Chin Navalized DH-10 LACM

[monitor]

Deployment of Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) on Chinese warships will bring new dimensions to diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific.

Images have surfaced of a naval variant of the DH-10 LACM on a China Navy test vessel. The missile canisters spotted appear to be virtually identical to the land-based variant. This sort of arrangement is reminiscent to the deployment of the BGM-109 Tomahawk on United States Navy surface combatants by way of the MK-143 Armored Box Launcher. The MK-143 enabled vessels such as the Iowa Class Battleships and Spruance Class Destroyers to launch the BGM-109.

The images suggest that the DH-10 would be installed in the same way as the YJ-62 or YJ-83 anti-ship missiles. This is advantageous for the current generation of China Navy surface combatants, giving designs such as the 052C land attack capability with minimal structural modification. However, the downside is that the arrangement would sacrifice anti-ship capabilities by substituting the YJ-62 or YJ-83 systems with DH-10 launchers. It also means that only a maximum of eight missiles can be carried and that is assuming the launch canisters can be stacked on top of one another.

In spite of its disadvantages and simplicity compared to the deployment of vertically launched LACMs by other navies, the adoption of a naval variant of the DH-10 is a considerable capability leap for Beijing. This development would enable China to complete its “cruise missile triad”, complementing the already in-service land-based system and the air-launched variant, the CJ-10. Missiles launched from land-based platforms are restricted to striking targets around China’s periphery, not so dissimilar to the range limitations faced by the Second Artillery Force’s inventory of conventional ballistic missiles. Missiles launched from the air force’s H-6 bombers provide more operational flexibility and reach for China’s cruise missiles, similar to the way in which the United States Air Force deploys cruise missiles from its bomber fleet. However, without aerial refueling capability and heavy fighter protection, the H-6 is an aircraft restricted to limited regional operations. The bomber’s obsolete design, slow speed and its vulnerability to interception are weighing heavily against its potential strategic roles.

The China Navy, on the other hand, is the only branch of the Chinese military capable of projecting limited power far beyond China’s shores. While it is debatable whether the China Navy would seek the same sort of global reach as the United States Navy, the possession of ship-launched LACMs would essentially enable Chinese warships to conduct long range precision attacks against land targets around the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The implications are strategic locations that were traditionally distance away from China mainland could now be potentially brought within the firing range of DH-10 armed vessels.

The fact that DH-10 is mounted on a test vessel that has yet sail suggests that it is still very early its development cycle. If the rumored Type 052D destroyer, the successor of the 052C that is reportedly under construction is mounted with DH-10, then a universal vertical launch system for Chinese armed forces is a reality.

It would also be interesting to monitor the future development of an undersea DH-10 systems as arming Beijing’s fleet of conventional and nuclear attack submarines with submarine-launched DH-10 missiles will have far reaching implications.

--cloneattacks

 

[j20blackdragon]

Guam (and the rest of the world) is now within reach.

 

[graphican]

We can launch multi-axis attacks on Tokyo with these. Tokyo has strategic depth if you are attacking from the South-West direction but it is terribly exposed if you come from the South-East or East direction.

Hay mate why would you need to engage Tokyo with these.. as of I know they are not offensive against China or anybody - or not?

 

[conworldus]

Other reports says CJ-10, advanced version of DH-10. It is a long range 2000 km +, supersonic with 2.5 mach + missile.

 

[cirr]

Hay mate why would you need to engage Tokyo with these.. as of I know they are not offensive against China or anybody - or not?

The Japs are 1000 times worse than the Vietnameses or the Pilipinois。

 

[ahfatzia]

Thread Tittle: Chin Navalized DH-10 LACM .

Can someone tell me what Chin Navalized mean? I never heard of such term.

 

[monitor]

 

[Akasa]

I fully expect this to be integrated with an universal VLS. I expect this to be deployed on the Type 052D, the future cruiser, the Type 095, and Type 043.

 

[razgriz19]

Did anyone else noticed the rolling air frame missile defense system??

 

[thecurryguy]

The Chinese Version of RAM has been deployed on the Chinese AC and those latest 056 frigates.

 

[no_name]

The Chinese version of RAM is not really a RAM since it does not roll in flight. But it's designed purpose is almost the same.

Navalized just means adapted for use by ships or naval assets.

 

[monitor]

Chinese Navy Tests Land Attack Cruise Missiles: Implications for Asia-Pacific
by Wilson Chau on Jul 25, 2012 • 4:07 pm

Deployment of the DH-10 land attack cruise missile (LACM), similar in design to the American BGM-109 Tomahawk and Russian KH-55, on Chinese warships could bring new meaning to gunboat diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific.

Images have surfaced of a naval variant of the DH-10. The missile canisters spotted on the test ship appear to be virtually identical to the land-based variant. This sort of arrangement is reminiscent to the deployment of the BGM-109 Tomahawk on United States Navy surface combatants by way of the MK-143 Armored Box Launcher. The MK-143 enabled vessels such as the Iowa Class Battleships and Spruance Class Destroyers to launch the BGM-109.

The images suggest that the DH-10 would be installed in the same way as the YJ-62 or YJ-83 anti-ship missiles. This is advantageous for the current generation of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) surface combatants, giving designs such as the 052C land attack capability with minimal structural modification. However, the downside is that the arrangement would sacrifice anti-ship capabilities by substituting the YJ-62 or YJ-83 systems with DH-10 launchers. It also means that only a maximum of eight missiles can be carried and that is assuming the launch canisters can be stacked on top of one another.

In spite of its disadvantages and simplicity compared to the deployment of vertically launched LACMs by other navies, the adoption of a naval variant of the DH-10 is a considerable capability leap for Beijing.

The emergence of a navalised version of the DH-10 completes China’s “cruise missile triad”, complementing the already in-service land-based system and the air-launched variant, the CJ-10. Missiles launched from land-based platforms are restricted to striking targets around China’s periphery, not so dissimilar to the range limitations faced by the Second Artillery Force’s inventory of conventional ballistic missiles. Missiles launched from the air force’s H-6 bombers provide more operational flexibility and reach for China’s cruise missiles, similar to the way in which the United States Air Force deploys cruise missiles from its bomber fleet. However, without aerial refuelling capability, the H-6 is an aircraft restricted to regional operations. The bomber’s obsolete design and its vulnerability to interception are also limiting factors.

The PLAN, on the other hand, is the only branch of the Chinese military capable of projecting power far beyond China’s shores. While it is debatable whether the PLAN may not seek the same sort of global reach as the United States Navy, the possession of ship-launched LACMs would essentially enable Chinese warships to conduct long range precision attacks against land targets around the Indian and Pacific Oceans. For China’s neighbors, PLAN surface combatants could now execute attacks on Taiwan, Japan and most of Southeast Asia without the need to venture far from Chinese waters. American bases across the Indo-Pacific region could also be vulnerable to conventional cruise missile attack. Facilities in Guam, Hawaii, Diego Garcia and Darwin, strategic locations that were traditionally safe from anything short of a Chinese nuclear strike, could now be potentially brought within the firing range of PLAN ships armed with the DH-10.

It must be stressed, however, that arming Chinese warships with LACMs is not necessarily a silver bullet in a regional conflict. It is not clear how the PLAN would coordinate with other services such as the Second Artillery Force in the execution of a cruise missile attack. A saturated or sustained cruise missile bombardment from the navy alone may not be achievable given the limited number of ships and munitions. A PLAN surface task force approaching or taking up firing positions off the adversary’s coast would most likely be detected, offering ample warning for air defenses and even providing sufficient time for the adversary to respond with sea or air attacks.

The current way the DH-10 is being tested or fielded should only be regarded as an interim solution. All eyes are now on the 052D destroyer, the successor of the 052C that is reportedly under construction, and whether the PLAN will adopt a universal vertical launch system to accommodate the DH-10. It would also be interesting to monitor the development of undersea systems. Arming Beijing’s fleet of conventional and nuclear attack submarines with submarine-launched cruise missiles will have far reaching implications.

Wilson's publication, "Examining China's Participation in Bilateral and Multilateral Military Exercises", Security Challenges Journal 7, no. 3 (2011), won first prize in the Australia Defence Business Review's 2011 Young Strategic Writers' Competition (article is available for download at Security Challenges Journal). Wilson completed a conjoint degree in LLB (Hons) and BA (Hons) at the University of Auckland. He was a summer research scholar at the Australian National University's Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies and interned with the Lowy Institute of International Policy. His area of expertise includes the South China Sea, China-India relations, and China's military modernisation.
Wilson Chau has 10 post(s) on Asia Security Watch

 

[Abdi-Karim Elmi]

Sometimed I wish turkey was located at the pacific. But no we are at the middle east and snoring Europe..