Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War

[justanobserver]

Maxwell believes that the forward policy foreshadowed by the Times of India editorial began almost without discussion

No wonder you hate ToI so much CardSharp

if 62 taught anything to us, it was: ANYBODY CAN STAB YOU IN THE BACK

That was the only lesson india learnt - China is an official threat

 

[CardSharp]

Sorry if I seem like interrupting, but I would like to answer that. Its friday night here so feel free to question me anywhere you think I'm wrong.
If you read the whole thing through, even the above source accepts that surprise was the main thing that chinese took away from the war. It was the incompetence of the politicians, that were making decisions in a fools land that China won't react that resulted in the blunder. Include the likes of cronies like Kaul in that. the Chinese have given credit to the ordinary soldier for fighting bravely, but what can a soldier do if he doesnt have the resources to fight. I've read about soldiers ready to fight but having no ammunition to fire, now who do you blame that on, I'd say that the govt was the culprit. The favoritism that made Kaul the commander was the culprit. kaul did not consider logistics while advocating the Forward Policy, that was stupid. Even the retreat was cut off by the Chinese in the eastern sector who attacked from routes the commanders had given opinion were unknown to them. It was a failure at the very top level, but we learned; and applied that in '65 when attacked again, the army responded and thwarted agression.


I'd like to quote here from wiki Brig. Dalvi-



There was an analysis by a Chinese historian I read some time ago that agreed with the above assesment, I think it was posted by CardSharp as well, you can go through it if you like.

Brigadier Dalvi saw the attack coming from miles away, he was on the ground and he knew that Delhi's actions were having tangible effects in the pattern of patroling, but I guess he was unable to communicate this to his higher ups or if he did, he was ignored.


As for the gogobot's question about "where the PLA found it easy , where they fond it challenging"

The weather and terrain were equally a problem for both sides, though the Chinese soldiers had comparatively better logistics due to the roads in the area, there were still many many casualties due to weather and temperature. At those altitudes and temperature, the conditions are as much your enemy as the opposite army.

The way I see it, 1962 allowed Chinese army to play to its strong suits. The PLA has always been an excellent light infantry force. It's origins came from the light/guerilla tactics in the Japanese+Civil war and it's Maoist people's war doctrine meant that its roots were in the light infantry.

The conditions in 1962, meant that it was very very hard to mount a combined arms attack. The terrain was impassable for armour, good airfields weren't present on either side, artillery was only used to a limited extent again because of terrain. These condition meant that the battles were fought by light infantry vs light infantry and the PLA were definitely the more experienced force. There were still many many combat vets still in the ranks from the civil war and even Korean war.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

Originally Posted by CardSharp
"Brigadier Dalvi saw the attack coming from miles away, he was on the ground and he knew that Delhi's actions were having tangible effects in the pattern of patroling, but I guess he was unable to communicate this to his higher ups or if he did, he was ignored. "

@ Cardsharp,
Brig. John Dalvi has put forth his experiences and point of view in a book that he wrote- "Himalayan Blunder".
i read that book a long time ago and cannot remember the exact words that he wrote, except to say that he was extremely unhappy with the situation that he had been put into. He had expressed his dissatisfaction and disagreement to his formation commander (Div.Com) who in turn had a put up a representation to the Eastern Army Commander. But all this was brushed aside/bulldozed over by Lt. Gen. Kaul who had become a 'trouble-shooter' with a roving commission. For one thing Brig. Dalvi's Brigade was under strength (only 2 battalions), pathetically underequipped and loosely strung out. If i recall correctly, at the Brigade and Divisional levels, they were aware of the Chinese use of massed attack tactics in Korea and it had been the subject of some discussion among the staff officers. Additionally, with very poor roads, all supply was by mules and occasional air-drops. i recall having read an account by the Senior Air Staff Officer then attached to the Division who had clearly explained the inability of the IAF to meet the air-drop tonnage requirements because of limited air-lift capacity.
But the "Forward Policy" was being pushed down the throats of all concerned and "McArthur" Kaul was in his element doing that, even while bypassing the chain of command (the Eastern Army Commander and Chief of the Army were reduced to spectator status ) to deal directly with the Krishna Menon himself. About the military aspects, i need to refresh the information since i read nearly all the published material years ago (as a college student) from various libraries; later the interest in the subject revived slightly but (by then)most of the books had gone out of print.
Having said that, the political aspects are more important as a subject of study; because they created and then fuelled a situation that rapidly spun out of control of the main protagonists.

 

[CardSharp]

Originally Posted by CardSharp
"Brigadier Dalvi saw the attack coming from miles away, he was on the ground and he knew that Delhi's actions were having tangible effects in the pattern of patroling, but I guess he was unable to communicate this to his higher ups or if he did, he was ignored. "

@ Cardsharp,
Brig. John Dalvi has put forth his experiences and point of view in a book that he wrote- "Himalayan Blunder".
i read that book a long time ago and cannot remember the exact words that he wrote, except to say that he was extremely unhappy with the situation that he had been put into. He had expressed his dissatisfaction and disagreement to his formation commander (Div.Com) who in turn had a put up a representation to the Eastern Army Commander. But all this was brushed aside/bulldozed over by Lt. Gen. Kaul who had become a 'trouble-shooter' with a roving commission. For one thing Brig. Dalvi's Brigade was under strength (only 2 battalions), pathetically underequipped and loosely strung out. If i recall correctly, at the Brigade and Divisional levels, they were aware of the Chinese use of massed attack tactics in Korea and it had been the subject of some discussion among the staff officers. Additionally, with very poor roads, all supply was by mules and occasional air-drops. i recall having read an account by the Senior Air Staff Officer then attached to the Division who had clearly explained the inability of the IAF to meet the air-drop tonnage requirements because of limited air-lift capacity.
But the "Forward Policy" was being pushed down the throats of all concerned and "McArthur" Kaul was in his element doing that, even while bypassing the chain of command (the Eastern Army Commander and Chief of the Army were reduced to spectator status ) to deal directly with the Krishna Menon himself. About the military aspects, i need to refresh the information since i read nearly all the published material years ago (as a college student) from various libraries; later the interest in the subject revived slightly but (by then)most of the books had gone out of print.
Having said that, the political aspects are more important as a subject of study; because they created and then fuelled a situation that rapidly spun out of control of the main protagonists.

Good points but with regard to Bgd. Dalvi, a word of warning. I've read enough military memoirs in my time to realize that the majority of them political pieces to glorify the author/absolve them of blame and to ensure a legacy. I haven't read the account but I personally would take what he said with a grain of salt. God knows there is enough blame to spread around.


Also I'd like to point that it would be wrong for Dalvi to characterize the PLA's attack as wave of flesh robots that hurled themselves on the emplacements. As indeed title of the article hints at, the sucess of the PLA came because of coordinated concentration and local superiority, it doesn't mean they used human wave attacks (this was an American media fabrication in step with the stereotype of the yellow horde.)

(I suspect that Dalvi gave this as an excuse to escape with his prestige in tact)

On an aside, the same book this chapter came from also contained an narrative of how the brilliantly light infantry tactics of the PLA mentioned above catastrophically failed the PLA in the Sino-Vietnam war.


This chapter mentions an PLA internal study where it highlighted several things in that 1979 conflict

1) absolutely horrible coordination between artillery and Infantry (to the point there was no 'on call' artillery strikes)
2) no mine clearing trained troops
3) terrible logistics to the point units didn't receive food or water for several days
4) Air force played almost no role because they refused mission after 5 Chinese MiGs were downed by friendly fire (the Viet and CHN used the same model soviet equipment and there was little coordination between AA crews and PLAAF)

 

[Capt.Popeye]

@ Cardsharp
You generic comments on the memoirs written by various actors in momentous events is understandable, John Dalvi cannot be made any exception thereto. BTW, even Kaul wrote a book which was (necessarily)more of a self-serving description.

"Also I'd like to point that it would be wrong for Dalvi to characterize the PLA's attack as wave of flesh robots that hurled themselves on the emplacements. As indeed title of the article hints at, the sucess of the PLA came because of coordinated concentration and local superiority"

The above is part of your post. Is that a quote from Dalvi's book?

While in some ways, Dalvi was present in a very important theater, he was only a local commander, not one of the principal policy makers either political or military.

 

[CardSharp]

@ Cardsharp
You generic comments on the memoirs written by various actors in momentous events is understandable, John Dalvi cannot be made any exception thereto. BTW, even Kaul wrote a book which was (necessarily)more of a self-serving description.

"Also I'd like to point that it would be wrong for Dalvi to characterize the PLA's attack as wave of flesh robots that hurled themselves on the emplacements. As indeed title of the article hints at, the sucess of the PLA came because of coordinated concentration and local superiority"

The above is part of your post. Is that a quote from Dalvi's book?

While in some ways, Dalvi was present in a very important theater, he was only a local commander, not one of the principal policy makers either political or military.

Sorry I made the assumption based on your description.

For one thing Brig. Dalvi's Brigade was under strength (only 2 battalions), pathetically underequipped and loosely strung out. If i recall correctly, at the Brigade and Divisional levels, they were aware of the Chinese use of massed attack tactics in Korea and it had been the subject of some discussion among the staff officers.

Which I assume (perhaps erroneously) was lifted out of Dalvi's memoir.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

"For one thing Brig. Dalvi's Brigade was under strength (only 2 battalions), pathetically underequipped and loosely strung out. If i recall correctly, at the Brigade and Divisional levels, they were aware of the Chinese use of massed attack tactics in Korea and it had been the subject of some discussion among the staff officers. "

Negative, Dalvi's book was read by me more than 25 years ago. And i don't own a copy so i can't quote from it at all.

 

[CardSharp]

"For one thing Brig. Dalvi's Brigade was under strength (only 2 battalions), pathetically underequipped and loosely strung out. If i recall correctly, at the Brigade and Divisional levels, they were aware of the Chinese use of massed attack tactics in Korea and it had been the subject of some discussion among the staff officers. "

Negative, Dalvi's book was read by me more than 25 years ago. And i don't own a copy so i can't quote from it at all.

Copy that, thank you for the clarification. Please forgive my suspicion of military men and their memoirs. I've just read too many coming out of this war to trust any of them (perhaps Bgd. Dalvi could be the except if I get a hold of his book)

Tom Rick's list of worse memoirs of the Iraq war.

1. Tommy R. Franks: American Soldier
2. L. Paul Bremer III: My Year in Iraq
3. Ricardo Sanchez: Wiser in Battle
4. Janis Karpinksi: One Woman's Army
5. Nathan Sassaman: Warrior King
6. Douglas Feith: War and Decision

 

[Hafizzz]

CONCENTRATING FORCES AND AUDACIOUS ACTION: PLA LESSONS FROM THE SINO-INDIAN WAR

on PDF format :

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Cardsharp

Thank you for posting this extract from Burkitt, Scobel and Worzel. I was impressed when I first read their account, I continue to be impressed. I have only read their account partially, and besides taking away lessons relating to the 62 Conflict, sought an answer there for the sharply-contrasting outcome in Vietnam. That is invaluable, as it gives us a framework of reference for comparison: (i) the Korean War; (ii) the 62 Conflict; (iii) the clashes with Vietnam.

Their particular point of view apart, there are four levels, from a macro-level descending to a micro-level, in the 62 Conflict, each of which is a subject which has absorbed huge, learned tomes. These are:

1. China's claims to Tibet and Xinjiang;
2. Foreign relations between the British Empire and neighbouring states, including Imperial and Nationalist China, and independent India's dealings with relevant neighbours;
3. Political and civilian leadership of Indian military forces, and the interaction between the civilian and military leadership through the history of independent India;
4. The doctrinal, strategic and tactical analysis of the 62 Conflict.

Obviously, from your selected title for this thread, you would like to concentrate on the final two, nos. 3 and 4. However, neglecting the other two issues altogether is to reduce the amount of useful and relevant detail from the situation.

Do let me know your response to this, and your thoughts in general.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The lesson wasn't as much for the IA as it was for the Government. You can expect as much from soldiers if you send the to fight without proper clothes and support to fight, while chinese were acclimatised and better supplied.

The idiotic Nehru Govt didnt believe China would attack and therefore did not prepare for it, and when China attacked the troops weren't ready. As the author of the above book mentions it, China won the war by surprise. The credit is with them for surprising us and the blame is on the Govt, the IA wasn't prepared clear an simple, nothing for them to be humbled about.

This is incorrect.

There were several distinct phases of action. Please examine the dates. The intervals were sufficient to regroup, to restructure and to re-equip the troops; there was enough time to recover, far more than Harbaksh Singh had in 65 against the Pakistani attack on Akhnoor launched by Akhtar Hussain Malik.

The Indian Army leadership, under General Thapar, had completely surrendered to the political interference of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and General B.M.Kaul, who wanted to be Chief of Army Staff without having commanded a unit in battle in his entire professional career.

That is with reference to failures at the leadership level. There were also failures at field level. Please read the extracts, if you cannot read the full PDF version; it is clear that several myths that were propagated by our hyper-active media and film industry need careful re-examination.

The PLA did not outnumber the Indian Army in massive numbers. It did not defeat the Indian Army through human wave tactics, losing huge numbers of men before overwhelming the very small units facing it with almost 100% casualties to the Indian Army.

The fact is that the Indian Army had doctrinal blind spots, and these doctrinal blind spots continue to this date, with no corrective action. The drastic overhaul taken up by General Sundarji was completely sabotaged by the Defence Ministry which did not support his initiative by doing all the corrective, balancing work that was part and parcel of the overhaul. Having said that, this overhaul was technology-heavy; some basic faults in outlook, leadership and focus of the command levels at divisional levels and upwards are clearly evident.

That the troops were not ready and that the PLA won through surprise is only partly true. It does not highlight the fact that the top military leadership threw in troops which were ill-equipped; these were not selections of the politicians. It does not acknowledge the fact that the PLA achieved tactical surprise as well as strategic surprise.

Without understanding, absorbing and eliminating the causes of this debacle, the Indian Army will continue to fight and win on brute force, in frontal attacks and through the bloody sacrifices of its junior officers and its soldiers.

 

[Joe Shearer]

That is not how it works in India, the civilian leadership decides and military leaderships executes.

I think you meant, Kaul failed to apprise the Civilian leadership about the "complexities" of such a venture?

This is slightly misleading. The civilian leadership takes decisions at the policy level, at the geo-political level. It does not decide how many men are to be posted, at which locations, which units are to be deployed, what tactics are to be used, who should be general officers involved and field officers, and the like. Those are strictly military decisions.

Please remember that behind this massive leadership failure, there was a third factor besides the political/civilian factor and the military factor. This was a situation very largely created by an ego-maniac, the ranking police officer in the country with a rank equivalent of Lt. General, Mr. B. N. Malik, in those days Director IB. In 62, all intelligence activity, internal and external, political and security, was combined in one body, and Malik was the undisputed monarch of the establishment. It was his consistent and sustained advice, based on unknown evidence, that China would do nothing to resist India. This was a considerable influence on the increasingly bellicose attitude of the Indian leadership.

Second, Kaul always had the option of informing the political leadership of why, professionally speaking, the Army should not have taken up patrolling border guard duties, and also why it should be prepared for a robust response from the PLA. However, it was an option only under the very peculiar conditions of the times, when the Chief of General Staff spoke to the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister, rather than being a totally silent supporting staff officer tasked to work on the projects and activities discussed between him and his boss, the Chief of Army Staff. General Thapar's acquiescence in the goings on was a very sad end to a good military career.

Third, in 71, the situation for the Bangladeshis was quite desperate after Operation Searchlight. It was only then that it dawned on the Indian leadership that this was not a problem that was going to go away, it was not the Language Riots, it could not be dispelled by patience and tactful administrative handling by the authorities in East Pakistan, not even by a mild show of force and a couple of occasions when a mob would be fired upon. It would remain and take on sinister dimensions as time went on. When the then prime minister asked her COAS to take action, he refused: (i) no plans were ready for an intervention in East Pakistan; (ii) there were no troops assigned for East Pakistan; (iii) starting a campaign two months before the monsoons was not intelligent behaviour or good military planning.

He therefore insisted that we wait until the GOC-in-C Eastern Command, and that Command's Chief of Staff, both completed their job of planning and re-grouping troops. This took till November 71. Except for a military overturn, aand another really stupid bit of planning, it was quite a good plan.

Telling the pols something can't be done is possible; telling them what is possible instead has their entire attention.

 

[arihant]

I think some Indians consider that China took advantage of friendly relations with India but thats not completely true.

We were having two disputes with china at around Independence. One was Aksai Chin and other was Arunachal Pradesh. First thing that nothing happen after few years of Independence was that we didn't have any official marking of international borders till that time. So, all assume as there borders were perfect. But when India released the official map it included Aksai chin as well AP.

Well Aksai Chin map was drawn by some British but they never confirmed it from China. On the other than on AP, treaty was signed by Tibet which was not Independent at that time. Thus in that way AP is technically not India because that treaty is invalid I guess as per International laws. But what can happen China cannot leave it and India would not like to leave it.

But I guess India claim on Aksai Chin is valid while for AP its invalid but clause of natural boundaries comes in. In the clause, there is well written that boundaries should be such that it looks very natural and that could be case if Aksai Chin remains with China and AP with India. AP is accessible easily through India while Aksai Chin is accessible for Tibet. So, to my guess whatever happen leave it. Just put the full stop and sign the final treaty and allow free visa permit for work system in both countries.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

"Copy that, thank you for the clarification. Please forgive my suspicion of military men and their memoirs. I've just read too many coming out of this war to trust any of them (perhaps Bgd. Dalvi could be the except if I get a hold of his book)"

Your opinions, IMO are quite correct. As a matter of fact; this "may" be extrapolated to any person who has had a role in any major (or controversial ) event.
Brig. Dalvi need not be an exception to this. All that i feel, is that he was a player in the 'micro' sense not a 'macro' sense.

i overlooked to tell you to draw Joe Shearer in to the discussion; but now i see that he has joined. Which is very good. He (i'm sure) has some more insight and knowledge in the matter.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Sorry if I seem like interrupting, but I would like to answer that. Its friday night here so feel free to question me anywhere you think I'm wrong.
If you read the whole thing through, even the above source accepts that surprise was the main thing that chinese took away from the war.

That is not how it works in India, the civilian leadership decides and military leaderships executes.

I think you meant, Kaul failed to apprise the Civilian leadership about the "complexities" of such a venture?

I am unable to understand this.

Did the PLA learn the virtue of surprise in warfare from this episode? That is what the words say, but that is so wrong.

It was the incompetence of the politicians, that were making decisions in a fools land that China won't react that resulted in the blunder. Include the likes of cronies like Kaul in that.

In an earlier post, I had sought to enumerate some of the reasons and the background factors that needed to be considered when considering this 62 Conflict. Now, this post has its own logic which compels us to review those background factors.

In the quotation above, we have three factors:

• Decision making with insufficient or incorrect information about opposition interests and decision-making processes;
• Poor selection of top military staff;
• Violation of the principles of the chain of command.

the Chinese have given credit to the ordinary soldier for fighting bravely, but what can a soldier do if he doesnt have the resources to fight. I've read about soldiers ready to fight but having no ammunition to fire, now who do you blame that on, I'd say that the govt was the culprit.

Factor:

• Insufficient ammunition, thanks to defective Government policy and planning;

The favoritism that made Kaul the commander was the culprit.

Factor:

• Poor selection of top military staff;

kaul did not consider logistics while advocating the Forward Policy, that was stupid.

Factor:

• Professional incompetence of top military staff;

Even the retreat was cut off by the Chinese in the eastern sector who attacked from routes the commanders had given opinion were unknown to them.

Factor:

• Tactical over-confidence of top military staff;

It was a failure at the very top level, but we learned; and applied that in '65 when attacked again, the army responded and thwarted agression.

This is rather a general statement. Which specific actions, or changes in military doctrine, resulted from the 62 Incident?

I'd like to quote here from wiki Brig. Dalvi-



There was an analysis by a Chinese historian I read some time ago that agreed with the above assesment, I think it was posted by CardSharp as well, you can go through it if you like.

Perhaps that quotation from Brigadier Dalvi deserves separate treatment and a separate discussion.

In conclusion, we have the following factors identifiable as contributory factors in this situation:

• Decision making with insufficient or incorrect information about opposition interests and decision-making processes;
• Poor selection of top military staff;
• Violation of the principles of the chain of command.
• Insufficient ammunition, thanks to defective Government policy and planning;
• Professional incompetence of top military staff;
• Tactical over-confidence of top military staff;

Perhaps now the question relating to changes made that influenced the outcome in 65 is clearer.