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Armoured Thrusts, Pivotal Support Elements for Better Results

Actually I discussed the same with @Signalian a few days back i.e. an 8X8 with a 120mm gun. So your logic is very sound.

@PanzerKiel & @Signalian Can better explain what PA thinks about light tanks, some examples are listed below:

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Patria AMV 8x8 showcased with 120mm Leonardo turret

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Centauro 2 II MGS 120/105 8x8 anti-tank wheeled armoured vehicle

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Chinese ZTL-11 8x8 amphibious 105mm

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Japan Type 16

Note: for details of above eqpt, kindly click on their names.
Two regiments of any one of these are good enough for a brisk but brief rendezvous in the Rann of Kutch!!!
 
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I'll leave you with some thoughts. Take the example of our battle rifle. We never went for 5.56, since 7.62 is lethal, even though heavy. May not be easy to carry but where it gets applied, it matters. Same with our tanks.
The eschewed logic, behind NATO's adoption of the 5.56mm, is that it is less lethal than the 7.62mm, hence causes serious injury and not death, in some cases.

Trade off being, long range accuracy also compromised. Ideally, you would like to take out your opponent at longer ranges.

In this case, cost, weight, speed, all favor a light tank / fire support vehicle. Something PA needs to re-think.
 
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The eschewed logic, behind NATO's adoption of the 5.56mm, is that it is less lethal than the 7.62mm, hence causes serious injury and not death, in some cases.

Trade off being, long range accuracy also compromised. Ideally, you would like to take out your opponent at longer ranges.

In this case, cost, weight, speed, all favor a light tank / fire support vehicle. Something PA needs to re-think.

Doctrines are made after exhaustive studies taking years, then once they are adopted the whole military machinery is geared up to support it. PA wont re-think about this since pros and cons of this decision have been researched and discussed at all levels. This light tanks concept was last heard on the table in the mid 90s. Its not easy to adopt a different doctrine suddenly. It would take decades or a war to change.

@PanzerKiel hope italian Pumas are coming to PA

As of today, negative.
 
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Doctrines are made after exhaustive studies taking years, then once they are adopted the whole military machinery is geared up to support it. PA wont re-think about this since pros and cons of this decision have been researched and discussed at all levels. This light tanks concept was last heard on the table in the mid 90s. Its not easy to adopt a different doctrine suddenly. It would take decades or a war to change.



As of today, negative.
so u mean we shoot to kill not to incapacitate
 
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Doctrines are made after exhaustive studies taking years, then once they are adopted the whole military machinery is geared up to support it. PA wont re-think about this since pros and cons of this decision have been researched and discussed at all levels. This light tanks concept was last heard on the table in the mid 90s. Its not easy to adopt a different doctrine suddenly. It would take decades or a war to change.

The compromise here is perhaps more Zarrars converted from Chinese stock. The other way around this problem is to get more "APCs" perhaps the BMP-2 refurbished which are as heavy as a light tank.
 
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The compromise here is perhaps more Zarrars converted from Chinese stock. The other way around this problem is to get more "APCs" perhaps the BMP-2 refurbished which are as heavy as a light tank.

Somehow both sides refrain from getting equipment already used by the other side. For obvious reasons.
 
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Embedded manpad and SP AD teams are there now, already embedded.

Bingo (for your map)

For Strike Corps, what matters now is that when (time), where (location), and how(manner) do you launch them. This will decide the outcome.

FM-90 can shoot and scot while driving?
 
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The eschewed logic, behind NATO's adoption of the 5.56mm, is that it is less lethal than the 7.62mm, hence causes serious injury and not death, in some cases.

Trade off being, long range accuracy also compromised. Ideally, you would like to take out your opponent at longer ranges.

In this case, cost, weight, speed, all favor a light tank / fire support vehicle. Something PA needs to re-think.


Hi

The reason being there for each wounded person you need to spare two other people to take care of that wounded person.

that would weigh very heavily on enemies who have not as much resources as a US
 
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Does PA has capability to simulate this (or any other) theater for that matter in time-domain (say hrs) starting from build-up and all the way to actual fighting with high-fidelity in terms of vehicle mobility characteristics, terrain, aerial threats, fire-power, A-priori information (a.k.a intelligence about enemy in the simulation), high level strategy...etc?

Furthermore, does PA able to practice an armored formation in simulator (in networked environment) with actual crew in loop, and all the variables accounted for in highly dynamic situation (pop-up threats, unknown factors)?

1965warmap.jpg



Please don't post if anything is classified/confidential.

I am trying to get up to speed on these threads as it contains excellent and thought provoking information.

Will try to contribute regarding impact of engine/powertrain (my forte) and its potential tactical implications in armored formation.

@PanzerKiel @Signalian @Armchair @FOOLS_NIGHTMARE
 
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Does PA has capability to simulate this (or any other) theater for that matter in time-domain (say hrs) starting from build-up and all the way to actual fighting with high-fidelity in terms of vehicle mobility characteristics, terrain, aerial threats, fire-power, A-priori information (a.k.a intelligence about enemy in the simulation), high level strategy...etc?

Furthermore, does PA able to practice an armored formation in simulator (in networked environment) with actual crew in loop, and all the variables accounted for in highly dynamic situation (pop-up threats, unknown factors)?

1965warmap.jpg



Please don't post if anything is classified/confidential.

I am trying to get up to speed on these threads as it contains excellent and thought provoking information.

Will try to contribute regarding impact of engine/powertrain (my forte) and its potential tactical implications in armored formation.

@PanzerKiel @Signalian @Armchair @FOOLS_NIGHTMARE

Yes, it is something normal, in the form of long war games and map exercises having everything real except for real troops on ground. It's part of normal training.
 
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Yes, it is something normal, in the form of long war games and map exercises having everything real except for real troops on ground. It's part of normal training.

Does outcome of simulation/exercise dictate "manual" optimization afterwards to (say for example) logistics, fire-power mobility, or are there mathematical / operations research a norm for full-spectrum optimization of operations?

For example, for build-up situation, there could be automated way of employing machine learning / mathematical techniques to perturb all the variables (e.g. transport speed, road-structure, type of vehicles, ), with objective of minimizing the time for build up...all while keep the constraints (# of vehicles available, bridge capacity, max vehicle(s) speed, fueling intervals, $$ available, and many more constraints), and arrive at optimal solution to minimize the objective...hence improving buildup time, and providing an initiative advantage for blue force.

buildup.JPG
 

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Does outcome of simulation/exercise dictate "manual" optimization afterwards to (say for example) logistics, fire-power mobility, or are there mathematical / operations research a norm for full-spectrum optimization of operations?

For example, for build-up situation, there could be automated way of employing machine learning / mathematical techniques to perturb all the variables (e.g. transport speed, road-structure, type of vehicles, ), with objective of minimizing the time for build up...all while keep the constraints (# of vehicles available, bridge capacity, max vehicle(s) speed, fueling intervals, $$ available, and many more constraints), and arrive at optimal solution to minimize the objective...hence improving buildup time, and providing an initiative advantage for blue force.

View attachment 642690

We do make use of mathematical aids, graphs, matrices .....apart from force comparisons.
 
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Does PA has capability to simulate this (or any other) theater for that matter in time-domain (say hrs) starting from build-up and all the way to actual fighting with high-fidelity in terms of vehicle mobility characteristics, terrain, aerial threats, fire-power, A-priori information (a.k.a intelligence about enemy in the simulation), high level strategy...etc?

Furthermore, does PA able to practice an armored formation in simulator (in networked environment) with actual crew in loop, and all the variables accounted for in highly dynamic situation (pop-up threats, unknown factors)?

1965warmap.jpg



Please don't post if anything is classified/confidential.

I am trying to get up to speed on these threads as it contains excellent and thought provoking information.

Will try to contribute regarding impact of engine/powertrain (my forte) and its potential tactical implications in armored formation.

@PanzerKiel @Signalian @Armchair @FOOLS_NIGHTMARE

Yes, however, mobility is something that PA does not have enough of. PA is still largely an infantry heavy army with less motorization than optimal. Also, any military power worth its salt can mass produce vehicles for war. PA can't, so there will be no replenishment except by outside powers during a war.

How can we change this dynamic?

I've suggested, by developing a simple, mass produce-able, Jeep derivative:
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/a-vi...losophy-doctrine.561888/page-28#post-12437214

Will try to contribute regarding impact of engine/powertrain (my forte) and its potential tactical implications in armored formation.

That is an interesting background. I'd love to get your help figuring out the right engine for this mass produce-able jeep I'm thinking of. Presently I was thinking of a boxer engine, similar to a Subaru engine.
 
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Does outcome of simulation/exercise dictate "manual" optimization afterwards to (say for example) logistics, fire-power mobility, or are there mathematical / operations research a norm for full-spectrum optimization of operations?

For example, for build-up situation, there could be automated way of employing machine learning / mathematical techniques to perturb all the variables (e.g. transport speed, road-structure, type of vehicles, ), with objective of minimizing the time for build up...all while keep the constraints (# of vehicles available, bridge capacity, max vehicle(s) speed, fueling intervals, $$ available, and many more constraints), and arrive at optimal solution to minimize the objective...hence improving buildup time, and providing an initiative advantage for blue force.

View attachment 642690

Absolutely, during such simulations, we always give the maximum advantages to the enemy side so that we can land in the worst possible situation to start with.....and then we run the simulations from Blue's side....and of course at the end of such activities, the lessons are keenly noted and then incorporated into real operational plans....thats how it happens all over the world in professional armies.
Moreover, to keep operational plans updated, any new induction of equipment or capability on the enemy's sides is always looked for, it is also then incorporated into the subsequent simulations....this way plans are kept updated.
 
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