Cambodia & Laos Defence Forum

[Aepsilons]

You know why? Because they already got what they wanted from Cambodia (the military and the yellow shirts) are in power now, so no need to make conflict with Cambodia anymore, that's already past history. And the other reason is because they don't want Cambodia to be used as a refuge for Thai dissidents and a possible Thai government in exile, etc. Taksin has good relations with Hun Sen, so the real purpose of all this is to neutralize Cambodia in that sense.

Very good analysis, and quite strategic of the Thais.

 

[alaungphaya]

You know why? Because they already got what they wanted from Cambodia (the military and the yellow shirts) are in power now, so no need to make conflict with Cambodia anymore, that's already past history. And the other reason is because they don't want Cambodia to be used as a refuge for Thai dissidents and a possible Thai government in exile, etc. Taksin has good relations with Hun Sen, so the real purpose of all this is to neutralize Cambodia in that sense.

I would say redshirts would head to Singapore before Cambo.

 

[Aepsilons]

Uncertainty at home brings calm to the Thai–Cambodian border

Domestic uncertainties in Thailand and Cambodia have hindered progress along the heavily militarised border and the Preah Vihear temple dispute.

Between 2008 and 2011 the border around the ancient Khmer temple of Preah Vihear (Phra Viharn in Thai) was the site of repeated clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops. Open conflict was put on hold when Cambodia submitted the dispute to the International Court of Justice in 2011. More than two years later the Court confirmed Cambodia’s ownership over part of the disputed territory, leaving the adjacent area subject to bilateral negotiations.

Months before the military took power in Bangkok in 2014, Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen realised that he could no longer rely on a ‘red’, Thaksin-linked government holding power in Thailand. The Thai army made it clear that while it was tied up with the internal crisis, it would be in charge along the border as well. This was most obvious when the Thai government was unable to follow through with a plan to allow Indonesian observers, under the banner of ASEAN, to be stationed at the conflict site. The Abhisit-brokered agreement was rejected by a number of officers who had served on the Thai–Cambodian border and who enjoyed backing from the highest positions in the military. The situation did not change under Yingluck, who left the military free in dealing with Cambodia.

This prompted Hun Sen to end any visible support to Thaksin and the red shirt movement. This was a marked contrast to late 2009, when Hun Sen appointed Thaksin as his economic adviser and when he allowed tens of thousands of red shirt supporters to meet Thaksin when speaking in Siem Reap in April 2012.

Increasingly, Cambodia relied on military-to-military contacts to manage the situation on the ground, starting with local commanders, who were instructed to share not only information but also dried fish. When the Thai military took control in Bangkok, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Defence Tea Banh was the first ASEAN high-level politician to visit. Hun Sen did not waste any time, delivering his congratulations to Prayuth Chan-ocha the day after the Thai army chief was appointed prime minister. Cambodian officials even thanked the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) for managing the swift return of an estimated 200,000 Cambodian workers to Thailand, whose sudden outflow had ironically been triggered by the coup.

In Cambodia, Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party lost 22 of 123 seats in the 2013 election. Economic development and job creation are now among the top priorities of the party to counter its loss of popularity, especially among the young generation. Good relations with Bangkok are therefore badly needed: Thailand is the second biggest importer of Cambodian goods after China. In addition, the Thai economy provides jobs for an estimated 400,000 Cambodians.

It is unlikely that Phnom Penh will be pushed to abandon its soft course. Despite — or perhaps precisely because of — the opposition’s overwhelming focus on the eastern border with Vietnam. The opposition parties have so far endorsed CPP’s policy in regard to Thailand. The border dispute effectively remained a non-issue when Cambodia protested a newly polished fence in front of Preah Vihear — in an area that is still to be demarcated — only days after the coup. When a shooting incident at a border post nearby made it into the news in early October 2014, both sides hushed up the issue. In the meantime, restoration works at the temple are undertaken with utmost care — to comply with the management plan endorsed by UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee and in order to avoid raising Thailand’s attention.

Cambodia would likely welcome talks on the land border and the maritime boundaries sooner rather than later. But the NCPO has signalled that talks will only resume once Thailand’s domestic situation is more certain. The border around Preah Vihear will doubtlessly remain a thorny issue. Any proposal by the Thai to develop the Preah Vihear World Heritage site jointly is likely to be ignored in Cambodia just as it happened when Prayuth brought it up at his visit in late October. But this does not foreclose other forms of cooperation in order to boost tourism at the temple. Nor does it mean that survey and demarcation work along the border needs to remain on standby. Talks on the maritime areas can also resume independently of the land border negotiations.

But with the question of royal succession looming over the Thai conflict, it is difficult to predict when Thailand will find a way out of its domestic crisis. Measures already adopted by the NCPO suggest that the military will strengthen its grip on power.

For the border dispute, this means a likely end to the high turnover of office holders and differing voices that have greatly increased uncertainty for Phnom Penh in the past. Now in the driver’s seat both at the border and in Bangkok, the Thai army will soon have to show how committed it is to put an end to the conflict. So while renewed fighting is unlikely, the Thai military will soon have to nail its colours to the mast.

Nicole Jenne is a PhD researcher at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.

Uncertainty at home brings calm to the Thai–Cambodian border | East Asia Forum

 

[Carlosa]

I would say redshirts would head to Singapore before Cambo.

Interesting, why Singapore, they usually don't get involved in that type of politics?

 

[alaungphaya]

Interesting, why Singapore, they usually don't get involved in that type of politics?

Cambo wouldn't be able to sustain a gov in exile and the Shinawatras are popular in Singapore I believe. But I guess Sing wouldn't tolerate a gov in exile either.

 

[Carlosa]

Uncertainty at home brings calm to the Thai–Cambodian border

Domestic uncertainties in Thailand and Cambodia have hindered progress along the heavily militarised border and the Preah Vihear temple dispute.

Between 2008 and 2011 the border around the ancient Khmer temple of Preah Vihear (Phra Viharn in Thai) was the site of repeated clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops. Open conflict was put on hold when Cambodia submitted the dispute to the International Court of Justice in 2011. More than two years later the Court confirmed Cambodia’s ownership over part of the disputed territory, leaving the adjacent area subject to bilateral negotiations.

Months before the military took power in Bangkok in 2014, Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen realised that he could no longer rely on a ‘red’, Thaksin-linked government holding power in Thailand. The Thai army made it clear that while it was tied up with the internal crisis, it would be in charge along the border as well. This was most obvious when the Thai government was unable to follow through with a plan to allow Indonesian observers, under the banner of ASEAN, to be stationed at the conflict site. The Abhisit-brokered agreement was rejected by a number of officers who had served on the Thai–Cambodian border and who enjoyed backing from the highest positions in the military. The situation did not change under Yingluck, who left the military free in dealing with Cambodia.

This prompted Hun Sen to end any visible support to Thaksin and the red shirt movement. This was a marked contrast to late 2009, when Hun Sen appointed Thaksin as his economic adviser and when he allowed tens of thousands of red shirt supporters to meet Thaksin when speaking in Siem Reap in April 2012.

Increasingly, Cambodia relied on military-to-military contacts to manage the situation on the ground, starting with local commanders, who were instructed to share not only information but also dried fish. When the Thai military took control in Bangkok, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Defence Tea Banh was the first ASEAN high-level politician to visit. Hun Sen did not waste any time, delivering his congratulations to Prayuth Chan-ocha the day after the Thai army chief was appointed prime minister. Cambodian officials even thanked the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) for managing the swift return of an estimated 200,000 Cambodian workers to Thailand, whose sudden outflow had ironically been triggered by the coup.

In Cambodia, Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party lost 22 of 123 seats in the 2013 election. Economic development and job creation are now among the top priorities of the party to counter its loss of popularity, especially among the young generation. Good relations with Bangkok are therefore badly needed: Thailand is the second biggest importer of Cambodian goods after China. In addition, the Thai economy provides jobs for an estimated 400,000 Cambodians.

It is unlikely that Phnom Penh will be pushed to abandon its soft course. Despite — or perhaps precisely because of — the opposition’s overwhelming focus on the eastern border with Vietnam. The opposition parties have so far endorsed CPP’s policy in regard to Thailand. The border dispute effectively remained a non-issue when Cambodia protested a newly polished fence in front of Preah Vihear — in an area that is still to be demarcated — only days after the coup. When a shooting incident at a border post nearby made it into the news in early October 2014, both sides hushed up the issue. In the meantime, restoration works at the temple are undertaken with utmost care — to comply with the management plan endorsed by UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee and in order to avoid raising Thailand’s attention.

Cambodia would likely welcome talks on the land border and the maritime boundaries sooner rather than later. But the NCPO has signalled that talks will only resume once Thailand’s domestic situation is more certain. The border around Preah Vihear will doubtlessly remain a thorny issue. Any proposal by the Thai to develop the Preah Vihear World Heritage site jointly is likely to be ignored in Cambodia just as it happened when Prayuth brought it up at his visit in late October. But this does not foreclose other forms of cooperation in order to boost tourism at the temple. Nor does it mean that survey and demarcation work along the border needs to remain on standby. Talks on the maritime areas can also resume independently of the land border negotiations.

But with the question of royal succession looming over the Thai conflict, it is difficult to predict when Thailand will find a way out of its domestic crisis. Measures already adopted by the NCPO suggest that the military will strengthen its grip on power.

For the border dispute, this means a likely end to the high turnover of office holders and differing voices that have greatly increased uncertainty for Phnom Penh in the past. Now in the driver’s seat both at the border and in Bangkok, the Thai army will soon have to show how committed it is to put an end to the conflict. So while renewed fighting is unlikely, the Thai military will soon have to nail its colours to the mast.

Nicole Jenne is a PhD researcher at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.

Uncertainty at home brings calm to the Thai–Cambodian border | East Asia Forum

Very correct, the Thai military is in a bit of an awkward position now, they had championed the position of not giving territory to Cambodia when they were flying the nationalistic card, and so far they have not complied with the world court decision, but that situation can't last forever, they'll have to make a decision soon.

 

[Carlosa]

Back on topic:

Thailand is trying hard to buy submarines for the very first time. The civilian government didn't procure subs in the past, but now that the military is in power, its very likely that they'll buy subs.

But, less analyze that for a moment, the golf of Thailand is 40 m deep on average and the maximum depth is only 80 meters, does it make sense to buy submarines or is it just another cases of trying to look good? If my neighbors have subs, then I also want them!

 

[Aepsilons]

Back on topic:

Thailand is trying hard to buy submarines for the very first time. The civilian government didn't procure subs in the past, but now that the military is in power, its very likely that they'll buy subs.

But, less analyze that for a moment, the golf of Thailand is 40 m deep on average and the maximum depth is only 80 meters, does it make sense to buy submarines or is it just another cases of trying to look good? If my neighbors have subs, then I also want them!

The Thai Navy have a naval base in Phuket, as well as in Takua Pa, as well as in Phangnga , which faces the Indian Ocean. It makes sense for them to procure submarines to address threats there, as well as to increase their projection of power not only in the Gulf of Thailand, but also into South China Sea.

 

[NiceGuy]

And you forgot the rest of Thai generals. that like China and all show the middle finger to Vietname, what are you try to prove by using an Isolated case? and Ask if she hate China ...LMAO

Chinese in Thai-Sing-TW-HK support US and show their middle finger to main land Chinese like u. Stupid Chinese support China against VN like Pol Pot got hard spank and died miserably

 

[Carlosa]

The Thai Navy have a naval base in Phuket, as well as in Takua Pa, as well as in Phangnga , which faces the Indian Ocean. It makes sense for them to procure submarines to address threats there, as well as to increase their projection of power not only in the Gulf of Thailand, but also into South China Sea.

You have a point there, even that I don't see why they would want to project power into the south china sea, but how about for operations in the gulf of Thailand, Its too shallow, too easy to detect subs at such a low depth. I think overall is not cost effective, but I'm sure they are going to do it.

 

[Carlosa]

Chinese in Thai-Sing-TW-HK support US and show their middle finger to main land Chinese like u. Stupid Chinese support China against VN like Pol Pot got hard spank and died miserably

The Shinawatras are Thai chinese by the way and I can say that in general, Thai chinese are very proud of their chinese heritage and in private they will say things like "I'm a chinese born in Thailand" and they usually look down on the native Thais, so don't be so sure about that, but when it comes to in what direction Thailand goes or who they will support, Thais follow the money and whoever is stronger. They will not do anything for the sake of helping Vietnam unless there is benefit in doing that. I can also say that in general Thais look down on vietnamese. Some vietnamese here are reading too much into that Thai general that made some statements recently that the chinese claims in the south china sea are wrong, those are his personal opinions, they are not official Thai policy.

 

[Carlosa]

Uncertainty at home brings calm to the Thai–Cambodian border

Domestic uncertainties in Thailand and Cambodia have hindered progress along the heavily militarised border and the Preah Vihear temple dispute.

Between 2008 and 2011 the border around the ancient Khmer temple of Preah Vihear (Phra Viharn in Thai) was the site of repeated clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops. Open conflict was put on hold when Cambodia submitted the dispute to the International Court of Justice in 2011. More than two years later the Court confirmed Cambodia’s ownership over part of the disputed territory, leaving the adjacent area subject to bilateral negotiations.

Months before the military took power in Bangkok in 2014, Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen realised that he could no longer rely on a ‘red’, Thaksin-linked government holding power in Thailand. The Thai army made it clear that while it was tied up with the internal crisis, it would be in charge along the border as well. This was most obvious when the Thai government was unable to follow through with a plan to allow Indonesian observers, under the banner of ASEAN, to be stationed at the conflict site. The Abhisit-brokered agreement was rejected by a number of officers who had served on the Thai–Cambodian border and who enjoyed backing from the highest positions in the military. The situation did not change under Yingluck, who left the military free in dealing with Cambodia.

This prompted Hun Sen to end any visible support to Thaksin and the red shirt movement. This was a marked contrast to late 2009, when Hun Sen appointed Thaksin as his economic adviser and when he allowed tens of thousands of red shirt supporters to meet Thaksin when speaking in Siem Reap in April 2012.

Increasingly, Cambodia relied on military-to-military contacts to manage the situation on the ground, starting with local commanders, who were instructed to share not only information but also dried fish. When the Thai military took control in Bangkok, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Defence Tea Banh was the first ASEAN high-level politician to visit. Hun Sen did not waste any time, delivering his congratulations to Prayuth Chan-ocha the day after the Thai army chief was appointed prime minister. Cambodian officials even thanked the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) for managing the swift return of an estimated 200,000 Cambodian workers to Thailand, whose sudden outflow had ironically been triggered by the coup.

In Cambodia, Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party lost 22 of 123 seats in the 2013 election. Economic development and job creation are now among the top priorities of the party to counter its loss of popularity, especially among the young generation. Good relations with Bangkok are therefore badly needed: Thailand is the second biggest importer of Cambodian goods after China. In addition, the Thai economy provides jobs for an estimated 400,000 Cambodians.

It is unlikely that Phnom Penh will be pushed to abandon its soft course. Despite — or perhaps precisely because of — the opposition’s overwhelming focus on the eastern border with Vietnam. The opposition parties have so far endorsed CPP’s policy in regard to Thailand. The border dispute effectively remained a non-issue when Cambodia protested a newly polished fence in front of Preah Vihear — in an area that is still to be demarcated — only days after the coup. When a shooting incident at a border post nearby made it into the news in early October 2014, both sides hushed up the issue. In the meantime, restoration works at the temple are undertaken with utmost care — to comply with the management plan endorsed by UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee and in order to avoid raising Thailand’s attention.

Cambodia would likely welcome talks on the land border and the maritime boundaries sooner rather than later. But the NCPO has signalled that talks will only resume once Thailand’s domestic situation is more certain. The border around Preah Vihear will doubtlessly remain a thorny issue. Any proposal by the Thai to develop the Preah Vihear World Heritage site jointly is likely to be ignored in Cambodia just as it happened when Prayuth brought it up at his visit in late October. But this does not foreclose other forms of cooperation in order to boost tourism at the temple. Nor does it mean that survey and demarcation work along the border needs to remain on standby. Talks on the maritime areas can also resume independently of the land border negotiations.

But with the question of royal succession looming over the Thai conflict, it is difficult to predict when Thailand will find a way out of its domestic crisis. Measures already adopted by the NCPO suggest that the military will strengthen its grip on power.

For the border dispute, this means a likely end to the high turnover of office holders and differing voices that have greatly increased uncertainty for Phnom Penh in the past. Now in the driver’s seat both at the border and in Bangkok, the Thai army will soon have to show how committed it is to put an end to the conflict. So while renewed fighting is unlikely, the Thai military will soon have to nail its colours to the mast.

Nicole Jenne is a PhD researcher at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.

Uncertainty at home brings calm to the Thai–Cambodian border | East Asia Forum

By the way, my friends in Thailand that deal with the Thai military used to tell me that the seals at the Sattahip base were the best elite forces in Thailand and actually had good officers and good maintenance of their equipment. They saw it as an exception to the rule, and the navy in general is more competent than the army even that they made a big blunder with the aircraft carrier.

 

[Aepsilons]

The Shinawatras are Thai chinese by the way and I can say that in general, Thai chinese are very proud of their chinese heritage and in private they will say things like "I'm a chinese born in Thailand" and they usually look down on the native Thais, so don't be so sure about that, but when it comes to in what direction Thailand goes or who they will support, Thais follow the money and whoever is stronger. They will not do anything for the sake of helping Vietnam unless there is benefit in doing that. I can also say that in general Thais look down on vietnamese. Some vietnamese here are reading too much into that Thai general that made some statements recently that the chinese claims in the south china sea are wrong, those are his personal opinions, they are not official Thai policy.

Precisely. Besides, as it stands now, Thailand is showing pragmatism: Its cooperating with the United States through military exercises, and at the same time the Thais are keen in expanding its relationship with the Chinese.

 

[NiceGuy]

The Shinawatras are Thai chinese by the way and I can say that in general, Thai chinese are very proud of their chinese heritage and in private they will say things like "I'm a chinese born in Thailand" and they usually look down on the native Thais, so don't be so sure about that, but when it comes to in what direction Thailand goes or who they will support, Thais follow the money and whoever is stronger. They will not do anything for the sake of helping Vietnam unless there is benefit in doing that. I can also say that in general Thais look down on vietnamese. Some vietnamese here are reading too much into that Thai general that made some statements recently that the chinese claims in the south china sea are wrong, those are his personal opinions, they are not official Thai policy.

Its okay, let them look down on whoever they want, but at least Thai Gens. r smart enough to know that VN is behind Cambodia and our forces in Laos-Camb can attack them at any times we want when China is too far and too weak to help them.

Thats why Thai Gen. think that support VN against China will bring more benefit than harm. They will sit tight on their thrones like Mr. Hun Sen when they support VN.

 

[Carlosa]

Precisely. Besides, as it stands now, Thailand is showing pragmatism: Its cooperating with the United States through military exercises, and at the same time the Thais are keen in expanding its relationship with the Chinese.

Correct, what you call pragmatism and strategic thinking is simply traditional Thai cunning skills of which they are masters of. Thailand is with everybody and nobody at the same time. They are very fluid and always know how to follow the direction that brings most benefit and profit.