We are only concerned how you are enslaving the fellow Muslims in present in your own country and how you want to do so in near future. As China is the one that is going to be most benefited by CPEC. Moreover it can turn out to be a colony of yours in near future.
Have a look on an article few days ago.... What CHINA is upto in the region and world ........when its economy took a sharp turn for the worse in 2012, it found a new, even more urgent, reason: with its huge deficit in infrastructure and its still reasonably high growth rate, India was the only country left that could absorb enough of China’s output of machinery steel and cement to substantially ease its crisis of overcapacity. In July 2012, weeks before he left office, Premier Wen Jiabao was asked by a Chinese reporter whether the government intended to check the slowdown in growth by applying another fiscal stimulus to the economy. Wen’s reply was that he would not do so under any circumstances because ‘the economy was already suffering from excess capacity in 21 sectors’. Wen was understating the magnitude of the looming crisis. For by then, a two-year fiscal stimulus programme begun in 2009 had run completely out of control and led to vast, mostly useless, additions of capacity. Against 4.3 trillion Yuan ($586 billion) to be spent over 24 months, central ministries and provincial governments had managed to commit 12 trillion Yuan in just 14 months. 80% of this money had gone into infrastructure, basic industries and real estate and created a bubble, the likes of which the world had never seen. Western economists have likened China’s predicament to Japan’s in 1990, and South Korea’s at the time of the Asian financial crash in 1997. Chinese growth, they predict, will remain low for many years to come, till gradually rising demand and the retirement of obsolete and poorly managed enterprises, eliminates the excess capacity built up in the past. This comfortable prediction ignores the trauma of transition and the options open to China if it wants to lessen it. In China’s case, this will be far more severe than it was in Japan and South Korea. This is because while those were basically market economies with healthy doses of state guidance, China’s is still fundamentally a command economy. When centralised planning was wound up in the mid-1980s, the power to invest passed into the hands of 60,000 township administrations, and around 15,000 investing authorities created by the provincial governments at three higher levels of local government. In all of these, investment decisions are not dictated by the still weak signals from the market, but by the ambitions of party bureaucrats. The result has been huge surges of over-investment, followed by equally precipitate crashes that Beijing has done its best to pretend were just ‘soft landings’. The steel industry is a good example. Despite the global recession, the world’s steel production capacity has increased from 1.6 billion tons in 2008 to 2.4 billion tons in 2016. Three quarters of this increase has taken place in China. This had very little to do with global demand, which has been stagnating at around 1.4 billion tonnes since 2011. It was entirely driven by the domestic fiscal stimulus programme that the government initiated in 2009. Stimulus programme When the stimulus programme ended in 2011, local demand collapsed once more. In desperation, Chinese producers began ramping up exports at throwaway prices till they reached 100 million tonnes in 2015. This brought steel prices down by 39% in the US in the second half of 2015, and forced US Steel to lay off a quarter of its entire work force. The crisis has spread to other steel producers, like Corus and Arcelor Mittal, all over the world. Today China has an estimated 200 million tonnes of surplus steel production capacity and has promised to retire 150 million tonnes of it in the coming few years. It is the same in coal mining and thermal power generation. 300,000 MW of generating capacity has been added since 2013 – more than India’s entire power generation capacity – but the demand for power has barely increased to accommodate the new plants existing plants are working at just over 50% of their capacity. Cement, non-ferrous metals, plate glass, oil refineries, and even the garments industry are in a similar plight. But the problems these industries face pale into insignificance before those faced by the heavy engineering and construction industries that build the mother plants and machines of industry. If steel, cement, and power plants are being moth-balled to eliminate excess capacity, new plants will not be started till this is completed. This means that while steel production may fall by 20% , the production of machine tools, cranes, forges and blast furnaces will fall to zero. What will the heavy engineering and construction industries do in the meantime? Where will the workers go? At a time when its Mandate from Heaven is wearing thin for other reasons, this is not a problem that the Chinese government can ignore. In actual fact, even closing down surplus steel and cement plants, power stations and coal mines is not proving easy. In January 2016, after two years of bumbled efforts to soften the impact of the slowdown and turn it into yet another ‘soft landing’, the central government finally announced, via an article written by an “Authoritative Personage” and published in the Peoples’ Daily, that it intended to eliminate the huge excess capacity by going in for “supply side structural reform’, i.e closing down non-viable enterprises and paying off the redundant workers, backed by limited amounts of demand stimulation. But this is not proving easy, because during four decades of hectic growth, local government investments have developed an interlocking web of interests that has given them considerable power to resist, and even challenge, the directives issued by technocrats in Beijing. For instance, the demand for coal depends upon the demand for power, which depends very largely upon the demand for steel and cement, which depends upon the demand for real estate. But most of the deposits of coal are concentrated in the poorer regions of China, notably inner Mongolia where coal mining is not only the main source of employment in many counties, but also an important source of revenue for the township and county administrations for meeting their administrative and developmental responsibilities. Eliminating surplus capacity in steel and power generation will therefore immediately create social unrest in the coal-rich provinces. The see-saw struggle over reforms that is now developing between the centre and the provinces became apparent when, only four months after its announcement of supply side structural reforms in January, Beijing issued an explicit directive in April 2016, that it would permit plants and mines to be closed down only after alternate employment for the workers had been found. Clearly, local governments had had their way. This is only the latest round in a the three decades-old struggle for control over developmental policies that was triggered by the winding up of centralised planning in the early 1980s and leaving the decision-making space open for local governments to take over. Beginning with taxation reform in 1994, every major directive for reform issued by the central government has met with the same mixed response. For Beijing therefore, guiding China’s development has been like riding a team of circus horses that have developed wills of their own. China’s leaders have yet to come out with a comprehensive plan for economic recovery. But they know that all of their problems will become easier to resolve if the order books of these industries can be kept at least partly filled. Launch yet another fiscal stimulus programme to fill their order books, or invest in infrastructure and industry in other countries. The first will compound the folly of the last stimulus programme, so the second is the only way to go. That is the reason for the increasing importance China is attaching to its One Belt One Road initiative. However OBOR will significantly mitigate China’s excess capacity only if India takes wholehearted advantage of what China has to offer. This is because India is the only country left in the world that is large enough to absorb , and therefore gainfully employ, China’s immense excess capacity in its steel, cement, plastics and heavy engineering industries, and thus enable it to ease its crisis of overcapacity.
...dont feel offended, you may be branded as non muslim as some declared Bohra Muslims here or a slave of Hindus 
