The Last Days of Pakistan: Recollections of a Civil Servant
Azizul Jalil, USA
In March 1969, President Ayub Khan had convened a roundtable conference in Rawalpindi. It was a last ditch attempt to save his endangered position and arrive at a consensus among leaders of East and West Pakistan to maintain the integrity of Pakistan.
The conference failed to achieve its purpose and there was terrible uncertainty in the country. In East Pakistan, there was an ongoing movement to assert its full rights within Pakistan, which often turned violent. East Pakistans governor, Monem Khan had become very unpopular in East Pakistan and even hated by the people. Ayub decided to sacrifice him and appoint Dr. M.N. Huda in his place. Then, serving in the presidents secretariat as a Deputy Secretary, I had the opportunity to watch these developments closely because of my frequent visits to the East Pakistan House in Rawalpindi and conversations with the leaders and high officials of the province.
The day after Monem Khans replacement was announced, I received a call from his secretary to meet the governor in the evening. One other Bengali officer was also invited. When I entered the living room of the governors suite in East Pakistan House, I found Monem Khan standing near a door, clad in kurta/ pajama, literally trembling in nervousness.
When we all sat down, he went on a monologue for a few minutes about what was happening in Pakistan-- chaos, lawlessness and lack of respect for the authority of the government. He spoke not from strength, but from extreme helplessness and despair. He asked us, at the time relatively junior of the senior officers in the Pakistan government, whether it was not time for the military to bring order in the country. We told him that the military would intervene only in their own self-interest and on their own terms. They would also time it accordingly. Obviously, Monem was hoping for a different answer to get some reassurance for his troubled mind.
Monem Khan then said something, which I will never forget. I later wondered whether he had a premonition of things that would later happen to him. Literally shaking in fear, the old man said he would soon return to Dhaka. He recalled with a sigh that the remains of Ayubs father had been taken out of his grave at Nehala (near Rawalpindi), and dishonoured. Monem Khan feared that people might try to do the same after assassinating him. However, if he had to die he would like to die in nijer desh (own country). We knew what could happen to him once out of power and government protection. There was no consolation to offer--we remained silent. What happened to him in 1971 is widely known.
The governor-designate Dr. Huda was a teacher of mine at the Dhaka University and we were quite close. He, then a provincial finance minister, called me to the East Pakistan House and requested the urgent transfer of two Bengali officers of the central cadres then occupying important positions in Dhaka. He thought that they were too close to Monem Khan and the transfers were essential to run the administration his way.
The matter was takenup with M.H. Sufi, the Cabinet Secretary, who was also in charge of the establishment division. He told me that since the Governor-designate had made the request, it was not important that the request was not made directly to the secretary and that Dr. Huda had not even taken the oath of office. We should proceed immediately to accommodate him. We issued the orders of transfer within two days. Meanwhile, Dr. Huda went back to Dhaka and was sworn-in. However, after a few days on March 25, Yahya Khan declared martial law and took over powers. Dr. Huda ceased to be the governor and General Muzaffaruddin, the GOC 14 Division took charge as the provincial martial law administrator. The officers were transferred nonetheless.
In the summer of 1970, the Planning Commission had constituted an advisory panel of academic and professional economists to consider the macroeconomic and overall issues relating to the draft Fourth Five-Year Plan (FYP) for 1970-75. At that time, I got a call in my office in the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) in Islamabad from Dr. Mazharul Huq, my old teacher at the Dhaka University. He was the Chairman of the panel, which had equal number of senior East and West Pakistani economists.
Dr. Huq complained that he had not been provided with any facility for his work, not even a steno/typist with a typewriter and stationary. Although I was not officially concerned with the panel, I took up the matter with the high officials of the planning commission and the EAD (happened to be West Pakistanis). They told me that they had not received any official request in that regard.
Finding no alternative, I asked my personal assistant, a Bengali, whether he was willing to go with me when the office closed (after 1:30 pm), take out the big typewriter in my office (completely irregular and punishable) and provide help to Dr. Huq. He unhesitatingly agreed. I picked him up from his quarters, went back to the secretariat to pick up the typewriter, and drove from Islamabad to the East Pakistan House in Pindi where the Bengali economists were staying. After discussing some issues with the panel members, I left the secretary to work with them returning at night to pick him up.
The secretary refused to accept a modest compensation from me for his services, telling me that he was happy to work for the Bengali cause. The panel deliberated for some days, failed to come to an agreed recommendation and ended with the economists of each wing submitting two separate reports.
The cabinet that Yahya formed after imposing martial law had five members from East Pakistan. None of them had any political background except Dr. A, M. Malik, who was the senior-most. Before submission of Pakistans Fourth Five Year Plan (FYP) to the cabinet for approval, we, the activist Bengali civil servants in the central government (Dr. Sattar, Obaidullah Khan and me) approached the East Pakistani ministers.
We had serious objections to the Planning Commissions proposals and allocation of funds for East Pakistan, which were less than fifty percent of the total. It did not recognize the existing disparity between East and West Pakistan and the fact that East Pakistan had fifty-six percent of the population. To these, the Planning Commissions response was that West Pakistan was geographically far-flung and had a larger size. East Pakistan did not have the absorptive capacity due to implementation weaknesses and lack of local funds. They famously held that though disparity between the two wings had increased, the rate of growth of disparity had gone down.
In EAD, for estimating resources available during the plan period from foreign aid we had to count the local resources arising from counterpart funds of foreign loans and commodity aid. Being responsible for USAID in EAD, I found that rupee funds from the sale of DDT under US assistance arose entirely from East Pakistan, where it was used. The use of DDT was discontinued in West Pakistan for a number of years, but the counterpart funds were divided equally and one-half continued to be credited to West Pakistan. I raised the issue at a meeting between senior officers of the planning commission and EAD at which Dr.Mahbubul Huq was present.
He was then a staff member of the World Bank and loaned to the planning commission for assistance in finalizing the FYP. I proposed that the entire rupee funds from sale of DDT be allocated to East Pakistan, which had local resource constraints. Dr. Huq countered it by an economic argument, whose thrust, as I understood it, was that those were not real resources for development! I am mentioning this anecdote to exemplify the subtle ways in which East Pakistan had been deprived of its legitimate share.
We prepared short analytical notes and talking points for the ministers from East Pakistan and went to their homes in the evenings to brief them for the cabinet meeting on FYP. In examination of the economic issues of the plan, Dr. Anisur Rahman, then a Professor at the Islamabad University, assisted and fully cooperated with us. Syeduzzaman, then an officer in the Central government, had separately briefed the commerce minister, Ahsanul Huq. We found the ministers, in varying degrees of enthusiasm, receptive to our views and efforts. Thus motivated and equipped with notes, the Bengali ministers took part in the cabinet deliberations of the FYP.
G.W. Choudhury, one of the ministers, countered the argument that the much bigger area of West Pakistan justified greater allocation by saying that development was for the people and not for the barren deserts of Sind and the mountains of the Frontier and Baluchistan provinces. Other Bengali ministers, led by Dr. Malik, voiced their objections to the inequities of the Plan and demanded that the plan proposals be modified and affirmative actions taken to reduce disparity between the two wings. Later, I learnt that Yahya Khan had tauntingly asked what Dr. Malik and his Muslim League party did in respect of removal of disparity when they were in power for a long time.
In the end, due to the objections of the Bengali ministers, the cabinet referred the Plan back to the Planning Commission for reconsideration. The Fourth FYP was not finalized by March 1971, when due to the army crack down beginning on March 25, the plan became irrelevant to East Pakistan.
Brigadier Iskander Karim (Later Major General) was a senior Bengali staff officer in the presidents office. He and I had worked very closely during my time in the Establishment Division, as well as in the EAD, both in the presidents secretariat. Whether it was in respect of appointments, promotions or transfers of senior central government officials or issues relating to the FYP, we coordinated our work to promote East Pakistans interests. Karim and I maintained these contacts until I left for Brussels in November 1970. From early that year, preparations were afoot to hold a general election on adult franchise throughout Pakistan for a new parliament and drafting of a new constitution. It was clear that because of its bigger population, East Pakistani members would be in a majority in the new parliament.
However, there were then about seventy political parties in East Pakistan. Brig. Karim informed me that military intelligence reports to the president were to the effect that the voting strength of East Pakistan in parliament would be split among a large number of parties. The province would not have a unified voice with regard to its demands and even if the Bengalis were in the government, they would not be effective vis-a-vis West Pakistan and the army junta. In view of this, he felt that we should try to accomplish as much as possible for East Pakistan within the reality of the existing governmental framework and before the new and possibly a weak government comes into office.
Within the limitations, we did just that but in the absence of an overall political settlement in Pakistan, it was too little, too late. Actually, the military intelligence assessments were utterly wrong with regard to the Bengali peoples mood and the extent of their political alienation from Pakistan. In the seventy elections, the Awami League won overwhelmingly in East Pakistan and became the single largest party in parliament. However, the parliament was never convened by Yahya Khan. The ultimate result was the break up of Pakistan at the end of 1971.
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