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It is not exactly a good thing unless China can find more use of that money that does not involve property speculation all over the world or just parking it in US treasuries.

I guess it is one step better than the other export giant Germany wasting its export money on US military ventures and bailing out failing European countries.

Germany bailing out failing European countries is hardly "wasted". As long as EU exists, Germany will be known as core of EU instead of economic colony of US like Japan is. It was barely 20 years ago when Germany was forced to sign Plaza according along with Japan and barely 25 years ago when Germany was divided in half. The other European states may be a drain on German economy, but the protection they provided is practically priceless.
 
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Germany bailing out failing European countries is hardly "wasted". As long as EU exists, Germany will be known as core of EU instead of economic colony of US like Japan is. It was barely 20 years ago when Germany was forced to sign Plaza according along with Japan and barely 25 years ago when Germany was divided in half. The other European states may be a drain on German economy, but the protection they provided is practically priceless.

Economic colony? This is getting ridiculous, and I am disappointed in you. Why did Germany sign the Plaza Accord?

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Look at that spike between 1980 and 1985, which, like the Japanese yen, was a reaction to Volcker's actions to kill inflation in the US. The Plaza Accord was one method to address US weakness; there were others, which both Germany and Japan decided would be far more destructive to their own economies than signing the Plaza Accord. They could have refused, and suffered severe consequences (because of the inevitable unilateral US action), but they were fortunately smarter than many users in this forum.

To put it in terms you can understand: China had a choice of continuing to keep its currency artificially cheap, or allow the RMB to appreciate to give the US some breathing room. China chose to allow the RMB to appreciate starting in 2005. If you're clever, you will know why China chose this course of action instead of continuing to manipulate its currency. If you're not clever, you will believe that China is an economic colony of the US.

All of this talk of "economic colonialism" is pure historical revisionism.

N.B. if I understand your sentence correction, you claim that the markets that European countries provide to Germany are "practically priceless," but dismiss US military protection of Europe as worthless. Stay classy, my friend.
 
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To put it in terms you can understand: China had a choice of continuing to keep its currency artificially cheap, or allow the RMB to appreciate to give the US some breathing room. China chose to allow the RMB to appreciate starting in 2005. If you're clever, you will know why China chose this course of action instead of continuing to manipulate its currency. If you're not clever, you will believe that China is an economic colony of the US.

The RMB appreciation is purely in response to shifting prices in commodities markets and the rising needs of Chinese import. There was no negative impact on net exports and it reduced the price of imports. It had nothing to do with US pressure, since the complaints neither stopped after 2005 or were increasing before 2005.
 
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The RMB appreciation is purely in response to shifting prices in commodities markets and the rising needs of Chinese import. There was no negative impact on net exports and it reduced the price of imports. It had nothing to do with US pressure, since the complaints neither stopped after 2005 or were increasing before 2005.

Please substantiate this quantitatively, for example, by showing the effects on inflation.
 
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Please substantiate this quantitatively, for example, by showing the effects on inflation.

Historic inflation China – historic CPI inflation China

63542d5a8f2b5ea25aa1b45ed5a44acd.jpg


Massive inflation pre-2005, especially in the 90's during the largest changes in economic structure but after the exchange rate freeze. Stable inflation rates 2000-2003. Drop in inflation post 2005 from a 5% high in mid 2004. Brief spike in inflation in 2008. Exchange rates frozen in 2009-2010, inflation decreased to 2000-2003 levels during the free-float era of post 2010.
 
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Historic inflation China – historic CPI inflation China

View attachment 51861

Massive inflation pre-2005, especially in the 90's during the largest changes in economic structure but after the exchange rate freeze. Stable inflation rates 2000-2003. Drop in inflation post 2005 from a 5% high in mid 2004. Brief spike in inflation in 2008. Exchange rates frozen in 2009-2010, inflation decreased to 2000-2003 levels during the free-float era of post 2010.

Are you seriously claiming that reducing the inflation rate from 1.8% in 2005 to 1.5% in 2006 is evidence that China engineered a currency appreciation in order to combat inflation? Let alone the increase in inflation back to 4.8% in 2007.

The consensus explanation is the simpler and more correct one: China allowed its currency to start appreciating in response to complaints from its trading partners.
 
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Are you seriously claiming that reducing the inflation rate from 1.8% in 2005 to 1.5% in 2006 is evidence that China engineered a currency appreciation in order to combat inflation? Let alone the increase in inflation back to 4.8% in 2007.

The consensus explanation is the simpler and more correct one: China allowed its currency to start appreciating in response to complaints from its trading partners.

But the complaints never stopped after 2005 and indeed, increased even further and hit a peak in 2012 (I have no numbers on complaint frequency, just my feeling from reading the news), despite the 30% appreciation in currency value in that period.

Also, you are implying with "partners" that there was appreciation in more than the CNY-USD exchange rate. There wasn't. The CNY-KRW exchange rate only spiked in 2008-2009 with a massive depreciation of the won.

[url="http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/"]Historical Exchange Rates | OANDA[/URL]

(I cannot copy the picture, so set the year to 2002-2014, CNY:KRW exchange)
 
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But the complaints never stopped after 2005 and indeed, increased even further and hit a peak in 2012 (I have no numbers on complaint frequency, just my feeling from reading the news), despite the 30% appreciation in currency value in that period.

I don't have any numbers on this either, but even assuming you're correct, wouldn't it be easier to explain this as unhappiness with the speed of RMB's managed appreciation, instead of allowing the RMB to float freely? That is to say, with China's continued manipulation, even if RMB were (slowly) moving in the right direction?

In any case, why is it impossible to believe that China would actually respond to such complaints with concrete action?
 
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I don't have any numbers on this either, but even assuming you're correct, wouldn't it be easier to explain this as unhappiness with the speed of RMB's managed appreciation, instead of allowing the RMB to float freely? That is to say, with China's continued manipulation, even if RMB were (slowly) moving in the right direction?

In any case, why is it impossible to believe that China would actually respond to such complaints with concrete action?

Because in the past, China's response to threats has been "bring it on" rather than to cower and fold. Just like McArthur's threats in Korea, just like India's threats in 1962, just like Vietnam's threats in 1974, 1979 and 1988, the response was to hit back as hard as possible. Just like sanctions in 1989, the response wasn't to fold and give up but to increase military research even further. Just like the response to Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu islands was not to fold and give up the islands, but to increase military surveillance even further.
 
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Because in the past, China's response to threats has been "bring it on" rather than to cower and fold. Just like McArthur's threats in Korea, just like India's threats in 1962, just like Vietnam's threats in 1974, 1979 and 1988, the response was to hit back as hard as possible. Just like sanctions in 1989, the response wasn't to fold and give up but to increase military research even further. Just like the response to Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu islands was not to fold and give up the islands, but to increase military surveillance even further.

China's chip-on-shoulder approach works only when its economic interests are not at stake. I imagine that Chinese media frames this issue as mere jealousy on the part of the barbarians, or an attempt by the running dog Yankees to undermine the Chinese economy, but it really comes down to WTO rules on subsidies and IMF rules on currency manipulation. The United States has not been the only one frustrated with China's currency manipulation (recently, Brazil has also loudly complained about the peg, but there have been other countries as well). The IMF doesn't have the power to impose penalties, and no case has yet been tested in the WTO courts, but it is a real threat. China wisely decided to settle the matter with a managed currency appreciation, because had it lost a WTO ruling, its exports would have been subjected to severe tariffs in retaliation. And such a loss was a strong possibility.

On the other hand, if China had responded as you claim it always does, it would have brazenly depreciated its currency further. It did the opposite.

Many Chinese are locked in a zero-sum mentality, where everything must be a battle for pride, and if China doesn't win, it loses. Fortunately, the Chinese leadership has been pragmatic, weighed the costs and benefits, and made the better decision (as Japan and Germany did before it). Mutual benefit is possible in the real world, and the CCP understands that.

The US never claimed "victory" over this, it just viewed it as a return to fairness. It is only the Chinese who turn this into a "defeat" and use it as additional fuel for their fabricated resentments against US "humiliation" of China. That perception is the choice of the Chinese people, of course, even if the reality is different.
 
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China's chip-on-shoulder approach works only when its economic interests are not at stake.

On the other hand, if China had responded as you claim it always does, it would have brazenly depreciated its currency further. It did the opposite.

There's no chip-on-shoulder here. Those who have a chip on their shoulders would meekly fold. Its like playing street basketball. If a team is fouling you in street basketball, what do you do? You don't keep playing normally.

Why would there be a depreciation? That makes no economic sense internally - it subsidizes low tech exporters at the cost of consumers and especially high tech exporters (who import expensive components and raw materials). In 2005 the economy was already re-orienting towards high tech exports.

I find it interesting that you are trying to talk down to me. How much experience in finance do you have yourself?
 
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There's no chip-on-shoulder here. Those who have a chip on their shoulders would meekly fold. Its like playing street basketball. If a team is fouling you in street basketball, what do you do? You don't keep playing normally.

Why would there be a depreciation? That makes no economic sense internally - it subsidizes low tech exporters at the cost of consumers and especially high tech exporters (who import expensive components and raw materials). In 2005 the economy was already re-orienting towards high tech exports.

I find it interesting that you are trying to talk down to me. How much experience in finance do you have yourself?

We're going in circles at this point. Since it's impossible for China to ever accommodate any other nation in your framework, you've decided to pursue fringe arguments to explain away the currency appreciation (which had no other discernible policy catalyst). Strange, I would have expected someone who is "FairAndUnbiased" to be a bit more pragmatic.

It's interesting that you consider my counterpoints to be equivalent to condescension. Since you have not declared your flags, it's impossible for me to adjust my responses to suit your culture, although your consistent defensiveness regarding China provides a clue. In the United States, we do not treat debate as a mechanism to condescend, but rather to explore the facts and come to a reasoned conclusion. If such an exchange is unacceptable to you, I am happy to disengage.

Regarding my experience, I don't see how it's relevant (either I am wrong, or I am right). You are free to think of me as an unemployed janitor if it helps you dismiss the points I have made, but that falls short of your previously stated philosophy about the supremacy of numbers and facts.
 
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A timely article.

Academics Get Caught Up in Debate Over China’s Interest Rates - China Real Time Report - WSJ

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  • September 16, 2014, 10:54 AM HKT
Academics Get Caught Up in Debate Over China’s Interest Rates
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The national flag of China flutters behind a fence of the headquarters of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in Beijing, in this July 12, 2013 file photo.
Reuters
The central bank’s push to liberalize interest rates is running into an unexpected new problem – opposition from some prominent Chinese economists.

The academics, who usually back market-oriented reforms, don’t oppose freeing deposit rates per se. Rather, they say, interest rate liberalization should be a lower priority than other changes.

“My argument is that China should achieve much fuller currency flexibility before achieving full interest rate liberalization,” says Guonan Ma, a Chinese-born and educated scholar at the Bruegel think tank in Brussels and a former senior economist at the Bank for International Settlements, an international organization of central banks in Basel Switzerland. Mr. Ma is influential back home on central banking issues. Yu Yongding, a senior economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for instance, says he agrees with Mr. Ma’s priorities, as does He Fan, another senior CASS economist.

“I am less optimistic than [Chinese central banker] Zhou Xiaochuan on interest rate liberalization,” says Mr. He.

Academics are always questioning government priorities, even in a country with as tight political controls as China. But opposition by prominent economists can have big political consequences in Beijing, where many in the government and party are wary that big institutional changes could further slow the economy. Opponents can seize on the academics’ arguments as a rationale to retain the status quo.

Opposition to freer flow of capital in and out of China by Mr. Yu and former World Bank chief economist Justin Yifu Lin, for instance, has slowed the central bank’s plans to ease capital controls, say Chinese officials. Messrs. Yu and Lin have argued that controls are important to protect China from massive inflows and outflows of money, which helped wreck other Asian economies during the financial crisis of 1997 and 1998. Acknowledging the opposition, PBOC officials now stress their ability to reimpose controls should problems arise.

Mr. Zhou, the central banker, has said that he wants to liberalize deposit rates, now capped at 3.3%, by the spring of 2016 as a way to put more money in consumers’ pockets and to increase competition among big state-owned banks. But his plan already faces formidable opposition from banks, who fear that their costs would rise and profit margins would shrink. The academics’ arguments help the bankers make their case without seeming as self-interested, say Chinese officials and economists inside and out of China.

“If a large bank goes to the State Council” – the Chinese government’s top decision-making body—“and says profits are getting squeezed, you’ll get one kind of hearing,” says a sometime adviser to the People’s Bank of China. “But if you have support from the academic community, you’ll get another kind of hearing.”

Given that Chinese political system, like any other, must pick priorities, Mr. Ma says reducing intervention in currency markets and allowing the yuan to float much more freely is much more important – and achievable—goal than freeing deposit rates.

“The Chinese economy currently needs a more flexible currency that could help absorb shocks, rather than a more volatile interest rate that could inflict damage on the economy,” he writes in a Bruegel paper. Even though the PBOC has tried to spook currency traders by engineering a fall in the value of the yuan earlier this year, he says, that’s not sufficient. Many traders still figure the central bank will prod the yuan steadily upward in value—and thus add to pressure for the yuan to appreciate even more.

When it comes to interest-liberalization, he has a number of qualms. The likely outcome of such a move would be to boost interest rates in China. Who would benefit? Big state-owned firms that are “less sensitive to interest rates,” he says, not private firms, which regularly complain they can’t get bank loans. Higher interest rates could also put further downward pressure on the economy.

Of course, not all economists agree with such reasoning. Nicholas Lardy, a senior economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, says that higher rates would actually benefit private firms because they are more profitable than state-owned ones. Banks would have more incentive to lend to the private borrower because they could afford higher rates. Such lending would help speed the transformation of the Chinese economy so it relies more on entrepreneurship and services, he says.

“The most important reforms are the gradual liberalization of deposit rates and the formation of more private banks,” Mr. Lardy argues in a new book about China’s state-owned firms called “Markets over Mao.”
 
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Look at that spike between 1980 and 1985, which, like the Japanese yen, was a reaction to Volcker's actions to kill inflation in the US. The Plaza Accord was one method to address US weakness; there were others, which both Germany and Japan decided would be far more destructive to their own economies than signing the Plaza Accord. They could have refused, and suffered severe consequences (because of the inevitable unilateral US action), but they were fortunately smarter than many users in this forum.

So at the end of the day, it is an action that damages the economic of Germany and Japan to save US economy. Also, you are trying to class a gradual appreciate of RMB against USD since 2005 and hyper-appreciation seen by Yen as the same.

Historical exchange rates from 1953 with graph and charts
USD/CNY Currency Conversion Chart - Yahoo! Finance

The effect of less than 25% appreciate over a 9 year period against a more than 75% appreciate over a four year period. The former allows the market to adjust normally, while the latter doesn't. So it comes back to the same thing we have discussed quite a few times already-----why do you assume other nations should be putting US' interest over their own interest? Given Japan's unenviable geopolitical and economic condition after US' pivot to east Asia, is it a wonder that Germans wants layers of protection against it?
 
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So at the end of the day, it is an action that damages the economic of Germany and Japan to save US economy. Also, you are trying to class a gradual appreciate of RMB against USD since 2005 and hyper-appreciation seen by Yen as the same.

Historical exchange rates from 1953 with graph and charts
USD/CNY Currency Conversion Chart - Yahoo! Finance

The effect of less than 25% appreciate over a 9 year period against a more than 75% appreciate over a four year period. The former allows the market to adjust normally, while the latter doesn't. So it comes back to the same thing we have discussed quite a few times already-----why do you assume other nations should be putting US' interest over their own interest? Given Japan's unenviable geopolitical and economic condition after US' pivot to east Asia, is it a wonder that Germans wants layers of protection against it?

I'll try one more time, then I give up. Japan and Germany had three choices:

1) Stimulate demand in their own economies (i.e. fiscal expansion), enabling US exports to grow
2) Go along with the Plaza Accord, and suffer a bit with the exchange rates.
3) Oppose the Plaza Accord, and face unilateral American devaluation of the USD (do you doubt the US ability to do this unilaterally?) along with protective tariffs to protect its manufacturers.

You tell me: if you were Japan or Germany, which one would you choose? It's hard for me to believe this is a difficult choice, but perhaps you see something that I'm not seeing. I sense you might not know this, so let me point it out explicitly (and perhaps this will clarify the situation for others as well). Here was Japan's real GDP growth in the 1980s:

1980: 3.2%
1981: 4.2%
1982: 3.4%
1983: 3.1%
1984: 4.5%
1985: 6.3%
1986: 2.8%
1987: 4.1%
1988: 7.1%
1989: 5.4%

And here was Germany's:

1980: 1.3%
1981: 0.1%
1982: -0.8%
1983: 1.6%
1984: 2.8%
1985: 2.2%
1986: 2.4%
1987: 1.5%
1988: 3.7%
1989: 3.9%

I keep hearing from users here about how Plaza destroyed the Japanese economy. That asserting is not evident in the numbers. The real estate bubble was not inevitable, and could have been avoided with better monetary policy (just like the US real estate bubble), but to put Japan's lost decades entirely on the shoulders of Plaza is misguided. It's clear that Plaza didn't destroy the German economy either. In fact, in this fascinating account of the lead up to the Plaza Accords and the after-effects, it's clear that Germany essentially single-handedly was responsible for the USD devaluation, doing far more than either the US or Japan (pp. 12-13 of the pdf, pp. 303-304 of the text in the upper left corner). And to complete the picture, the USD had already depreciated as much in the six months leading up to Plaza as it did in the six months following Plaza, so the trend was already in place. Plaza simply accelerated it.

In light of that, is it easier for you to accept that Japan could make a decision, as a sovereign nation, that its best course of action to assist a major trading partner without triggering a trade war, would be choice #2? If not, then please continue believing that Japan is an American colony, or science experiment, or amusement park.

China, on the other hand, managed the appreciation well, whereas Japan did not. I don't see how that contradicts the case that China accommodated the US in this regard, as it was the least bad option from China's perspective.

Regarding the issue of forcing other countries to put America's interest over their own, it is precisely that framework of thinking that I am trying to refute. These actions served the interests of both nations. Not every nation sees the world through a zero-sum lens in the same way that several Chinese users here do. Not even the CCP sees the world through that lens, at least when it comes to the United States.

In short, I don't assume other nations should prioritize the US over their own interests. Please, let's move on from that framework, since it is false.
 
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