Army Gets Attack Helicopters

[Hellraiser007]

Army Gets Attack Helicopters​

New Delhi . 12 October 2012 will go down in the history of the Indian Army and the Army Aviation Corps as a red letter day with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), after vacillating for decades, finally taking the call on the crucial issue of the ownership and operations of Attack Helicopters (AH).

The letter issued by the MOD clearly stipulates that the “future inductions” of the entire AH fleet will be owned, operated and maintained by the Army. Though late in coming, the decision is a welcome step and will have a major impact on war fighting in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA). The Government (MOD) had to finally follow the path taken by the US and UK Governments, on similar issues involving their respective air forces and armies.
It would be pertinent to mention here that the case for inclusion of AH to be part and parcel of army dates back to 1963 when Gen JN Chaudhary, the then COAS, stressed the requirement for a separate air wing for the Indian Army.
He had emphasized that efforts at increasing the firepower and mobility of the Army would not be complete without an integral aviation element comprising light, medium, heavy as well as armed/attack helicopters. However, it took 23 years for the Army with Government intervention to finally break away from the Indian Air Force (IAF) and form an independent Army Aviation Corps in November 1986.
The organization sanctioned though was nowhere near what had been envisaged in 1963, totally lacking the wherewithal to be a full fledged aviation arm of the Army, primarily due to non availability of armed/attack and utility helicopters in its inventory.
It is ironic that it has taken another 26 years since the birth of the Army Aviation Corps to get the AH arsenal in its inventory. This move, when realized, will greatly enhance its capability, making it a battle winning factor in any future conflict.
While the MOD in its letter has stated that "all future inductions” of combat helicopters will go to the Army, no specific mention however has been made about the ownership of the 22 Boeing Apaches being acquired by the IAF from the US for the replacement of its ageing and Soviet vintage MI-25/ MI-35 AH fleet.
But, as a consequence of this decision, their transfer to the Army should be the first milestone initial step.
The Army's claim of ownership of Apaches being inducted is based on the basic premise that the two units (or squadrons) of MI-25/MI-35 AH presently held with the IAF, are Army assets and are also operationally controlled by the Army. In fact a few army aviation pilots are also posted to these units.
While the final fate of these Apaches is yet to be decided by the MOD, it is understood that the Army is also going ahead with its plans to acquire, on its own, another set of state of the art attack helicopters, preferably Apaches, for its Strike Corps.

In related developments, the armed version of the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) called RUDRA is at an advanced stage of development and the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is likely to commence its induction into the Army by early next year. Though not a typical attack helicopter, it has an array of comparable weapon systems to include gun, rockets, air-to-air, and air-to-ground missiles (ATGM).
Notably, while the HAL’s weapon package is based on French/ European systems, the Apaches have US weapons and electronic warfare package.
Integration of the weapons systems less the ATGM is currently going on at HAL. Trials for the ATGM have already been carried out and a decision is awaited. In fray are the Israeli Spike-ER and French PARS-3. Once inducted the RUDRA units will form part of the Holding/ Pivot Corps constituting a formidable offensive punch to the field force commander.
Seven to eight units (or squadrons) of RUDRAs are planned for induction into the Army in the coming years as per the Army’s perspective plan.
In this context, the development of the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) by HAL is a significant achievement. The LCH aims to gatecrash the exclusive club of the state of the art light attack helicopters, which includes Eurocopter’s Tiger, Bell’s AH 1Z Super Cobra and China ’s secret Zhisheng 10 (Z-10). The LCH is a derivative of the ALH and the RUDRA and is being designed to fit into an anti-infantry and anti-armour role with capability to operate at high altitudes (16000 feet), a distinct advantage over other attack helicopters. Both the HAL-made helicopters will carry the Nexter THL 20 turret gun.
Composite materials have extensively been used in the LCH to keep it light in weight as also capable of withstanding extreme temperatures of the Himalayan heights.
Unlike the RUDRA, the LCH will have tandem seating cockpit and stealth features, but will carry the same weapons package now being qualified on board the RUDRA. The helicopter is expected to enter service by 2015. The LCH/ attack helicopter units will be the main punch of the maneuver force commander and will be inducted into the Army Aviation Corps and operate in support of ground forces both in the plains and mountains.
The Army has plans to induct 114 such machines into its inventory. The earlier reservations of the Air Force regarding its induction into the Army being no longer valid, the Army Aviation Corps is all set to have a lethal arsenal of state of art AH/Armed helicopters, thus making it a force to reckon with and distinctly be the arm of decision in the future.

The employment of AH fully integrated with Army Aviation units and fighting alongside and above the Infantry will also give a new meaning to close air support in the TBA.
There is indeed a need to relook fresh at the concept of close air support in the TBA and the role of attack/ armed helicopters in the same. The present concept of close air support is a relic of World War II, driven by range limitations of surveillance, target acquisition and engagement capability of land based platforms. The availability of unmanned aerial vehicles, missiles and long range artillery platforms (40-120 km) has changed all that, as today surface based platforms can cover the entire TBA.
This also brings into focus the role of attack and armed helicopters in providing intimate close air support in the TBA.
In Afghanistan for instance, US and NATO troops on ground have been more comfortable with the intimate support provided by attack/ armed helicopters in their operations, due to the visibility, proximity and response time factors.
The primary mission of army aviation is to fight the land battle and support ground operations, operating in the TBA as a combined arms team expanding the ground commander’s battlefield in space and time.
Its battlefield leverage is achieved through a combination of reconnaissance, mobility and firepower that is unprecedented in land warfare. Its greatest contribution to battlefield success is the ability it gives the commander to apply decisive combat power at critical times, virtually anywhere on the battlefield, in the form of direct fire from aviation maneuver units (attack/armed helicopters) or insertion of overwhelming ground forces at the point of decision (utility/lift helicopters).
The assets required for the above maneuver, the attack and assault helicopters must be at the beck and call of the field force commander and also piloted by men in olive green who fully understand the ground situation.
This will ensure the optimum utilization of the battle winning resource. This has been the basic rationale on which the Army’s case for ownership of these assets rests.
It is therefore surprising that the MOD in its decision has not addressed this issue of ownership of the helicopter aviation assets in its entirety, particularly with regard to the Army’s requirement of tactical Medium and heavy lift capability machines.
The positioning of a few MI-17 helicopters at Army bases in J&K to reduce the response time for counter insurgency operations is at best an ad hoc arrangement for a specific type of operation and limited to a specific area and hence does not address the larger issue of ownership and operational role of the Army.
The Army’s modernization and restructuring thrust to move towards a capability based force envisages integral lift capability of a company at the Corps level, a battalion at Command level and a brigade at Army level.
Accordingly, the resources for this capability in terms of tactical and heavy lift helicopters have been planned for induction as per the Army’s perspective plan. The tactical lift class of helicopters (10-12 Ton) are also required for special operations.

In fact, the case for the acquisition of the tactical class of helicopters has been ongoing for the last 7-8 years with even the HAL involved in this project, but no headway has been made due to stonewalling by the Air Force on the ownership issue.
It would be pertinent to mention here that the Army’s plans for the induction of the Ultra Light Howitzer (ULH) into the artillery (trials for which have been completed and induction is likely soon), had triggered the requirement for heavy lift helicopters, which would be capable of lifting the ULH in the mountains as well as providing heavy logistical support, specially on our eastern borders where the infrastructure is woefully inadequate.
Based on this Army requirement in fact, IAF set in motion the process for acquisition of this class of helicopters.
As per reports the trials have been completed and the US Boeing’s Chinook has been down selected vis a vis the Russian MI-26 in the open competition. The Army needs both the Medium lift Mi 17s and the heavy lift Boeing Chinooks also.
Their acquistion will give a major boost to the heavy lift capability; the Chinooks have already proved themselves as logistical warhorses in Iraq and Afghanistan. By not addressing the ownership aspect related to assault helicopters, the MOD has left the issue unresolved, thereby allowing the turf wars to continue between the two Services.
Unlike the Air Force, the Army Aviation units and helicopters are located closer to their operational areas and along with the formations affiliated to, especially at the Corps level.

During war these units will require to operate from forward composite aviation bases, catering for security, maintenance, fuelling and arming facilities. The employment philosophy dictates the need to develop organizations that enhance aviation capabilities to support the concept of operations of field commanders and be tailored to meet the evolving operational requirements, hence the concept of Aviation Brigade with each Corps and not bases as in the case of Air Force.
For dominating the tactical battle space of the 21st century, the roles that Army Aviation needs to perform in support of land battles, require equipment, personnel, aircrew and organizations that enhance the overall goal and capability of the land forces commander. The need is for dedicated aircrews who are not only proficient in flying but are associated full time with army maneuvers, operational thinking and ground tactics, as well as spend time in the field.
The present structure is not suited for the short, swift and limited wars envisaged in the future. While the transformation process has been set into motion by MODs decision to transfer AH to the army, a lot still needs to be done on the issue of the ownership of the lift/utility component of helicopters.
Experience of other nations clearly illustrates that each Service needs a viable integral aviation component for it to retain the capacity to include air encounters as part of its personal armory. The control and ownership of tactical/ heavy lift helicopters by the Army is an operational imperative due to the need for integration of all elements of army aviation (combat and combat support) into a cohesive combat organization.

..:: India Strategic ::. Army: Army Gets Attack Helicopters