Manticore
RETIRED MOD
- Joined
- Jan 18, 2009
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Operationally the Type-022 appears to operate using pack tactics with four or more boats. With each boat carrying 8 missiles, that equates to up to 32 anti-ship missiles per attack. Saturation attacks have long been discussed but are obviously hard to pull-off and have never been employed in a real war. Type-022 appears to be built and operated with such attacks in mind. A typical Type-022 base has at least 8 boats based there, such as this one:
The Type-022 compares favorably to other missile boats in many respects. Of particular relevance is the new Kuang Hua IV class of the Taiwanese navy. On paper these are also stealthy, though less so than the Type-022. Stealth is such a large part of Type-022’s design that even small details like the windows have RCS reducing saw-tooth edges.The Kuang Hua is significantly smaller, particularly in internal volume, and less well armed in both anti-ship missiles (4 x HF-II) and guns (1-2 crewed 20mm guns or more commonly 2 crewed .50cal machine guns).
Although the 30mm AK-630 CIWS is reasonably effective against aircraft and missiles at point range, it has a limited arc of fire the Type-022 lacks any air-defences at the rear:
Generally there is a school of thought that missile boats are not a serious threat to ‘real’ navies. One popular theory propagated by the Royal Navy is that the missile boats would be easily sunk by shipboard helicopters before they could get within range of launching their missiles. This is a valid argument for a RN frigate operating in the Arabian Sea, approached by Iranian boats. Indeed RN Lynx helicopters armed with Sea Skua missiles proved very effective in both the Falklands and Gulf wars. But this argument appears less convincing when the Type-022 is taken as the adversary. It is relatively stealthy, operating in littorals, employing data links to achieve long range targeting and deployed in huge quantities. It’s also worth remembering that in a scenario where China was facing a major navy (even Taiwan’s) the opposing helicopter force would be subject to distraction of submarine hunting, and quite possibly air-supremacy. Most countries do not equip their shipboard helicopters with anti-ship missiles anyway.
Regardless of the above assessment, many observers regard the Type-022 as a doctrinal dinosaur, a hang-over from the PLAN’s Soviet influenced strategies of the past and that PLAN should only be spending on blue-water assets. An interesting perspective worth thinking about.
The Type-022 compares favorably to other missile boats in many respects. Of particular relevance is the new Kuang Hua IV class of the Taiwanese navy. On paper these are also stealthy, though less so than the Type-022. Stealth is such a large part of Type-022’s design that even small details like the windows have RCS reducing saw-tooth edges.The Kuang Hua is significantly smaller, particularly in internal volume, and less well armed in both anti-ship missiles (4 x HF-II) and guns (1-2 crewed 20mm guns or more commonly 2 crewed .50cal machine guns).
Although the 30mm AK-630 CIWS is reasonably effective against aircraft and missiles at point range, it has a limited arc of fire the Type-022 lacks any air-defences at the rear:
Generally there is a school of thought that missile boats are not a serious threat to ‘real’ navies. One popular theory propagated by the Royal Navy is that the missile boats would be easily sunk by shipboard helicopters before they could get within range of launching their missiles. This is a valid argument for a RN frigate operating in the Arabian Sea, approached by Iranian boats. Indeed RN Lynx helicopters armed with Sea Skua missiles proved very effective in both the Falklands and Gulf wars. But this argument appears less convincing when the Type-022 is taken as the adversary. It is relatively stealthy, operating in littorals, employing data links to achieve long range targeting and deployed in huge quantities. It’s also worth remembering that in a scenario where China was facing a major navy (even Taiwan’s) the opposing helicopter force would be subject to distraction of submarine hunting, and quite possibly air-supremacy. Most countries do not equip their shipboard helicopters with anti-ship missiles anyway.
Regardless of the above assessment, many observers regard the Type-022 as a doctrinal dinosaur, a hang-over from the PLAN’s Soviet influenced strategies of the past and that PLAN should only be spending on blue-water assets. An interesting perspective worth thinking about.
