M. Sarmad
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And the completion or lack thereof was hampered by the trained and armed tribals coming from territories held by the State of Pakistan.
No, India was never serious in holding a plebiscite in Kashmir from Day 1
To quote Sir Owen Dixon, the UN appointed official mediator:
"In the end, I became convinced that India`s agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation, and other forms of abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperiled." (Para 52 of Document S/1971)
The London Economist stated that "the whole world can see that India, which claims the support of this majority [the Kashmiri people]...has been obstructing a holding of an internationally supervised plebiscite. From this the world opinion can only conclude that India really has no confidence that the vote would go in its favour" The Economist (London), Feb 18, 1950
And here is a "confession" by your own PM :
Writing to the Chief Minister of West Bengal, B.C. Roy on 29 June 1953, Nehru confided “If there was a plebiscite, a great majority of Muslims in Kashmir would go against us.” They had “become frightened of the communal elements in Jammu and in India.” He had “this feeling of our losing grip in Kashmir.” [Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 22, pp.204-5]
In 1996 was published a Note Nehru had written to Sheikh Abdullah on 25 August 1952 from Sonamarg in Kashmir. It is a document of cardinal importance. It laid bare Nehru’s entire approach to the questions; his strategy and tactics. He revealed that “towards the end of 1948” he concluded that “there were only two possibilities open to us, continuance of the war in a limited way; (2) some kind of a settlement on the basis of the existing military situation”. He had accepted the UNCIP resolutions to get a ceasefire; not to hold a plebiscite.“We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power,” With the passage of time Pakistan will “accept a settlement which we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere”.
He was not bothered about what “Pakistan did or what the United Nations might do.” But he was “worried to find that the leaders of Kashmir were not so clear in their minds about the present or the future.” He was not worried about the wishes of the people either. They were “not what are called a virile people. They are soft and addicted to easy living.” Like Indira Gandhi, he felt that they were interested in “an honest administration and cheap and adequate food. If they get this, then they are more or less content.” The State would retain its “autonomy in most respects.” The leaders must shed doubt as doubt “percolates to their followers.” His recipe was clear. “Make the people think that the association of Kashmir State with India is an accomplished and final fact, and nothing is going to undo it.” [Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 19, pp.322-330. ed. S. Gopal, Nehru Memorial Fund, OUP, Second Series.]
http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/bilateral-negotiation-on-kaskmir-unlearnt-lesson/