Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War

[Joe Shearer]

This map shows the attack on the 7th Brigade's position.


The 7th Brigade was posted at the extremity of the Indian line stretching across from Thagla ridge to Bomdila with each Indian brigade posted roughly along the axis of the road. Their position was to say the least extremely exposed and it was with this low hanging fruit that the PLA chose to start their attack.

Note extensive use of mortar in the attack, the use of infiltration/flanking tactics by the infantry, and the use of troops to preoccupy the units on the Indian flanks (stopping them from reinforcing the main position.)

The easiest thing in the world is for civilians to criticise soldiers, especially after an unfortunate event for the soldiers. For what follows, I ask the forgiveness of my batch-mates who finally did go through the SSB exams and go to Khadakvasla. My excuse can only be an ardent desire to see that this never happens again.

First, if the Indians had to occupy 'forward' positions (they did), this was perhaps as much as they could do. There were units guarding the temporary crossings and log bridges on the Namka Chu; there was a flanking force (one company each of the Punjab and 1/9 Gurkhas on the left flank with machine guns, obviously in a properly-entrenched nest; and there was the reserve element, in classic defensive fashion behind the crest of the hill. Impeccable placement for a normal war, but let down by lack of sufficient strength, and of the essential indefensibility of the line. The Namka Chu was fordable at this point, the log bridges were mere conveniences. In such a position, a good, entrenched position is of course a huge disincentive to move out! There is no earthly reason why the flanking force would move out of the well-dug-in positions that they had been asked to prepare.

The attacking PLA had everything to gain and nothing to lose by not being dug in. It allowed them complete freedom of movement, and the privilege of determining when to attack. I am not sure if this is the night attack where the camp fires were left burning, and used to focus the attention of the defenders away from the actual axis of the attack, well to their left and much later, to the right. The defendants were not in small numbers either. The PLA attacked when their movements were difficult to follow, the flanking party had no idea of what was going on, and no way to give protective fire except firing along fixed lines of their machine gun emplacements, and at the weak spots of the Indian position. This also implies that the entire position had been scouted out well before and plans made accordingly. To know what was behind the ridge there must have been a reconnaissance, and that report must have formed the basis for the battle plan.

There is much more, of course.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Imagine my surprise when the evidence supports the youtube's phase of battle. I think I am starting to understand the situation as you described it. You're emphasis on enfilading was on the brigade scale, where because the Indian brigades were strung out facing from one side of the road to the other, the PLA was able to attack them end on via the open flank created by the 7th brigades collapse and the sneak attack through the Bailey trail.

Exactly!

The first domino was the badly-exposed, almost sacrificial 7th Bde. It opened the path for the PLA stopper at the end of the trail, and for the three following brigades to be strung out, as you have noticed, and almost held in place for the PLA flanking attack through the Bailey Trail.

There was a very famous battle in Japan which followed almost the same pattern. It was one of Tokugawa's best battles.

 

[CardSharp]

Exactly!

The first domino was the badly-exposed, almost sacrificial 7th Bde. It opened the path for the PLA stopper at the end of the trail, and for the three following brigades to be strung out, as you have noticed, and almost held in place for the PLA flanking attack through the Bailey Trail.

There was a very famous battle in Japan which followed almost the same pattern. It was one of Tokugawa's best battles.

It was too much to expect of the 7th Brigade. They couldn't secure the position with such small a number. It also seems that Dalvi had to detach single companies to watch key point on his flanks, which likely means his position was completely independent and out of support range of the next brigade.

another thing about the Thagla ridge map. Notice the left most arrow, indicates a force went down the road towards KarpolaI after defeating the 1/9 Gorkhas at Tsangdhar. This no doubt was meant to cut off any retreating forces using the road to Towang

It would have cut off the retreat of almost the entire 7th Brigade

 

[Joe Shearer]

It was too much to expect of the 7th Brigade. They couldn't secure the position with such small a number. It also seems that Dalvi had to detach single companies to watch key point on his flanks, which likely means his position was completely independent and out of support range of the next brigade.

another thing about the Thagla ridge map. Notice the left most arrow, indicates a force went down the road towards KarpolaI after defeating the 1/9 Gorkhas at Tsangdhar. This no doubt was meant to cut off any retreating forces using the road to Towang

It would have cut off the retreat of almost the entire 7th Brigade

Before I get stuck in micro-analysis, and have to be pried loose with a crowbar, a question for you; suppose you are Dalvi, you have with you 7th Bde., with 4 infantry battalions, with different characteristics. You have with you 4 Grenadiers, 9 Punjabis, 2 Rajputs and 1/9 Gorkhas. Each typically has 4 companies, maximum of 8. You also have two mountain guns, two medium machine guns and four 2" mortars (I think; could be 3", altogether nastier stuff).

How would you arrange your forces, knowing that the creep is in Delhi, and probably won't snoop around? Why?

 

[CardSharp]

Before I get stuck in micro-analysis, and have to be pried loose with a crowbar, a question for you; suppose you are Dalvi, you have with you 7th Bde., with 4 infantry battalions, with different characteristics. You have with you 4 Grenadiers, 9 Punjabis, 2 Rajputs and 1/9 Gorkhas. Each typically has 4 companies, maximum of 8. You also have two mountain guns, two medium machine guns and four 2" mortars (I think; could be 3", altogether nastier stuff).

How would you arrange your forces, knowing that the creep is in Delhi, and probably won't snoop around? Why?

Oh boy what a question. We have the infinite advantage of hindsight and not to use it would be a sin. I will read more about that fateful day and get back to you with an informed answer.

But some preliminaries. The question you pose may actually be two fold. In addition to the question of could the 7th Brigade position be defended successfully? we must then ask would it have mattered? If the 65th and 62nd brigades collapsed a successful 7th Bgd. defense would have meant facing assaults in two directions completely cut off from the rest of the Army (such as it was).

but to answer your question based on what I think now... I think Bgd. Dalvi's position was as well arranged as it was possible without retreating to another less exposed position (and he was expressly prohibited from doing so). It was a case of old Frederick's dictum "In trying to defend everything he defended nothing"

 

[Joe Shearer]

I regret to inform you that there are major changes needed to the remarks that we have made, in order to align them with the phases of the battle. On going back and re-reading my sources, it becomes clear that the map which I discussed in post 76 is incorrect; it assumes that all the action took place in one broad sweep of action. On revisiting the history of this particular battle, it is clear that there were four phases, separated by several days. Above all, the greatest weight of the PLA was on the Indian right wing and right flank, which led to the outflanked troops retreating west into Bhutan, where they found sanctuary, and where the Chinese did not pursue them. I am really furious about the lack of access to the Internet, which is slowing me down immeasurably.

On a broader subject, I would like to deal with these events in the format of three major battles - one single battle, fought over several days, with long gaps in between, for the western (Aksai Chin) sector; one battle for this, the battle of Thag La; and one for the battle of Bomdi La - Dirrang - Se La. I think that these should cover the bulk of the action, and I think that we should take up each by itself first, following up, after all three are considered and discussed (why is nobody else seemingly interested?), a look at the military consequences and the situation today: how it is the same, and where it is apparently different.

Hope you think that makes sense.

PS: Since then, I have proposed to you Capt. Popeye's rather better division of the battles. Do comment.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Oh boy what a question. We have the infinite advantage of hindsight and not to use it would be a sin. I will read more about that fateful day and get back to you with an informed answer.

But some preliminaries. The question you pose may actually be two fold. In addition to the question of could the 7th Brigade position be defended successfully? we must then ask would it have mattered? If the 65th and 62nd brigades collapsed a successful 7th Bgd. defense would have meant facing assaults in two directions completely cut off from the rest of the Army (such as it was).

but to answer your question based on what I think now... I think Bgd. Dalvi's position was as well arranged as it was possible without retreating to another less exposed position (and he was expressly prohibited from doing so). It was a case of old Frederick's dictum "In trying to defend everything he defended nothing"

A 'quick and dirty' response, not intended to spoon-feed, nothing having given me any license to do so, considering your masterly presentation of the evidence so far, but perhaps intended to prompt and suggest:

COULD 7 BDE HAVE BEEN BETTER DEFENDED?

Yes, it's quite obvious.

1. Dalvi was forced to put troops at specific locations contrary to whatever the Indian Army knew about warfare. From the battle of Assaye onwards, it was doctrine NEVER to put troops on the forward slopes, always on the backward slope, at least partially covered by the margin.

2. This was not done for the hapless Rajput units on the front slope of the ridge, facing the Thag La ridge. In fact, battle accounts specifically say that Indian counter-fire using its guns and mortars was inhibited due to the presence of Indian troops hopelessly intermingled with the Chinese.

3. Those forward detachments were at company strength or more (I don't have a copy of Dalvi with me at the moment). Simple pickets guarding the crossings, and acting as trip-wires to reserves held up-slope on the reverse, would presumably have been better, and would have allowed some response time to the Indian side. Not that there was any doubt about the Chinese intentions; any action or positioning obviously needed to take into account, contrary to New Delhi's assessment, that the PLA was on the attack.

4. Why were the slopes guarded and not the ravines?

5. The positioning of the company strength contingents on the right can only be explained by orders from above. What else would prompt a commander to split his troops and allow them to be picked off piece-meal?

6. I am not sure I agree with your comment about the PLA right hook (attacking the Indian left flank) having mopped up 1/9 Gorkhas and then moved on to ambush any survivors rushing back along the track. We know that Indian troops who survived did not go down the track, back towards Tawang; they went west, to the left of the illustration, into Bhutan. Perhaps the fighting on that flank was less than on the other.

7. Slopes were defended, ravines not. A legacy of the frontier skirmishes on the Afghan frontier, if I could take a sly dig at an earlier post!

8. No landmines. Just imagine the change in mobility options if there were landmines in the picture.

9. Look at the difference in firepower.

AAAaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaah! I give up.

WOULD IT HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE?

Dunno.

 

[gpit]

This map shows the attack on the 7th Brigade's position.


The 7th Brigade was posted at the extremity of the Indian line stretching across from Thagla ridge to Bomdila with each Indian brigade posted roughly along the axis of the road. Their position was to say the least extremely exposed and it was with this low hanging fruit that the PLA chose to start their attack.

Note extensive use of mortar in the attack, the use of infiltration/flanking tactics by the infantry, and the use of troops to preoccupy the units on the Indian flanks (stopping them from reinforcing the main position.)

By just looking at the map, and roughly understanding PLA’s tactics, 4 grenadiers at Khenzemane are in an extremely dangerous position. From layman’s point of view, PLA can concentrate and outnumber them easily while they standing out without support.

Perhaps it should be positioned on right side of Dhola hill to support 9 Punjab and 4 Grenadiers as well as those in Dhola post if needed.

Besides, the 4 Grenadiers north of Drokung Samba Bridge are also so isolated. It perhaps should be moved to the western bank of the river and destroy the Bridge.

But again, those positions are obviously against “forwarding policy”. And Mr. Nehru would be angry to see it.

I believe Mao and his generals must have laughed to death had they gotten the map, for they are all the master of concentration of force to annihilate isolated enemies, and to defeat enemy during movements…

 

[Joe Shearer]

By just looking at the map, and roughly understanding PLA’s tactics, 4 grenadiers at Khenzemane are in an extremely dangerous position. From layman’s point of view, PLA can concentrate and outnumber them easily while they standing out without support.

Impossible to defend. That position only makes sense in the context of the Nehru-Kaul policy of stationing Indian troops so far in front that they 'cut off' the l.o.c of PLA troops. Obviously, Kaul was an enthusiastic football player, or at least a football fan with a thorough understanding of the offside rule; Chacha Nehru (his nickname in India) took part in no sports that I can recall.

Perhaps it should be positioned on right side of Dhola hill to support 9 Punjab and 4 Grenadiers as well as those in Dhola post if needed.

Slightly better than sticking them in front and isolated from everybody else. Remember that the PLA attacked the end of a trench line or trench alignment, and rolled each up, piecemeal. Even pulling them back to the Dhola hillside would have got us a few hours' breather, the time taken for the PLA to go along the Nyam Jang Chu, cross and take the re-positioned 4 Grenadiers in flank or rear.

Besides, the 4 Grenadiers north of Drokung Samba Bridge are also so isolated. It perhaps should be moved to the western bank of the river and destroy the Bridge.

You mean "4 Grenadiers south of Drokung Samba bridge"... The map is oriented north to the top, west left, east right and south down.

Yes, destroying the bridge would have been good, but not for the reason we might imagine. The 'river' there is a swift-flowing but shallow mountain stream. The monsoons cease in September, more or less; thereafter, the water in these streams is snow-fed and spring-fed, not very heavy flows. So destroying the bridges would not have affected the mobility or striking power of the PLA; it would merely have released the Indian Army from the mental trap of thinking that these were defensible positions or bottlenecks, and removed various placements from harm's way.

It would have stopped the IA from thinking that these had any value. Nothing more, nothing less, I suppose.

But again, those positions are obviously against “forwarding policy”. And Mr. Nehru would be angry to see it.

Regrettable. How did this start? The answer may lie in an innocuous but tremendously mischief-making article in an influential foreign magazine titled "Thimayya of India". Of which more anon, if anybody is interested. That comes into the account of the preliminaries, not here.

I believe Mao and his generals must have laughed to death had they gotten the map, for they are all the master of concentration of force to annihilate isolated enemies, and to defeat enemy during movements…

Indeed.

It was a sad day for the Indian Army to fight a war without being allowed to fight a war as they had been trained. Even with this superiority of doctrine and strategy of the PLA, they were not unstoppable. But the way the Indian Army was laid out, as on an operating table, waiting for the surgeon's scalpel, there was no hope.

 

[TenjikuKensei]

I'll Take the liberty of posting a couple of posts related to this topic, which I made on another one. This thread seems more apt for discussions of that kind than the the one it was initially made on.

The initial thread where these posts were made can be found here
http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-...o-chinese-war-2013-2015-a-15.html#post1381921

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---------- Post added at 05:38 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:37 PM ----------

We already did in 1962. Indians have not beaten a non-subcontinent army in 2000 years. I see little reason why this would change.

Jai Hind.

Not really. The Cholas beat quite a lot of SEA armies during their time...especially the SriVijayan Empire that held sway over that region..In fact the SriVijaya empire ceased to exist after their defeat by the Cholas.

As for 1962, sure it was a loss, but my research tells me that China would not have been able to hold onto the territory it took. The "unilateral" Chinese withdrawal would have happened anyways when the supplies to sustain combat operations ground to a halt(as they would have been if the war continued on for a few more weeks in that sector...sure some supplies would have made it through..but definitely not enough to sustain combat footing...not even close.). Correct me if I'm wrong, but at most the Chinese forces had a few more weeks of combat supplies left by the time they withdrew. This is further supported by some Chinese accounts of how hard it was for them to bring up supplies to prepare for the 1962 offensive. To have tried to hold the ground taken would have been military suicide, and I suspect the Chinese generals knew that very well.

An army marches on its stomach and if not for the unilateral withdrawal, the PLA forces would have been forced to withdraw anyways..and this time under enemy pressure and lack of supplies. The Chinese generals were smart to withdraw when they did. Ultimately imo the 1962 expedition resulted in no net Chinese gains(again correct me here if i left something out). No land gain...no agreement on subject of the disputed land either.

No one gainsays that the 1962 offensive was a successful one,,but only till it lasted.It is akin to starting a game and declaring it over unilaterally when the initial beginners/headstart advantage ceases to exist.

The 1962 Chinese offensive is analogous to the medieval era Cavalry Charges which mostly hinged on the initial damage done by a cavalry charge.Any extended melee battle of Cavalry vs heavy infantry would have resulted in the expensive Cavalry units whittled down. Thus the most common cavalry tactic during the middle ages(and even later in the Napoleonic wars) was to charge and then withdraw when the initial momentum has been lost.They would charge again later when and if battlefield situations permit. A common rule of thumb about cavalry charges is that 80% of the damage is done during the initial charge..afterward the damage dealt peters out to almost nothing. In this particular case, the Cavalry would not have been able to continue to charge cos it would not have been able to receive reinforcements/supplies.

If you do believe that the PLA could have held on to the land gained during the 1962 offensive, especially when a corps worth of Indian Army units approaching the theater, along with the newly arriving Foreign military aid, ill be most interested in hearing your argument as to how it could have been done. So basing an argument on a very limited conflict , imho seems like house built out of a deck of cards

 

[TenjikuKensei]

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the 2000 year remark is not my assertion but merely a statement I came across made by an Indian officer who wrote about 1962.

I have found that it is almost always a must to verify such claims, regardless of their origin. To merely state what one reads somewhere without verifying the validity of it might lead to such erroneous statements. The officer makes a rather silly claim about Indian military history in that regard. One wonders about his knowledge given such a breathtaking display of ignorance about probably one of the biggest empires in Indian history, and the Only Indian empire to have brought SEA under its rule...in fact according to historians it was one of the preeminent Naval and Military powers during the 11 and 12th centuries in the world.

Either the officer is ignorant about a major part of the military history of India, and/or he conveniently leaves aside such facts in order to push his pet theory. I believe that in reality this was a mixture of both ignorance as well as willful denial of facts just so he could ride his hobby horse of how "South Asians" mostly suck at military matters. An opening chapter like that does not exactly shore up the credentials of the Author.

http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-...cious-action-pla-lessons-sino-indian-war.html

it's in there somewhere.


and as for the rest about 1962, it's best to deal with facts and details instead of drawing analogies between the PLA offensive and cavalry charges.


Here is a Times report of the period (as an interesting aside, note the use of Red China and the casual racism). They have the situation down.

//Quoted text

The Cavalry analogy does fit this particular situation, as my explanations would show later on, in this post. Keep in mind that I explicitly refrained from using the ww2 Blitz analogy as it would certainly not fit this one

Btw, I have read the Thread you had on this issue a couple of months back, when you provided me the link to it. I was hard pressed for time at that time and was not able to reply to it, however I did read through every single page of the pdfs as well as the thread itself.

Quote 1

Red China behaved in so inscrutably Oriental a manner last week that even Asians were baffled. After a series of smashing victories in the border war with India. Chinese troops swept down from the towering Himalayas and were poised at the edge of the fertile plains of Assam, whose jute and tea plantations account for one-fourth of India’s export trade. Then, with Assam lying defenseless before her conquering army. Red China suddenly called a halt to the fighting.

The part quoted in blue is merely setting the stage for the "story" as told by the writer. Inscrutably Oriental means absolutely nothing except to hark back to the old Kipling-ish notions of the East...and to raise an aura of mystery and suspense..what better way for the writer to rope in some more readers

The part in bold was mostly true.

And the part in Red was not. Here is where I fundamentally Disagree.
Ill expand more on this later.

Quote 2

Radio Peking announced that, “on its own initiative.” Red China was ordering a cease-fire on all fronts. Further, by Dec. 1, Chinese troops would retire to positions 12½ miles behind the lines they occupied on Nov. 7. 1959. If this promise is actually carried out. it would mean, for some Chinese units, a pullback of more than 60 miles. These decisions. Peking continued, ”represent a most sincere effort” to achieve ”a speedy termination of the Sino-Indian conflict, a reopening of peaceful negotiations, and a peaceful settlement of the boundary question.” War or peace, the message concluded, ”depends on whether or not the Indian government responds positively.”

The above is pure Propaganda to explain away the inevitable(I'm sorry if this sounds blunt, but one has to call a spade a spade). For the simple fact that the PLA could not have held on to the territory taken, let alone take more. Again ill answer this later.

Quote 3

In New Delhi the government of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was taken completely by surprise. An Indian spokesman first denounced the Chinese offer as a “diabolical maneuver.” which was later amended to the comment that India would “wait and see” exactly what the Chinese were proposing. A communique confirmed that, after the cease-fire deadline, there “had been no report of firing by the Chinese aggressors.” Indian troops also stopped shooting, but Nehru warned India: “We must not imagine that the struggle will soon be over.”

I would not be surprised if Nehru actually was surprised...after all he was clueless when it came to military matters.

Quote 4

On closer examination, the Chinese cease-fire proved to be a lot less mysterious. It did offer India’s battered armies a badly needed respite. But it left the Chinese armies in position to resume their offensive if Nehru refuses the Peking terms. And it puts on India the onus of continuing the war. Said the Hindustan Times: “The latest Chinese proposals are not a peace offer but an ultimatum.”

This statement is patently wrong. Some "closer examination" indeed.


Now that I have set the template for my post, ill go ahead and address them in detail.


A picture is worth a thousand words, so allow me to provide one of the region where the conflict took place.

The answer to why China Withdrew, is as simple as that ^^. However, lets continue

I reiterate what I posted on my previous post. An army marches on its stomach. Some salient points to note

Point 1:
The conflict was limited to infantry engagements.No tanks, No air force

Point 2:
The Assam plains...as the name implies (and as you can see in the topographical map provided above) are exactly that...plains.

Point 3:
America was sending Airsupport in the form of bombers and fighter aircraft to India, and the first of these units were already on their way when China "Unilaterally" withdrew. Russia on the other hand supported India on this issue as well, and this was the time when China and Russia were at loggerheads.

Point 3.1

The PLA had both strengths and weakness in its readiness
for mountain warfare against India. Perhaps China's biggest
weakness was the economic and budgetary constraints on the
Army. The Soviets has willingly supplied the PLA in the
1950's. But deteriorating relations--including border disputes--
with Russia led to the end of Soviet military aid in 1960.
Further, China faced national economic difficulties in the
late 1950s and early 1960s. This resulted in progressive
cutbacks and constraints from 1960 to 1962 for the PLA:
". . . . so serious was the shortage of military equipment
and materials that it caused trouble in the training pro-
gram. . . . The Ground Force is also facing the difficulties
of obtaining fuel, ammunition, and batteries for the use of
their vehicles and in training." The 1962 Taiwan Strait
Crisis put further strains on the PLA's resources. Clearly,
the watchword for the PLA was self-reliance--making due with
the supplies and equipment that were available.

Author: CALVIN, James Barnard, Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. Navy
Title: THE CHINA - INDIA BORDER WAR (1962)
Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Date: April 1984

link
The China-India Border War

Now let us revisit Quotes 1 and 4


Quote 1

Red China behaved in so inscrutably Oriental a manner last week that even Asians were baffled. After a series of smashing victories in the border war with India. Chinese troops swept down from the towering Himalayas and were poised at the edge of the fertile plains of Assam, whose jute and tea plantations account for one-fourth of India’s export trade. Then, with Assam lying defenseless before her conquering army. Red China suddenly called a halt to the fighting.

On closer examination, the Chinese cease-fire proved to be a lot less mysterious. It did offer India’s battered armies a badly needed respite. But it left the Chinese armies in position to resume their offensive if Nehru refuses the Peking terms. And it puts on India the onus of continuing the war.

Chinese forces, if they ever set foot on the Assam plains would have been walking into certain defeat. Pls refer to the map provided. There is No way for the Chinese military to bring tanks or heavy weapons...While on the other hand, the Indian troops would be able to. Furthermore the Chinese forces would not only have to face heavy weapons with infantry alone, they will also have to suffer under complete air-superiority held by American and Indian air forces. The Heavy bombing the PLA underwent in Korea was not a pleasant experience...but at lest over there they had far far shorter supply and logistics lines to China than they would have in Assam...in fact the Chinese war reserves would be exhausted in days if not weeks of sustained fighting in that region.


This is not mere speculation, but solely based on facts.(You are free to point out any mistakes). Any trickle of supplies that made through nearly 1000km of mountainous terrain would not suffice...not by a long shot


Otoh the Indian forces would be in a far better position, doubly so because their supply lines would be much shorter....would in fact be much more mobile due to American supply airdrops/logistics, and also to the fact that they can and would use heavy weapons/vehicles against an enemy that is made up on infantry units...and is also bingo ammo and supplies!

There is no way for the PLA to do a Hannibal and bring Tanks(instead of elephants) over the mountains into this region.

And no..there is simply no way...especially in 62 that China could have supplied a fighting force in Assam. I distinctly remember reading a Chinese account of the 1962 conflict(I will go over the stuff I have right with me now and see if it was from one of those sources or from some other book)where it is mentioned that mortar/artillery shells and other supplies had to be built up on the Chinese/India border just before the 1962 conflict through backbreaking labor of men and mules....literally...men used to carry mortar shells on their backs...they were the only things that could bring supplies to such a region..and keep in mind that these man-mule supply trains have to be literally hundreds of kms long.Also keep in mind that that there were no rail lines on the Chinese side for hundreds of miles from the border.The Indian side had at least two going right up the Assam plains.(pic provided for reference)

The Indians, backed with American airpower (even without it) would have no trouble defeating a force that is purely infantry and is almost zero ammo/supplies if it sets foot in the Assam plains.Also refer to point 3.1


This is the very same reason that the Allies during ww2 (who had logistical capabilities orders of magnitudes greater than the PLA during 1962) did not try to invade Germany/France through Italy, even though they had invaded and occupied Italy long before the Normandy invasion. Again, the answer is very simple...mountains. And compared to the mountains and logistical challenges the Allies would have faced, the one faced by PLA would have been orders of magnitudes bigger

^^ see the similarity? Hell Invasion of Europe via Italy would have been a cakewalk compared to the logistical challenges faced by the PLA in the Indo China war.

Thus my previous post still stands, notwithstanding some baseless claims made by writers who do not look at the bigger military picture and are more concerned about "sensationalist" proclamations.


Its a "fact" that the PLA HAD to withdraw or face crushing defeat. In military conflicts around the world, entire armies have fallen due to their own weight...due to lack of supplies. Without supplies, an army is not an army anymore than a writer is a writer without a pen. It would be useless.


Thus in conclusion we can see why "QUOTE 2" was nothing but propaganda. I could go into more detail about this, but I believe I have made my points sufficiently well. I am yet to see any evidence or explanation as to how the PLA could have continued on fighting.....Even without American aid the supply lines from Assam plains to the Arunachal Pradesh border is a few hundred kilometers....for the PLA nearly a 1000. They did well initially, but would have definitly lost a protracted war in that region not for lack of "valour" but for the previously stated reasons. They "saved face" by declaring a unilateral withdrawal which resulted in no net gain to China..and in fact benefited the Indian army in more concrete ways over the years. As I pointed out in my previous post, the Chinese withdrawal is simply to cut its losses when it lost the beginners advantage, and would have to face diminishing returns, and eventual defeat if it were to have followed through on its invasion. You have to give it to them for making it seem as it was a "victory" (if one can claim victory if the "victor" vacates the field with no net gains and with the opponent not suing for peace) thanks to some good old propaganda.


I would gladly answer any valid points you have against this course of events which imho would not have been merely possible, but would have been inevitable.(i meant the withdrawal of the PLA lest it wanted to face defeat).I am aware that you do know a quite bit about lines of communication..supplies and other stuff regarding warfare, so I'm sure you will look at the cold hard facts than quote reporters who are clueless about the subject they are dealing with...and are more concerned about sensationalist news items than factual ones.

 

[Srinivas]

I'll Take the liberty of posting a couple of posts related to this topic, which I made on another one. This thread seems more apt for discussions of that kind than the the one it was initially made on.

The initial thread where these posts were made can be found here
http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-...o-chinese-war-2013-2015-a-15.html#post1381921

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---------- Post added at 05:38 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:37 PM ----------



Not really. The Cholas beat quite a lot of SEA armies during their time...especially the SriVijayan Empire that held sway over that region..In fact the SriVijaya empire ceased to exist after their defeat by the Cholas.

As for 1962, sure it was a loss, but my research tells me that China would not have been able to hold onto the territory it took. The "unilateral" Chinese withdrawal would have happened anyways when the supplies to sustain combat operations ground to a halt(as they would have been if the war continued on for a few more weeks in that sector...sure some supplies would have made it through..but definitely not enough to sustain combat footing...not even close.). Correct me if I'm wrong, but at most the Chinese forces had a few more weeks of combat supplies left by the time they withdrew. This is further supported by some Chinese accounts of how hard it was for them to bring up supplies to prepare for the 1962 offensive. To have tried to hold the ground taken would have been military suicide, and I suspect the Chinese generals knew that very well.

An army marches on its stomach and if not for the unilateral withdrawal, the PLA forces would have been forced to withdraw anyways..and this time under enemy pressure and lack of supplies. The Chinese generals were smart to withdraw when they did. Ultimately imo the 1962 expedition resulted in no net Chinese gains(again correct me here if i left something out). No land gain...no agreement on subject of the disputed land either.

No one gainsays that the 1962 offensive was a successful one,,but only till it lasted.It is akin to starting a game and declaring it over unilaterally when the initial beginners/headstart advantage ceases to exist.

The 1962 Chinese offensive is analogous to the medieval era Cavalry Charges which mostly hinged on the initial damage done by a cavalry charge.Any extended melee battle of Cavalry vs heavy infantry would have resulted in the expensive Cavalry units whittled down. Thus the most common cavalry tactic during the middle ages(and even later in the Napoleonic wars) was to charge and then withdraw when the initial momentum has been lost.They would charge again later when and if battlefield situations permit. A common rule of thumb about cavalry charges is that 80% of the damage is done during the initial charge..afterward the damage dealt peters out to almost nothing. In this particular case, the Cavalry would not have been able to continue to charge cos it would not have been able to receive reinforcements/supplies.

If you do believe that the PLA could have held on to the land gained during the 1962 offensive, especially when a corps worth of Indian Army units approaching the theater, along with the newly arriving Foreign military aid, ill be most interested in hearing your argument as to how it could have been done. So basing an argument on a very limited conflict , imho seems like house built out of a deck of cards

Very True buddy this is the time when Cuban missile crisis took over b/n US and USSR and major power are preoccupied with that. As soon as it ended Chinese strategically announced unilateral cease fire.
Not only they have declared the cease fire they also respected the border between India and China as international border and virtually accepting Arunachal pradesh as indian territory.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I'll Take the liberty of posting a couple of posts related to this topic, which I made on another one. This thread seems more apt for discussions of that kind than the the one it was initially made on.

The initial thread where these posts were made can be found here
http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-...o-chinese-war-2013-2015-a-15.html#post1381921

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---------- Post added at 05:38 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:37 PM ----------



Not really. The Cholas beat quite a lot of SEA armies during their time...especially the SriVijayan Empire that held sway over that region..In fact the SriVijaya empire ceased to exist after their defeat by the Cholas.

As for 1962, sure it was a loss, but my research tells me that China would not have been able to hold onto the territory it took. The "unilateral" Chinese withdrawal would have happened anyways when the supplies to sustain combat operations ground to a halt(as they would have been if the war continued on for a few more weeks in that sector...sure some supplies would have made it through..but definitely not enough to sustain combat footing...not even close.). Correct me if I'm wrong, but at most the Chinese forces had a few more weeks of combat supplies left by the time they withdrew. This is further supported by some Chinese accounts of how hard it was for them to bring up supplies to prepare for the 1962 offensive. To have tried to hold the ground taken would have been military suicide, and I suspect the Chinese generals knew that very well.

An army marches on its stomach and if not for the unilateral withdrawal, the PLA forces would have been forced to withdraw anyways..and this time under enemy pressure and lack of supplies. The Chinese generals were smart to withdraw when they did. Ultimately imo the 1962 expedition resulted in no net Chinese gains(again correct me here if i left something out). No land gain...no agreement on subject of the disputed land either.

No one gainsays that the 1962 offensive was a successful one,,but only till it lasted.It is akin to starting a game and declaring it over unilaterally when the initial beginners/headstart advantage ceases to exist.

The 1962 Chinese offensive is analogous to the medieval era Cavalry Charges which mostly hinged on the initial damage done by a cavalry charge.Any extended melee battle of Cavalry vs heavy infantry would have resulted in the expensive Cavalry units whittled down. Thus the most common cavalry tactic during the middle ages(and even later in the Napoleonic wars) was to charge and then withdraw when the initial momentum has been lost.They would charge again later when and if battlefield situations permit. A common rule of thumb about cavalry charges is that 80% of the damage is done during the initial charge..afterward the damage dealt peters out to almost nothing. In this particular case, the Cavalry would not have been able to continue to charge cos it would not have been able to receive reinforcements/supplies.

If you do believe that the PLA could have held on to the land gained during the 1962 offensive, especially when a corps worth of Indian Army units approaching the theater, along with the newly arriving Foreign military aid, ill be most interested in hearing your argument as to how it could have been done. So basing an argument on a very limited conflict , imho seems like house built out of a deck of cards

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I have found that it is almost always a must to verify such claims, regardless of their origin. To merely state what one reads somewhere without verifying the validity of it might lead to such erroneous statements. The officer makes a rather silly claim about Indian military history in that regard. One wonders about his knowledge given such a breathtaking display of ignorance about probably one of the biggest empires in Indian history, and the Only Indian empire to have brought SEA under its rule...in fact according to historians it was one of the preeminent Naval and Military powers during the 11 and 12th centuries in the world.

Either the officer is ignorant about a major part of the military history of India, and/or he conveniently leaves aside such facts in order to push his pet theory. I believe that in reality this was a mixture of both ignorance as well as willful denial of facts just so he could ride his hobby horse of how "South Asians" mostly suck at military matters. An opening chapter like that does not exactly shore up the credentials of the Author.




The Cavalry analogy does fit this particular situation, as my explanations would show later on, in this post. Keep in mind that I explicitly refrained from using the ww2 Blitz analogy as it would certainly not fit this one

Btw, I have read the Thread you had on this issue a couple of months back, when you provided me the link to it. I was hard pressed for time at that time and was not able to reply to it, however I did read through every single page of the pdfs as well as the thread itself.

Quote 1



The part quoted in blue is merely setting the stage for the "story" as told by the writer. Inscrutably Oriental means absolutely nothing except to hark back to the old Kipling-ish notions of the East...and to raise an aura of mystery and suspense..what better way for the writer to rope in some more readers

The part in bold was mostly true.

And the part in Red was not. Here is where I fundamentally Disagree.
Ill expand more on this later.

Quote 2


The above is pure Propaganda to explain away the inevitable(I'm sorry if this sounds blunt, but one has to call a spade a spade). For the simple fact that the PLA could not have held on to the territory taken, let alone take more. Again ill answer this later.

Quote 3


I would not be surprised if Nehru actually was surprised...after all he was clueless when it came to military matters.

Quote 4


This statement is patently wrong. Some "closer examination" indeed.


Now that I have set the template for my post, ill go ahead and address them in detail.


A picture is worth a thousand words, so allow me to provide one of the region where the conflict took place.

The answer to why China Withdrew, is as simple as that ^^. However, lets continue

I reiterate what I posted on my previous post. An army marches on its stomach. Some salient points to note

Point 1:
The conflict was limited to infantry engagements.No tanks, No air force

Point 2:
The Assam plains...as the name implies (and as you can see in the topographical map provided above) are exactly that...plains.

Point 3:
America was sending Airsupport in the form of bombers and fighter aircraft to India, and the first of these units were already on their way when China "Unilaterally" withdrew. Russia on the other hand supported India on this issue as well, and this was the time when China and Russia were at loggerheads.

Point 3.1




Now let us revisit Quotes 1 and 4


Quote 1






Chinese forces, if they ever set foot on the Assam plains would have been walking into certain defeat. Pls refer to the map provided. There is No way for the Chinese military to bring tanks or heavy weapons...While on the other hand, the Indian troops would be able to. Furthermore the Chinese forces would not only have to face heavy weapons with infantry alone, they will also have to suffer under complete air-superiority held by American and Indian air forces. The Heavy bombing the PLA underwent in Korea was not a pleasant experience...but at lest over there they had far far shorter supply and logistics lines to China than they would have in Assam...in fact the Chinese war reserves would be exhausted in days if not weeks of sustained fighting in that region.


This is not mere speculation, but solely based on facts.(You are free to point out any mistakes). Any trickle of supplies that made through nearly 1000km of mountainous terrain would not suffice...not by a long shot


Otoh the Indian forces would be in a far better position, doubly so because their supply lines would be much shorter....would in fact be much more mobile due to American supply airdrops/logistics, and also to the fact that they can and would use heavy weapons/vehicles against an enemy that is made up on infantry units...and is also bingo ammo and supplies!

There is no way for the PLA to do a Hannibal and bring Tanks(instead of elephants) over the mountains into this region.

And no..there is simply no way...especially in 62 that China could have supplied a fighting force in Assam. I distinctly remember reading a Chinese account of the 1962 conflict(I will go over the stuff I have right with me now and see if it was from one of those sources or from some other book)where it is mentioned that mortar/artillery shells and other supplies had to be built up on the Chinese/India border just before the 1962 conflict through backbreaking labor of men and mules....literally...men used to carry mortar shells on their backs...they were the only things that could bring supplies to such a region..and keep in mind that these man-mule supply trains have to be literally hundreds of kms long.Also keep in mind that that there were no rail lines on the Chinese side for hundreds of miles from the border.The Indian side had at least two going right up the Assam plains.(pic provided for reference)

The Indians, backed with American airpower (even without it) would have no trouble defeating a force that is purely infantry and is almost zero ammo/supplies if it sets foot in the Assam plains.Also refer to point 3.1


This is the very same reason that the Allies during ww2 (who had logistical capabilities orders of magnitudes greater than the PLA during 1962) did not try to invade Germany/France through Italy, even though they had invaded and occupied Italy long before the Normandy invasion. Again, the answer is very simple...mountains. And compared to the mountains and logistical challenges the Allies would have faced, the one faced by PLA would have been orders of magnitudes bigger

^^ see the similarity? Hell Invasion of Europe via Italy would have been a cakewalk compared to the logistical challenges faced by the PLA in the Indo China war.

Thus my previous post still stands, notwithstanding some baseless claims made by writers who do not look at the bigger military picture and are more concerned about "sensationalist" proclamations.


Its a "fact" that the PLA HAD to withdraw or face crushing defeat. In military conflicts around the world, entire armies have fallen due to their own weight...due to lack of supplies. Without supplies, an army is not an army anymore than a writer is a writer without a pen. It would be useless.


Thus in conclusion we can see why "QUOTE 2" was nothing but propaganda. I could go into more detail about this, but I believe I have made my points sufficiently well. I am yet to see any evidence or explanation as to how the PLA could have continued on fighting.....Even without American aid the supply lines from Assam plains to the Arunachal Pradesh border is a few hundred kilometers....for the PLA nearly a 1000. They did well initially, but would have definitly lost a protracted war in that region not for lack of "valour" but for the previously stated reasons. They "saved face" by declaring a unilateral withdrawal which resulted in no net gain to China..and in fact benefited the Indian army in more concrete ways over the years. As I pointed out in my previous post, the Chinese withdrawal is simply to cut its losses when it lost the beginners advantage, and would have to face diminishing returns, and eventual defeat if it were to have followed through on its invasion. You have to give it to them for making it seem as it was a "victory" (if one can claim victory if the "victor" vacates the field with no net gains and with the opponent not suing for peace) thanks to some good old propaganda.


I would gladly answer any valid points you have against this course of events which imho would not have been merely possible, but would have been inevitable.(i meant the withdrawal of the PLA lest it wanted to face defeat).I am aware that you do know a quite bit about lines of communication..supplies and other stuff regarding warfare, so I'm sure you will look at the cold hard facts than quote reporters who are clueless about the subject they are dealing with...and are more concerned about sensationalist news items than factual ones.

Very True buddy this is the time when Cuban missile crisis took over b/n US and USSR and major power are preoccupied with that. As soon as it ended Chinese strategically announced unilateral cease fire.
Not only they have declared the cease fire they also respected the border between India and China as international border and virtually accepting Arunachal pradesh as indian territory.

@Cardsharp

Have you noticed this comment? It is surprising to see this activity three months or more after the last exchanges we had. I wanted to know your response before commenting myself.

 

[CardSharp]

@Cardsharp

Have you noticed this comment? It is surprising to see this activity three months or more after the last exchanges we had. I wanted to know your response before commenting myself.

I think he's just posted it now, though I am glad for the renewed interest in serious discussion, I really don't know why chose to harp on a statement made in response to some troll that I was beating back with a stick.

Never the less, I'll give his arguments a careful read over and respond when I have sufficient time.

 

[CardSharp]

But before I start in on a serious rebuttal, I'd like to see some sourcing on the counterpoints he presented.

Point 1:
The conflict was limited to infantry engagements.No tanks, No air force

I have books saying that though there were no tank vs tank action, the IA had a battlion of light tanks on each sector

Point 2:
The Assam plains...as the name implies (and as you can see in the topographical map provided above) are exactly that...plains.

Point 3:
America was sending Airsupport in the form of bombers and fighter aircraft to India, and the first of these units were already on their way when China "Unilaterally" withdrew. Russia on the other hand supported India on this issue as well, and this was the time when China and Russia were at loggerheads.

With regards to point 3, I've not read any similar statement, I've read about ammunition from the UK and heavy lift capability from the US (see TexasJohn's posting of declassified CIA reports in this thread. http://www.defence.pk/forums/china-defence/70932-1962-anyone-who-havent-read.html )

and the USSR as I understood it, took a step back from that conflict. If you can provide sources to the contrary, I'd be interested in examining them.