BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY

[ghazi52]

BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY

Legendary Falcon Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui Shaheed (in centre)

6th September the martyrdom anniversary of Pakistan's national hero Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui Shaheed (Hilal-i-Jurrat).

On 6th September, 1965, Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui led a formation of three F-86 aircraft on a strike against Halwara airfield. Soon after crossing the Indian border Squadron Leader Rafiqui had been warned about a large number of enemy interceptors being in the air by the leader of a returning F-86 formation. He, however, continued his mission single-mindedly.

On the way back, the formation was intercepted by about ten Hunter aircraft out of which Squadron Leader Rafiqui accounted for one in the first few seconds. After Squadron Leader Rafiqui shot down one Hunter aircraft, his guns jammed due to a defect and stopped firing upon which he refused to leave the battle area as he would have been perfectly justified to do; he, instead ordered his No. 2 Group Captain Cecil Chaudhry to take over as leader and continue the engagement with the enemy. He himself now took up a defensive position in the formation in an attempt to give it as much protection as was possible by continuing fighting maneuvers in unarmed aircraft whilst the remainder proceeded to give battle to the enemy. This called for a quality of courage and dedication on the part of Squadron Leader Rafiqui equal to the best in the history of air-fighting. The end for him was never in doubt. He chose to disregard it and in the process, his aircraft was shot down and he was killed but not without his action enabling his formation to shoot down three more Hunter aircraft.

Squadron Leader Rafiqui thus provided exemplary leadership in battle and displayed outstanding courage in the face of exceptionally strong opposition. His inspiring leadership and selfless example significantly affected the subsequent course of the air war in which the P.A.F. never failed to dictate terms to an overwhelmingly larger and better equipped enemy. Squadron Leader Rafiqui's conduct was clearly beyond the call of duty and conformed to the highest tradition of leadership and bravery in battle against overwhelming odds. For this and his earlier exploits, he is posthumously awarded Hilal-i-Juraat.

 

[ghazi52]

Sarfaraz was selected for the RPAF, though the Services Selection Board report was not very generous about his prospects of making a pilot. He joined the Joint Services Pre-Cadet Training School at Quetta. The Commandant of the School was impressed with Sarfaraz's command of English, his confidence and his travels abroad at such an early age (3). After five months of training at JSPCTS, he entered the RPAF College at Risalpur. In 1953, he graduated in the footsteps of his brother, winning the prestigious Atcherly Trophy for the Best Pilot in the 13th GD(P) Course (and turning the Selection Board report on its head)!

Flying came easily to Sarfaraz, which ability, as some of his instructors noted, led him to exhibit careless tendencies and some over-confidence. He once pranged a Fury in Miranshah, breaking one of its landing gear; only a belly-landing at the better-endowed airfield of Peshawar saved the day. To sober him up, he was promptly administered a reprimand. Born fliers are known to follow the line of least resistance, but luckily for Sarfaraz, guidance was always at hand. He continued with a string of above average reports in his Advanced Flying Course as well as the Fighter Weapons Instructors' Course, both done in USA. He again showed his prowess as a superb fighter pilot by topping the course at PAF's Flight Leaders' School in 1960. After yet another course at RAF's prestigious Fighter Combat School (now Combat Commanders' School), he ended up piling a unique assortment of highly rated qualifications that served him (and the PAF) in good stead. As an exchange pilot in UK, he flew Hunters for two years Sarfaraz's Officer Commanding in No. 19 Squadron (RAF), reporting on his flying abilities, eloquently wrote, "In the air his experience and skill combine to make him a very effective fighter pilot and leader who creates an impression of disciplined efficiency in all that he does" (4). On return from UK in 1962, he was given command of No. 14 Squadron. A year later, he was given command of the elite No. 5 Squadron, in which he was to achieve martyrdom and eternal glory. He came to be well known as much for his highly assertive and effective control of the Unit as for his spirited attitude towards flying.

Sarfaraz's sense of humour, seldom evident from his sole published photograph, was a very genial trait, amply noted at home and across the shores. As an officer, he was found to be courteous and well mannered with a pleasant personality. He was extremely popular and, socially well accepted. Swimming took up his leisure time, though his keenness for flying determined the daily routine.

An incident that deserves special mention relates to Sarfaraz's steadfastness in matters of honour and righteousness. During a RAF dining-out night, he was enraged when the Pakistani ‘representatives’ (exchange pilots) were denied the customary toast to their Head of State, while the Europeans merrily drank to their royalty. He walked out of the dinner proceedings and, next morning, informed the bewildered Officer Commanding that he would prefer to be repatriated rather than suffer such scorn. The matter got a bit complicated, but an unyielding Sarfaraz would accept nothing short of an apology. The OC repented publicly and, later made sure that the Pakistanis were never slighted again (5). Sarfaraz also drove home a point that it was respect, not pennies that counted.

Sarfaraz was unconventional in more ways than one. His aversion to an arranged marriage invoked the ire of his conservative father, who had failed to incline Sarfaraz towards one particular offer; this included fringe benefits of a house and a good bit of cash besides the damsel! Star-crossed perhaps, he ran short of time looking for the right mate. The Mess remained his home and hearth till the end.

Deadly Stroke

Two memorable aerial encounters, each a classic of modern jet warfare, capped Sarfaraz Rafiqui's illustrious career as a fighter pilot. The evening of 1st September 1965 saw hectic and desperate attempts by the IAF to stop the rapid advance of Pak Army's 12 Division offensive against Akhnoor. Vampires, obsolescent but considered suitable for providing close support in the valleys of Kashmir, were hastily called into action. No. 45 Squadron was moved from Poona to Pathankot. The grim situation on the ground found the Vampires at work immediately. Three strikes of four Vampires each (alongwith some Canberras) had been launched in succession that evening. Much has been made of their success by the IAF, but Maj. Gen. G. S. Sandhu is not impressed; in his book ‘History of Indian Cavalry’, he recounts how the first Vampire strike of four ‘leisurely proceeded to destroy three AMX-13 tanks of India's own 20 Lancers, plus the only recovery vehicle and the only ammunition vehicle available during this hard-pressed fight. The second flight attacked Indian infantry and gun positions, blowing up several ammunition vehicles’. The Indian forces were spared further ignominy at their own hands when an element of two Sabres arrived on scene. Sqn. Ldr. Rafiqui and Flt. Lt. Imtiaz Bhatti were patrolling at 20,000 ft. near Chamb. On being vectored by the radar, they descended and picked up contact with two Vampires in the fading light. Rafiqui closed in rapidly and, before another two Vampires turned in on the Sabres, made short work of the first two with a blazing volley from the lethal 0.5’ Browning six-shooter. Then, with a quick-witted defensive break he readjusted on the wing of Bhatti, who got busy with his quarry. While Rafiqui cleared tails, Bhatti did an equally fast trigger job. One Vampire nosed over into the ground which was not too far below; the other, smoking and badly damaged, staggered for a few miles before its pilot, Flg. Off. Pathak, ejected. The less fortunate Flt. Lts. A K Bhagwagar, M V Joshi and S Bhardwaj went down with their ghoulish Vampires, in full view of the horrified Indian troops (6).

This single engagement resulted in a windfall of strategic dimensions for the PAF. The shocked and demoralised IAF immediately withdrew about 130 Vampires, together with over 50 Ouragons, from front-line service. The IAF was effectively reduced in combat strength by nearly 35% in one stroke, thanks to Rafiqui and Bhatti's marksmanship.

It may be appropriate to recollect the remarks of USAF Fighter Weapons School (Class of 1956) about Rafiqui's adeptness at gunnery. "Captain Rafiqui was the high individual in air-to-air firing and was above average in air-to-ground firing ... has a thorough understanding of methods and techniques used in fighter weapons delivery and aerial combat manoeuvring ...valuable as a future gunnery instructor...highly recommended that he be used in this capacity to the greatest advantage possible when returning". The PAF made no mistake and put his skills to good use, as the Chamb encounter demonstrated. But there was more to come.

 

[The Accountant]

A question to PAF veterans ? This just a question to understand the situation our brave soldier face ...

I just want to ask was this a wise or advisable move even from Pakistan? If he would have returned back then it would have saved us one brave soldier (which worth alot more) and one aircraft as well ...

So what do you guys think or are trained in such circumstances

 

[Jammer]

A question to PAF veterans ? This just a question to understand the situation our brave soldier face ...

I just want to ask was this a wise or advisable move even from Pakistan? If he would have returned back then it would have saved us one brave soldier (which worth alot more) and one aircraft as well ...

So what do you guys think or are trained in such circumstances

Had Sarfraz Saab retreated and not stayed on his no.2's tail (giving the illusion of threat to the IAF fighters even though his guns were jammed), Cecil Saab would probably not have made it. Turning tail in a old school melee of a dogfight against the superior acceleration of the hunter could possibly have allowed the hunters to get on both Sarfraz Saab and Cecil Saab's Sabre's six with ease, he therefore decided to cover his no.2 selflessly to buy him time and opportunity to do some damage and perhaps get away. A selfless leader, highly skilled pilot and a true son of the soil, may he rest in peace.

 

[SQ8]

A question to PAF veterans ? This just a question to understand the situation our brave soldier face ...

I just want to ask was this a wise or advisable move even from Pakistan? If he would have returned back then it would have saved us one brave soldier (which worth alot more) and one aircraft as well ...

So what do you guys think or are trained in such circumstances

It is a decision upto the leader, but the attitude of leave no man behind and the need to work as a team is what prevails.
As such, the PAF displayed dismal performance versus what its plans were and failed to objectively carry out its taskings to its full potential. There were a lot of contributors to this, but if the PAF plan was followed even 90% then the IAF would truly have been wiped out of the conflict.

Sadly, a leadership change at the wrong time and certain career frauds and yes men cost the PAF victory.

 

[MilSpec]

It is a decision upto the leader, but the attitude of leave no man behind and the need to work as a team is what prevails.
As such, the PAF displayed dismal performance versus what its plans were and failed to objectively carry out its taskings to its full potential. There were a lot of contributors to this, but if the PAF plan was followed even 90% then the IAF would truly have been wiped out of the conflict.

Sadly, a leadership change at the wrong time and certain career frauds and yes men cost the PAF victory.

Plans are all well and good till the first shots are fired, there onward, cause and effect takes over, no matter how well the plans are made there are bound to be setbacks. Nevertheless, in 65 PAF did catch IAF by surprise, but then again that surprise can only last for initial strike.

 

[SQ8]

Plans are all well and good till the first shots are fired, there onward, cause and effect takes over, no matter how well the plans are made there are bound to be setbacks. Nevertheless, in 65 PAF did catch IAF by surprise, but then again that surprise can only last for initial strike.

It lasted beyond the initial strike, the IAF in 65 was acting like a flying club im its coordination and skillset.
The results were the drubbing they recieved. Compare that to 71 where the IAF really put its lessons into play and were a different air force altogether.

 

[ghazi52]

All brave men of substance who delivered beyond the call of duty !

Air Marshal Malik Nur Khan Awan, Group Captain Cecil Chaudhry, Flying officer Aliuddin, Masood Hatmi.— with Yaseen Awan, Avm Farooq Umar and Lesley Ann Middlecoat.

 

[MilSpec]

It lasted beyond the initial strike, the IAF in 65 was acting like a flying club im its coordination and skillset.
The results were the drubbing they recieved. Compare that to 71 where the IAF really put its lessons into play and were a different air force altogether.

71 was a planned effort , while 65 wasn't as being a reaction to PA's op Gibraltar, main losses on ground got IAF rattled, but after initial setbacks IAF did get back taking the fight into Pakistani airspace, and you are right 65 was a wake up call for India, and lessons learnt were incorporated in subsequent years. 65 war air war had phases, later down the line IAF actually did well like decoy led targeting of badin etc.

 

[SQ8]

71 was a planned effort , while 65 wasn't as being a reaction to PA's op Gibraltar, main losses on ground got IAF rattled, but after initial setbacks IAF did get back taking the fight into Pakistani airspace, and you are right 65 was a wake up call for India, and lessons learnt were incorporated in subsequent years. 65 war air war had phases, later down the line IAF actually did well like decoy led targeting of badin etc.

USAF lessons from exhange programs, exposure breeds better warfighters.

To digress, current IAF is a deadly force on the basis of exercises and exchanges alone.

 

[MilSpec]

USAF lessons from exhange programs, exposure breeds better warfighters.

To digress, current IAF is a deadly force on the basis of exercises and exchanges alone.

Maybe half of the fighting fleet is. The other half is marred with obsolescence