helped deprive it of the economic take-off enjoyed by India.

The challenge for the West is to help the forces of change without making their lives more difficult by intervening openly in a way that brings up all the old distrust of colonial intervention. Pakistan needs support, but it also needs understanding of the predicament that the stumbling democratic government is in.

Which is precisely what Brown's latest flurry of "initiatives" failed to do. Ignoring Pakistan sensitivities over the arrest and then judicial release of the 12 Pakistani students in the UK, which has played so badly back in their home country, he proceeded to lecture his hosts on their failed obligations to the West on security. It should have been no surprise that the Pakistani president refused to appear in a press conference by his side.

The trouble with this "new" policy is that it bundles ever more issues into one over-arching theme. That's the opposite of what should be happening. If it is terror in the West and al-Qa'ida that is the problem we should be concentrating on that, pressing the Pakistan authorities to cut off entry to the Swat camps and helping them finger anyone who has been to the training centres or the more extreme mosques.

Instead we refer to the Taliban and Pashtun with al-Qa'ida as if the were one (they aren't) and confuse an aim of counter terror with an ambition in Afghanistan to stamp out narcotics production, impose gender quality and root out Islamic fundamentalism all out the same time.

Yes, Pakistan is part of the problem. But the real difficulty of our policy is that we have no real definition of aims. And Gordon Brown yesterday only increased the confusion.

a.hamilton@independent.co.uk
Adrian Hamilton: Demonising Pakistan will not solve Afghanistan - Adrian Hamilton, Commentators - The Independent

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Threads merged.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

"But the real difficulty of our policy is that we have no real definition of aims."

IMO, this was also reflected in Gen. Conway's statements yesterday, when talking about Pakistani concerns over the impact of US operations in Southern Afghanistan reportedly conveyed to him by Ge, Kiyani.

‘He expressed concern that our forces going into the south could cause a refugee problem that Pakistan is ill-equipped to handle right now, based on their fiscal scenario, and the possibility that we could be forcing Taliban out of the south and onto supply lines that the Pakistani forces are currently trying to protect for us,’ Conway told reporters.

US President Barack Obama has ordered 21,000 additional troops to Afghanistan as part of a new strategy to fight a growing insurgency, with most combat forces to focus on the volatile south.

Conway said it was unclear if the Taliban would flee and move across Afghan’s southern border. ‘I accept General Kayani’s concerns as face value from his perspective. I would offer to you that not everybody believes that’s where the Taliban will flush to,’ he said.

‘But in any event, we’ve got to do what we’ve got to do in the south,’ he said, adding that the Pakistani general ‘might be citing a worst-case scenario to us.’
DAWN.COM | World | Pakistan concerned over US plan

So essentially in the end the good General just brushed of Pakistani concerns about the impact of military operations in Pakistan. What happened to taking a 'regional approach' to the problem, that was trumpeted barely a few weeks ago?

The appropriate response would have been to suggest that military operations in Southern Afghanistan would be coordinated with Pakistan to minimize potential flow of militants over the Pakistani border, as well as a coordinated approach to deal with any potential refugee crises, instead of a repeat of Tora Bora.

If Gen. Kiyani's concerns turn out to be accurate, then there is no doubt that the issues mentioned will have a destabilizing impact on Pakistan, and under this 'regional strategy' is that not one of the objectives, to stabilize both Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Which brings us back to the points made by both Burke and Hamilton that ring true at this point.

"Our interest in Afghanistan has been reduced to preventing it from becoming a platform for threats to the west."

"But the real difficulty of our policy is that we have no real definition of aims."

Perhaps there will be coordination when the time comes, and Conway's comments may have unintentionally suggested (or he misinterpreted) that Kiyani was perhaps arguing against US operations.

 

[S-2]

"Conway's comments may have unintentionally suggested (or he misinterpreted) that Kiyani was perhaps arguing against US operations."

Our southern reinforcement can't be coming as a surprise to the good COAS. Afterall, this board has led the way in castigating our efforts to bring opium under control, correct?

Well, that's long been where we've LOOOOONG understood the bulk of the dope to be. Him too.

Kiyani is WELCOME to suggest plans that can be coordinated given the long lead-time he's had with our intention. Us? Sorry, but having broached the subject of running joint ops along your eastern borders only to be rebuffed, maybe we're waiting to see a change in heart.

Meanwhile, what triggers me is Kiyani's suggestion that our operations will drive the taliban south across your border and smack dab onto our line of supply running north from Karachi through Quetta to Kandahar.

Maybe a warning...maybe a threat.

Yup. That's a real problem, I suppose, if the militants are able to do so. Since it's on your side, though, and since you HAVEN'T proposed a joint op, maybe we can ramp up PREDATOR to give us at least SOME coverage along those LOCs (lines of communication) through Baluchistan?

Found his comment utterly befuddling I'm sure that attacking groups along Afghan's EASTERN border has far greater appeal to the good general. Keeps the taliban in Afghanistan and away from Gwadar or the rest of the Baluchi sights and scenes.

Probably just isn't in our interests no matter how much you plead that the greater threat is elsewhere.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Our southern reinforcement can't be coming as a surprise to the good COAS. Afterall, this board has led the way in castigating our efforts to bring opium under control, correct?

I don't see why it would be a surprise, nor that Conway suggested that.

Kiyani is WELCOME to suggest plans that can be coordinated given the long lead-time he's had with our intention. Us? Sorry, but having broached the subject of running joint ops along your eastern borders only to be rebuffed, maybe we're waiting to see a change in heart.

I don't think joint ops are on the table even now. My understanding of 'coordination' would be something along the lines of Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur on our side, and Operation Lion Heart on the Afghan side, in addition to coordinated efforts on potential humanitarian issues.

This has nothing to do with jingoism over being 'rebuffed', it does have a lot to do with executing a military strategy in Southern Afghanistan that also alleviates potentially destabilizing effects on Pakistan, since the latter is ostensibly the overall aim of the new US 'strategy'.

Meanwhile, what triggers me is Kiyani's suggestion that our operations will drive the taliban south across your border and smack dab onto our line of supply running north from Karachi through Quetta to Kandahar.

Maybe a warning...maybe a threat.

Maybe a an articulation of the potential side effects of increased military activity in order to elicit views on how to better coordinate efforts to minimize those side effects. Not everything has to be a conspiracy, your paranoia is matching that of some others nowadays.

Yup. That's a real problem, I suppose, if the militants are able to do so. Since it's on your side, though, and since you HAVEN'T proposed a joint op, maybe we can ramp up PREDATOR to give us at least SOME coverage along those LOCs (lines of communication) through Baluchistan?

Joint Ops or Predator aren't necessary. Coordination along the lines of Operation Lion Heart and using some of that much talked about 'civilian component of the strategy' to address any humanitarian issues are suggestions that are feasible and have been implemented elsewhere to varying degrees already.

Found his comment utterly befuddling I'm sure that attacking groups along Afghan's EASTERN border has far greater appeal to the good general. Keeps the taliban in Afghanistan and away from Gwadar or the rest of the Baluchi sights and scenes.

Probably just isn't in our interests no matter how much you plead that the greater threat is elsewhere.

I have no clue where you are extrapolating this from.

Kiyani's comments, if accurately conveyed by Conway, are pretty straightforward, ad the solutions to the concerns raised pretty feasible and some already implemented elsewhere.

What I find befuddling is the Conway's lack of acknowledgment of the measures that could be taken to address concerns along the lines I pointed out, but that could be attributed to time constraints of a press conference, hopefully, instead of what Burke and Hamilton alluded to.

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

We dont enjoy that confidance level than why to cry over the regection of joint operation. I thing most people in US dont know that how America is viewd in our public .

Yes a joint ops would probably solve the problem but the Army would pay a price of Public support which it still has among many. People hate US and they would hate OUR ARMY if we caried out a joint op.

Someday or sooner this Wetren Adveture in Afghanistan will End. We have to woory abt wat if US and other forces exit Afghanistan leaving it as it is as the pressure from the global economic meltdown continues to mount. Thats the concern which is more threatning .

 

[S-2]

"My understanding of 'coordination' would be something along the lines of Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur on our side, and Operation Lion Heart on the Afghan side, in addition to coordinated efforts on potential humanitarian issues."

I see this as "joint" even should neither cross the border in conduct of such. However characterized, it would require joint planning. Perhaps the taint might be too much for your leaders.

"...it does have a lot to do with executing a military strategy in Southern Afghanistan that also alleviates potentially destabilizing effects on Pakistan, since the latter is ostensibly the overall aim of the new US 'strategy'."

Well, maybe-maybe not, but there's an ISAF mission on our side under mandate and the British and Canadians likely expect those troops. Until I read the specifics of how we satisfy our needs while displaying the appropriate deference to your concerns, it will be hard to judge just how Kiyani's comments will be addressed and with what actual priority.

Feel free in the interim fog to take pro-active measures along that border in anticipation of our operations going forth. Feel free to also presume doing so will give us the green light we need to go full bore at it. Finally, feel free to assume that we will go after this area regardless of what you do.

My preference would be a massive slaughter on our side of the border that excludes any need to rely upon your "assistance". If the taliban again retreat faster than we can attack, my preference would be that your army doesn't replicate it's inactions of those days. That, like so many other matters, will ultimately be up to Pakistan, so we'll see.

 

[S-2]

"I thing most people in US dont know that how America is viewd in our public ."

You'd be surprised. Most understand that we're blindly and feverishly hated and castigated daily in a vitriolic stream of invective.

I just hope that my Congress understands the same.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

If the taliban again retreat faster than we can attack, my preference would be that your army doesn't replicate it's inactions of those days. That, like so many other matters, will ultimately be up to Pakistan, so we'll see.

That will depend upon the coordination.

Pakistan's opposition you referred to are to proposals that imply US boots on the ground.

Cross border coordination, along the lines of Operation Sher Dil, has not been an issue at any point AFAIK, and Pakistani officials have in fact called for more such coordination several times in the past.

The issues mentioned by Kiyani may or may not materialize, but it woudl speak to a rather flawed approach on the US side if even minimal efforts to minimize potentially destabilizing effects were not taken.

Secondly, coordination of this sort offers an excellent test of whether the Pakistani Military acts in accordance with agreed objectives on its side, so one would think the US military would in fact want to engage the Pakistani Military on this. Unless of course they would rather see the Taliban move across the border because Pakistani operations were not coordinated with the US and so have something to blame Pakistan for.

Finally, if the objective is not stabilization of Pakistan and Afghanistan, then you have no strategy or plan, and Hamilton and Burke's conclusions are spot on.

Do you know what long term US objectives are?

And if preventing AQ from gaining more safe havens, I fail to see how a destabilized Pakistan accomplishes that.