Copied from Acig.info, a nice summary of what has happened till now.
Nov 02, 2020 6:26 am
Found this: IN RUSSIAN
https://lostarmour.info/offtopic/caucas ... 5134447568 FOR RECORD...
On the situation in the mountains of Karabakh. Lachin, Shusha, Hadrut, Martuni (Khojavend).
I will present some of my views on the current operational situation on the southern face of the front in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). Since I had at one time to be a co-author of this work and the author of chapters dedicated to the April 2016 war and the dynamics of the balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan: http: //cast.ru/news/tsentr -...
So. What happened again:
1. At the beginning of the conflict, the NKR Armed Forces were increased to 21.5 thousand bayonets (including 8500 servicemen from NKR itself and about 13 thousand servicemen who arrived from Armenia). They were organizationally consolidated into two divisions: the 10th Guards Rifle Division (north and center) and the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, framed and deployed in case of war (south). In addition, before the outbreak of hostilities, the Armenians managed to transfer about 8,500 more people, bringing the number of their troops to about 30 thousand bayonets.
2. Azerbaijanis used the same tactics that they practiced back in the April 2016 war. They gathered the bulk of their troops along the railway road, running parallel to the borders of the NKR through Yevlakh and east of the unrecognized republic, about a few tens of kilometers to the rear of the contact line, and at the right moment quickly brought the columns down, literally throwing them straight into battle (in the campaign In 2016, the columns were stopped, and the main forces were not brought into battle). It seems that this was connected with the swiftness of the onslaught of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces and a kind of "zerg-rush" when the troops stormed the Armenian lines until they were completely concentrated. Those. Azerbaijanis somewhat outplayed the Armenians in deployment due to slightly better communications (railways, albeit with poor throughput, against the significantly worse throughput of Armenians' highways going through the passes). And at the initial stage they received 100 thousand of their soldiers in three corps groups against 30 thousand in two divisions from the Armenians.
3. The Armenians made a mistake in the alignment of forces and assembled in the north three regimental groups at once (6th, 7th and one more SMR, their best units), which was the reason for the clogging of the Azerbaijani offensive here, in difficult terrain. But the main attack of the Azerbaijanis was naturally inflicted in the south, where in the direction of the main attack the Armenians had one 9th MRR against three infantry brigades of Azerbaijanis in the first echelon (the advantage was several times). Although this regiment occupied the area allotted by the defense standards for the regiment (10-12 km), it was on the plain and was poorly equipped in engineering terms, which led to the Azeris pushing through the defense here during about the first 10 days of the offensive. At the same time, the reinforcements of the Armenian forces here, marching in echelons, could not stabilize the situation.
4. Then well-known events took place. The Azerbaijanis put at least six motorized rifle brigades into operation in the second line and brought the number of the group operating against the NKR to about 150 thousand people. At the same time, significant forces were sent to the south, where the Azerbaijanis, on the basis of the 2nd Army Corps, deployed, in fact, a combined-arms army: 7-8 motorized rifle brigades, a reserve tank brigade on imported T-90S, summed up from the reserve 4th corps near Baku. With the stabilization of the front in the north and south, and minus the reserves and supplies of the entire grouping (but taking into account their rear supply personnel, of course), this gave at least 60-70 thousand bayonets here, in the south, among the Azerbaijanis - despite the fact that the Armenian forces had in the sum of up to 7 MRP plus separate units from the 10th Guards Rifle Division and the 18th Motorized Rifle Division by the 20th of October on a wide front from Martuni-Khojavend to Araks (about 20 thousand bayonets).
5. The need to go deeper into the enemy's defenses and at the same time expand the narrow "neck" of the Horadiz corridor forced the Azerbaijanis to act here in the south, in fact, in two corps groups: against Hadrut-Fuzuli (to expand the "neck"), with a separate blow on Khojavend-Martuni , and towards the Armenian border with the NKR, with the prospect of the expected turn to Lachin along the Aker River gorge. Counterattacks of the Armenians and attempts to lure into a trap in the conditions of an overwhelming quantitative and qualitative superiority of the enemy did not lead to a loss of pace for him, but, on the contrary, entailed the loss of territory and combat capability of his own units. This was a brief description of the attempted counterattack of the Armenian tank battalion near Horadiz (an Armenian village consonant with the city of the same name) on October 8, the Jebrail battle on October 10-11 and the Zangelan battle on October 20-21.
6. The advance of the Azerbaijani forces into the mountains led to a loss of pace in them due to the complexity of the terrain. In addition, Armenia did not bring into action the main forces concentrated in two corps on the border with NKR. This is 40-50 thousand bayonets in four divisions (two per corps), each deployed on the basis of a motorized rifle regiment. Some of these forces, apparently, were introduced, but dosed. The rest are standing at the border and waiting for the signal, supporting actions in the border zone with artillery and army aviation. This is the factor of a possible counter-offensive by the Armenians, about which so much has been said.
7. In reality, during the period of hostilities in NKR, only 20-25 thousand volunteers and reservists and some separate units of the Armenian Armed Forces went to the 30 thousand forces that were there before the war (30 thousand bayonets). In total - 50-60 thousand people. Excluding losses, Armenians now have no more than 35-40 thousand people in the ranks in the NKR. Only the number of active bayonets among the Armenians in the NKR (excluding the supply personnel) is estimated by the Azerbaijanis at only 20 thousand people.
8. The difficulties of the Azerbaijanis with the fact that they cannot achieve a swift victory with a cash advantage are explained by the fact that in a mountainous area they stumbled upon a line of fortified areas of Armenians, built so as to cover the "road of life" from Goris to Stepanakert from the south (at the same time covering from the south near Lachin, it seems, had to be formed in a hurry, as well as near Shusha).
9. In Karabakh, in the mountainous area, the following picture seems to have taken place. The Azerbaijanis, advancing, were not able to suppress the Armenian fortified areas in the region of Gadrut and Martuni-Khojavend, but tried to bypass them, squeeze and, if possible, neutralize them. Since they are located in mountain ranges, and their assault is a costly business (as a result, the Azerbaijani communications themselves stretched like thin snakes between such defensive areas).
- A fortification in the Hadrut region (in the region of the notorious Hadrut plateau and in the mountainous area). Before the war, there were positions of the 1st defensive region of the Armenians - 1st MRP + reinforcement units, including a tank battalion, an artillery division, a flamethrower company, and so on. In total, up to 2000-2500 bayonets by peacetime states and 3000-4000 bayonets by military states, taking into account the reinforcements that have arrived.
- A fortification in the mountain range near Martuni-Khojavend. This is the 2nd defensive area of the Armenians: the 2nd MRP and reinforcement units, respectively. The outfit of forces is approximately comparable to the 1st district.
Accordingly, in order to smoke three thousand (at least) detachments of Armenians in each of the listed fortified areas in the mountainous terrain at equipped positions, the Azerbaijanis need a grouping of 15-20 thousand bayonets for each. With a corresponding distraction from Shushi, which itself is a real mountain fortress and a pass, allowing you to control the heights over the same Stepanakert and the key position of the entire war. In particular, the positions of the 41st special Armenian artillery regiment are supposedly located here, firing at Azerbaijanis from "Smerchi". Not far from Stepanakert are also the positions of a separate Armenian tank brigade (up to 70 T-72s in service before the war), plus here, in the most populated area of the NKR and the hub of its communications, the main forces of the Armenian 10th Guards Rifle Division: several motorized rifle regiments.
10. Until the elimination or sufficient neutralization of these fortified areas, it will be problematic for Azerbaijanis to pull up the columns to the assault target - Shusha - along the mountain roads, as well as to carry out supplies if the Armenians fire (fire control of enemy communications) and counterattack from the flanks. Therefore, the Azerbaijani command, it seems, is again abandoning deep breakthroughs, preferring to provide their messages and gnaw out parts of the enemy's territory in small pieces (but this is only a version so far).
