Congressional Briefing: Where is Pakistan Heading?

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Congressional Briefing: Where is Pakistan Heading?

By Farhana Ali

Last month, I traveled from Islamabad to Peshawar and then headed north to Kashmir. To understand where Pakistan is today and where it is heading, I presented the following briefing to the U.S. Congress.

Today, there is cautious level of enthusiasm and hope in the country, made evident by the February 18th election results which confirmed the popularity of the country's two main centrist parties. It would be an understatement to say that the Pakistani public desires change, and hope that the new civilian government, which convened in Parliament this month, will be able to mitigate the rising threat of suicide attacks. The new government has a great burden and responsibility to counter the threats from the Pakistani Taliban, local emirs / commanders in the northwest province, and the terrorists' claim to Pakistan's settled territories, such as Swat.

With the failure of President Pervez Musharraf to secure Pakistan, the public places great demand and pressure on the new government to reverse policies of nepotism and negligence. Certainly the Pakistani Army scored a few successes on the war on terrorism, but that victory pales in comparison to the lawlessness that exists along the Afghan-Pakistan border and the extremists' ability to disrupt civil society through numerous bombings against hard and soft targets which now include the capital city of Islamabad.

Based on my recent trip, it seems to me that an issue of great importance revolves around perceptions of the war on terrorism. How is the war perceived by the general public and established elites? With militants' largely striking Pakistanis, as opposed to Westerners in the country, the Pakistani public is now beginning to view the U.S.-led war on terror as "their" war; there is general acceptance that this battle that can only be won in the long-run with support from the local population to root out criminal and terrorists from within their families, neighborhoods, and communities. According to a prominent editor of the Daily Times, winning the war on terrorism in Pakistan will required the support of "the people a a whole."

This is an important shift in thinking from the immediate years following 9/11, when any military operation or counter-terrorism cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan was regarded as being driven by the United States for American strategic interests. The earlier thinking in Pakistan was that terrorism was a reflection of Pakistan's flawed foreign and domestic policies; others faulted Pakistan's inability to counter terrorism because of structural weaknesses; in other words, because Pakistan is not a democracy, it does not have the tools to fight this war. This is illogical. The radicals carrying out the majority of these violent attacks do not believe in democracy but only stand behind their own religious doctrine. More than ever, Pakistanis are taking ownership for a war that has cost them at least 1200 deaths of their armed forces, scores of civilian casualties, and a public fatigued both with war and an enemy they have trouble identifying with.

The spike in suicide bombings has another important repercussion for Pakistan's civil society; that is, the public has little to no appetite for an overt U.S.-Pakistan partnership. Seen as the source of conflict, ordinary Pakistanis are unwilling to entertain a long-term U.S.-Pakistan relationship that only encourages military-military cooperation, with little attention to reforming the country's public educational system, empowering the people in the northern areas with economic opportunities and improving the standard of living for the country's burgeoning poor. For too long, Pakistanis have witnessed an alliance of military partners and the recent election results made it clear that the public will no longer tolerate a military regime, and/or foreign intervention that encroaches on domestic policy. Pakistanis' distress for dictatorships and a desire for determined politicians who can provide a certain modicum of stability will likely place enormous demands on the new civilian leadership to deliver.

Contrast this with the opinions of strategic elites with whom I met, which includes the army brass and some civilian professionals in the government. High-ranking Pakistani officials privately told me they need the U.S. support for the war on terrorism though understand that an overt U.S.-Pakistan partnership comes at a very high political cost. In a meeting with former Ambassadors and senior military officials, the message was the same: Pakistan cannot fight the war on terrorism without U.S. military and intelligence support. But the larger question is how much assistance is enough? In other words, how much U.S. foreign aid will enable the Pakistanis to fight against a local insurgency? Military sources inside Pakistan indicate that despite the aid they have currently received, it is “insufficient.” An effective army requires technical capabilities to detect and destroy terrorist targets, according to one source. A Pakistani General indicated that force, alone, is not the solution. He indicated that development assistance to the northern areas in parallel with military action can result in long-term progress.

Another common misperception outside the country is that mullahs are agents of the militants and vice versa. Before 2002, the mullahs and militants shared the same threat perception. Thus, a nexus between militancy and mullah-oriented Islamist party leaders such Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA) was a natural phenomenon. But after 2002, the mullah-militant relationship became entangled, proven again by the recent election results in which mullahs like Rehman are no longer protected by militants, and in some cases, have come under attack. Several other factors account for the extremists’ rule of the northern areas, which can be partly attributed to the Islamists’ boycott of the elections and the extremists’ (i.e., jihadi movement) ability to emerge as a political system, for which there is no counter-political movement in the tribal areas. Die-hard militants, however, are not always popular with the local population and it is within this context that secular, nationalist parties have won in Peshawar.

When I was in Peshawar, considered by many the backyard of the Taliban—a city that conjures images of al-Qaeda foot soldiers and woman dressed in shuttle-cocked burqas—people expressed hope for the victory of the ANP, a Pashtun Nationalist Party, which has a history in the northwest part of the country. For the first time in years, members of the ANP who were close to the party’s leader, Asfandiyar Wali Khan, told me they were optimistic about the future of Pakistan, if the ANP and the central government could reach consensus on various issues, including how to engage the Taliban.

Why is the victory of the ANP potentially encouraging for Pakistan and the United States? As a Pashtun party, the ANP is not willing to fight the Taliban, who they know is armed to the teeth and has demonstrated in recent months the ability to weaken the tribal chiefs in the northern areas in place of the mullahs. On the outset, the ANP’s unwillingness to fight the Taliban may seem disappointing, as it symbolizes a policy shift from the Pakistani state. And certainly appeasing the Taliban is not a popular step regarded by the Pakistani Army or the United States, but it is a move the ANP could take with or without Islamabad’s blessing. According to ANP members, negotiations with the Taliban is the only option now to decrease the rate of suicide attacks, and discourage the Taliban from dominating tribal society with their own religious-based rules and regulations.

The ultimate question is how can the ANP negotiate with terrorists? First, there is a myth in Western circles that the Taliban is one conglomerate. This myth has helped propagate the Taliban as larger-than-life extremists who can never be conquered unless with brute force. Secondly, the notion that the Taliban is linked to all other threats and extremists in the country is a myth that distorts the wide range of threats facing Pakistan today. In simple terms, the Taliban is a loosely organized group with various factions, with different leaders (i.e, amirs), some centered on religion while others are seen as drug traffickers and arms smugglers. Most importantly, the Pakistani Taliban organized themselves as an alternative leadership to the traditional tribal elders; by eliminating the malik system, the new brand of the Taliban is able to use the tribal jirga institution, but has amended its traditional rules-based system with religious edicts and legislation. Therefore, the face of the Taliban today is multiple.

For Pakistan and the United States, this is good news. It can allow the Pakistani army, with proper intelligence capabilities and counter-insurgency tactics, to identify cleavages within the organization. By allying with the members of the “Taliban” that are Pashtun nationalists, as opposed to die-hard terrorists, it is possible for the ANP, with support from the central government, to engage those members willing to initiate a dialogue with the Pashtun party and the Pakistani state. Through engagement, it is possible to pursue a multi-pronged strategy that uses force against Taliban leaders, such as Baitullah Mehsud, while seeking reliable partners within the Taliban to develop large-scale projects in the tribal belt that ultimately empowers the local population through jobs, education, as well as basic services such as medical care.

Finally, I fully agree with Senator Joe Biden’s statement made last month when he said, “the outcome of the battle [in Afghanistan and Pakistan] is going to be determined less by bullets than by dollars and determination.” But current U.S. assistance programs being allotted for Pakistan are mired with problems. First, it became clear to me after having come from Peshawar as well as the valley of Kashmir, where local militants are still present, that the solution to fighting al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal areas is not more money, but targeted assistance. The current plan to spend $750 million in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and $350 million to train the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary unit, to confront the terrorist threat will unlikely yield significant results. I have been told by Pakistani low-ranking security officials that they are unwilling to fight a war against their own people, who like them, are from local Pashtun tribes.

If the war cannot be won with bullets, then how can U.S. dollars be properly spent? I want to tell you the story of one American working in the northern hills of Kashmir to demonstrate the good work he is doing for the people living in the remote areas of Pakistan. A former American rock star, Todd Shea, has been helping earthquake victims rebuild their lives by providing health care. In return, he has asked for nothing, but through his work, he is leaving behind a legacy of American good will. In the long run, Todd’s work will help the population he serves to reject the extremists also operating in that part of the world. Through the Comprehensive Disaster Response Services (CDRS), Todd’s NGO, unlike other commonly funded US-government funded programs, has had greater success in the region and a long-lasting effect on rebuilding civil society. And it is not expensive. The cost is $1.43 per person per patient contact (from a total of 104,659 patient contacts); that amounts to a total of $152,000 for the year. This is a nominal sum for the services Todd’s NGO provides. By supporting local individuals like Todd, the U.S. can help sustain American’s long-term interest in the region: which is to fight against terrorists by helping local populations establish strong civilian institutions.

Sustainable democracy and stability should therefore be pursued together to ensure that Pakistan has a smooth political transition. The U.S. has an important role to play in helping Pakistan manage its transition to democracy by helping the country undertake wide-ranging reforms.
Engagement should be broadened to include development, economic assistance, and educational initiatives that can be managed by local Pakistanis. While there is great American goodwill to help Pakistan break the back of al-Qaeda, the real test for Pakistan is now. Until a new government proves itself capable, and the military proves itself able to fight counter-terrorism operations with the support of the local population, we are likely to see a country fall short of its long-term vision to stabilize Pakistan.