Barak-8 is India's answer to Pakistan's Harpoon Anti-Ship Missile

[wiseone2]

How far Barack-8 can engage a fighter?? Because now PAF can launch AShMs from 250km range with variety and ease.

Also YJ-18 is designed to defeat US Agis system that means it can handle threats posed by interceptor missiles.

being designed to defeat the Aegis system is one thing
defeating it is another thing

 

[Mike_Brando]

Just heard news about Barak 8 was offered to colombia by IAI

I have heard somewhere that we(India) may end up buying as many as 100 Barak-8/ER systems from the IAI in the long run!!With three launchers and 24 missiles per system this will mean near about 2500 missiles in our inventory!!Man,these B-8s along with the S-400 are literally going to saturate our airspace from literally anyone!!

 

[Wasteland]

PN already operates super sonic anti ship missiles. But not sure how effective Barak8 would be against super-sonic targets.

The effectiveness is not based on the speed of the to-be-intercepted target, it's based on the size and altitude at which the anti-ship missile travels, anti-ship missiles like Exocet, although slow, are not easy, if not impossible to intercept.

 

[Guynextdoor2]

im skeptical on the speed. for a sam mach 2 is pathetic. i though it was in the region of mach 4-5.5. also the cm-400 is classed as hypersonic asm meaning it's terminal speed is mach 5+ or mach 5.5 to be publicly specific


ok thats the only time when you can troll, when its funny.

When the incoming missile has high Mach, the outgoing SAM has to have a low mach to maintain intercept course and remain agile.

 

[Mrc]

Cm 400 akg is for slow moving targets like an aircraft carier.... high speed at impact can give huge damage to target ship.. hence called "carier killer" . For smaller ships more agile harpoon block 2 or c 803 or exocest would be used

 

[Blue Marlin]

My Dear friend don't confused yourself from the Global Positional Satellite with the Survellance, monitoring and targeting Satellite. GPS provides the coordinates to the GPS reciever on the earth about its position. In simple word the Cruise Missile with the GPS reciever will get its own coordinates (whether Public or Military Grade) and not the Targets coordinates because it don't have that reciever which is connected to Chinese Belaidu.


I will appreciate if you give your technical knowledge light on those topics

1. Remote Sensing Satetllite and GPS satellite to detect Ship target ?

2. Air launch Cruise Missile promotional Range of 300 KM and the actual range when launch with the Sea Skimishing flight profile.

3. Nose Mounter fighter Radar range to detect the target to launch Harpoon or other ASHM against warship and stealth covertee like Shivalik

4. Barak 1/2 against Harpoon and Barak 8 against Harpoon-2 and CJ-xx (hypersonic)


@amardeep mishra Could you explain

ISPR saying it can hit the targets at Land and Sea does not means it can target the Moving target but the stationary target. I had already explain you in detail, that for targeting the Moving target with this Sub sonic Cruise Missile you would need continuous Monitoring, updates of the Target thru High speed two way Link. And Land and Sea target Means the stationary target whose coordinates and flight path is embebedded in the Missile prior to the launch, and the Missile sensors matches with the Maps in its memory to remain in its course of flight aka terracom. In case of SEA target e.g Island or Naval RIG there is no land picture for matching, in this case the magnetic imaging of sea is used instead of visual terrain map.

hi i havent. im mentioning two systems a gps and survalence

 

[Basel]

My Dear friend don't confused yourself from the Global Positional Satellite with the Survellance, monitoring and targeting Satellite. GPS provides the coordinates to the GPS reciever on the earth about its position. In simple word the Cruise Missile with the GPS reciever will get its own coordinates (whether Public or Military Grade) and not the Targets coordinates because it don't have that reciever which is connected to Chinese Belaidu.


I will appreciate if you give your technical knowledge light on those topics

1. Remote Sensing Satetllite and GPS satellite to detect Ship target ?

2. Air launch Cruise Missile promotional Range of 300 KM and the actual range when launch with the Sea Skimishing flight profile.

3. Nose Mounter fighter Radar range to detect the target to launch Harpoon or other ASHM against warship and stealth covertee like Shivalik

4. Barak 1/2 against Harpoon and Barak 8 against Harpoon-2 and CJ-xx (hypersonic)


@amardeep mishra Could you explain

ISPR saying it can hit the targets at Land and Sea does not means it can target the Moving target but the stationary target. I had already explain you in detail, that for targeting the Moving target with this Sub sonic Cruise Missile you would need continuous Monitoring, updates of the Target thru High speed two way Link. And Land and Sea target Means the stationary target whose coordinates and flight path is embebedded in the Missile prior to the launch, and the Missile sensors matches with the Maps in its memory to remain in its course of flight aka terracom. In case of SEA target e.g Island or Naval RIG there is no land picture for matching, in this case the magnetic imaging of sea is used instead of visual terrain map.

Are you the one who are working in Defense Production department of Mod in Pakistan?? Dear you are the enemy and Ra' ad can hit targets at sea you will only know when it will hit your so called mighty IN.

S 40 0 shall shoot it down.

Having a capability and using it are two different things, if India did that mistake then it will have severe consequences too, that is why India is building EW capabilities to handle threats like AWACS and in response Pakistan upgrading its capabilities.

being designed to defeat the Aegis system is one thing
defeating it is another thing

Your logic also applies on you acquired systems too Dear.

 

[Talwar e Pakistan]

those Pasthun were kicked back after Indian military arrived despite of all political or military backing by Pakistan, if Nehru was not in hurry to go to UN this dispute would be ended then & there

No Bhai Jaan, as soon as Kashmir was ceded, Indian troops were para dropped and then dug in. The Military did not back the Pasthun Militias, as the Military was making their own advances in Azad Kashmir which was halted by the then commander of the Pakistan military who refused to go any further, because he was British.

 

[HariPrasad]

Having a capability and using it are two different things, if India did that mistake then it will have severe consequences too, that is why India is building EW capabilities to handle threats like AWACS and in response Pakistan upgrading its capabilities.

You can not keep the pace with our modernization. By the time you get some stuff from china and put Pakistan tag, we would move a loat ahead like we did in case of LRSAM. Wait for a while. We are testing even a more potent version with even high range , High speed and high maneuverability.

 

[zebra7]

hi i havent. im mentioning two systems a gps and survalence

You forgot the third one Monitoring & Targeting System.

Leave aside every thing Just explain Airborne based ISR, and Space based ISR capability of Pakistan or rather China in Western Indian Ocean for Pakistan. In short Sea based C4ISR capability.

Let me explain what Chinese have.

The PLA decided that it was necessary to develop “an integrated C4ISR system” in the early 1990s. This was motivated by observations of U.S. prowess in Operation DESERT STORM,the U.S. role in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the 7 May 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing. The subsequent development of network-centric warfare added further impetus. Accordingly, in May 1999, China initiated the 995 Program to support megaprojects for the development of “assassin’s mace” weapons, which promised disproportionate effectiveness vis-à-vis a top military power, such as the United States, despite China’s overall technological inferiority.

Over the next decade, “the PLA began to develop and field airborne and space-based ISR technologies, and it was during this time that Chinese military analysts began to consider the requirements and applications of C4ISR systems to be used by the PLA.

Airborne ISR

China’s fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT); in wartime they would support air defense and antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Breakthroughs in the Beidou/Compass satellite system (discussed later) and high-speed data links, as demonstrated by China’s airborne earlywarning aircraft systems, are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress.

China’s smaller KJ-200/Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol, electronic warfare, airborneearly-warning and control aircraft, with its electronically steered, active, phased-array radar (similar in appearance to, but larger than, Sweden’s Ericsson Erieye active phasedarray radar), complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically. 8 Gaoxin ISR variants based on Y-8 medium transport aircraft, TU-154 for ELINT/SIGNIT/ESW/Communication Relay/C3I/EW countermeasures/Airborne Earlywarning systems.


Space based ISR

Space capabilities underpin China’s current naval and other military capabilities for the near seas. The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen PLA capabilities.
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
China’s reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO), multi- and hyperspectral, and radar, especially SAR. Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY), the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), Ziyuan (ZY), the Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC), Haiyang (HY), Huanjing (HJ), and Yaogan (YG) satellites.
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft, which remain as orbital modules after their crews return to earth, and the Tiangong(TG) space-station module launched in 2011, as relevant to reconnaissance.38
Fengyun weather satellites provide visible, IR, and microwave imaging. Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014, FY-3D/PM1 and FY-4 M in 2015, FY-3E/AM1 in 2017, FY-3F/PM2 in 2019, FY-3G/AM3 in 2021, FY-3H/PM3 in 2023, and FY-4 O at an unspecified date. FY-2H and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary; all others have polar orbits. Three satellite series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring. The CBERS polar near-real-time electro-optical satellites, with 2.7-meter resolution, are used for military observation. CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons, with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX optical sensors, may be launched as early as 2013.

Ocean surveillance, a significant focus of Chinese satellite development, has been prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology Development Plan.

High-Resolution Reconnaissance, Possible ELINT Satellites: Yaogan China’s Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced, paired SAR and EO remote-sensing satellites, operating in near-polar, sun-synchronous orbits, “may provide multiwavelength, overlapping, continuous medium resolution, global imagery of military targets.
Ya o g a n - 9; Yaog an - 16A, B,and C;and Yaog an - 17A, B,and Cconstellations may constitute a vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network. Flying in triangular formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations, each constellation apparently contains an electro-optical surveillance satellite, a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite, and possibly an electronic/signal intelligence satellite. Designed for location and tracking of
foreign warships, the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval vessels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy. . . . They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships, providing accurate positioning data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems.
Also China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites.

Beidou/Compass Satellites

By 2020, a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit, twenty-seven inclined medium earth orbit, and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global coverage. Beidou/Compass provides PNT to an accuracy of ten meters, 0.2 meters per second, and ten nanoseconds, respectively; it also offers “differential” and “integrity” services. Initially, unlike other PNT systems, which transmit signals directly, it transmitted signals indirectly, through a central ground station, although the PLA General Armament Department’s newspaper recently reported that “after providing passive navigation and locating service, Beidou became more and more like the GPS system.

Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets

To achieve its near-seas operational objectives, the must needed is to coordinate multiple sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communications and a common operational picture. Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets. For instance,
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed roughly at the position of a CSG, as determined partly on the basis of satellite data. Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSG—by, for instance, supplying position updates.

The Beidou/Compass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision of Chinese ballistic missiles. China’s combination of land-based radars and satellites— perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or microsatellites—might be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
China’s coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat. Examination of the orbits, inclinations, and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic sense of their coverage. By 2009, China had approximately twenty-two imaging satellites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG.
This number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage, in terms of revisit times for specific ocean areas, but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan satellites of multiple types, and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of Gaofen satellites. In 2009, civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites, plus additional military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian, plus additional military) by 2020; these estimates may require adjustment, given recent launch numbers.

The Challenge

Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process. China would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose. Qu Dian would have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fusion process, then transmit the result to commanders and shooters. Even with complete coverage of relevant maritime zones, data transmission (i.e., from satellites to ground stations), imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area examined), and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays. Software and data management requirements will be complex. Command and control will likely pose particular challenges: the PLA will have to coordinate both among the many service elements that “own” various ISR sensor and ground station architectures and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use, and with the release authority (CMC, supreme command, or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs.


Geostrategic Implications

China’s air- and space-based surveillance platforms—together with their supporting infrastructure, human and otherwise—are improving rapidly but remain incomplete and are experiencing growing pains. As Larry Wortzel emphasizes, “The duration on station of its AWACS aircraft is short, their range is limited, and not all of them are capable of aerial refueling. Most of the PLA’s combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked operations but can handle only a limited number of targets. In addition, not all of the China’s emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nation’s maritime periphery. In the near seas, at least, China’s military awareness, coordination, and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously. weapons they carry can receive the networked combat data.

Are you the one who are working in Defense Production department of Mod in Pakistan?? Dear you are the enemy and Ra' ad can hit targets at sea you will only know when it will hit your so called mighty IN.

My dear friend I don't work in the defense department of Pakistan, but I do have some Idea how this Cruise Missile works. So you claim Ra'ad could hit the movable target, I have posted some material to @Blue Marlin about some information on how China would achieve that in the seas near the China. In the mean time let ask some experts @Horus @Oscar @MilSpec @AUSTERLITZ @waz

@PARIKRAMA @nForce @Abingdonboy @amardeep mishra @Nilgiri

 

[Blue Marlin]

You forgot the third one Monitoring & Targeting System.

Leave aside every thing Just explain Airborne based ISR, and Space based ISR capability of Pakistan or rather China in Western Indian Ocean for Pakistan. In short Sea based C4ISR capability.

Let me explain what Chinese have.

The PLA decided that it was necessary to develop “an integrated C4ISR system” in the early 1990s. This was motivated by observations of U.S. prowess in Operation DESERT STORM,the U.S. role in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the 7 May 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing. The subsequent development of network-centric warfare added further impetus. Accordingly, in May 1999, China initiated the 995 Program to support megaprojects for the development of “assassin’s mace” weapons, which promised disproportionate effectiveness vis-à-vis a top military power, such as the United States, despite China’s overall technological inferiority.

Over the next decade, “the PLA began to develop and field airborne and space-based ISR technologies, and it was during this time that Chinese military analysts began to consider the requirements and applications of C4ISR systems to be used by the PLA.

Airborne ISR

China’s fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT); in wartime they would support air defense and antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Breakthroughs in the Beidou/Compass satellite system (discussed later) and high-speed data links, as demonstrated by China’s airborne earlywarning aircraft systems, are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress.

China’s smaller KJ-200/Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol, electronic warfare, airborneearly-warning and control aircraft, with its electronically steered, active, phased-array radar (similar in appearance to, but larger than, Sweden’s Ericsson Erieye active phasedarray radar), complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically. 8 Gaoxin ISR variants based on Y-8 medium transport aircraft, TU-154 for ELINT/SIGNIT/ESW/Communication Relay/C3I/EW countermeasures/Airborne Earlywarning systems.


Space based ISR

Space capabilities underpin China’s current naval and other military capabilities for the near seas. The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen PLA capabilities.
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
China’s reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO), multi- and hyperspectral, and radar, especially SAR. Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY), the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), Ziyuan (ZY), the Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC), Haiyang (HY), Huanjing (HJ), and Yaogan (YG) satellites.
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft, which remain as orbital modules after their crews return to earth, and the Tiangong(TG) space-station module launched in 2011, as relevant to reconnaissance.38
Fengyun weather satellites provide visible, IR, and microwave imaging. Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014, FY-3D/PM1 and FY-4 M in 2015, FY-3E/AM1 in 2017, FY-3F/PM2 in 2019, FY-3G/AM3 in 2021, FY-3H/PM3 in 2023, and FY-4 O at an unspecified date. FY-2H and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary; all others have polar orbits. Three satellite series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring. The CBERS polar near-real-time electro-optical satellites, with 2.7-meter resolution, are used for military observation. CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons, with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX optical sensors, may be launched as early as 2013.

Ocean surveillance, a significant focus of Chinese satellite development, has been prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology Development Plan.

High-Resolution Reconnaissance, Possible ELINT Satellites: Yaogan China’s Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced, paired SAR and EO remote-sensing satellites, operating in near-polar, sun-synchronous orbits, “may provide multiwavelength, overlapping, continuous medium resolution, global imagery of military targets.
Ya o g a n - 9; Yaog an - 16A, B,and C;and Yaog an - 17A, B,and Cconstellations may constitute a vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network. Flying in triangular formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations, each constellation apparently contains an electro-optical surveillance satellite, a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite, and possibly an electronic/signal intelligence satellite. Designed for location and tracking of
foreign warships, the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval vessels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy. . . . They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships, providing accurate positioning data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems.
Also China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites.

Beidou/Compass Satellites

By 2020, a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit, twenty-seven inclined medium earth orbit, and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global coverage. Beidou/Compass provides PNT to an accuracy of ten meters, 0.2 meters per second, and ten nanoseconds, respectively; it also offers “differential” and “integrity” services. Initially, unlike other PNT systems, which transmit signals directly, it transmitted signals indirectly, through a central ground station, although the PLA General Armament Department’s newspaper recently reported that “after providing passive navigation and locating service, Beidou became more and more like the GPS system.

Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets

To achieve its near-seas operational objectives, the must needed is to coordinate multiple sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communications and a common operational picture. Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets. For instance,
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed roughly at the position of a CSG, as determined partly on the basis of satellite data. Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSG—by, for instance, supplying position updates.

The Beidou/Compass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision of Chinese ballistic missiles. China’s combination of land-based radars and satellites— perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or microsatellites—might be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
China’s coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat. Examination of the orbits, inclinations, and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic sense of their coverage. By 2009, China had approximately twenty-two imaging satellites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG.
This number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage, in terms of revisit times for specific ocean areas, but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan satellites of multiple types, and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of Gaofen satellites. In 2009, civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites, plus additional military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian, plus additional military) by 2020; these estimates may require adjustment, given recent launch numbers.

The Challenge

Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process. China would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose. Qu Dian would have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fusion process, then transmit the result to commanders and shooters. Even with complete coverage of relevant maritime zones, data transmission (i.e., from satellites to ground stations), imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area examined), and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays. Software and data management requirements will be complex. Command and control will likely pose particular challenges: the PLA will have to coordinate both among the many service elements that “own” various ISR sensor and ground station architectures and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use, and with the release authority (CMC, supreme command, or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs.


Geostrategic Implications

China’s air- and space-based surveillance platforms—together with their supporting infrastructure, human and otherwise—are improving rapidly but remain incomplete and are experiencing growing pains. As Larry Wortzel emphasizes, “The duration on station of its AWACS aircraft is short, their range is limited, and not all of them are capable of aerial refueling. Most of the PLA’s combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked operations but can handle only a limited number of targets. In addition, not all of the China’s emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nation’s maritime periphery. In the near seas, at least, China’s military awareness, coordination, and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously. weapons they carry can receive the networked combat data.



My dear friend I don't work in the defense department of Pakistan, but I do have some Idea how this Cruise Missile works. So you claim Ra'ad could hit the movable target, I have posted some material to @Blue Marlin about some information on how China would achieve that in the seas near the China. In the mean time let ask some experts @Horus @Oscar @MilSpec @AUSTERLITZ @waz

@PARIKRAMA @nForce @Abingdonboy @amardeep mishra @Nilgiri

as good as as read that was im still mentioning two methods, survalence and tracking/gps satelites. there are plenty of other methods of survalence and guidance some of which you have missed, but thats when it get to big and long and simply just too boring.guidance is somthig mm planning to doing my disertation on then we can have the multithreaded comparison. also i prefer a dual comparisons as opposed to a multi threaded one, even if there is more than two subjects.

 

[ni8mare]

Dear you are the enemy and Ra' ad can hit targets at sea you will only know when it will hit your so called mighty IN

To hit a moving ship at sea you going to need terminal guidance ..does raad has it if not cut the crap of hitting targets at sea which you rant all the time ....and your raad is not some super weapon that cannot be shot down ..CIWS and barak 1 is more than enough

And yes IN is indeed mighty we are not talking about coast guard here

 

[surya kiran]

To hit a moving ship at sea you going to need terminal guidance ..does raad has it if not cut the crap of hitting targets at sea which you rant all the time ....and your raad is not some super weapon that cannot be shot down ..CIWS and barak 1 is more than enough

And yes IN is indeed mighty we are not talking about coast guard here

Raad is not a sea skimmer. Will get picked up miles away.

 

[tsinga]

Pakistan will field AWACS to track IN if you don't believe check out how it was deployed recently in Sea Spark 2015.

Yes. Pakistan could bring its AWACS forward if the Indian SAG does not have a Carrier Group supporting it. If the Carrier is present, that is a squadron of jets waiting for an opportunity to take down an AWACS.

And if Pakistan persists, it would have to cover its own AWACS with a very large escort (as opposed to the standard skeletal escort) which would give the Indian Airforce a wide opening to attack from the East and the Indian Navy a wide warning.

Its means near hypersonic.

India has a hypersonic CM and AShM deployed for close to a decade now. Barak 8 development factored in hypersonic missiles from the get go.

People forget that anti ship missiles can be made to stealth configurations of F22 and then some due to even a smaller physical footprint and passive hunting options....... therefore, unless you design a radar that can actually detect an F22, the holy grail of stealth, you are left with no other option but CIWS and SRSAMS.

Do you know what is stealth?
Nothing is undetectable. Its just that the RCS of F-22 is small enough that by the time it gets detected, it is able to complete its mission.

Any radar worth a chip inside of it will detect a CM visible at horizon level.
Point defense systems are purpose built to swing into action to provide at that stage. Which is why Indian Navy went all in for Barak systems. It shoots down (has been tested and has literally been tested against every AShM in Indian inventory - from both West and Russia - successful every single time)

Or as per you, all the global navies are daft as they are all developing naval SAM's with increasing range and sophistication when "F-22 like" missiles can be deployed by the likes of underfunded and not-very-capable Navies like Pakistan Navy also fielding them.

 

[zebra7]

More accurate details form Israel about B-8.V-Clip in the link.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/watch-isra ... se-system/

WATCH: Israel successfully launches new naval missile defense system

IDF holds first operational test of ‘Barak 8,’ aimed to deflect Hezbollah weapons, as all eyes turn to more powerful Russian S-400

By Judah Ari Gross and Times of Israel staff November 26, 2015,
The Israel Navy has carried out its first successful launch of a new maritime missile defense system under battlefield conditions, a senior naval official announced on Thursday.

News of the “Barak 8” missile defense system’s successful test came as the eyes of the world turn to the Russian S-400, an anti-aircraft system deployed in Syria on Thursday, which operates at a substantially greater distance.

Though the Russian missile system is effective at a greater range, the Barak 8 can be installed on naval ships as well as on the ground, giving it a decided advantage in its mobility.

The system, made up of a radar array and missile launcher, successfully detected and shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle “that was very fast and very small,” in order to simulate a real-life enemy aircraft or missiles, the naval officer said.

The system, which was developed jointly by Israel and India, had been installed on one of Israel’s Sa’ar 5-class warships. In previous tests, the missiles had been fired from land.

The radar acquiring targets for the Barak 8 system is code-named Adir (Hebrew for “Tremendous”), or MF-STAR (Multi Function Surveillance And Threat Alert Radar).

This newest iteration (“8”) is intended to defend against advanced weaponry believed to be in the hands of Hezbollah, including the Russian-made Yakhont P-800 anti-ship missile.

“The Barak/Adir systems will be able to deal with the Yakhont,” the senior officer boasted. “It is the bread and butter of this system.”
The Israeli Navy tests its new 'Barak 8' missile defense system on November 26, 2015. The missile (blue) is shown here about to strike its target (red). (Screen capture: IDF Spokesperson's Unit)

The system is intended to be mounted either on naval vessels or on the ground, in a battery formation. It can identify and destroy airborne threats like UAVs, jets, missiles and rockets — including projectiles launched simultaneously.

Though the senior officer said he could not reveal the maximum range of the Barak 8 system, an executive vice president of Israel Aerospace Industries, which helped develop the defense system, revealed to Jane’s Defense News earlier this summer that some of the missiles being used can shoot down targets at a range of 150 kilometers (93 miles).

The system is also intended to defend the coastline and reportedly can tackle missiles larger than those within the capabilities of the Iron Dome system.

If the desi fish do not match existing firang fish,forget about more advanced torpedoes,then what's the point? Is this yet another case of "more talk than walk" from the DRDO? One cannot accuse the IN of sabotaging indigenous efforts.It is the only service that has gone the whole hog in maximizing indigenisation with its own naval design team. Weapon systems and sensors are the only areas where it is yet to succeed,as these are designed and developed by the DRDO/DPSUs.

The 30mm main armament on many of the smaller IN and CG vessels was an ingenious development from the BMP-1 turret if I am right.This was being made locally under licence from Russia.I don't understand what the problem is,upgunning these smaller vessels with a new more capable 30mm gun ,or problems with the Italian 3' gun on the FFGs and DDGs. ideally for these smaller vessels a gun/missile system like the lightweight Russian systemsdeveloped from the Kashtan/Kortik/Palma systems.There is even the Sosna system for smaller craft.Full details in the link.

http://defense-update.com/products/s/Sosna-R.htm
Quote:
SOSNA-R

Air defense System /

For protection of smaller missile boats and corvettes against air attacks, Russia is offering the new Palma turret, which incorporates the same close-in air defense system used with the Tunguska (SA-19 Grison). Palma uses eight SOSNA-R missiles and two 30mm six-barrel AO-18KD gatling guns, which have a cyclic rate of fire of 10,000 rounds per minute. Each gun is provided with 1,500 ready-use rounds. Palma provides fully automatic close-in protection for naval ships and, unlike most Russian systems, uses combined input from radar, laser and IR systems, reportedly making it immune to electronic countermeasures.
The SOSNA-R 9M337 (SA-24) hyper-velocity beam rider missile is a two-stage missile designed for interception of fired wing aircraft and helicopters, as well as guided weapons and cruise missiles. This missile type is also capable of engaging light armored vehicles. The missile uses radar-guidance for boost phase, transitioning to laser beam guidance for mid-course corrections and the terminal phase. The 28 kg missile can sustain maximum dynamic loads of 40Gs, cruises at a speed of 570 m/sec and has a top speed of 920 m/sec. The missile is equipped with a fragmentation charge activated at close proximity flyby, or a rod penetrator, which is used when a direct hit can be achieved. The missile uses a selective proximity/impact fuse with continuous circular pattern scan and adaptive burst rate in order to support both kill mechanisms. SOSNA-R missiles are designed to engage targets at ranges of 1 – 10 km and altitudes of 6 – 15,000 feet.

PS:Some good news. Media reports (Hindu).The B-8 LR naval SAM will be tested shortly from the INS Kol. The missile is meant to replace the B-1s in service.The JV between India and Israel is running 4 years late due to "tech difficulties".DRDO delays supposed to be the reason says the other side. The short ramged Maitri missile is also overdue,sanctioned way back in 2007 another JV with MBDA but it did not arrive as it "clashed with the Akash programme"!

I've never heard such bull in my life.Are we incapable or developing several types of missile simultaneously? It is now almost 2016,9 years on.Surely the parameters drawn up of the SR-SAM ,which is yet to arrive will be obsolete by now,or will the goalposts be continually shifted until it arrives?

IN warships must have reliable layered air defence systems.As someone said in another post I think,there must be alternatives,"Plan B" readily available in case the first option fails. The absence of this is affecting acquisitions across the board from the MMRCA to missiles. The **** navy has just successfully tested its anti-ship missiles in the Arabian Sea.It possesses both Harpoons,French Exocets and Chinese anti-ship missiles that cannot be sniffed at.

If the B-8 tests are successful,why can't they be installed straight away on the Vik-A carrier? This is the most important vessel in the IN's fleet and at the moment lacks any kind of SAM/anti-missile system. Earlier reports said that the B-1s would be refitted from a G class FFG being pensioned off.It makes little sense.That system could be used on a smaller warship. The more capable B-8 should first be used on the most valuable warship in the fleet.