beijingwalker
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In Defense of Socialism, 1990–1991
After the collapse of
socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the VCP chief and defense minister
sought an ideological alliance with China.
As Party Chief Nguyen Van Linh explained to the Chinese ambassador to Vietnam on
June 5, 1990, the situation was marked by the West’s offensive to eliminate socialism
and concurrently the difficulties of the Soviet Union in defending socialism.
In
this situation, Linh concluded,“China should raise high the banner of
socialism and stick to Marxism-Leninism.”22 Linh and Defense Minister Le
Duc Anh hoped that China would take the leadership of the world’s
socialist forces; they indicated to the ambassador that they were ready
to meet Chinese leaders to discuss solidarity between the two states to
fight imperialism.
.
.
On September 2 that year,
Vietnam’s Independence Day, the party and government chiefs did not stay
in Hanoi to celebrate the 45th birthday of their state but instead flew
to Chengdu, China, for a secret summit with Chinese leaders, the first
since the mid-1970s.
The Vietnamese understood that their acceptance
of the time, place, and participants was a sign of deference to China.
.
.
Participants
included Vietnam’s elder statesman Pham Van Dong but not China’s
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping; Foreign Minister Thach was excluded.
During the meeting, the Vietnamese also let the Chinese dictate the
terms of negotiation;this should be seen against the background of a
decade-long hostility between the two countries.
The Vietnamese
had urgent reasons for taking this approach. At the time, the
counterweight of the Soviet Union was no longer available and Vietnam
was still isolated, regionally and globally. In China, Vietnam faced a
disproportionately powerful neighbor, and in order to prevent Chinese
aggression, Hanoi had to pay deference to Beijing. It appeared to be the
calculation of Pham Van
Dong and, to some extent, Prime Minister Do Muoi.
Yet, as discussed above, General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh had different concerns and priorities.
His
primary intention at Chengdu was to discuss how to protect socialism
from the West, led by the United States. Although the Chinese refused to
play the solidarity game, Linh and his successors over the next decade
kept trying to reestablish the Sino-Vietnamese relationship on an
ideological basis.
www.yale.edu/seas/Vuving.doc · DOC file
