Thank you for this thought-provoking post. I like the general tilt of your thinking, but I wanted to comment on some specific points and ask for clarification. I hope my Chinese friends will not interpret these comments as belligerence, but rather as a relatively dispassionate presentation of an American perspective.
I find this to be an artificial delineation of the German Empire. Bismarck fought three wars as chancellor, so whatever "stabilizing" he did was an attempt to protect Germany from being outmaneuvered, not out of an altruistic spirit or a desire for peace for Europe. Perhaps you can clarify this a bit more, because we can easily compare Bismarck's thought process with China's (as you assert), but it was precisely the "balance of power" calculation that led to the "entangling alliances" that precipitated WWI. Surely that is an outcome that China hopes to avoid, but your narrative doesn't seem to touch on that issue.
I keep seeing this claim from Chinese citizens, and the relation to Deng Xiaoping's saying about hiding capabilities and biding time. The problem with this is that the rest of the world is not comprised of idiots, so even if China pleads weakness, no one believes it. China is a world power, perhaps a superpower, in the world's eyes, so China is certainly not "closer to the beginning." In fact,
@Chinese-Dragon has asserted that within 10 years, China's rise to dominance will be complete, and I tend to agree.
I would agree with you, but the SCS issues, the provocation of India during the Xi-Modi meeting, and the ADIZ don't seem to jibe with that view. It would be more accurate to say China had been patient, but now sees a window of opportunity for action. I don't blame it for that thought process, but we cannot call today's China a "stabilizing" force, at least not in Asia.
This is the crux of the difference between the American mindset and the Chinese mindset. Ebola, ISIS, climate change--these are not American problems, they are global problems. Ebola and climate change don't differentiate based on nationality, as much as China might hope they do. Increasingly, neither does ISIS, or at least, Islamic terrorism. We both face all of these issues, so it is not unreasonable to ask for China's participation in solving them.
China's strategic interests benefit China alone, so it is reasonable to expect the US to oppose China on initiatives that exclusively benefit China. Perhaps you can elaborate on why you believe the US is obligated to help China with its strategic goals, but China is not obligated to help with global issues.
We have no basis to believe that. I am not saying that China is lying, but there's no reason to believe that China would stop at the SCS if it sees it can take whatever it wants there without opposition. And why should it stop there?
i.e. "if played right" = submit to China. Is it reasonable to expect other sovereign nations to do so in the modern era? They are no longer tributary states, and there's another powerful player in Asia that presents an attractive alternative.
Agreed, that's why talk of hastening the arrival of a multi-polar world is so disturbing. China has done well under the current world order, and it seems to want to overturn this objectively beneficial system in return for an unproven new system, for what? Prestige? I'm still waiting for a historical precedent of a multi-polar world that was more stable and prosperous than Pax Americana.
Truthfully, this is the argument that is most convincing to me. If China wanted to threaten its neighbors, it easily could use its capacity for rearming to do so in short order. The fact that it has kept its military expenditure relatively modest provides comfort--but at the same time, it will be a glaring warning signal if China decides to significantly increase military spending.
It's one thing to create an ADIZ in the east as a buffer for the mainland, it's another to impose one in the south and essentially force sovereign nations to ask China for permission to fly home from a third party (e.g. from the Philippines to Vietnam, crossing a Chinese-declared ADIZ). An ADIZ in the SCS would probably be interpreted as casus belli, which is why China didn't do it--not out of altruism or a desire to be conciliatory to its neighbors. The proof is the oil rig business. And again, the PLA behavior during the Xi-Modi meeting calls into question just how controlled certain actions are.
It's logical in the sense that if China can get it without a war, it should try. If I were in that position, I would try, too. But it's really hard to justify the nine-dash line based on history, because history changes. The artificial freezing of time at 1945 will not last forever, so if China insists on claiming the entire SCS all the way down to Indonedia, it should be prepared for push-back.
It's clear that China's aims aren't to control the SCS to choke off trade, but rather to exploit the natural resources that can be found in the area. The problem is that this rush to grab resources (and islands to secure the resources) risks precipitating a backlash that might result in a disruption to trade. To me, this is the most confusing part of the Chinese stance: would it risk trillions of dollars of trade in order to get 100% of the resources, when it could preserve the trade and negotiate agreements for, say, 50% of the resources? I understand that China has proposed joint exploration and extraction with the other SCS nations, but the failure to reach agreement doesn't seem to justify a unilateral appropriation of the resources. Again, I understand China's thought process, but there's a point where China goes a bridge too far. Taking an island here or there is one thing, taking the entire nine-dash line is something else.
I acknowledge that China's leadership has been superb for the last few decades, which makes me wonder at the ulterior motive behind these geopolitical moves. I read an article recently that argued that the US should back away from pressuring China to embrace democracy, because the truth of the matter is that the Chinese elite is cosmopolitan, rational, and measured, but the Chinese citizenry is emotional, nationalistic, and xenophobic, so a democratic China could be our worst nightmare. I suspect that the SCS moves are thus less about the resources than about satisfying some of the more extreme elements in the populace, in the same way that the anti-corruption drive has been used to buy goodwill for the structural reforms. Is there something to this, or am I off base, here?
Anyway, thanks again for your article. You often contribute original content, and it's a refreshing change from the usual copy-paste threads that PDF users usually create (me included). Please keep up the good work.
