China and the Global Jihad Network

[William Hung]

China and the Global Jihad Network - by DeGang Sun

A very informative 2010 article from the Journal of Middle East & Africa.

Some interesting facts about the historic ties between muslim terrorists from XinJiang and Al Qaeda/bin Laden, their current support from Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the ETIM's involvement in drug trafficking to finance their terrorist activities, etc.

Part 1

The global jihadist network in Eurasia is growing as terrorism
spreads from the Middle East to the geographically broader ‘‘arc
of instability,’’ which covers North Africa, West Asia, Central Asia,
and South Asia. Influenced by their close ties with global jihadism,
the terrorist groups targeting China openly challenge the legitimacy
of China’s administration in Xinjiang by raising the banners of
liberty, freedom, and human rights, while advocating attacks
against civilians to arouse worldwide attention. Pressured by the
terrorists, some nonviolent Xinjiang separatist groups are becom-
ing increasingly radical in their actions. To address the ‘‘three evil’’
forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, Beijing has
emphasized economic and social development in western China
and pursued a ‘‘three-ring’’ strategy for antiterrorism consisting
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China-India-Israel
antiterrorism cooperation, and tacit China-U.S.-Pakistan cooper-
ation. The 2010 Shanghai World Expo and its counterterrorism
protocols will test the efficacy of this approach.


THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE THREAT OF THE
GLOBAL JIHAD NETWORK

Due to the vast distances between China and the Middle East as well as
the physical and political barriers presented by Central Asia, Middle Eastern
terrorist groups traditionally had very little impact on China’s national secur-
ity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the revitalization of Islam in
Central Asia, however, Islamist radicals in the Middle East found it quite easy
to physically and ideologically penetrate China’s western regions, especially
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. A global jihadist network now
connects the Middle East with China, making the latter increasingly vulner-
able to terrorist attacks originating beyond its borders. Indeed, this net-
work has fully incorporated Islamist terrorism into the ‘‘arc of instability,’’ a
vast area encompassing North Africa, the Near East, Central Asia, South Asia,
and China’s Xinjiang.

This has resulted in a diverse array of recent attacks in
Asia including the October 30, 2008 synchronized explosions that tore
through four towns in India’s Assam State killing at least 67 people and leav-
ing more than 210 wounded;the bomb attacks at two hotels in Jakarta,
Indonesia on July 17, 2009 that killed nine people;and the July 5, 2009
attacks and subsequent riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang, that killed at least 200.
Given this recent history and the ongoing war in Afghanistan and tumult
in Pakistan involving Islamist activists, it seems inevitable that China increas-
ingly will be subjected to the violence that defines the ‘‘arc of instability.’’
The global jihadist network in Eurasia is loosely organized but guided
by radical Islamist ideologies imported from the Middle East and supported
by shared financing, personnel, training, and information. The network in
this vast landmass includes various terrorist or extremist groups, including
Hezbollah in Lebanon; al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in Iraq; the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Central Asia; the Taliban and al-Qaeda
in Afghanistan; Jamaat ul-Fuqra, Guardians of the Friends of the Prophet,
Lashkar-e-Toiba, and the Taliban in Pakistan; Jemmah Islamiya in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines; and the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of
Assam and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front in India. The network also
includes the East Turkistan Liberation Organization, the East Turkistan
Islamic Movement, the United Revolutionary Front for Eastern Turkistan,
the World Uyghur Information Center, and the World Uyghur Youth
Congress in China’s Xinjiang.

In financial terms these terrorist groups interact with each other via
the informal value transfer system known as hawala (or hundi), a large
network of brokers offering channels for transferring and laundering money.
According to one report, the annual value of hawala transactions among ter-
rorist groups in Pakistan alone reached somewhere between $2 and 5 billion
following the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Such funds are used not only for outright attacks but to develop popular
support and legitimacy through social welfare programs and, in particular,
financing religious schools that indoctrinate students and spread radical Isla-
mic ideologies. In Pakistan, for example, there are over 20,000 such religious
schools that have not registered with the government’s educational offices.
These schools receive abundant financial and personnel support from groups
in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations and accommodate students from all
corners of the world, including Xinjiang, Kashmir, and Southeast Asia.

The links between Middle Eastern and Chinese terrorists groups were
first forged during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when Chinese Uyghurs
swarmed into Afghanistan to resist the Soviet forces in the 1980s and later
into Chechnya to resist Russian forces in the 1990s alongside their comrades
from various Muslim countries. They returned to Afghanistan to fight the
U.S.-led coalition forces following the American invasion in 2001 and remain
active in the region. In January 2010, U.S. military forces killed fifteen foreign
terrorists, including thirteen Uyghurs and two Turks from a Central Asian
jihadist group, the Turkistan Islamic Party, also known as ETIM, during an
airstrike in northwestern Afghanistan. ETIM, an al-Qaeda affiliate, revealed
their nationalities in a statement released on their own website. The attack
was also confirmed by a senior Afghan police commander.
Hence, ETIMis a transboundary and multinational terrorist group whose members hail
not only from Xinjiang in China but also from Afghanistan and the Middle
East, especially Turkey.

TERRORIST GROUPS TARGETING CHINA

Since the 1990s, Islamist terrorist groups and their sympathizers in Turkey,
Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan have provided the most assistance to their
allies in China. As early as December 1992, the East Turkistan National
Congress was held in Istanbul, Turkey with participants coming from Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Central Asia, and elsewhere. Later, a variety of
activist groups formed, including the East Turkistan National Liberation
Organization, East Turkistan National Liberation League, and East Turkistan
Endowment Foundation, to promote the cause of East Turkistan (indepen-
dent Xinjiang), and a magazine, The Voice of East Turkistan, was founded
to voice their grievances.

In February 1998, ETIM sent over four dozen terrorists to Xinjiang from
the Middle East and Central Asia after they were trained by al-Qaeda experts
from Afghanistan in tactics ranging from the use of explosives to kidnap-
ping.

In 1999, Osama bin Laden received the head of ETIM and promised
financial assistance, but demanded that the group coordinate with the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan. In December of that year, over forty representa-
tives from these groups gathered together in Istanbul, established a united
front, and declared their goal of founding a state in Xinjiang by armed strug-
gle, including possible ‘‘guerrilla war’’ in southern Xinjiang.

In February 2001, the top leaders of al-Qaeda met in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and decided
to support ETIM with weapons, explosives, vehicles, and communications
equipment.

The links among ETIM, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
and al-Qaeda subsequently were confirmed when the founder of ETIM,
Hasan Mahsum, was killed by the Pakistani Army on October 2, 2003, as part
of the U.S.-led campaign against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The U.S. State
Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 accused ETIM of plotting
an attack against the U.S. embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and listed it with
links to al-Qaeda.

ETIM maintains an active propaganda effort that voices support for
‘‘self-determination, de-colonization and national independence,’’ while also
taking credit for assassinating civil servants, religious leaders, and ordinary
civilians to spread terror. ETIM urges all Muslims in China to launch terrorist
attacks in densely populated regions, ‘‘including kindergartens, hospitals,
schools and other public places in order to create a strong atmosphere of
terror.’’

In the Islamic world, their messages emphasize pan-Islamism and
pan-Turkism, and jihadist themes such as ‘‘one jihad for Allah is better than
sixty years’ Muslim worship.’’

Predictably, ETIM and its fellow travelers rely not only on the assist-
ance of Middle East terrorist groups and sympathizers but also on drug
trafficking. Official Chinese statistics claim that revenue from transnational
drug-trafficking accounted for 2 percent of these terrorist groups’ total
expenditure in 1990s, but after the 9=11 attacks, the proportion topped
50 percent.

Anti-China terrorist groups have made the most of their accumulated
funds and training. For example, China witnessed a wave of terrorism during
the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games when terrorists in Kashqar,
Xinjiang killed sixteen armed policemen and injured sixteen more.
Additional attacks took place in the southern Xinjiang Autonomous Region
in Kashqar and Hetian during the same time frame. Also, on July 5, 2009,
mobs incited by both ETIM and World Uyghur Congress (WUC) in Urumqi,
capital of Xinjiang, destroyed 331 shops and 1,325 vehicles during wide-
spread disturbances. Some 197 lives were lost and over 1,700 people were
injured in the incident.

Additional disturbances followed in August and
September 2009 in Xi’an, Urumqi, and the southern Xinjiang Autonomous
Region when terrorists from ETIM attacked citizens with hypodermic nee-
dles. Infuriated citizens demonstrated in the streets demanding the govern-
ment guarantee their physical safety. Wang Lequan, former secretary of the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Committee of the Communist Party
of China, was forced to order more than 7,000 government officials to walk
door-to-door in Urumqi to urge calm after five people died and fourteen
were injured during riots protesting the attacks.

Chinese security authorities have had some success in preventing greater harm by uncovering a variety of
indoctrination efforts and interrupting planned attacks. In July 2008, police in
Urumqi uncovered a terrorist cell affiliated to ETIM operating a ‘‘Jihad
Seminar,’’ which aimed at ‘‘killing the infidels of the Han ethnic group and
establishing al-Khilafah.’’ Among the ten suspects caught, five were women
engaged in Koranic studies who were encouraged to become suicide
bombers and martyrs. In the same month, China’s security forces caught sev-
eral young female suicide bombers as they attempted to conduct terrorist
attacks in Urumqi. Like most terrorist groups, ETIM and others in Xinjiang
have targeted civilians, public servants, and government buildings. Their aim
is not to defeat Chinese communist ‘‘oppressors,’’ but to arouse domestic
unrest and attract worldwide attention, especially in Islamic countries and
the West.

 

[Aepsilons]

A very interesting article. Thanks for sharing it here @Black Flag .

 

[William Hung]

Part 2

THE INCREASING RADICALIZATION OF SEPARATIST
GROUPS IN CHINA

In addition to terrorist groups operating in Xinjiang, Chinese authorities also
face the problem of separatist groups, such as the WUC, that help undermine
China’s claim to the province. The WUC claims to be the sole representative
of all Uyghurs in China and abroad.
Founded in April 2004 in Munich, Germany, the WUC is a collection of
various Uyghur exile groups, including the Uyghur American Association and
the East Turkistan National Congress. The WUC’s members come from over
thirteen countries and regions, with most living in Turkey, including
past and present leaders such as the group’s Honorary Chairman M. Riza
Bekin (d. 2010); Vice-President, Seyit Tumturk; and Vice Secretary-General,
Erkin Emet.

Approximately one million Uyghurs live outside China, with 80 percent
of the total living in Central Asia (540,000), West Asia (210,000), and South
Asia (80,000).

Most have taken up permanent residence in these lands
and obtained new nationalities. The largest community of overseas Uyghurs
is in Turkey, which provides political, financial, and moral support for the
WUC. In fact, Turkish leaders have proven personally sympathetic to the
WUC; Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan charged China with ethnic cleansing
during the 2009 Urumqi riots.

Aside from serving as an umbrella organization for the various Uyghur
interest groups, the WUC also plays an important role as an international
pressure group. As such, it issues statements, maintains contacts with foreign
government officials, and coordinates the activities of its component groups
through meetings abroad such as the 3rd World Uyghur Congress held in
Washington, D.C. on May 21, 2009. That meeting was attended by several
U.S. congressmen in addition to representatives of the Dalai Lama and
China’s democratic movement, attesting to the success of the WUC in lobby-
ing influential foreign officials and fellow exiles. Participants at the meeting
summarized the Congress’s achievements in the previous three years,
formulated the principles for the next period, and reelected Rebiya Kadeer
as president.

While publicly espousing Western political values, and campaigning
for liberty, democracy, and human rights for Uyghurs, the WUC has not
abandoned its ultimate goal of achieving independence for East Turkistan=
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. According to the organization,
‘‘East Turkistan’’ is a colony of China and the Uyghur people are an ethnic
nation without a state, resembling the Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Syria, and
Iraq. Knowing that complete independence is unachievable at present,
however, the WUC is pragmatically pursuing a policy of incremental
independence.

Despite its relative moderation, the WUC is being radicalized by some of
its more extreme members, such as the World Uyghur Youth Congress and
East Turkistan Information Center, both of which were pressured by the
ongoing Afghan War and a series of joint antiterror endeavors to abandon
their previous terrorist organizations and join the WUC. In the process they
have captured some key positions and are encouraging the organization to
radicalize. For instance, after being reelected president of the WUC, Rebiya
Kadeer, the preeminent human right activist and the de facto spiritual lea-
der, was frequently criticized by the more radical factions inside the organi-
zation for being ‘‘too soft.’’

In order to demonstrate the WUC’s toughness
and her strong leadership, Kadeer reportedly encouraged and guided the
July 2009 violence in Urumqi, in sharp contrast to the organization’s declared
dedication to nonviolence.

While the Chinese government regards the WUC as a separatist rather
than a terrorist group, several of the WUC leaders, including Dolkun Isa
(the former vice President of ETIM and currently Secretary of the WUC)
and Abudujelili Kalakash (the former President of East Turkistan Information
Center), are actually terrorists from ETIM and the East Turkestan Liberation
Organization. These two groups, along with the World Uyghur Youth Con-
gress and East Turkistan Information Center, have been designated by
Beijing as terrorist organizations, and the ETIM was designated by the UN as
a terrorist organization in September 2002.

CHINA’S ‘‘THREE-RING STRATEGY’’ FOR
ANTITERROR COOPERATION

Given its worsening security situation at home and abroad, the Chinese
government has spared no effort to combat terrorism, separatism, and
extremism. From a Chinese perspective, terrorism hinges not only on social
instability, but also on the erosion of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Further, China does not want the Xinjiang issue internationalized, as it inevi-
tably would challenge Beijing’s legitimacy of rule in the region.
China’s international antiterrorism cooperation efforts are focused on
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); China-India-Israel coopera-
tion; and a tacit agreement among China, the United States, and Pakistan
to fight terror in Central Asia.

Founded in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan,
and later Uzbekistan, the underlying purpose of the SCO is to combat ter-
rorism in Central Asia. Joint antiterror exercises involving the member
states’ security forces are now a regular event. As one example, the armed
forces of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan gathered in
Kazakhstan in August 2003 for a large-scale military exercise called
‘‘Union-2003.’’ Subsequent events included ‘‘Peace Mission-2005,’’ involving
China and Russia; ‘‘Tianshan-1,’’ in 2006 involving China and Kazakhstan;
‘‘Collaboration-2006,’’ involving China and Tajikistan; and ‘‘Union-2007,’’
involving all the SCO members.

Despite the shared threat of Islamist terror and the fact that China, India,
and Israel are among the most important non-Muslim, secular societies on
the periphery of Eurasia, their cooperative antiterror efforts remain in the
fledgling stage. While India and Israel have enjoyed close cooperation in
military intelligence for some time, China has engaged in bilateral antiterror
cooperation with India and Israel ranging from tactical cooperation,
extradition, and academic exchanges to antiterror equipment sales. China
and India have also staged several joint military rehearsals focused on
antiterrorism.

During the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, Israeli antiterror
experts contributed heavily to China’s security check system, and Israel is
continuing its antiterror assistance during the Shanghai World Expo of 2010.
Since 2009, the Chinese government has invited several Israeli antiterror
experts to evaluate China’s security situation in Beijing, Shanghai, and
Xinjiang; Israeli security check facilities were extensively used during the
Shanghai World Expo as well.

Still, Beijing has been slow to expand cooperation with India due to the
outstanding border dispute between them and an unwillingness to upset
Pakistan, a close ally of China, or other Muslim countries. Sino-Israeli antiter-
rorism cooperation has been sporadic partly due to China’s fear of upsetting
Arab=Islamic countries important to China’s economy.
The 2009 riot in Urumqi might augur change in these relations as Beijing
has been forced to recognize the synergies that a cooperative approach
might provide. For example, all three countries are economically, militarily,
and politically powerful in their respective regions; China is the major spon-
sor of the SCO and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, India is
the largest and the most influential state in South Asia, and Israel has decades
of experience fighting terror. The threat of terrorism and the promise coop-
erative efforts to eliminate it hold may even have helped spur negotiations
held last year in New Delhi regarding the China-India border dispute. Hence,
by adhering to the principle of seeking common ground while shelving
differences, a China-India-Israel quasi-alliance in antiterrorism is not out of
the question.

How would the three nations expand cooperation? As a first step, the
three sides’ top officials may establish a trilateral platform for dialogue to
exchange their views frankly and to improve mutual trust. Second, military-
to-military exchanges would build links for sharing intelligence on radical
Islamic groups in the ‘‘arc of instability.’’ Last, the three countries’ academic
institutes dealing with antiterror studies would enhance their interaction and
act as an informal ‘‘second track’’ for dialogue.

China’s antiterrorism cooperation with the United States and Pakistan is
the third ring of Chinese strategy and also the least understood. As the only
reliable friend of China and an observer at the SCO, Pakistan is important to
China’s international antiterror effort. For instance, Pakistan is one of the few
Muslim countries that opposed an urgent request for a conference made in
the Organization of the Islamic Conference after the 2009 Urumqi riots.

Sino-Pakistan security cooperation is apparent in other ways. For
instance, on January 23, 2010, a spokesperson for ETIM admitted that fifteen
of its members, including thirteen Uyghurs and two Turks, were killed during
a U.S. Predator air strike in Afghanistan.

Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the head of the terrorist militant group, was confirmed to have been killed in a U.S.
drone strike on February 15, 2010, according to Pakistani security officials.

During his visit to Beijing on May 7, 2010, Pakistan Interior Minister Rehman
Malik stated that China and Pakistan had cooperated fully to combat ETIM,
the common enemy of the two countries, including in the killing of the
terrorist group’s leader, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani. Malik suggested that due
to the lack of strong leadership, ETIM is too weak to be an effective organi-
zation at present. Beijing, in return, offered Islamabad a loan of U.S. $180
million for purchasing vehicles and other items for their police.

The recent U.S. focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan has stabilized China’s
external environment by pressuring anti-China terrorists who train or have
sought refuge in the region. Hence, Beijing seems to have encouraged
Pakistan to cooperate with the United States in combating al-Qaeda and
the Taliban, although during Jintao’s meeting, China highlighted that Sino-
Pakistan bilateral—rather than China-U.S.-Pakistan trilateral—cooperation
was the top agenda item.

On the other hand, Beijing is undoubtedly con-
cerned about the political implications of the U.S. military presence in the
region and is quite worried about increasing U.S. and Western influence
there. The two sides undoubtedly are highly competitive in expanding polit-
ical influence in Central Asia.That fear seems to be behind China and
Russia’s 2005 request to the United States to set up a timetable to withdraw
troops and close military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

In a broad sense, China-U.S.-Pakistan antiterror cooperation in Central Asia serves their
respective interests on terrorism, but China’s suspicion of American inten-
tions and future capabilities in the region remains.

CONCLUSION

Radical Islamic forces from the Middle East pose direct and indirect threats to
China’s western regions due to their long reach and the presence of willing
allies in Xinjiang. Unlike the United States, China lacks foreign bases on the
periphery of the ‘‘arc of instability,’’ and its antiterror battle is relatively con-
fined. As a result, it has not launched any military campaigns in Central Asia to
root out terrorist sanctuaries. Instead, it gives top priority to eradicating
terrorism by means of social and economic development at home, which is
regarded as the root cause of terrorism.

From May 17 to May 19, 2010, the Central Government Work Conference on Xinjiang was held in Beijing, and
all the key decision makers from the Political Bureau of the Communist Party
of China Central Committee turned up, including President Hu Jintao. The
conference underscored the importance of improving Xinjiang residents’
well-being to guarantee the region’s enduring peace and stability. President
Hu demanded that Xinjiang’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) reach
the average level of the whole of China by 2015. To achieve this goal, the
heads of nineteen provinces and municipalities promised that they would
spare no effort to aid Xinjiang economically by means of counterpart sup-
port.

Thereafter, the city of Kashqar in southern Xinjiang, terror-torn in the
previous years, has been designated a special economic zone (SEZ) resem-
bling Shenzhen in Guangdong Province, an SEZ since 1979.
In recent years, however, China has relied not only on economic, social,
and political endeavors at home, but also on international cooperation
abroad to fight terrorism. By the end of October 2008, China had ratified
eleven UN conventions related to countering terrorism, including the Inter-
national Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on
September 14, 2005, and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material on October 28, 2008.

In the next few years, China increasingly will focus on making the most of its three-ring strategy,
including the SCO, the China-India-Israel consultative triangle, and the
China-U.S.-Pakistan axis, to reshape the geopolitics of Eurasia and promote
greater regional and international cooperation in combating terrorism.
Nevertheless, in its antiterror campaign, China still faces major chal-
lenges. For example, Beijing lacks concrete antiterror laws and regulations
and can only rely on several articles of PRC Criminal Law, making it hard
to cooperate with other countries tactically, such as on the issue of extradit-
ing terrorists.

Second, compared with those of Britain, the United States,
and Germany, China’s paramilitary police have limited authority for preemp-
tive strikes or searching private property, and no special force for countering
terrorism. Third, China is a transitional society, not a fully fledged Western
democracy, and its legitimacy is frequently challenged by Western countries
when it fights terrorism. This is well understood by the majority of terrorist
groups and die-hard separatists that effectively play the ‘‘human rights’’ card
as they attempt to internationalize Xinjiang troubles, divert attention from
their terrorist activities, and portray Chinese counterterrorism efforts as
anti-Muslim persecution. Fourth, China has encountered frequent intelli-
gence failures such that it frequently cannot predict or preempt terrorist
attacks. Finally, China is quite inexperienced in coping with Internet terror-
ism. It has not yet found an effective countermeasure to defeat terrorists
who communicate with each other via the Internet.

China’s three-ring strategy, and still developing antiterror capabilities,
will be put to the test during the six-month-long 2010 World Expo, already
underway in Shanghai, and the upcoming Asian Games to be hosted in
November 2010 in Guangzhou. Given the lengthy duration of these events,
the vast areas they cover, and the huge floating population associated with
them, success in preventing terror attacks will augur well for China’s overall
political, economic, and military antiterror efforts. Failure to prevent any such
attacks, however, may lead China’s leaders to reach a different conclusion
and retreat to the kinds of tough tactics that the terrorists hope to elicit.

 

[The SC]

Their aim is not to defeat Chinese communist ‘‘oppressors,’’ but to arouse domestic
unrest and attract worldwide attention, especially in Islamic countries and
the West.

Why would they need extreme action like suicide bombngs for this end, while Internet and other efficient means are available, if not to them in China than to their friends outside.

The whole thing seems unreal and exagerated by the extremists if it is true and the writers of the article if it is not.

 

[William Hung]

A very interesting article. Thanks for sharing it here @Black Flag .

Yea it's very interesting. This kind of fact is surprising:

In financial terms these terrorist groups interact with each other via
the informal value transfer system known as hawala (or hundi), a large
network of brokers offering channels for transferring and laundering money.
According to one report, the annual value of hawala transactions among ter-
rorist groups in Pakistan alone reached somewhere between $2 and 5 billion
following the September 11, 2001 attacks.

$2-$5 billion is only an estimate value within Pakistan. Imagine the total value from their global network!!!! Where can they find all that financing? I think its that really rich country with lots of oil who has a friendly relationship with a super strong country.

 

[Aepsilons]

Yea it's very interesting. This kind of fact is surprising:



$2-$5 billion is only an estimate value within Pakistan. Imagine the total value from their global network!!!! Where can they find all that financing? I think its that really rich country with lots of oil who has a friendly relationship with a super strong country.

It sheds light on the instability that is a result of such financing , more or less. Very good article.

 

[William Hung]

Why would they need extreme action like suicide bombngs for this end, while Internet and other efficient means are available, if not to them in China than to their friends outside.

The whole thing seems unreal and exagerated by the extremists if it is true and the writers of the article if it is not.

This article was published in a western peer-reviewed academic journal.

Taylor & Francis (Routledge), who publishes this Journal, has a very very high standard and credential in academia. Ask Nihonjin.

This journal is not a tabloid opinion piece. It has been peer-reviewed by international scholars.

 

[The SC]

This article was published in a western peer-reviewed academic journal.

Taylor & Francis (Routledge), who publishes this Journal, has a very very high standard and credential in academia. Ask Nihonjin.

This journal is not a tabloid opinion piece. It has been peer-reviewed by international scholars.

I have no doubt about that, but like you have enhanced it yourself it is still a western article, and god knows how this Terror thing is in fashion out there.
I have based my own analysis on the fact that suicide is forbidden in Islam, and that these extremists should not be called Muslims, since they are most probably not. You can imagine that if anyone wants to dirty the Islamic world or Islam in general , he can stage such happenings and have them published in the media as facts. Anyhow this seems to be a very minor thing in China at least, not much of it in India either, so it is Usrael who has much to gain from this propaganda, since it is an apartheid occupying regime who needs to justify its existence by creating chaos and fighting terrorism, a word coined by them against the Palestinians, while forgetting that they were the first ones to be coined as terrorists in the middle east by the same England that has helped establish them there.

 

[William Hung]

I have no doubt about that, but like you have enhanced it yourself it is still a western article, and god knows how this Terror thing is in fashion out there.
I have based my own analysis on the fact that suicide is forbidden in Islam, and that these extremists should not be called Muslims, since they are most probably not. You can imagine that if anyone wants to dirty the Islamic world or Islam in general , he can stage such happenings and have them published in the media as facts. Anyhow this seems to be a very minor thing in China at least, not much of it in India either, so it is Usrael who has much to gain from this propaganda, since it is an apartheid occupying regime who needs to justify its existence by creating chaos and fighting terrorism, a word coined by them against the Palestinians, while forgetting that they were the first ones to be coined as terrorists in the middle east by the same England that has helped establish them there.

Let's not confuse western academia with western media. They are two completely different institution.

Like I said, that publisher has high academic credential and uses international scholars to review their articles. If the author write some BS, it will be weeded out during the peer-review process. And after its published, Muslim scholars, or any scholars, are free to dispute it.

This is not the media where journalists and editors can publish whatever they want.

I don't know too much about Islam so I don't want to start a theological debate. You can argue extremists are not real muslims, but those extremists would probably argue that only they are real muslims.

I don't know who's wrong or right, but I don't think they are just "staging" it (by killing themselves?) just for the sake of tarnishing the reputation of muslim/Islam.

 

[Aepsilons]

This is very , very interesting. It will never be really known of the identities of contributors to such a network. In regards to this, it makes sense why most of the modern militaries that are engaged in the War on Terror have emphasized Covert Operations in taking down terror cells. Considering the network and the extensive financial support towards these terror cells, it necessitates the clandestine operational tactics of some special forces. Now i realize why the United States Congress passed a bill to effectively increase the Black Budget -- particularly for operations against such terror cells. This is something that the Chinese counterparts, am sure, are realizing as we speak. The same goes for Pakistan and India, who both have similar concerns.

 

[William Hung]

This is very , very interesting. It will never be really known of the identities of contributors to such a network. In regards to this, it makes sense why most of the modern militaries that are engaged in the War on Terror have emphasized Covert Operations in taking down terror cells. Considering the network and the extensive financial support towards these terror cells, it necessitates the clandestine operational tactics of some special forces. Now i realize why the United States Congress passed a bill to effectively increase the Black Budget -- particularly for operations against such terror cells. This is something that the Chinese counterparts, am sure, are realizing as we speak. The same goes for Pakistan and India, who both have similar concerns.

Not just SOF but also itel/spy agents to monitor them at their home base. The US has got this covered with their strong ties with several gulf Arab states and they have access to military bases in that region.

In another paper, the author said China has a big problem in that they don't have these foreign military bases nor do they have any strong military/intel relationship with these region like the US has.

I think the Chinese anti-terrorist intelligence are overwhelmed by the complexity of these terrorist networks and their operations being more sophisticated than expected. That's why they recently made it public that they were seeking foreign experts to deal with terrorism.

 

[Aepsilons]

Not just SOF but also itel/spy agents to monitor them at their home base. The US has got this covered with their strong ties with several gulf Arab states and they have access to military bases in that region.

In another paper, the author said China has a big problem in that they don't have these foreign military bases nor do they have any strong military/intel relationship with these region like the US has.

I think the Chinese anti-terrorist intelligence are overwhelmed by the complexity of these terrorist networks and their operations being more sophisticated than expected. That's why they recently made it public that they were seeking foreign experts to deal with terrorism.

Given they share a common border with Russia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan et al, all of which have experience in dealing with extremist cells, I'm sure they have developed the processes to exchange military tactics in dealing with hidden terror cells. I think the largest barrier to the Chinese Military in their plans to have a global reach is simply their defense budget. The question is -- are they willing to raise their defense budget to say 2-3% of their GDP?

 

[Pulsar]

RARE CONFESSION `China jihadi outfit leader admits to Pak terror links'
China Daily 28 Aug 2014

In a rare public admission of Pakistani links to militancy in China's Muslim majority Xinjiang province, the official media on Wednesday said that the co-founder of al-Qaida linked East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was indoctrinated in a madarasa in that country .

State-run China Daily today published confessions of Memetuhut Memetrozi, 41, co-founder of ETIM which is fighting for secession of Xinjiang from China.

He is serving a life sentence for his involvement in terrorist attacks. According to confession statement released by Xinjiang No. 1 Prison, Memetuhut was repatriated by Pakistan's intelligence service to China.

Memetuhut said he trav elled around Central Asia pursuing his interest in Islam. In 1992, he enrolled in an Arab-run school in Pakistan where he came into contact with young extremists. They showed him books and videos about religious extre mism. “Such thoughts in his head were like bugs that grew bigger and bigger until they took control of his mind and body ,“ said Memetuhut, who began to promote jihad.

The publication of Memetuhut's confessions by the staterun media marks a departure from the past when Chinese government refrained from publicly criticizing its ally over the infiltration of militants into Xinjiang which bordered Azad Kashmir and Afghanistan.

RARE CONFESSION `China jihadi outfit leader admits to Pak terror links'

The problem is, how can Pakistan control these terrorist who are being trained and radicalized in Pakistan's 'Wild West' where the government administration is almost nonexistent with little or no presence of security forces?

More such attacks by terrorists in Xinjiang may result in cooling Sino-Pak relations. Things aren't looking good for Pakistan unless terrorists - both good ('Strategic Assets') and bad (Anti Pakistan) - are eliminated.

 

[William Hung]

Given they share a common border with Russia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan et al, all of which have experience in dealing with extremist cells, I'm sure they have developed the processes to exchange military tactics in dealing with hidden terror cells. I think the largest barrier to the Chinese Military in their plans to have a global reach is simply their defense budget. The question is -- are they willing to raise their defense budget to say 2-3% of their GDP?

Yes China have anti-terror cooperation with the SCO, the China-India-Israel cooperation and the China-Pakistan-US cooperation. But all these countries are not going to share everything they know with each other, especially if it will compromise their intelligence network.

And remember the US and China (and Russia too) are all rivals in the big scheme of things.

These countries cannot and will never fully depend on each other. They will all need their own foreign military/Intel networks in those region. This is one area that China is lacking compared with the US and Israel.

 

[William Hung]

The problem is, how can Pakistan control these terrorist who are being trained and radicalized in Pakistan's 'Wild West' where the government administration is almost nonexistent with little or no presence of security forces?

More such attacks by terrorists in Xinjiang may result in cooling Sino-Pak relations. Things aren't looking good for Pakistan unless terrorists - both good ('Strategic Assets') and bad (Anti Pakistan) - are eliminated.

These terrorist cell/schools are supported from outside Pakistan, they are not a pure homegrown movement. Their finacial support is estimated to be $2-5billion annually. A homegrown Pakistani group can never raise this kind of finance locally. It must come from outside.

So you can never eliminate these terrorist elements entirely unless you eliminate it's root, which lies outside of Pakistan.

While pakistan army is conducting zarb-i-azb these elements are getting finished too. Hope to see a more better cooperation between both friendly countries.

I wouldn't be too optimistic. India is a rival to both Pakistan and China, if it is in their interest to see their rival getting hurt, they will gladly sit by and watch. This is an unfortunate truth.