A.Rahman
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CIA papers blame India for the 1962 war with China
By Arun Kumar, Washington, June 28: The Indian leadership is to blame for turning India's border dispute with China "from a primarily political quarrel into a serious military confrontation," recently released papers of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) say.
The papers, described by the CIA as its "Family Jewels", suggest that Chinese policy toward India in the run-up to the 1962 Sino-Indian war operated on contradictory assumptions about dealing with prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru.
The Chinese believed that it was necessary to "unite" with Nehru and simultaneously to "struggle" against him. They had hoped that an opening for negotiations would appear but, at the same time, noted that Nehru insisted on China withdrawing from the Aksai Plain.
They apparently believed that they had some room for diplomatic manoeuvring with him, when in fact such room no longer existed, they papers suggest.
The Chinese absorbed a continuous volley of Indian insults and rebuffs without striking back publicly, calculating that a public riposte would compel Nehru to leave the dispute open indefinitely.
It pointed up the self-defeating aspect of the Chinese policy to press Nehru in various clever ways but to offer him no concessions. That is, the Chinese had rejected the carrot-and-the-stick as a policy because the only carrot acceptable to Nehru was the entire Plain.
They were, therefore, left with sticks of various sizes, and when they used even a small one the Indians winced. Their adamant stand against withdrawal made political probes-by certain- Indian civilian leaders-futile exercises, the CIA papers said.
Then external affairs ministry secretary general, R.K. Nehru, was scolded like a small boy by Liu Shao-chi in July 1961 for coming to China only to demand Chinese withdrawal and to insist that the border had been delimited, the papers suggest.
As a result of the angry rebuke, relations further deteriorated. Even Nehru indicated he had no choice but to adopt a tougher attitude toward the Chinese. The Chinese response was to treat him as an implacable foe, Nehru was constantly pulled in two directions. His inclination was to work for a political settlement; however, Chinese adamancy made him vulnerable in parliament and consequently more susceptible than ever to the argument of army leaders that the Chinese should be pushed back by force, the papers said.
He accepted their view that flanking moves against Chinese posts would provide a form of safe pressure. Nehru spoke in tones of striking belligerency. Chinese charges of Indian responsibility for the initial provocation-i.e. new posts in spring 196l-seem to be valid, CIA suggests.
The Chinese then warned Nehru that they would not remain passive observers. The warnings failed to deter Nehru; on the contrary, they enabled his opponents to press for an even harder anti-China line.
"The border dispute was in this way transformed by the Indians from a primarily political quarrel into a serious military confrontation," the declassified CIA papers concluded.
http://www.newkerala.com/news5.php?action=...ws&id=42819
By Arun Kumar, Washington, June 28: The Indian leadership is to blame for turning India's border dispute with China "from a primarily political quarrel into a serious military confrontation," recently released papers of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) say.
The papers, described by the CIA as its "Family Jewels", suggest that Chinese policy toward India in the run-up to the 1962 Sino-Indian war operated on contradictory assumptions about dealing with prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru.
The Chinese believed that it was necessary to "unite" with Nehru and simultaneously to "struggle" against him. They had hoped that an opening for negotiations would appear but, at the same time, noted that Nehru insisted on China withdrawing from the Aksai Plain.
They apparently believed that they had some room for diplomatic manoeuvring with him, when in fact such room no longer existed, they papers suggest.
The Chinese absorbed a continuous volley of Indian insults and rebuffs without striking back publicly, calculating that a public riposte would compel Nehru to leave the dispute open indefinitely.
It pointed up the self-defeating aspect of the Chinese policy to press Nehru in various clever ways but to offer him no concessions. That is, the Chinese had rejected the carrot-and-the-stick as a policy because the only carrot acceptable to Nehru was the entire Plain.
They were, therefore, left with sticks of various sizes, and when they used even a small one the Indians winced. Their adamant stand against withdrawal made political probes-by certain- Indian civilian leaders-futile exercises, the CIA papers said.
Then external affairs ministry secretary general, R.K. Nehru, was scolded like a small boy by Liu Shao-chi in July 1961 for coming to China only to demand Chinese withdrawal and to insist that the border had been delimited, the papers suggest.
As a result of the angry rebuke, relations further deteriorated. Even Nehru indicated he had no choice but to adopt a tougher attitude toward the Chinese. The Chinese response was to treat him as an implacable foe, Nehru was constantly pulled in two directions. His inclination was to work for a political settlement; however, Chinese adamancy made him vulnerable in parliament and consequently more susceptible than ever to the argument of army leaders that the Chinese should be pushed back by force, the papers said.
He accepted their view that flanking moves against Chinese posts would provide a form of safe pressure. Nehru spoke in tones of striking belligerency. Chinese charges of Indian responsibility for the initial provocation-i.e. new posts in spring 196l-seem to be valid, CIA suggests.
The Chinese then warned Nehru that they would not remain passive observers. The warnings failed to deter Nehru; on the contrary, they enabled his opponents to press for an even harder anti-China line.
"The border dispute was in this way transformed by the Indians from a primarily political quarrel into a serious military confrontation," the declassified CIA papers concluded.
http://www.newkerala.com/news5.php?action=...ws&id=42819
