Half a century has gone by since a border war between China and India broke out in the eastern Himalayas on October 20, 1962. Memories of that war linger not only at the Indian national policymaking level but also in local discourses in northeast India, given the Indian defeat at the hands of China in 1962. The border issue remains disputed.
Indian policy makers remain deeply concerned about the 1,080-kilometer disputed China-India border in the eastern Himalayas. Indian concern has grown in recent years as China has become
more aggressive on its territorial claim on the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh. To be noted in this regard is the fact that China claims 90,000 square kilometers of territory in Indias eastern sector from the disputed McMahon boundary onwards, which includes the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh.
The Chinese base their territorial claim on the argument that these areas had been historically administered by Tibet. Hence the Chinese logic is that since Tibet is now a part of China, so is Arunachal Pradesh. In February this year, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei objected strongly to the Indian defense ministers visit to Arunachal Pradesh by stating that India should refrain from activities that could disrupt the peace in the border areas.
Similar Chinese objections to visits by Indian policymakers to Arunachal Pradesh have been routine. In 2009, China objected to the Indian prime ministers visit to Arunachal Pradesh. That same year, for the first time ever in a multilateral body, China sought to block Asian Development Bank loans to India earmarked for projects in Arunachal Pradesh.
The aggressive Chinese posture in Indias eastern sector has led to increasing militarization of the region. In 2010, China replaced its old liquid-fueled, nuclear-capable CSS-3 intermediate range ballistic missile with more-advanced CSS-5 MRBMs and has vastly improved its border roads in the eastern sector bordering India, which will considerably enhance movement by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA).
Intercontinental missiles such as the DF-31 and DF-31A have also been deployed by China at Delingha, north of Tibet. On the border with India, China has deployed 13 Border Defense Regiments totaling around 300,000 troops. Airfields have been established at Hoping, Pangta and Kong Ka, which are in addition to the existing six airfields in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for supporting fighter aircraft and enhance the PLAs airlift capability.
China plans to deploy its fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the J-20 in this region, once the radar-evading stealth fighter jet gets operational by 2018. Six divisions of Chinas Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) are stationed at Chengdu with 24-hour operational readiness and supported by an airlift capability to transport the troops to the India-China border within 48 hours.
This is a comparative Chinese advantage vis-a-vis India given that air-lifting of troops to the Indian side of the border has proved hazardous due to the high lifts across the Himalayas and the lack of all-weather airlift capabilities on the Indian side. While 120, 000 Indian troops of the IV Corps guard the entry in Tezpur to the plains of Assam from the high mountains across Arunachal Pradesh, their movement to the eastern border in military convoys is slowed down due to bad roads conditions.
Ironically, the strategies of both India and China in this long-standing border dispute are a mirror image of the other. Both countries are building up their defense infrastructure and modernizing their armed forces as a response to the others threat to their territory. While India is actively responding to the Chinese threat to Arunachal Pradesh, China is responding to the perceived Indian threat to Tibet given the presence of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in India.
Significantly, the two countries signed a framework agreement to hold talks on the border issue in 2005. The Special Representatives on the boundary question continue to consult and dialogue on a final resolution mechanism.
Despite this, Chinas aggressive posture on Arunachal Pradesh continues; and India mirror images China in its response by militarizing its side of the border as well. For instance, India has upgraded its military presence in the eastern sector by its decision in 2011 to deploy the 290-km-range Brahmos supersonic cruise missile in order to strengthen its defense posture vis-a-vis China there. A five-year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern sector is also underway.
Already, as stated earlier, there are 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi 30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. Two more MKI Sukhoi 30 squadrons are in the process of being inducted into the airforce structure in the eastern sector. Two bases for the Medium Multi Role Fighter Aircraft (MMRCA), otherwise known as the French Rafale, will be established in the Eastern Air Command at Panagarh. This will be buttressed by advanced Radars and air defense systems.
In the later part of this year, the Indian Air Force will get its first indigenously built network centric all weather air defense weapon system, called Akash, with the capability to shoot down fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles up to a distance of 30 km. Based on mobile radar guidance, the Akash system can detect and identify an aircraft or a missile 120 km away from target. The Akash will be based in the Eastern Air Command, when inducted.
India plans to develop its version of fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft in collaboration with Russia. Known as the Perspective Multirole Fighter in Russia, the Indian version of the plane will be developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd in collaboration with Russias United Aircraft Corporation.
Given this overt militarization of the China-India border conflict, any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia. This is even more plausible in the present context as China and India emerge as two of the largest military hardware-importing countries in the world.
India, historically averse to militarizing its foreign policy, is rapidly modernizing its armed forces with plans of owning aircraft carriers, thousands of fighter aircraft, and a super-specialized armed force within the time span of 2012-2025. There is also an increasing domestic focus on developing Indias own indigenous arms industry. Ostensibly, this Indian military modernization is based on a threat perception from a superior force in the region.
With that kind of air and naval military modernization, India could plausibly work on a worst-case scenario where in order to dissuade Chinese aggression on its eastern border its navy escalates its military posture in the Indian Ocean.
There is already policy talk within Indias strategic community to establish an Indian Ocean Naval Command in the Andaman and Nicobar islands in order to strengthen Indias naval presence in the Indian Ocean region. To boost its anti-ship missile system, India has test-fired the nuclear-capable Dhanush, which is the naval version of the Prithvi short-range ballistic missile with a strike range of 350 km. the Indian Navy has also test-fired the 290-km Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, capable of carrying a 300 kg conventional warhead from the guided missile frigate INS Teg, the Indian Navys latest stealth warship.
With this kind of overt militarization by the two most significant powers of Asia, the border dispute in the eastern Indian sector will emerge as a flashpoint impacting relations in other regional theaters where both countries enjoy increasing influence, namely South and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean Region and East Asia.
Therefore, there is an urgent need to create institutional conflict management frameworks that can deal with misperceptions on the China-India border. Both countries need to seriously consider the others vulnerability in the region: China to consider that its aggressive rhetoric in the eastern sector is creating an enormous threat for India in that region; India to consider that China suffers from deep-seated vulnerabilities in Tibet given the continuous questioning of its legitimacy there.
This Tibetan vulnerability makes China wary of perceived Indian designs on Tibet from the Indian side of the border, where there is a strong Tibetan Buddhist culture and has seen trips by the Dalai Lama to the Tawang monastery in Arunachal Pradesh.
These difficult issues need to be addressed in China-India border dialogue mechanisms. Otherwise, the issue and the related Chinese territorial claim will continue to remain conflict prone and will be a flashpoint between two of Asias nuclear-armed states.
Dr Namrata Goswami is a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, D.C. She can be reached at ngoswami@usip.org. The views expressed in this article are solely that of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the USIP, which does not advocate specific policy positions.
Link: Ashes of Sino-Indian war stay warm | idrw.org
Indian policy makers remain deeply concerned about the 1,080-kilometer disputed China-India border in the eastern Himalayas. Indian concern has grown in recent years as China has become
more aggressive on its territorial claim on the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh. To be noted in this regard is the fact that China claims 90,000 square kilometers of territory in Indias eastern sector from the disputed McMahon boundary onwards, which includes the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh.
The Chinese base their territorial claim on the argument that these areas had been historically administered by Tibet. Hence the Chinese logic is that since Tibet is now a part of China, so is Arunachal Pradesh. In February this year, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei objected strongly to the Indian defense ministers visit to Arunachal Pradesh by stating that India should refrain from activities that could disrupt the peace in the border areas.
Similar Chinese objections to visits by Indian policymakers to Arunachal Pradesh have been routine. In 2009, China objected to the Indian prime ministers visit to Arunachal Pradesh. That same year, for the first time ever in a multilateral body, China sought to block Asian Development Bank loans to India earmarked for projects in Arunachal Pradesh.
The aggressive Chinese posture in Indias eastern sector has led to increasing militarization of the region. In 2010, China replaced its old liquid-fueled, nuclear-capable CSS-3 intermediate range ballistic missile with more-advanced CSS-5 MRBMs and has vastly improved its border roads in the eastern sector bordering India, which will considerably enhance movement by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA).
Intercontinental missiles such as the DF-31 and DF-31A have also been deployed by China at Delingha, north of Tibet. On the border with India, China has deployed 13 Border Defense Regiments totaling around 300,000 troops. Airfields have been established at Hoping, Pangta and Kong Ka, which are in addition to the existing six airfields in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for supporting fighter aircraft and enhance the PLAs airlift capability.
China plans to deploy its fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the J-20 in this region, once the radar-evading stealth fighter jet gets operational by 2018. Six divisions of Chinas Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) are stationed at Chengdu with 24-hour operational readiness and supported by an airlift capability to transport the troops to the India-China border within 48 hours.
This is a comparative Chinese advantage vis-a-vis India given that air-lifting of troops to the Indian side of the border has proved hazardous due to the high lifts across the Himalayas and the lack of all-weather airlift capabilities on the Indian side. While 120, 000 Indian troops of the IV Corps guard the entry in Tezpur to the plains of Assam from the high mountains across Arunachal Pradesh, their movement to the eastern border in military convoys is slowed down due to bad roads conditions.
Ironically, the strategies of both India and China in this long-standing border dispute are a mirror image of the other. Both countries are building up their defense infrastructure and modernizing their armed forces as a response to the others threat to their territory. While India is actively responding to the Chinese threat to Arunachal Pradesh, China is responding to the perceived Indian threat to Tibet given the presence of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in India.
Significantly, the two countries signed a framework agreement to hold talks on the border issue in 2005. The Special Representatives on the boundary question continue to consult and dialogue on a final resolution mechanism.
Despite this, Chinas aggressive posture on Arunachal Pradesh continues; and India mirror images China in its response by militarizing its side of the border as well. For instance, India has upgraded its military presence in the eastern sector by its decision in 2011 to deploy the 290-km-range Brahmos supersonic cruise missile in order to strengthen its defense posture vis-a-vis China there. A five-year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern sector is also underway.
Already, as stated earlier, there are 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi 30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. Two more MKI Sukhoi 30 squadrons are in the process of being inducted into the airforce structure in the eastern sector. Two bases for the Medium Multi Role Fighter Aircraft (MMRCA), otherwise known as the French Rafale, will be established in the Eastern Air Command at Panagarh. This will be buttressed by advanced Radars and air defense systems.
In the later part of this year, the Indian Air Force will get its first indigenously built network centric all weather air defense weapon system, called Akash, with the capability to shoot down fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles up to a distance of 30 km. Based on mobile radar guidance, the Akash system can detect and identify an aircraft or a missile 120 km away from target. The Akash will be based in the Eastern Air Command, when inducted.
India plans to develop its version of fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft in collaboration with Russia. Known as the Perspective Multirole Fighter in Russia, the Indian version of the plane will be developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd in collaboration with Russias United Aircraft Corporation.
Given this overt militarization of the China-India border conflict, any escalation in the conflict dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability of Asia. This is even more plausible in the present context as China and India emerge as two of the largest military hardware-importing countries in the world.
India, historically averse to militarizing its foreign policy, is rapidly modernizing its armed forces with plans of owning aircraft carriers, thousands of fighter aircraft, and a super-specialized armed force within the time span of 2012-2025. There is also an increasing domestic focus on developing Indias own indigenous arms industry. Ostensibly, this Indian military modernization is based on a threat perception from a superior force in the region.
With that kind of air and naval military modernization, India could plausibly work on a worst-case scenario where in order to dissuade Chinese aggression on its eastern border its navy escalates its military posture in the Indian Ocean.
There is already policy talk within Indias strategic community to establish an Indian Ocean Naval Command in the Andaman and Nicobar islands in order to strengthen Indias naval presence in the Indian Ocean region. To boost its anti-ship missile system, India has test-fired the nuclear-capable Dhanush, which is the naval version of the Prithvi short-range ballistic missile with a strike range of 350 km. the Indian Navy has also test-fired the 290-km Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, capable of carrying a 300 kg conventional warhead from the guided missile frigate INS Teg, the Indian Navys latest stealth warship.
With this kind of overt militarization by the two most significant powers of Asia, the border dispute in the eastern Indian sector will emerge as a flashpoint impacting relations in other regional theaters where both countries enjoy increasing influence, namely South and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean Region and East Asia.
Therefore, there is an urgent need to create institutional conflict management frameworks that can deal with misperceptions on the China-India border. Both countries need to seriously consider the others vulnerability in the region: China to consider that its aggressive rhetoric in the eastern sector is creating an enormous threat for India in that region; India to consider that China suffers from deep-seated vulnerabilities in Tibet given the continuous questioning of its legitimacy there.
This Tibetan vulnerability makes China wary of perceived Indian designs on Tibet from the Indian side of the border, where there is a strong Tibetan Buddhist culture and has seen trips by the Dalai Lama to the Tawang monastery in Arunachal Pradesh.
These difficult issues need to be addressed in China-India border dialogue mechanisms. Otherwise, the issue and the related Chinese territorial claim will continue to remain conflict prone and will be a flashpoint between two of Asias nuclear-armed states.
Dr Namrata Goswami is a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, D.C. She can be reached at ngoswami@usip.org. The views expressed in this article are solely that of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the USIP, which does not advocate specific policy positions.
Link: Ashes of Sino-Indian war stay warm | idrw.org
Those majors are hated by all the neighbors of them.
