Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War

[Joe Shearer]

I'm not sure we are disagreeing here. Do I read this correct? "the Afghan skirmishing mode of fighting is not comparable to the PLA's objective driven battles"

Hmm.

Wouldn't the Afghan skirmishers have objectives? they might not articulate these so clearly, but certainly there would be objectives.

 

[CardSharp]

Hmm. Wouldn't the Afghan skirmishers have objectives? they might not articulate these so clearly, but certainly there would be objectives.

Ahhh yes. Let me try to explain myself better (these discussions would go a lot smoother, face to face and with pints of lager)

I think the difference lies not in the ultimate goal (ie destroy that outpost on that hill) but the way it is managed. As with most ancient skirmishers, the Afghans would try to destroy the opposing force by wearing down the enemy. In your words

skirmishing parties and squads of irregulars fighting from behind very good cover, attacking a formation of regulars, and moving ahead to lay ambushes for that formation as it fought its way out of the previous one. Attacks on fixed points were mounted with cover from sniper fire, by squads which moved closer and closer under cover, until it was time for the final rush.

These tactics would be the order of the day. Only when they judge the enemy sufficiently weaken would they risk pressing home "the final rush". This is a minimal risk and opportunistic strategy that makes sense for non-profession irregulars. Where I contend the difference lays is PLA leaders are given objectives and a timetable in which to achieve them. This would necessarily make action more direct and the attack more vigorous than the wearing down tactics of the Afghans. While the IA's interlock fields of fire may do well against Afghans skirmishing in cover, they may not do as well against infiltration tactics of larger units using weather and terrain as cover.



I really hope I am making sense.

 

[gpit]

if 62 taught anything to us, it was: ANYBODY CAN STAB YOU IN THE BACK

That was the only lesson india learnt - China is an official threat

Is that the mentality making nearly all your neighbors your enemy?

If so, enjoy!

Back you up? NO WAY!

 

[Srinivas]

First of all Tibet is annexed by china by using military action against the wish of the people of Tibet and Aksai Chin is an integral part of Kashmir(i.e India). I don't see any thing wrong with the forward policy of Nehru.
But the planning and execution in the sino-Indian war was not done correctly.
The main reason for with drawl or unilateral cease fire of China is because of international pressure, At that time US and USSR are engaged in Cuban missile crisis and in the verge of a nuclear war and as soon as the crisis ended china announced cease fire, That does not mean that china wanted friendly relations with India at that time.
At present China is repeating the same mistake which India did in 1962 by sending its troops into Indian territory. There are still some areas which are under Chinese occupation which should be returned to India in Aksai Chin.
Nice thread buddy the role of Commissar is portrayed very well in " Enemy at the Gates".

 

[Joe Shearer]

Ahhh yes. Let me try to explain myself better (these discussions would go a lot smoother, face to face and with pints of lager)

I think the difference lies not in the ultimate goal (ie destroy that outpost on that hill) but the way it is managed. As with most ancient skirmishers, the Afghans would try to destroy the opposing force by wearing down the enemy. In your words



These tactics would be the order of the day. Only when they judge the enemy sufficiently weaken would they risk pressing home "the final rush". This is a minimal risk and opportunistic strategy that makes sense for non-profession irregulars. Where I contend the difference lays is PLA leaders are given objectives and a timetable in which to achieve them. This would necessarily make action more direct and the attack more vigorous than the wearing down tactics of the Afghans. While the IA's interlock fields of fire may do well against Afghans skirmishing in cover, they may not do as well against infiltration tactics of larger units using weather and terrain as cover.



I really hope I am making sense.

You are making ENORMOUS sense.

The most difficult part of a discussion, as I have always, ALWAYS pointed out, and in fact, written in almost these identical words as well, is the part in which we tease out agreeable or friendly elements in each other's argument. This is seldom possible without an atmosphere which is conducive.

Personally I recommend a dark ale in preference to continental lagers, perhaps a stout, a Guinness over all else!

Now regarding the rest of your response, the general practice that seems to have been followed by PLA attackers is that they wound up a line of trenches by attacking one end of it and rolling up the defences along the line. This did not allow the defenders' fire-power to bear on the attackers, only those elements in the trenches facing attack, from one side or the other, often without warning, were able to shoot back, often with only seconds of notice. The results were grim and almost inevitable, in the conditions of night attack, often with confusing noises, trumpets, drums and other noises being made in a distracting and confusing way, in other directions.

While the IA's interlock fields of fire may do well against Afghans skirmishing in cover, they may not do as well against infiltration tactics of larger units using weather and terrain as cover.

In fact, I think that this analysis needs some slight modification.

If weather and terrain had been sufficient cover for infiltration, then the trenches in question must have been most unprofessionally located, not to allow all-weather defence. That may not have been the case.

Instead, in more than one case, the attacking force rolled up a trench-full of attackers by enfilading the line. This was done in conditions of darkness and tremendously confusing distracting noises and demonstrations of a completely misleading nature.

Only in some cases, where this was not possible because of the layout of the Indian Army defences, were there massed frontal attacks, and presumably, relatively higher casualties.

Your thoughts on this, please?

 

[Joe Shearer]

First of all Tibet is annexed by china by using military action against the wish of the people of Tibet and Aksai Chin is an integral part of Kashmir(i.e India). I don't see any thing wrong with the forward policy of Nehru.
But the planning and execution in the sino-Indian war was not done correctly.
The main reason for with drawl or unilateral cease fire of China is because of international pressure, At that time US and USSR are engaged in Cuban missile crisis and in the verge of a nuclear war and as soon as the crisis ended china announced cease fire, That does not mean that china wanted friendly relations with India at that time.
At present China is repeating the same mistake which India did in 1962 by sending its troops into Indian territory. There are still some areas which are under Chinese occupation which should be returned to India in Aksai Chin.
Nice thread buddy the role of Commissar is portrayed very well in " Enemy at the Gates".

Thank you for your interesting post. It is not clear exactly what was sought to be expressed, so let us clarify as much as we can.

1. Are you aware that there was a Chinese representative at the Tibetan Court symbolising Chinese suzerainty at least from the 19th century onwards?
2. Are you aware that Imperial Russia and Imperial India both acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet?
3. Are you aware that the Dalai Lama and his court acknowledged Chinese suzerainty? it became a question of suzerainty stiffening into sovereignty under the communist regime, and India, officially, recognised the Chinese take-over. This was formally conveyed by the Government of India.
4. Are you aware of the nature of the respective claims to Aksai Chin? How did India get title to Ladakh and to those territories?
5. Are you aware that the Aksai Chin area was never clearly demarcated in British maps? That the dispute began after independence, when the Chinese built roads through what they considered an integral part of Tibet? That the Government of India changed its stand, and its maps, several times?

I am not sure what prompted your post other than excess of patriotic spirit.

 

[huzihaidao12]

Joe Shearer, sir, I applaud you, your attitude is most needed for the really friendly exchanges between China and India . Sincere attitude, rather than Some so-called small smart. Chinese members also need to learn from you.

 

[Brotherhood]

Joe Shearer, I applaud you, your attitude is most needed for the friendly exchanges between China and India really. Sincere attitude, rather than cleverness. Chinese members also need to learn from you.

Agreed, actually he had earn respect from Chinese members here long way back.
And the worst part is we get so use to his good posts and sometimes take things for granted and forget to give him thanks.

 

[CardSharp]

Still formulating a response will post when I get home. Till then

 

[Joe Shearer]

Joe Shearer, sir, I applaud you, your attitude is most needed for the really friendly exchanges between China and India . Sincere attitude, rather than Some so-called small smart. Chinese members also need to learn from you.

Thank you very much.

In honesty, I have been given very sincere responses by chauism (whom I don't see much, to my disappointment) and Cardsharp. Cardsharp actually has a very thought-provoking point of view, constantly making his interlocutor think about what is being said.

What troubles me is thoughtless and needlessly aggressive remarks on both sides. We can discuss things, even bad relations between our countries, without being incivil.

The China-India conflict of 62 is very interesting for several reasons:

1. An analysis of Nehru-era diplomacy, comparing it with today's;
2. The different strategic concepts of the two countries: why is China driven, what are India's motives?
3. Military strategy employed by the two sides, or lack of strategy and the repercussions on the operations of the respective;
4. The battle-management of the two armies, and how did they relate it to objective conditions.

[quote="Brotherhood, post: 1148559"]Agreed, actually he had earn respect from Chinese members here long way back. :tup:
And the worst part is we get so use to his good posts

and sometimes take things for granted and forget to give him thanks.[/quote]

A sincere request to all friends: DO NOT feel shy of saying good things when you want to; all compliments will be avidly accepted, naturally with a modest attitude and a self-deprecatory simper.

PS: For the benefit of those with funny bones surgically extracted, this was a joke.

 

[CardSharp]

If only we had the Henderson-Brooke report! Neville Maxwell quipped he would release the H-B report since he doesn't plan on returning to India but I guess he thought better of incurring the wrath of the GoI because despite my searches, I've not found it.


But I digress


I think we might differ on our conception of what the Indian fortifications looked like and therefore we differ on how the PLA cracked these fortifications. As you say,

If weather and terrain had been sufficient cover for infiltration, then the trenches in question must have been most unprofessionally located, not to allow all-weather defence. That may not have been the case.

Instead, in more than one case, the attacking force rolled up a trench-full of attackers by enfilading the line. This was done in conditions of darkness and tremendously confusing distracting noises and demonstrations of a completely misleading nature.

Whereas I think the outposts as having a cirlcular perimeter posted near the knife-edge crest of some piece of highground.

Dispite my searching on the web (I forgot to check the Indian army section of my library today, get to it tommorow if I have time), I found very very little information on how Indian or British field fortifications were setup. The pictures I found were of individuals in what can be either fox hole OR trench.

The only footage I found that may be helpful is from youtube. It is clearly a propaganda video but it does seem to contain some military maps (dubious), actual footage (probably posed after the fact, though presumably on the same terrain), AND a mention of a Bailey trail that the PLA supposedly infiltrated through.

Then when I went looking for references to the Bailey trails, I stumbled upon a source that I’ve skimmed before from Global security. It contains gives a pretty description of the Bailey trial and some evidence that supports my view of infiltration + coordinated attacks from multiple directions was the method used by the PLA.

Author: CALVIN, James Barnard, Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. Navy
Title: THE CHINA - INDIA BORDER WAR (1962)
Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Date: April 1984

Captain F. M. Bailey had explored into Tibet in 1913;
his work helped McMahon to draw his boundary line. Bailey had
made his way from Tulung La to Lap, and thence through Tse La
Pass and southward. The 1962 Indian forces soon came to rea-
lize that the Chinese could use the Trail that Bailey had used
half a century before. If the Chinese did come down Bailey
Trail, they would emerge at Thembang, between Dirang Dzong and
Bomdi La. Such a Chinese move would cut off Dirang Dzong and
Se La. Yet, despite this, there remained the underlying In-
dian faith that the Chinese would not attack.

The China-India Border War

 

[CardSharp]

I found this map to be useful when reading the Calvin article

 

[Joe Shearer]

So how do we go forward? Battle/ encounter at a time or as an integrated whole? I feel the need for more detailed maps; in the one enclosed by you, the Bailey trail is barely distinguishable. It was slightly easier on Google Maps.

Let us discuss the way forward; meanwhile I have given myself leave of absence today, and will commence tomorrow.

 

[CardSharp]

So how do we go forward? Battle/ encounter at a time or as an integrated whole? I feel the need for more detailed maps; in the one enclosed by you, the Bailey trail is barely distinguishable. It was slightly easier on Google Maps.

Let us discuss the way forward; meanwhile I have given myself leave of absence today, and will commence tomorrow.

Many exciting possibilities. A campaign history of 1962 will be difficult if not impossible to tease out given our limited information. I have set out a 2 hour block tomorrow for wandering the libraries, will check the Indian armed forces section (a whole 30 foot long five rows section ). If I can't find some explicit info/maps for us to discuss further, I propose we move on to the political side and perhaps examine the impact the war has had on India and shaping its armed forces. This might be a more general discussion that will interest the other members as well.

I am particularly interested in hearing what you meant by the "Indian Army's doctrinal blindspots"

 

[CardSharp]

I'm come bearing gifts!

I found the Sino-Indian war section of the library, about one shelve of books. I took out a selection after a quick look over. There seems to be plenty of campaign information present, more than enough I think to answer our questions about how the PLA fought the IA. They include

Himalayas Blunder - Brigadier Dalvi (the general of the 7th bgd who was captured by the PLA for those who are not familiar)

The Unfought war of 1962 - Lt. Col J R Sagail (A logistics major at the time)

When Generals failed - Bgd Darshan Khullar (Rtd) (a mere subaltern at the time)

They all focus on the fighting the NEFA (eastern theatre of war) and specifically the Kameng region encompassing Towang, Sela, and Bombdila.

I choose Bgd. Dalvi's memoir because it is famous and I choose the rest of the books based on the quality of their campaign maps. I hope to scan the map and the organizations/weapons tables and post them here. I also have a few words to say about Bgd. Dalvi's book but more on that later.

If this topic is proves a bit too tedious eventually please say so and we can move on to talking about the reformation and transformation of the Indian Army (I took out a couple of texts on that too).