Dude, F22/F35 are not some divine machines that are not beatable. They have never been tested against a worthy opponent so all their capabilities are on paper only. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon are the kind of places where so the super duper F35/F15 have been used and that I believe means nothing.
Bro,
USAF and USN are globally active forces - deployed in many countries, called upon in different theaters (if necessary), and involved in the surveillance of many environments via aircraft carriers as well as airborne refueling assets. As such, both receive unparalleled operational exposure and insight of security dynamics from around the world (American surveillance activities being a vast topic in itself and beyond the scope of this post). This translate into information that is invaluable to the military industrial complex back home - you understand the bigger picture now? Continue to read below.
One of the worst miscalculations is to develop a perception about the defenses of any country without surveillance-related homework in the picture. Never judge a book by its cover.
Countries in the Middle East are rich on average and buy lot of hardware from Russia, China, France, UK, Germany, USA and more. Even those which are not on friendly terms with NATO, invest a great deal in hardware from Russia and China respectively. These two are willing to provide technologies with limited restrictions, and both would want to see how their respective hardware will perform in actual combat situations. When up against US-led forces in a theater, results are usually underwhelming.
Syria have a much smaller geography then China but this is not a disadvantage; Syria can have a much more meaningful and densely packed A2/AD arrangement in place, at a far lower cost as well.
Syria had no choice but to invest a lot in its A2/AD arrangements due to security threats from Israel, and much of its hardware is Russian. Although Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011 and took a heavy toll on Syrian defenses at large
but Russia decided to prevent militants from toppling Assad regime in 2015, and not only rebuild its A2/AD arrangements but provided its own security cover to it (on top). In the face of this Russian intervention at the request of Assad regime, US and Russia settled for a defacto partition within Syria with a deconfliction arrangement in place. US-led forces were preoccupied with ISIS in Syria since 2014 (i.e. Operation Inherent Resolve), but USAF now had to operate in a complex A2/AD environment involving Russian-operated defenses on the ground including S-400 system, Russian Air Force in the air, and Russian EW in the mix involving Krasukha-S4 and KRET L-175V Khibiny EW systems. This security dynamic emboldened Assad regime to excercise its soverignity whereever possible in Syria and clashes with US-led forces became inevitable at times. There were heated moments in which F-22A were called upon to restrict Russian aerial activity over Syria.
For instance:
The F-22 provided a crucial communications node when tensions between the U.S. and Russia were running high. Following the Tomahawk strikes, Moscow condemned the attack and suspended the so-called “deconfliction line” the two countries used to coordinate air operations over Syria. U.S. President Donald Trump said relations with Russia were at an “all-time low.” But U.S. and noncoalition aircraft were still communicating directly, over an internationally recognized, unsecure frequency often used for emergencies known as “Guard,” says Shell. His F-22s acted as a kind of quarterback, using high-fidelity sensors to determine the positions of all the actors on the battlefield, directing noncoalition aircraft where to fly and asking them over the Guard frequency to move out of the way. The Raptors were able to fly in contested areas, in range of surface-to-air missile systems and fighters, without the noncoalition players knowing their exact positions, Shell says. This allowed them to establish air superiority—giving noncoalition forces freedom of movement in the air and on the ground—and a credible deterrent. “If we need to let them know that we are there for any reason, then we will let them know that we are there—usually to deter something that they are trying to do that we don’t want them to do,” he explains. During those weeks after April 6, Shell and his squadron temporarily moved all of their operations into Syria. In addition to helping deconflict and deter noncoalition actors, the F-22s also provided defensive counter-air for allied forces on the ground and in the air, and occasionally conducted ground strikes and CAS, Shell says. He stresses that the interactions with noncoalition aircraft were always “professional,” adding that his squadron experienced “nothing that raises any eyebrows.” Two months after the strikes, Shell’s squadron is back to splitting its time between Iraq and Syria.
Credit to
Aviation Week
Syrian exclusive A2/AD arrangements include SA-17 (BUK series), SA-19 (Tunguska series), SA-22 (Pantsir series),
S-200, and an S-300 PMU-2 battery. If Russian marketing hype of these systems is to be believed, then certainly not an easy environment to operate over.
I shall also draw your attention to a training program known as RED FLAG.
USAF commenced this training program in 1975 with lessons from Vietnam War in mind, but RED FLAG quickly expanded into simulations encompassing a wide range of combat-relevant possibilities and/or scenarios. Till date, no training program come close to matching the complexity and costs of RED FLAG simulations.
Reference:
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2000/November 2000/1100flag.aspx
Emphasis mine. Valuable insight from RED FLAG simulations and also from overseas deployments of USAF and USN around the world,
inform each other as well as the development of new combat aircraft
[1] - companies such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman being involved to large extent.
Now consider reports of
kill ratios of F-22A and F-35 variants in RED FLAG simulations.
For reference:
https://www.businessinsider.com/the...fighters-in-major-combat-exercise-usaf-2019-2
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Shall WE discuss Chinese A2/AD arrangements, level of exposure in military context, and provide pointers as to how US can overcome them in theory? I am sure that our Chinese friends will not feel comfortable and therefore WE shall keep mum.
US and China might not exchange blows anytime soon
but US is in the position to study Chinese military capabilities up close and execute relevant simulations back home. Of-course, Chinese surveillance activities are also in the picture (cyber espionage most notably) but US is far ahead of China in this matter in operational terms to say the least.
Nevertheless, US is investing a lot in the
low observability factor whereas China is investing a lot in the
range factor; fundamental difference in engagement principles and philosophies to say the least.
Even if US is getting it 80% right about China in its simulations back home, good enough I suppose....
