jhungary
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Landing at Sulva Bay
Time skipped ahead 3 months, it's now August, and the position and situation in Gallipoli have not change a bit, a dead lock have been there since the 27th of April, and both side have now been dug in deep on their respective trench, the situation is entirely the same as in Western Front.
Not much can do to tilt the situation to anyone favor, the Commonwealth seems not be able to make headway inland, nor can the ottoman push the Commonwealth back into the Ocean, primarly, the Allied controlled the coast. Yet both side do not intent to put more troop into the grinder, and there are something they need to do, but the beaches in both AnZAC Cove and Cape Helles are already in Maximum capacity.
The solution is to open a third front, far away from the 2 choatic failure, in hope that that work and would allow a break out toward ANZAC Cove and Cape Helles.
The plan, however, did not change any, as usual, the plan was to land on Gallipoli, immediately capture an objective (in this case Tekke Tepe) and by assaulting the beaches in Suvla, the ANZAC will break out to Lone Pine, while the British will assault the Krithia Vineyard as a diversion.
The Battle
The Landing is destined to commence late night on the 7th August, with the moon over the crest, the landing will go ahead in pitch darkness.
The plan called to land the newly formed British 10th and 11th Division on shore and work their way to the high ground covering the Sulva area. The Aussie and the 29th Division will start their own diversory battle to divert troop and attention from ottoman empire and they would be going in the wrong direction. Couple with the fact that the landing is going to be at night, the reaction time for the turkish defender would be estimated at 36 hours, by then the British would already have force the local garrision out and occupied the high ground and possibly digging in.
At least, that was the battle plan.
The landing at Suvla started at 2200 on the 7th August, and continue on thru midnight, the landing, did not precede by naval bombardment, achieve complete surprise, The landing itself, however, also decended into chaos, due to the condition on landing at night, most of the immediate objective were not achieve, simply the commander on site do not know where the objective were and most importantly, where they were.
Compare the landing in Suvla and ANZAC Cove or Cape Helles, this landing uses specific landing craft which design on the sole purpose of amphibious landing, and the landing were planned but most would agreed that the landing is a controlled chaos.
At A Beach, the 34th Brigade landed with the objective to capture Hill 10, a small knoll overlooking the beach, was not capture until dawn, the 11 Battalion fought their way to Kiretch Ridge but that was the only success at night, else where on A Beach, the 9th and 10th battalion were pinned down between Lala Baba and the Salt Lake by sniper fire.
C Beach see the landing of 1oth Division, the 10th total achievement is 2 hill over to the right of the salt lake, confused and thirsty, the troop were settling for the night without any sort of further progress
D + 1
D + 1 sees the ottoman planned reinforcement somewhere after mid day as predicted it will take ottoman 36 hours from landing to send the troop to reinforce the position. On site, ottoman commander reported to Ottoman command the British landing is in a timid place where progress is slow.
Early in the morning of 8th August, British send a convoy to survey the landing at Suvla, and found the troop assembled in the beachhead with minimal activities, initially thought the troop at suvla have been moved further inland (account for the inactivities in the beaches) not until almsot mid-day, the British command were alerted that landing progress actually did stop at the ridge beyond the beachheads
The overall command at Suvla were still at the ship commanding the landing, but not down in the field, the soldier were, as described by some senior NCO - Taking a fiver. It was until late afternoon on 8th August, the overall command of commonwealth force in Gallipoli, General Ian Hamilton were notified the progress on Suvla.
Flight into a fist of fury, Hamilton inspect the beach himself and order an immediate attack on 1830 on the 8th August, a time where the Ottoman Reinforce due to arrive. And the march to Tekke Tepe was complicated due to darkness and terrain, the British troop did not launch an attack until 4 am 9th August. By then the Turks were already seriously entrenched themselves and set up a defensive position.
D + 2
D + 2 started with Ottoman counter attacked the British in Simictar Hill, and the defence of the above charge at Tekke Tepe by the 32nd Brigade, virtually wiped out the whole brigade.
The second day of battle saw see-sawing from both side by sending in their reserve and reinforcement into battle, however, the British was playing at an underhand as most of the troop send ashore 2 days ago did not have an overall objective and been send ashore confused and now without much of the supplies. The force now hold the beachhead at the ground they stand, and the chance to out manuover is now gone
Reinforcement not fed directly to defend the line held between Hill 10, Lala Baba and the Salt Lake.
Firing of General Stopford
While the overall command knew there would have nothing changed as long as Stopford remain as the commander of the Landing Force in Suvla, the general staff have cabled England to Kitchener to fire General Stopford, but if you think getting rid of Stopford then the problem will be solved immediately, then you are dead wrong.
Once Stopford is fired, he is out of the picture, but the next in line is a 3 way fight between 3 Lieutenant General, Juilan Byng, Beauvior De Lisle and Bryan Mahon. While the commander of IX Corp were assigned to Julian Byng, the commander of 29th Division (Byng old job) went to De Lisle and that Mahon resign as he cannot bear De Lisle promoted above him.
The power play paralyse the British troop at Suvla, to some extend over Cape Helles and resulting inactivities and indecisiveness over the whole month of August.
The Landing at Suvla ended officially when the last charge at Scimitar hill failed by the British Commonwealth on the 21st of August.
Post Mortem
The following quote from british military Historian J.F.C Fuller is best summed up the debaco in Suvla and the character of General Federick Stopford
"(General Stopford) have no conception of what generalship meant"
The plan for attacking at Suvla is quite sound indeed and although suffering from a bad start, the plan did gone to the plan and all the element, in hind sight were satisified to the original requirment. However, the command and the play out of the battle can only be described as diaster.
It was said that the man himself, is not promoted or put into the position because of his abilitiy nor experience, simpliest way to say is, he was put into that position because he is old and he have seniority.
However, no diaster happen simply for one reason. the troop is new, and hence the command structure failed the troop on ground but at the same time, it did not saved by the on field command where the safety line usually held.
The general was not making any decision, not even present in the battle, then for an experience field officer, he would know this would be for him to take charge, any officer with experience would do that, but luck (or bad luck) would have it that the troop were paired with an incompetent general and inexperience officer.
Unlike the Cape Helles landing or the ANZAC landing, where one did have the experience but did not have any chance to land and the other have an excellent plan but fail to carry out in the end, this landing, the landing at Suvla also start with a good plan, but was blogged down by an indecisive general and inexperience staff.
Time skipped ahead 3 months, it's now August, and the position and situation in Gallipoli have not change a bit, a dead lock have been there since the 27th of April, and both side have now been dug in deep on their respective trench, the situation is entirely the same as in Western Front.
Not much can do to tilt the situation to anyone favor, the Commonwealth seems not be able to make headway inland, nor can the ottoman push the Commonwealth back into the Ocean, primarly, the Allied controlled the coast. Yet both side do not intent to put more troop into the grinder, and there are something they need to do, but the beaches in both AnZAC Cove and Cape Helles are already in Maximum capacity.
The solution is to open a third front, far away from the 2 choatic failure, in hope that that work and would allow a break out toward ANZAC Cove and Cape Helles.
The plan, however, did not change any, as usual, the plan was to land on Gallipoli, immediately capture an objective (in this case Tekke Tepe) and by assaulting the beaches in Suvla, the ANZAC will break out to Lone Pine, while the British will assault the Krithia Vineyard as a diversion.
The Battle
The Landing is destined to commence late night on the 7th August, with the moon over the crest, the landing will go ahead in pitch darkness.
The plan called to land the newly formed British 10th and 11th Division on shore and work their way to the high ground covering the Sulva area. The Aussie and the 29th Division will start their own diversory battle to divert troop and attention from ottoman empire and they would be going in the wrong direction. Couple with the fact that the landing is going to be at night, the reaction time for the turkish defender would be estimated at 36 hours, by then the British would already have force the local garrision out and occupied the high ground and possibly digging in.
At least, that was the battle plan.
The landing at Suvla started at 2200 on the 7th August, and continue on thru midnight, the landing, did not precede by naval bombardment, achieve complete surprise, The landing itself, however, also decended into chaos, due to the condition on landing at night, most of the immediate objective were not achieve, simply the commander on site do not know where the objective were and most importantly, where they were.
Compare the landing in Suvla and ANZAC Cove or Cape Helles, this landing uses specific landing craft which design on the sole purpose of amphibious landing, and the landing were planned but most would agreed that the landing is a controlled chaos.
At A Beach, the 34th Brigade landed with the objective to capture Hill 10, a small knoll overlooking the beach, was not capture until dawn, the 11 Battalion fought their way to Kiretch Ridge but that was the only success at night, else where on A Beach, the 9th and 10th battalion were pinned down between Lala Baba and the Salt Lake by sniper fire.
C Beach see the landing of 1oth Division, the 10th total achievement is 2 hill over to the right of the salt lake, confused and thirsty, the troop were settling for the night without any sort of further progress
D + 1
D + 1 sees the ottoman planned reinforcement somewhere after mid day as predicted it will take ottoman 36 hours from landing to send the troop to reinforce the position. On site, ottoman commander reported to Ottoman command the British landing is in a timid place where progress is slow.
Early in the morning of 8th August, British send a convoy to survey the landing at Suvla, and found the troop assembled in the beachhead with minimal activities, initially thought the troop at suvla have been moved further inland (account for the inactivities in the beaches) not until almsot mid-day, the British command were alerted that landing progress actually did stop at the ridge beyond the beachheads
The overall command at Suvla were still at the ship commanding the landing, but not down in the field, the soldier were, as described by some senior NCO - Taking a fiver. It was until late afternoon on 8th August, the overall command of commonwealth force in Gallipoli, General Ian Hamilton were notified the progress on Suvla.
Flight into a fist of fury, Hamilton inspect the beach himself and order an immediate attack on 1830 on the 8th August, a time where the Ottoman Reinforce due to arrive. And the march to Tekke Tepe was complicated due to darkness and terrain, the British troop did not launch an attack until 4 am 9th August. By then the Turks were already seriously entrenched themselves and set up a defensive position.
D + 2
D + 2 started with Ottoman counter attacked the British in Simictar Hill, and the defence of the above charge at Tekke Tepe by the 32nd Brigade, virtually wiped out the whole brigade.
The second day of battle saw see-sawing from both side by sending in their reserve and reinforcement into battle, however, the British was playing at an underhand as most of the troop send ashore 2 days ago did not have an overall objective and been send ashore confused and now without much of the supplies. The force now hold the beachhead at the ground they stand, and the chance to out manuover is now gone
Reinforcement not fed directly to defend the line held between Hill 10, Lala Baba and the Salt Lake.
Firing of General Stopford
While the overall command knew there would have nothing changed as long as Stopford remain as the commander of the Landing Force in Suvla, the general staff have cabled England to Kitchener to fire General Stopford, but if you think getting rid of Stopford then the problem will be solved immediately, then you are dead wrong.
Once Stopford is fired, he is out of the picture, but the next in line is a 3 way fight between 3 Lieutenant General, Juilan Byng, Beauvior De Lisle and Bryan Mahon. While the commander of IX Corp were assigned to Julian Byng, the commander of 29th Division (Byng old job) went to De Lisle and that Mahon resign as he cannot bear De Lisle promoted above him.
The power play paralyse the British troop at Suvla, to some extend over Cape Helles and resulting inactivities and indecisiveness over the whole month of August.
The Landing at Suvla ended officially when the last charge at Scimitar hill failed by the British Commonwealth on the 21st of August.
Post Mortem
The following quote from british military Historian J.F.C Fuller is best summed up the debaco in Suvla and the character of General Federick Stopford
"(General Stopford) have no conception of what generalship meant"
The plan for attacking at Suvla is quite sound indeed and although suffering from a bad start, the plan did gone to the plan and all the element, in hind sight were satisified to the original requirment. However, the command and the play out of the battle can only be described as diaster.
It was said that the man himself, is not promoted or put into the position because of his abilitiy nor experience, simpliest way to say is, he was put into that position because he is old and he have seniority.
However, no diaster happen simply for one reason. the troop is new, and hence the command structure failed the troop on ground but at the same time, it did not saved by the on field command where the safety line usually held.
The general was not making any decision, not even present in the battle, then for an experience field officer, he would know this would be for him to take charge, any officer with experience would do that, but luck (or bad luck) would have it that the troop were paired with an incompetent general and inexperience officer.
Unlike the Cape Helles landing or the ANZAC landing, where one did have the experience but did not have any chance to land and the other have an excellent plan but fail to carry out in the end, this landing, the landing at Suvla also start with a good plan, but was blogged down by an indecisive general and inexperience staff.
