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As Musharraf Faltered, U.S. Stayed at a Distance
By Michael Abramowitz and Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, August 19, 2008; Page A09
For years, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had no stronger supporter than President Bush, who valued his assistance in fighting al-Qaeda in the years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. But as Musharraf's political standing crumbled over the past several months, the White House refused to throw him a lifeline.
The administration purposely kept to the side as Pakistani politicians began to debate the president's impeachment, making no move to support him, according to one senior State Department official. When U.S. officials heard rumors that Musharraf was considering dismissing the Parliament and invoking emergency powers, the embassy in Islamabad contacted senior members of the army and made it clear the United States opposed such an action.
The U.S. posture was hardly grounded in enthusiasm over the capabilities of the civilian government that took power earlier this year. U.S. officials are privately skeptical of its ability to transcend political bickering and grapple with the severe economic and other challenges confronting Pakistan.
But after seven years of unstinting support for the onetime army general, including more than $10 billion in U.S. assistance for Pakistan since the 2001 attacks, the Bush administration finally concluded -- too late, in the view of its critics -- that time was up for Musharraf.
"If the U.S. had tried, could it have in any way saved Musharraf? The answer is no," said another senior administration official, who was not authorized to talk on the record. "After taking off his uniform -- and once the new government was installed -- he became progressively weaker by the day. Even an effort to save him would not have borne fruit. It would have prolonged uncertainty."
The shift from the Bush administration on Musharraf has been slow in coming. Even last fall, after Musharraf imposed emergency rule, Bush stood by the Pakistani president, offering only muted criticism and lauding him as "a strong fighter against extremists and radicals" in the region. Although Musharraf's party was routed in elections this year, Bush telephoned the Pakistani president in May to say he looked forward to his continuing role in strengthening U.S.-Pakistan ties.
"Certain folks hung on to him," said a State Department official involved in Pakistan policy. "They were attached not to the man," the official said, but to the fact that dealing with a single person was much easier than navigating the complex and often chaotic politics of a coalition government. "It took some time for the realization to sink in that that Pakistan is gone, and that you are not going to go back to that Pakistan."
Teresita Schaffer, a former ambassador and director of the South Asian program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the administration was too slow to distance itself from Musharraf because of Bush's high personal regard for the Pakistani president and a lack of confidence in rival Pakistani politicians.
"They continued to see him as a factor for stability way beyond what made sense," Schaffer said in an interview. "We have basically continued to delaying the process by which [the new government] took charge and started dealing with things. Time is important because they are dealing with an internal insurgency where the trend lines are bad."
But some U.S. officials and other experts said the Bush administration's approach has resulted in a much smoother, less violent transition than Bush had simply abandoned Musharraf immediately. They noted that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other officials had frequently coupled their support for Musharraf with calls for democratic reform in Pakistan.
"It's been a balancing act and not always calibrated to best effect," said Daniel S. Markey, a former State Department official at the Council on Foreign Relations. "At times, it appears that Bush in particular was coming out too closely aligned with Musharraf and was tone-deaf to the outrage of Pakistani civilians. At other times, it was clear they were putting their weight behind a political transition that, left to his own devices, Musharraf and his team might not have undertaken."
With Musharraf's resignation yesterday, the country's fledgling democratic government must assume the full burden of fixing the economy and waging a more effective counterterrorism campaign, according to U.S. officials and South Asia experts.
"We'll see if they can turn their attention to governance and get a handle on their problems," said former deputy secretary of state Richard L. Armitage. "They have been using the Musharraf thing as an excuse for non-governance."
Despite the hope in some quarters of Washington that Musharraf could remain in his job, Bush administration officials said yesterday that they had been gradually preparing for his departure. Since the elections in February, Bush has held two meetings with the newly elected prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani.
"We're confident that we will maintain a good relationship with the government of Pakistan," White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe told reporters in Crawford, Tex., where the president is spending the week at his ranch.
Xenia Dormandy, a Harvard researcher and former Bush adviser on Pakistan, said she sees little immediate practical change from the departure of Musharraf, particularly with regard to counterterrorism. "He hasn't effectively been leading Pakistan for the last six months," Dormandy said.
She said the fight against extremists in the tribal regions along the border with Pakistan has been handled on the operational level by the army chief of staff, with policy alternating between military operations and trying to strike political deals with tribal leaders.
Michael J. Green, former top Asia official at the White House who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, predicted that the United States will miss Musharraf.
"You could count on him to make tough decisions, even though you could never count
on him to completely follow through," he said. "It will probably be much harder to get decisive action as we did with Musharraf."
Special correspondent Holly Watt in Crawford, Tex., contributed to this report
By Michael Abramowitz and Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, August 19, 2008; Page A09
For years, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had no stronger supporter than President Bush, who valued his assistance in fighting al-Qaeda in the years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. But as Musharraf's political standing crumbled over the past several months, the White House refused to throw him a lifeline.
The administration purposely kept to the side as Pakistani politicians began to debate the president's impeachment, making no move to support him, according to one senior State Department official. When U.S. officials heard rumors that Musharraf was considering dismissing the Parliament and invoking emergency powers, the embassy in Islamabad contacted senior members of the army and made it clear the United States opposed such an action.
The U.S. posture was hardly grounded in enthusiasm over the capabilities of the civilian government that took power earlier this year. U.S. officials are privately skeptical of its ability to transcend political bickering and grapple with the severe economic and other challenges confronting Pakistan.
But after seven years of unstinting support for the onetime army general, including more than $10 billion in U.S. assistance for Pakistan since the 2001 attacks, the Bush administration finally concluded -- too late, in the view of its critics -- that time was up for Musharraf.
"If the U.S. had tried, could it have in any way saved Musharraf? The answer is no," said another senior administration official, who was not authorized to talk on the record. "After taking off his uniform -- and once the new government was installed -- he became progressively weaker by the day. Even an effort to save him would not have borne fruit. It would have prolonged uncertainty."
The shift from the Bush administration on Musharraf has been slow in coming. Even last fall, after Musharraf imposed emergency rule, Bush stood by the Pakistani president, offering only muted criticism and lauding him as "a strong fighter against extremists and radicals" in the region. Although Musharraf's party was routed in elections this year, Bush telephoned the Pakistani president in May to say he looked forward to his continuing role in strengthening U.S.-Pakistan ties.
"Certain folks hung on to him," said a State Department official involved in Pakistan policy. "They were attached not to the man," the official said, but to the fact that dealing with a single person was much easier than navigating the complex and often chaotic politics of a coalition government. "It took some time for the realization to sink in that that Pakistan is gone, and that you are not going to go back to that Pakistan."
Teresita Schaffer, a former ambassador and director of the South Asian program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the administration was too slow to distance itself from Musharraf because of Bush's high personal regard for the Pakistani president and a lack of confidence in rival Pakistani politicians.
"They continued to see him as a factor for stability way beyond what made sense," Schaffer said in an interview. "We have basically continued to delaying the process by which [the new government] took charge and started dealing with things. Time is important because they are dealing with an internal insurgency where the trend lines are bad."
But some U.S. officials and other experts said the Bush administration's approach has resulted in a much smoother, less violent transition than Bush had simply abandoned Musharraf immediately. They noted that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other officials had frequently coupled their support for Musharraf with calls for democratic reform in Pakistan.
"It's been a balancing act and not always calibrated to best effect," said Daniel S. Markey, a former State Department official at the Council on Foreign Relations. "At times, it appears that Bush in particular was coming out too closely aligned with Musharraf and was tone-deaf to the outrage of Pakistani civilians. At other times, it was clear they were putting their weight behind a political transition that, left to his own devices, Musharraf and his team might not have undertaken."
With Musharraf's resignation yesterday, the country's fledgling democratic government must assume the full burden of fixing the economy and waging a more effective counterterrorism campaign, according to U.S. officials and South Asia experts.
"We'll see if they can turn their attention to governance and get a handle on their problems," said former deputy secretary of state Richard L. Armitage. "They have been using the Musharraf thing as an excuse for non-governance."
Despite the hope in some quarters of Washington that Musharraf could remain in his job, Bush administration officials said yesterday that they had been gradually preparing for his departure. Since the elections in February, Bush has held two meetings with the newly elected prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani.
"We're confident that we will maintain a good relationship with the government of Pakistan," White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe told reporters in Crawford, Tex., where the president is spending the week at his ranch.
Xenia Dormandy, a Harvard researcher and former Bush adviser on Pakistan, said she sees little immediate practical change from the departure of Musharraf, particularly with regard to counterterrorism. "He hasn't effectively been leading Pakistan for the last six months," Dormandy said.
She said the fight against extremists in the tribal regions along the border with Pakistan has been handled on the operational level by the army chief of staff, with policy alternating between military operations and trying to strike political deals with tribal leaders.
Michael J. Green, former top Asia official at the White House who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, predicted that the United States will miss Musharraf.
"You could count on him to make tough decisions, even though you could never count
on him to completely follow through," he said. "It will probably be much harder to get decisive action as we did with Musharraf."
Special correspondent Holly Watt in Crawford, Tex., contributed to this report
