fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Backstage, U.S. Nurtured Pakistan Rivals Deal
By HELENE COOPER and MARK MAZZETTI
Published: October 20, 2007
WASHINGTON, Oct. 19 To lay the groundwork for Benazir Bhuttos return to Pakistan, some of the highest ranking officials in the Bush administration lavished attention on her as they worked to broker a power-sharing arrangement between Ms. Bhutto and her longtime rival, President Pervez Musharraf.
Benazir Bhutto's Arrival But the violence that greeted Ms. Bhutto on her return after eight years in exile and the finger-pointing between her camp and General Musharrafs after the attack on her motorcade on Thursday has raised questions about whether the tenuous deal that the United States helped midwife can survive.
Bush administration officials on Friday publicly played down the potential for a deepening rift between General Musharraf and Ms. Bhutto, pointing out that the opposition leader herself had praised the rescue efforts of Pakistans security forces after Thursdays attack and that General Musharraf had called Ms. Bhutto to make sure she was safe after the blast.
But unresolved questions about the attack have added a new layer of distrust to relations between Ms. Bhutto and the government, as well as new uncertainties for the Bush administration policy.
On Friday, American officials acknowledged that there was no clear basis for confidence that the two leaders could work cooperatively. Now that Ms. Bhutto has returned to the country, they acknowledged that their control over events was limited, as Thursdays bombing showed.
Theres really not much left to say or do at this point, one Bush administration official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to publicly discuss American policy on Pakistan. But theres no clear indication that there is a foundation for both sides to work together cooperatively.
Ms. Bhutto used her time in exile to nurture influential connections within Washingtons power corridors. Still, the Bush administration had long kept her at arms length, in large part out of deference to General Musharraf, who cast his lot with the White House after the Sept. 11 attacks.
Two years ago, Ms. Bhutto could not even get the State Departments top official for South Asia to show up at a dinner party in her honor. (A desk officer in charge of Pakistan was sent instead.)
But in recent months that began to change. The American courtship of Ms. Bhutto included a private dinner and a jet ride with Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador to the United Nations, and, over the last month, several telephone calls to Ms. Bhutto from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
The Bush administration for a long time decided that the only telephone number in Pakistan they were going to call was Musharrafs, said Husain Haqqani, a former adviser to Ms. Bhutto and a professor of international relations at Boston University. But Bhutto made it clear to them that her phone number was available to call anytime.
In turning back to Ms. Bhutto, administration officials said they acted with reluctance, after General Musharrafs own political missteps and the mounting opposition to his military government had weakened his grip on power and threatened to plunge Pakistan deeper into turmoil.
The administration concluded over the summer that a power-sharing deal with Ms. Bhutto might be the only way that General Musharraf could keep from being toppled.
It began quietly nurturing the accord, under which Ms. Bhuttos party did not boycott General Musharrafs election last month, and the president issued a decree granting Ms. Bhutto and others amnesty for recent corruption charges, opening the way for her return.
Administration officials say that Ms. Rice stepped up her personal involvement last month, when it seemed possible that General Musharrafs other political nemesis, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, would make his own bid to return to power, and upset the deal.
Still, even now, there is no great love in the Bush administration for Ms. Bhutto. While American intelligence officials have been frustrated at times with General Musharrafs record in fighting the Islamic militants in northern Pakistan, they have also found a small level of comfort in dealing with him.
Now they worry that Ms. Bhuttos re-entry to Pakistans political scene will complicate their lagging efforts to pursue insurgents from Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
State Department bureaucrats also fret that her turbulent past will further inflame an already volatile country. Inside and outside the American bureaucracy, there remains deep skepticism that the arrangement between two longtime enemies has a chance for long-term success.
This backroom deal I think is going to explode in our face, said Bruce Riedel, who advised three presidents on South Asian issues and is now at the Brookings Institution. Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Musharraf detest each other, and the concept that they can somehow work collaboratively is a real stretch.
Before she left for Pakistan and since her return, Ms. Bhutto has publicly pressed an agenda that should please American policy makers: advocating democracy and attacking suicide bombing and Islamic militancy in words more forceful than those normally used by General Musharraf.
Still, there is concern among American officials that, given rising anti-Americanism inside Pakistan, eventually she and General Musharraf could compete for public support by showing who is less beholden to the White House especially on matters like attacking Al Qaedas haven in Pakistans tribal areas.
By HELENE COOPER and MARK MAZZETTI
Published: October 20, 2007
WASHINGTON, Oct. 19 To lay the groundwork for Benazir Bhuttos return to Pakistan, some of the highest ranking officials in the Bush administration lavished attention on her as they worked to broker a power-sharing arrangement between Ms. Bhutto and her longtime rival, President Pervez Musharraf.
Benazir Bhutto's Arrival But the violence that greeted Ms. Bhutto on her return after eight years in exile and the finger-pointing between her camp and General Musharrafs after the attack on her motorcade on Thursday has raised questions about whether the tenuous deal that the United States helped midwife can survive.
Bush administration officials on Friday publicly played down the potential for a deepening rift between General Musharraf and Ms. Bhutto, pointing out that the opposition leader herself had praised the rescue efforts of Pakistans security forces after Thursdays attack and that General Musharraf had called Ms. Bhutto to make sure she was safe after the blast.
But unresolved questions about the attack have added a new layer of distrust to relations between Ms. Bhutto and the government, as well as new uncertainties for the Bush administration policy.
On Friday, American officials acknowledged that there was no clear basis for confidence that the two leaders could work cooperatively. Now that Ms. Bhutto has returned to the country, they acknowledged that their control over events was limited, as Thursdays bombing showed.
Theres really not much left to say or do at this point, one Bush administration official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to publicly discuss American policy on Pakistan. But theres no clear indication that there is a foundation for both sides to work together cooperatively.
Ms. Bhutto used her time in exile to nurture influential connections within Washingtons power corridors. Still, the Bush administration had long kept her at arms length, in large part out of deference to General Musharraf, who cast his lot with the White House after the Sept. 11 attacks.
Two years ago, Ms. Bhutto could not even get the State Departments top official for South Asia to show up at a dinner party in her honor. (A desk officer in charge of Pakistan was sent instead.)
But in recent months that began to change. The American courtship of Ms. Bhutto included a private dinner and a jet ride with Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador to the United Nations, and, over the last month, several telephone calls to Ms. Bhutto from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
The Bush administration for a long time decided that the only telephone number in Pakistan they were going to call was Musharrafs, said Husain Haqqani, a former adviser to Ms. Bhutto and a professor of international relations at Boston University. But Bhutto made it clear to them that her phone number was available to call anytime.
In turning back to Ms. Bhutto, administration officials said they acted with reluctance, after General Musharrafs own political missteps and the mounting opposition to his military government had weakened his grip on power and threatened to plunge Pakistan deeper into turmoil.
The administration concluded over the summer that a power-sharing deal with Ms. Bhutto might be the only way that General Musharraf could keep from being toppled.
It began quietly nurturing the accord, under which Ms. Bhuttos party did not boycott General Musharrafs election last month, and the president issued a decree granting Ms. Bhutto and others amnesty for recent corruption charges, opening the way for her return.
Administration officials say that Ms. Rice stepped up her personal involvement last month, when it seemed possible that General Musharrafs other political nemesis, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, would make his own bid to return to power, and upset the deal.
Still, even now, there is no great love in the Bush administration for Ms. Bhutto. While American intelligence officials have been frustrated at times with General Musharrafs record in fighting the Islamic militants in northern Pakistan, they have also found a small level of comfort in dealing with him.
Now they worry that Ms. Bhuttos re-entry to Pakistans political scene will complicate their lagging efforts to pursue insurgents from Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
State Department bureaucrats also fret that her turbulent past will further inflame an already volatile country. Inside and outside the American bureaucracy, there remains deep skepticism that the arrangement between two longtime enemies has a chance for long-term success.
This backroom deal I think is going to explode in our face, said Bruce Riedel, who advised three presidents on South Asian issues and is now at the Brookings Institution. Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Musharraf detest each other, and the concept that they can somehow work collaboratively is a real stretch.
Before she left for Pakistan and since her return, Ms. Bhutto has publicly pressed an agenda that should please American policy makers: advocating democracy and attacking suicide bombing and Islamic militancy in words more forceful than those normally used by General Musharraf.
Still, there is concern among American officials that, given rising anti-Americanism inside Pakistan, eventually she and General Musharraf could compete for public support by showing who is less beholden to the White House especially on matters like attacking Al Qaedas haven in Pakistans tribal areas.
