DECLASSIFIED: US Attempts To Roll Back Pakistan's Nuclear Program

[GUNNER]

The United States and Pakistan's Quest for the Bomb

Newly Declassified Documents Disclose Carter Administration's Unsuccessful Efforts to Roll Back Islamabad's Secret Nuclear Program

Nationalistic Pakistani Officials Insisted That Their Country had an "Unfettered Right to do what It Wishes"

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 333

Posted - December 21, 2010 Washington, D.C., December 21, 2010

- The Wikileaks database of purloined State Department cable traffic includes revelations, published in the Washington Post and the New York Times about tensions in U.S.-Pakistan relations on key nuclear issues, including the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and the disposition of a stockpile of weapons-grade highly-enriched uranium.
(Note 1)

These frictions are not surprising because the Pakistani nuclear weapons program has been a source of anxiety for U.S. policymakers, since the late 1970s, when they discovered that Pakistani metallurgist A.Q. Khan had stolen blueprints for a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.

U.S. officials were alarmed that a nuclear Pakistan would bring greater instability to South Asia; years later, the rise of the Pakistani Taliban produced concerns about the nuclear stockpile's vulnerability to terrorists. Since 2002-2004 the discovery that the A.Q. Khan's nuclear supply network had spread nuclear weapons technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea, and elsewhere raised apprehensions even more. (Note 2)

Last week, before the Wikileaks revelations, the recently disclosed North Korean gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant raised questions about the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology by the Khan network. (Note 3)

Recently declassified U.S. government documents from the Jimmy Carter administration published today by the National Security Archive shed light on the critical period when Washington discovered that Pakistan, a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] hold-out, had acquired key elements of a nuclear weapons capability.

Once in power, the Carter administration tried to do what its predecessor, the Ford administration, had done: discourage the Pakistani nuclear program, but the CIA and the State Department discovered belatedly in 1978 that Islamabad was moving quickly to build a gas centrifuge plant, thanks to "dual use" technology acquired by Khan and his network.

The documents further disclose the U.S. government's complex but unsuccessful efforts to convince Pakistan to turn off the gas centrifuge project. Besides exerting direct pressure first on President Zulkifar Ali Bhutto and then on military dictator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Washington lobbied key allies and China to induce them to pressurize Islamabad, but also to cooperate by halting the sale of sensitive technology to Pakistan.

Declassified government documents show that the Carter administration recognized that export controls by industrial countries could not sufficiently disrupt Pakistan's secret purchases of uranium enrichment technology, so it tried combinations of diplomatic pressure and blandishments to dissuade the Pakistanis and to induce them to reach an understanding with India.

Washington's efforts met with strong resistance from top Pakistani officials; seeing a nuclear capability as a matter of national survival, they argued that Pakistan had an "unfettered right" to develop nuclear technology. The Indians were also not interested in a deal.

Senior US officials recognized that the prospects of stopping the Indian or the Pakistani nuclear programs were "poor"; within months arms controller were "scratching their heads" over how to tackle the problem.

Among the disclosures in the documents:

▪ U.S. requests during mid-1978 by U.S. diplomats for assurances that Pakistan would not use reprocessing technology to produce plutonium led foreign minister Agha Shahi's to insist that was a "demand that no country would accept" and that Pakistan "has the unfettered right to do what it wishes."

▪ By November 1978, U.S. government officials, aware that Pakistan was purchasing technology for a gas centrifuge enrichment facility, were developing proposals aimed at "inhibiting Pakistan" from making progress toward developing a nuclear capability.

▪ By January 1979, U.S. intelligence estimated that Pakistan was reaching the point where it "may soon acquire all the essential components" for a gas centrifuge plant.

▪ Also in January 1979, U.S. intelligence estimated that Pakistani would have a "single device" (plutonium) by 1982 and test a weapon using highly-enriched uranium [HEU] by 1983, although 1984 was "more likely".


▪ On 3 March 1979, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher spoke in "tough terms" with General Zia and Foreign Minister Shahi; the latter claimed that the U.S. was making an "ultimatum."

▪ On 23 March 1979, senior level State Department officials suggested to Secretary of State Vance possible measures to help make the "best combination" of carrots and sticks to constrain the Pakistani nuclear program; nevertheless, "prospects [were] poor" for realizing that goal.

▪ The decision in April 1979 to cut off aid to Pakistan because of its uranium enrichment program worried State Department officials, who believed that a nuclear Pakistan would be a "new and dangerous element of instability," but they wanted to maintain good relations with that country, a "moderate state" in an unstable region.

▪ During the spring of 1979, when Washington made unsuccessful attempts to frame a regional solution involving "mutual restraint" by India and Pakistan of their nuclear activities, Indian prime minister Morarji Desai declared that "if he discovered that Pakistan was ready to test a bomb or if it exploded one, he would act at [once] 'to smash it.'"

▪ In July 1979, CIA analysts speculated that the Pakistani nuclear program might receive funding from Islamic countries, including Libya, and that Pakistani might engage in nuclear cooperation, even share nuclear technology, with Saudi Arabia, Libya or Iraq.

▪ By September 1979 officials at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said that "most of us are scratching our heads" about what to do about the Pakistani nuclear program.

▪ In November 1979, ambassador Gerard C. Smith reported that when meeting with senior British, French, Dutch, and West German officials to encourage them to take tougher positions on the Pakistani nuclear program, he found "little enthusiasm … to emulate our position."

▪ In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when improving relations with Pakistan became a top priority for Washington, according to CIA analysts, Pakistani officials believed that Washington was "reconciled to a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability."

Like the Israeli bomb, the Pakistan case illustrates how difficult it is to prevent a determined country, especially an ally, from acquiring and using nuclear weapons technology. It also illustrates the complexity and difficulty of nuclear proliferation diplomacy: other political and strategic priorities can and do trump nonproliferation objectives.

The documents also shed light on a familiar problem: a US-Pakistan relationship that has been rife with suspicions and tensions, largely because of Washington's uneasy balancing act between India and Pakistan, two countries with strong mutual antagonisms, a problem that was aggravated during the Cold War by concerns about Soviet influence in the region. (Note 4)

The Pakistani nuclear issue was on Jimmy Carter's agenda when he became president in early 1977 because he brought a significant commitment to reducing nuclear armaments and to checking nuclear proliferation. His initial, though unrealized goal, of deep cuts of strategic nuclear forces, and his support for the comprehensive test ban treaty were of a piece with his support for the long-term abolition of nuclear weapons, suggesting that his concerns about proliferation were not the usual double standard of "what's good for us is bad for you." Carter made the danger of nuclear proliferation one of his campaign themes and during his presidency government agencies and Congress tightened up controls over nuclear exports; this led to the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, whose unilateral features were controversial with some allies, especially Japan and West Germany. The administration also engaged in a protracted, but generally successful, attempt to curb the Taiwanese nuclear weapons programs, although the effort to tackle South Africa's met with less short-term success. Another tough challenge was a West German contract to sell uranium enrichment and reprocessing plants to Brazil, although technical problems would ultimately undercut the agreement. (Note 5)

Pakistan's successful drive for a nuclear arsenal was perhaps the most significant frustration for the Carter administration's nonproliferation policy. Five years before Carter's inauguration, following Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India, President Bhutto made a secret decision to seek nuclear weapons which he followed up in 1973 with negotiations to buy a nuclear reprocessing facility (used for producing plutonium) from a French firm. (Note 6)

Apparently U.S. intelligence did not seriously examine the prospects for a Pakistani bomb until after India's May 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion." In the following months, the authors of Special National Intelligence Estimate [SNIE] NIE 4-1-74, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," expected Pakistan to "press ahead" with a nuclear weapons program, which they projected as "far inferior to its prime rival, India, in terms of nuclear technology." (Note 7)

In August 1974, US intelligence estimated that Pakistan would not have nuclear weapons before 1980 and only as long as "extensive foreign assistance" was available. Over a year later, however, a new prediction emerged: that Pakistan could produce a plutonium–fueled weapon as early as 1978, as long as it had access to a reprocessing plant.


By 1978 Pakistan did not have a reprocessing plant or the bomb.

Nevertheless, that same year a pattern of suspicious purchases detected by British customs officials led to the discovery that Pakistan was secretly acquiring technology to produce highly-enriched uranium as an alternative path to building the bomb.

The "extensive foreign assistance" postulated by the SNIE turned out to be the theft of plans for a gas centrifuge enrichment technology from the Uranium Enrichment Corporation [URENCO] in the Netherlands.

The perpetrator was metallurgist Abdul Q. Khan who founded a worldwide network to acquire sensitive technology for his country's nuclear project and later for providing nuclear technology to Pakistan's friends and customers. (Note 8)

Recent studies of the U.S.–Pakistan nuclear relationship see moments during the mid-to-late 1970s when it may have been possible to bring the Pakistani program to a halt by preventing Khan from acquiring sensitive technology. The Dutch may have had the best chance in 1975 when they suspected that Khan was a spy; whether the U.S. and British governments had similar opportunities to nip the Pakistani nuclear effort in the bud remains a matter of debate. (Note 9)

For example, when British officials learned that Khan and his associates were trying to purchase high frequency electrical inverters needed to run centrifuges, they acted too late to stop the Pakistani from acquiring this technology, which they soon learned how to copy and manufacture.

So far declassified documents do not shed light on when the British told the U.S. government about this development and how Washington initially reacted to it, or what else U.S. intelligence may have been learning from other sources.

In any event, some of the documents in this collection suggest that the U.S. intelligence establishment may have had a mindset that prevented it from acquiring, or looking for, timely intelligence about the Pakistani secret enrichment program.


A significant problem was U.S. intelligence's assumption during 1974-1978 that Pakistan would take the plutonium route for producing the bomb.

SNIE 4-1-74, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," (published by the National Security Archive in January 2008) and two documents in this collection, a "Memorandum to Holders" of SNIE 4-1-74 and a 1978 CIA report, shed some light on the former assumption. Both documents give virtually exclusive emphasis to the plutonium route for acquiring the fissile material required for building the bomb.

Thus, intelligence analysts assumed that countries like Pakistan would try to try to acquire reprocessing technology so that they could chemically extract plutonium from the spent fuel rods taken from nuclear power reactors. This was a reasonable premise because plutonium has played a central role in modern nuclear arsenals.

Nevertheless, during the early 1960s, U.S. intelligence had assumed that China would first build and test a plutonium weapon, but as it turned out, Beijing found it more expedient to produce highly-enriched uranium for the nuclear device which it tested in October 1964. This surprised Washington, but if the intelligence community conducted any postmortems, they did not yield long-lasting lessons. (Note 10)

That Pakistan could try to acquire and develop advanced gas centrifuge enrichment technology was not an element in intelligence analysis. While the authors of SNIE 4-1-74 recognized the possibility that interested nations could secretly undertake a gas centrifuge enrichment program for producing highly-enriched uranium, they posited that it was "highly unlikely" that it could be undertaken "without our getting some indications of it."


The possibility that "indications" might come too late was not discussed, but the tight secrecy controls over the gas centrifuge technique may have created a certain confidence that it would not leak out. Thus, the "Memorandum to Holders" did not include any discussion of what it would require for a country to build a gas centrifuge plant by purchasing "dual use" or "gray area" technology; no doubt its authors assumed that poor countries such as Pakistan were unlikely to pull off such a stunt. Indeed, according to some accounts, U.S. intelligence analysts dismissed Pakistan's competence to take the enrichment route. (Note 11) Whether such thinking may have made U.S. intelligence somewhat less watchful when Khan and his associates were creating their network will require more information than is presently available.


So far no U.S. government reports on the actual discovery of the enrichment program and the Khan network have emerged, although a few declassified CIA items in this collection include estimates how far Pakistan could go with the stolen technology. Most of the documents published today reflect the thinking of State Department officials— ambassadors and assistant secretaries--who worried about the Pakistani bomb, but were less than wholehearted supporters of a rigorous nuclear nonproliferation agenda because it might interfere with securing Pakistan's cooperation on regional issues.

This collection does not tap the resources of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, but several documents at the National Security Council-level provide insight into high-level policy debates and strategy discussions. A few items provide some insight into President Carter's thinking because they include his observations in handwritten marginalia (see documents 2 and 36). No documents from the files of the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are yet available, although a few forceful memoranda by special ambassador on nonproliferation Gerard C. Smith may have dovetailed with ACDA views.



The United States and Pakistan's Quest for the Bomb

 

[GUNNER]

Part I: The Controversy over Reprocessing and the Discovery of the Uranium Enrichment Program

Document 1: "A Nuclear Device in Four Years"

Memorandum to Holders, Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," SNIE 4-1-74, 18 December 1975, Secret, Excised copy

Source: FOIA release

Before the United States government realized that Pakistan was developing a secret network to acquire enrichment technology, one of its objectives was to thwart that country's efforts to purchase reprocessing technology from France. While a reprocessing plant would have an important non-military application—by recovering uranium from spent fuel in order to make fresh reactor fuel—the other byproduct from reprocessing—plutonium—had significant proliferation implications.

Concern about Pakistan's nuclear ambitions emerged after May 1974, when India staged its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) and the U.S. intelligence community, in SNIE 4-1-74, issued in August 1974, estimated that Pakistan was "likely to press ahead."

The purpose of the "Memorandum to Holders" of SNIE 4-1-74 was to explore a reference ("Conclusion J") that some countries could acquire a "very modest nuclear explosive capability" without trying to produce, or "weaponize," devices suitable for bombers and missiles.

The criteria used for the definition of a modest capability included possession of a small "nuclear device based on the possession of about 10 KGs or more" of plutonium or a larger amount of highly-enriched uranium, an "indigenous development program," or a "production capability" that just skirted violations of the NPT or IAEA safeguards by not actually producing nuclear explosives.

Using those criteria and the available evidence, the drafters of the memorandum estimated the "earliest technical feasible date that a country could have an unweaponized nuclear device in hand." Even though the description of the fuel for a device included either plutonium or highly-enriched uranium, the estimate focused (except for the South African case) on the development of a capability to produce weapons-grade or reactor-grade plutonium.

Based on that assumption, the Memorandum estimated that Taiwan could have a weapon as early as 1978, the Republic of Korea by 1979, Argentina by 1978, Brazil by 1980, Iran by 1982, and Yugoslavia by 1980. South Africa could have an HEU-based weapon sometime during 1976-1978. As for Pakistan, it could have a weapon as early as 1978.

Document 2: "We Have a Good Chance of Persuading Bhutto"

Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the President, "Reprocessing Negotiations with Pakistan: A Negotiating Strategy,"2 April 1977, Secret


Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records [hereinafter RG 59], Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, box 17, Official Chrons Jan-Dec 1977 [1 of 2]

The Carter administration opposed a French contract with Pakistan to sell a reprocessing plant. Believing that Prime Minister Bhutto might have been willing to trade away Pakistani's nuclear program in return for "significant benefits," Warren Christopher proposed a deal to President Jimmy Carter that, in part, reprised what Henry Kissinger had offered when he was Secretary of State. (Note 12)

The idea was to offer Bhutto cash sales of advanced weapons systems, such as F-5E fighters, along with economic assistance, assured fuel supply for nuclear reactors, and financing of a French nuclear reactor. The package would have to "stand on its own feet," thus arms sales would not be so excessive as to "start an arms race with India."

Carter's reaction, as evident in his marginalia, was skeptical; for example, he favored sale of the Navy's A-5 fighter jets only, opposed the proposed economic aid budget, and questioned the idea of financing a French sale.

Whether Bhutto, who had said "we will eat grass" to get nuclear weapons, would have accepted such a deal is debatable.

In any event, on 5 July, talks with him became irrelevant when the military seized power and placed Bhutto under arrest, in the wake of controversy over recent national elections, including charges of electoral rigging. General Zia became Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA).


Document 3: "Are We Just Asking [Congress] for (a) Forbearance or (b) Trouble?"

Assistant Secretaries Alfred L. Atherton and Douglas J. Bennet, Jr. through Mr. Habib to the Acting Secretary, "Pakistan's Purchase of a Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant: the Symington Amendment and Consultations with Congress," 23 June 1977, Confidential, with cover note from Christopher to "Roy" Atherton

Source: RG 59, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, box 17, Official Chrons Jan-Dec 1977 [1 of 2]

Press reports about the transfer of French nuclear reprocessing technology, mostly in the form of blueprints, sparked concern that Congress might ask the State Department why it had not yet invoked laws requiring the termination of economic and military assistance if Pakistan was trying to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

Oddly, the authors of this memorandum appear to have had a fundamental confusion about what law was applicable. The Symington Amendment (after Sen. Stuart Symington [D-Mo]), but the Glenn Amendment (after Sen. John Glenn [D-OH]) was not at issue in the debates over the export of reprocessing technology.

While the Glenn amendment, as later modified, covered both reprocessing and enrichment technologies, the Symington Amendment would go into effect only if Pakistan was importing and developing uranium enrichment capabilities. (Note 13)

While the authors of this memorandum argued that Congressional restrictions were not applicable as long as Washington was trying to "prevent Pakistan from acquiring a reprocessing capability," Christopher was not so sure. "Can we make a persuasive case that the Amendment is not yet applicable or are we just asking for (a) forbearance, or (b) trouble."

Document 4: "This Seems an Untenable Position"

Alfred L. Atherton and George S. Vest thru: Mr. Christopher, Mr. Habib, Mrs. Benson to the Secretary, "The Nuclear Reprocessing Issue with Pakistan and France: Whether to Resume Aid to Pakistan,"18 October 1977, with draft instructions and telegrams from embassies in Paris and Islamabad attached, Secret

Source: RG 59, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, box 17, Official Chrons Jan-Dec 1977 [1 of 2]

Apparently not seeking "trouble" with Congress, Pakistan's pursuit of French reprocessing technology convinced the administration to cut off development aid in September 1977, but it made no formal announcement, perhaps to minimize the diplomatic repercussions.

Within a few weeks, however, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Hummel was proposing the resumption of aid because the French were trying to figure out how to back out of the contract with Pakistan.

According to Hummel, that meant that we have "virtually achieved our objective of assuring that the … contract for a reprocessing plant in Pakistan will not be carried out." U.S. Ambassador to France Arthur Hartman argued that was not good enough; Washington needed "adequate assurances" that the contract was dead.

Moreover, resuming aid could weaken France's handing in liquidating the reprocessing contract. Key State Department officials agreed, concluding that it was better to see how the situation developed rather than take premature action and risk "tough questions" from Congress.

 

[GUNNER]

Document 13: "Unfettered Right to Do What It Wishes"

State Department cable 205550 to Embassy Islamabad, "Discussion between Under Secretary Newsom and Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Agha Shahi on the Reprocessing Issue," 14 August 1978, Secret

Source: MDR request

A meeting between Newsom and Agha Shahi did not advance the situation. Briefing the Pakistanis on his meeting with Glenn and Zablocki and holding back what he knew about France's decision, Newsom explained that if Washington was to resume economic aid, an assurance from Pakistan about nuclear reprocessing would greatly help.

Shahi, however, insisted that that was a "demand that no country would accept" and that if the French suspended the processing plant that his government would not inform Washington. Pakistan "has the unfettered right to do what it wishes and will retain all its options."

 

[Rank]

US FAILED !!!!

 

[GUNNER]

Document 25: "Clear, Unequivocal, and Repeated Offers by Pres. Zia"

U.S. Embassy Islamabad to cable 2413 to State Department, "Pakistan Nuclear Program: Technical Team Visit," 27 February 1979, Secret

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, box 56, Pakistan II

On 24 January, as an element of the U.S. campaign, Ambassador Hummel met with General Zia for a discussion of the Kahuta facility.

According to Hummel's later account, he brandished satellite photography of Kahuta, but Zia said "That's absolutely ridiculous. Your information is incorrect. We have to clear this up. Tell me any place in Pakistan you want to send your experts and I will let them come and see." (Note 24)

Apparently, Zia said much the same thing on 9 February, but when Hummel called on the Pakistanis to follow up Zia's offer, Foreign Ministry officials said they would not let U.S. inspectors visit the facilities because India also refused inspections.

Hummel replied that the discrepancies between U.S. information and Pakistani claims about peaceful purposes would have an impact on U.S. opinion and, making a veiled threat, "that applicable U.S. law might have to be implemented."

That is, the Symington Act might go into effect with economic aid terminated.

 

[GUNNER]

Documents 26A-B: Warren Christopher Meets General Zia

Document 26A: U.S. Embassy Islamabad cable 2769 to State Department, "Nuclear Aspects of DepSec Visit Discussed with UK and French Ambassadors," 7 March 1979

Document 26B: Handwritten notes, Warren Christopher Meetings with General Zia and Foreign Minister Shahi, 1 and 2 March 1979


Source for both: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, box 56, Pakistan II


When Hummel sent his 27 February cable, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher was in New Delhi and ready to fly to Rawalpindi for meetings with General Zia and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shahi.

Detailed records of the meetings have not surfaced, but Ambassador Hummel's briefing to the British and French has.

According to Hummel, neither Zia nor Shahi denied Pakistan's effort to build the bomb and both refused to halt it. Christopher warned them that Pakistani nuclear activities could lead Washington to invoke the Symington Amendment. State Department officials may have been taken aback by Hummel's frank discussion of some of the issues (e.g., economic aid from "Islamic nations," possible Libya-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, risk of a Pakistani understanding with the Soviet Union) because someone wrote "Not an understated report" on the cable.


Notes on the meetings with Zia and Shahi, possibly taken by NSC staffer Thomas Thornton, convey impressions of some of the discussion.

Most of notes concern the talks with Shahi the next day. Shahi made it plain that Pakistan's efforts to normalize relations with India had "been carried as far as possible." He also said in "several different ways that there is a double standard in our treatment of India and Pakistan re (1) arms (2) reprocessing." One implication was that the United States had never pushed India as hard as it was pushing Pakistan. After Christopher spoke in "tough terms" about the nuclear issue, Shahi characterized the U.S. position as an "ultimatum." He also stated that Pakistan was willing to support a South Asian nuclear weapons free zone [SANWFZ], or if India would not accept, a "multilateral declaration" toward the same end, or as a fall back "reciprocal inspections" between India and Pakistan. But Pakistan would not accept a U.S. "survey team," even a "one man survey team" consisting of Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Thomas Pickering.


Hummel explained that a visit by Pickering would be for discussion only, not for visiting installations.

Regarding possible U.S. supply of F-5 fighters, Shahi argued that they were not good for night interception and that Pakistan needed that "in view of [Indian] Jaguars' night strike capability."


On Pakistan's and nuclear weapons, Shahi claimed that his country "is not capable of pursuing a nuclear option." Further, "we are committed," he said "to "not using reprocessing capability to make nuclear weapons."


The notes also include some of Christopher's questions to Thornton during the meeting and the latter's answers. One was "How do Indians reconcile 'non-alignment' with their treaty with Soviets?" The answer was the treaty "doesn't commit them to anything. Also [Prime Minister] Desai govt didn't [negotiate?] and tones it down." Two other questions and answers: "Tom – Are Pathans usually light skinned? " "Relatively so." "If you were President of Pakistan would you seek to develop nuclear weapons?" "Yes, but I would be acting irrationally."

 

[MastanKhan]

Hi,

In other words---some of them looked the other way and let us have the nuc---.

 

[GUNNER]

Document 40: "Deeply Shocked"

State Department cable to U.S. Embassy, Austria, "Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Briefing of IAEA Director General Eklund", 9 July 1979, Secret

Source: FOIA request

In early June 1979, Robert Gallucci, the State Department's expert on Pakistan's nuclear program, to Islamabad and drove to the site of the enrichment plant at Kahuta. He had a chance to take a few photos before security guards challenged his presence (he told them he was on a picnic). (Note 25)

Later that month, Gallucci accompanied Gerard C. Smith to Vienna when the latter briefed Sigvard Eklund, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the evidence of Pakistan's efforts to develop reprocessing facilities and acquire technology for producing HEU.

Gallucci gave the briefing, showing his photos. While the details of the briefing are not in the text of this cable, the questions and answers are, and its profound impact on Eklund is evident. "Deeply shocked ," Eklund said he was aware of Pakistan's nuclear interests, but it "was another thing to learn how such extensive facilities were already built and under construction." Two days later, during another meeting, Smith expressed some optimism that there was "time" to stop the Pakistanis, but Eklund was not so sanguine: "the more work the Pakistanis did the harder it was to stop them."

Given Pakistan's status as a non-NPT signator and a nonmember of the IAEA, Eklund and the IAEA had no leverage to stop Islamabad.


On 26 June, in between the two Smith-Eklund meetings, an aide drove French ambassador Pol le Gourrierec by the Kahuta facility so he could see it for himself, but they were not as lucky as Gallucci. Pakistani security men followed them and beat them up severely.

 

[somebozo]

With Pakistan armed the US will not be able to play superpower in the region. We may not be able to strike US but small tactical nukes will guarantee complete anhillation of US forces on ground as well their equipment...the strategic corridor of for largest energy reserves starts from iraq, leads through iran, Pakistan, Central Asia and Xingjiang (china). Must be protected from foreign invaders at any cost.

 

[GUNNER]

Document 46: Implications of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

In December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and U.S. relations with Pakistan soon began to improve. The top policy priority became working with Islamabad to check the Soviet invasion.

Washington would continue to work with Western Europe and Japan to try to deny Pakistan access to sensitive nuclear technology, but direct pressure on the nuclear issue relaxed.

Language in this cable about not trying to change the Symington and Glenn amendments was spin of a high order; the White House was actually seeking to nullify them by obtaining an open-ended waiver of sanctions as long as Pakistan did not actually test a nuclear weapon.

Congress, however, did not grant such a waiver until Ronald Reagan came to power. (Note 31)

Document 47: "Reinforcing Pakistani Resolve to Go Ahead"

According to the CIA, officials in Islamabad believed that Washington had become "reconciled to a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability."

Also, according to the CIA, recent Indian government statements that it was "committed to 'peaceful nuclear experiments'" strengthened Pakistani determination on the nuclear front.

Work on the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant was proceeding apace as were efforts to upgrade defenses against air strikes. Undoubtedly what made Islamabad more comfortable about the U.S. stance was that Washington was seeking Pakistani cooperation with its effort to thwart the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

That new priority put the Pakistani nuclear program more or less in the backburner, at least in terms of high-level initiatives, but Washington would continue to try to slow it down and complicate it. (Note 32)

 

[Donatello]

So all of this proves that Pakistan ended up putting a shaft up CIA's a**.

Funny

 

[IceCold]

This shows the countries resolve. When the whole country to determined to get something, there isnt a damn thing any one can do about it and Pakistan acquiring nuclear capability shows then the resolve of the country and its people.

 

[Muhammad-Bin-Qasim]

Hi,

In other words---some of them looked the other way and let us have the nuc---.

They looked the other way when it suited them... We did not need Wikileaks to tell us that the Americans tried their best efforts to stop and roll back the Pak Nuke program.

We are told... that the enemies plan... and God plans too... and the best of planners is God Almighty

 

[SQ8]

Interestingly..
The Americans also asked the Saudi's to provide the funds for the religious bigots and their associated thugs that go around in the name of the JI, the Taliban etc..back in the 80's.
The very people they fight today.. the supported 30 years ago with complete backing..
Does it seem plausible that AQ Khan would not have attracted the attention of the CIA back then?.. he probably was under watch..
The same goes for the NoDong missiles bought from the DPRK.. but then..there was a need to ignore such sales.. after all.back in 96 there were plans to hit OBL in Afg with air strikes...in lieu of the tomahawk attacks.
Some of that Saudi monetary backing provided funds for the program during the sanctioned years of the 90's.
Albeit not directly..but by compensating for the cost of oil.. we were able to use our petroleum cash on such programs(small margin of it)..
The bit about Zia also shows how easy it is to turn our dictators into puppies..
Thankfully.. even with a dictator around..there are other .."saner" forces at play.

 

[Muhammad-Bin-Qasim]

Interestingly..
The Americans also asked the Saudi's to provide the funds for the religious bigots and their associated thugs that go around in the name of the JI, the Taliban etc..back in the 80's.
The very people they fight today.. the supported 30 years ago with complete backing..
Does it seem plausible that AQ Khan would not have attracted the attention of the CIA back then?.. he probably was under watch..
The same goes for the NoDong missiles bought from the DPRK.. but then..there was a need to ignore such sales.. after all.back in 96 there were plans to hit OBL in Afg with air strikes...in lieu of the tomahawk attacks.
Some of that Saudi monetary backing provided funds for the program during the sanctioned years of the 90's.
Albeit not directly..but by compensating for the cost of oil.. we were able to use our petroleum cash on such programs(small margin of it)..
The bit about Zia also shows how easy it is to turn our dictators into puppies..
Thankfully.. even with a dictator around..there are other .."saner" forces at play.

slight correction there Santro... our dictators ARE their puppies... They dont need any conversion...

Those who try to act too smart end up like Zia and Saddam...