Comment: Command attributes (III)

[fatman17]

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

Comment: Command attributes (III)

Shaukat Qadir

During war, particularly when faced with an opponent superior in numbers and equipment, one can have no hope of success without resorting to the unconventional and taking risks

Before concluding this series, it is essential to dwell upon an aspect peculiar to Pakistan. Because of our peculiarly linear shape — lying across the north-western border with India — there is little depth available and, at some places we are even critically vulnerable.

Further, our main artery of communication, the GT Road, with the parallel railway line, also lies critically close to the border at some places. Additionally, our war stamina is officially claimed to be three to four weeks, but in some items it is far less. As a consequence, our wars are going to be of an extremely short duration indeed.

To illustrate the point I am attempting to make, it is necessary to digress briefly. In his book On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Norman Dixon, a psychologist of repute in the UK has proceeded to tear apart the senior military leadership thrown up by the British system, throughout their history, up till and including the Second World War. He establishes beyond any shadow of doubt that the vast majority of leadership is not only incompetent to address any crisis in peace, but has also failed miserably in wars; exceptions being few and far between.

Of course, being a psychologist, he has attempted to find psychological rationale for their failure, and even establish relevant psychological profile(s).

While offering his explanations, Dixon has frequently quoted The Peter Principle, another interesting book authored by Dr Hull based on the theory expounded by Dr Peter, both of whom were bureaucrats in the US, Dr Hull having served under Dr Peter. The book quotes one principle, with numerous illustrations all relating to American bureaucrats at various levels of seniority: ‘every man/woman rises to the level of his/her incompetence!’

An amusing but often astonishing truism.

With relation to the Pakistan Army I discovered that, frequently, an outstanding Lieutenant Colonel that makes for an above-average Brigadier, could go on to become a high-average Major General, and still rise to become a merely average Lieutenant General.

Having read these books, while carrying out a study on military leadership, I concluded that all bureaucratic systems — make no mistakes, the military is one vast bureaucracy — tends to throw up mediocrity, unless it is placed under crisis. The odd exception is the individual that beats the system, the obvious conclusion being that peacetime training does not equip senior officers for war.

In the course of my career I came across very few inspiring senior officers; most noteworthy among them was Lt Gen Safdar, who later became VC Punjab University and, very briefly, Governor Punjab, and whose extraordinary dynamism in peace inspired one to believe that he would be a success in war.

In support of this thesis there are innumerable examples from contemporary history; the most telling one is that almost all senior British military commanders who held senior ranks when WWII broke out were failures and the successful ones were thrown up during combat.

However, the clinching example comes from the American entry into the war. Eisenhower was a Colonel on the faculty of the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, while Mark Clark, Omer Bradleigh, and Patton were only Lt Cols. Within the span of three years, the latter three were to rise through the process to command Army Groups!

Eisenhower, on the other hand continued to rise on staff assignments without commanding anything beyond the regiment (about one thousand men) that he commanded before the war, until he took over command of all Allied forces in the European theatre; no criticism in this unexpected rise is intended since Eisenhower’s forte was administration and this final assignment demanded extraordinary administrative skills! The only pre-war general who continued to prove himself an able commander in war was Douglas MacArthur, who was sacked when he fell afoul of President Roosevelt.

The only two exceptions to my thesis have been the German General Staff, which produced remarkable leaders during peace, all of whom were successful during the Second World War, and the erstwhile Israeli military up to the 1970s.

The reason for their successes are different: the German General Staff were training for actual war during peace and the Israeli military considered itself permanently at war; now the latter have gone to seed, having adopted the American policy of reliance on fire-power rather than intellect and intrepidity.

The basic reason for bureaucratic systems, especially the military, failing to produce leaders capable of dealing with crises or wars, is the lamentably insidious influx of careerism.

In peacetime officers aspiring to rise to senior ranks tend to follow rules by the letter and take no risks, since any risk can endanger their future. During war, particularly when faced with an opponent superior in numbers and equipment, one can have no hope of success without resorting to the unconventional and taking risks; in fact the measure of success will be in direct proportion to the extent of the risk taken.

While the British and the Americans could afford the initial errors of their senior military leaders and replace them with wartime commanders — since their wars were fought over years — we cannot afford the errors of our senior commanders, being that our wars are likely to be over by the time they have managed to show their inability.

It is imperative, therefore, that the Pakistan military learn from the German General Staff system and produce wartime leaders during peace. A difficult ask, but not an impossible one.


The author is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). This is the final article in a three-part series. The second appeared Saturday, May 10

 

[fatman17]

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

we r going in reverse order - so pls bear with me

Comment: Command attributes (II)
Shaukat Qadir

No one respects a commander who merely tries to be nice and does not have the guts to take punitive action; on the other hand no one likes a martinet

Having outlined the functions of senior military commanders (‘Command attributes’, Daily Times, May 3), we now proceed to address the qualities that make them fit for holding this enormous responsibility. The list can be long but I intend to address only six.

If a senior military commander’s instructions are to be clear, precise and unambiguous, which they must, the first quality that any officer aspiring to senior ranks must possess is clarity of thought; a quality that presumes his education and vision.

However, a senior officer must also be respected. And respect is not available on demand, it has to be earned. What must senior officers do to earn the respect of their subordinates?

Let us begin with the acceptance of orders — which is as important as issuing them. Any senior officer must be capable of thinking for himself. Consequently, when receiving orders that he disagrees with, he must express his disagreement to his superior, with his rationale; failure to do so would actually constitute disloyalty, since his superior will not have the benefit of his point of view.

However, once the orders are issued despite his advice, he can either refuse to obey them and suffer the consequences, or accept them in letter and spirit. So that when he issues them, they are issued as his; no subordinate can respect a whining superior who claims that he is ‘just following orders’.

Whereas a commander must act in accordance with his individual personality and combination of abilities, the one common factor necessary to earn the respect of subordinates is how he ‘leads’ his men.

Different individuals lead in different ways; some choose to actively participate with their command (when they are suffering physical hardships). This is perhaps the most effective, but not the only, way to lead; others choose merely to be present during adversity.

In 1986 my unit had just moved to Chamb under my command and was deployed along the LOC. It is usual that when the opponents know of the arrival of a new unit they test its mettle with cease-fire violations. I was dressing up after my morning jog when I heard the outbreak of firing and immediately rushed to the location where the firing had occurred.

I was received by a smiling Havaldar, Muhammed Ali, a Pashtun, while we were still exchanging fire. This post was under the command of a JCO and when I inquired after him he informed me that the JCO and two sepoys were injured.

‘Then why are your teeth showing?’ I snapped. He responded in Pashto, still smiling, that the young recruits (newly enrolled sepoys) were scared and he told them, ‘Don’t worry, the CO is on his way’.

I can still feel my chest swell when I recall that comment. It was, perhaps, the proudest moment in my career. My subordinates were certain that in moments of adversity, I would invariably be present.

I always remembered that lesson and made every effort to live up to this expectation even as a brigade commander, and I was provided plenty of opportunities. I quote this incident as an example of having established one’s ability to lead, in all humility, with absolutely no pretensions of being courageous, which I neither am nor ever was.

Though all other qualities fall under his ability to command respect, their individual significance deserves separate attention; the next quality I wish to address is justice.

A senior commander must be just. Being just is a two dimensional trait and incomplete without both aspects. On the one hand, he must ensure that the deserving are rewarded; and on the other, it is equally important that the guilty are punished. No one respects a commander who merely tries to be nice and does not have the guts to take punitive action; on the other hand no one likes a martinet. Once again the right balance needs to be found.

Another trait essential for a senior commander is his ability to remain cool in the face of adversity. After all, most officers would contend that adversity is the time for which senior officers are required; if all is going well, senior officers might just stay home.

I have witnessed some usually volatile senior officers becoming icily cool during adversity. I am not sure whether they cultivated this ability or it came naturally to them, but it is an essential attribute and, if it can be cultivated, it must.

Finally, there will be frequent occasions during actual combat when senior officers will find it necessary to take immediate decisions; sometimes such occasions also arise during peacetime. It is important for any senior officer worth the name to rise to the crisis and issue immediate instructions.

Sometimes these instructions will need to contradict previous instructions from higher headquarters or even violate standard operating procedures; if so, not only must he issue orders to do so, but accept full responsibility for them.

This implies that while senior officers should deliberate thoroughly before taking a decision, when the occasion demands it, they should also be able to act immediately.

Having discussed the qualities that make a senior officer successful, it is essential to briefly dwell upon a negative characteristic, careerism, for two reasons; firstly due to the quantity of people that it has affected in recent times and secondly, because of the enormity of its negative impact.

As opposed to professionalism, which seeks excellence in performance, careerism tolerates no mistakes in search of a non-existent perfectionism. To this end the careerist officer may stoop to lying, concealing and, where impossible to hide, finding scapegoats.

They forget that any body of men consists of dedicated professionals, malcontents, and the maladroit; it is for the commander to weld them into a professional outfit and it is impossible to do so, without someone making a mistake or causing an accident.

It is my experience that the higher the standard you set for yourself and your subordinates, the more likely they are to rise to it, but not without going wrong while trying.

What else are senior commanders meant for, if not to redress the mistakes of their subordinates, protect them if there has been an accident and punish only when someone has erred deliberately?


The author is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). This is the second article of a three-part series. The third and final article will appear Saturday, May 17

 

[fatman17]

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

Comment: Command attributes —Shaukat Qadir

Any senior military commander has four essential functions which relate to his command and one that relates to his own person. Those that relate to his command are: to guide, supervise, educate, and administer; and the one that relates to his own person is: to reflect

The foremost question that might arise in the mind of any reader is whether an individual, like this author, whom the army, with good reason, did not think fit to promote beyond one-star rank — even if he did command three brigades, each under difficult circumstances — is qualified to address such a subject.

It is my considered view that it is not necessary to have first-hand experience of being a senior military commander to know of the qualities that are necessary to make a successful senior commander. Each one who has served in the military has seen enough senior commanders to identify the qualities that differentiate between a successful and an unsuccessful one; and each one has studied military history analytically.

It is necessary to reiterate that, despite the common perception to the contrary, senior ranks in the military actually require a high degree of intellect. Senior military commanders will be playing the ultimate chess game; in which real pawns die, real castles fall, real kings/queens are captured, and the destiny of nations will lie in their hands in case of war.

It is for this reason that this subject is not only fascinating for students of military history but might also be of some interest to readers of this column.

Before discussing the qualities of senior military commanders, it is essential to outline their functions. In my view any senior military commander has four essential functions which relate to his command and one that relates to his own person.

Those that relate to his command are: to guide, supervise, educate, and administer; and the one that relates to his own person is: to reflect. Let us attempt to briefly examine each.

Under the guidance that senior commanders provide, they issue clear and unambiguous instructions on what they expect from their subordinates; these instructions cover all aspects, from training for war and routine administration, to expected roles in the event of war. While each one of the senior commander’s functions is no less significant than the other, the importance of the first function is that in this he not only establishes his authority but also provides his subordinates with an insight into his personality.

Having issued his instructions, it is essential that commanders ensure these are being carried out in the spirit that they were issued in and not just in letter. For this their command needs their supervision. However, supervision requires a very delicate balance.

If the senior commander over-exerts his supervisory role, it will become counter-productive since, in actual combat, subordinate commanders will frequently find it necessary to take decisions without awaiting orders and, if peacetime training has not prepared them for this, they will err by doing nothing; which is far worse than erring in an attempt to do something. The senior commander must ensure that his supervision does not appear to be interference in the duties of his subordinate commanders.

Senior commanders must also ensure that subordinates are educated so that they too can, in due course, rise to senior ranks, with the necessary abilities required for these commands. It is important for senior commanders to realise that every single act of theirs is a source of education for their subordinates; each act they appreciate, they will attempt to emulate, while each act that they do not appreciate will teach them what not to do. Since rising to a senior rank is the natural aspiration of every single officer; it is but natural that senior commanders deem themselves to live in glass houses, under constant critical observation by their subordinates.

This, however, must not influence senior commanders to attempt to be anything other than their natural selves; since it is my considered view that the subordinates could invariably write a more accurate annual confidential report, ACR, of their commanders, than those senior to the senior commanders could.

Finally, every commander, at all levels must administer his command. Routine administration includes ensuring the provision of supplies, equipment, rations, POL (petrol, oil and lubricants), and all items that subordinate formations/units need to perform the duties that are expected of them. It also includes ensuring that all ranks under his command are suitably housed, fed, and provided all facilities that are their due. However, while these are the function of commanders at all levels, far more is expected from senior commanders.

Even during routine administration, problems arise which are not covered by military regulations and senior commanders are required to exercise their own initiative in addressing those.

In Kel, the farthest corner of AJK, supplies for six months from November to May, are stocked before the onset of winters, including livestock to provide the troops fresh meat during that period.

When I assumed command of the brigade in Kel I was faced with an unusual problem; we did not have sufficient accommodation for the livestock and, invariably lost a number of animals which died due to severe cold. My only option was to authorise my subordinates to receive cash in lieu of the livestock from the contractors and purchase livestock and fly it in by a helicopter during winters. I issued them written authorisation to that effect.

Administration includes writing reports on the annual performance of every officer under his command. This is a singularly heavy responsibility, since these reports decide the officer’s future. It is, therefore, essential for senior commanders to make every possible attempt to acquaint themselves with all officers under their command, so as to report on them accurately.

The author is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). This is the first article in a three-part series. The second article will appear on Saturday, May 10, 2008.

 

[vish]

Thank you for posting these articles. It was a pleasure reading them.

 

[blain2]

Good stuff!