Arming LTTE against Indian Army was most unfavorable and dangerous: Maj. Gen Gunaratne

[anant_s]

Arming LTTE against Indian Army was most unfavorable and dangerous: Maj. Gen Gunaratne
By P.K.Balachandran

COLOMBO: The clandestine arming of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the Premadasa government in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s to get rid of the “common enemy” – the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) - was “one of the most unfavorable and dangerous steps ever taken by any government in Sri Lanka,” says Maj.Gen.Kamal Gunaratne in his book “Road To Nandikadal”.

The whole operation was an “abhorrence” to Sri Lankan army officers who were tasked to hand over brand new weapons to the LTTE, says Gen. Gunaratne whose 53 Division finally killed the LTTE chief, Velupillai Prabhakaran, in May 2009.

Maj.Gen.Kamal Gunaratne, former commander 53 Div of Sri Lankan army. | Express Photo Service


“When truck loads of weapons and ammunition were handed over to the LTTE inside jungles, we felt we were digging our own graves but carried out order nevertheless. Fortunately and thankfully, I was not part of this unholy transaction,” he says.

The gifting of arms was of immense relief to the LTTE which had by then “taken a heavy beating from the IPKF,” he adds.

“I have had long chats with some of the young officers who were involved in this operation and their stories are disturbing to say the least. Obviously, the whole transaction was an abhorrence to these young officers and it was made worse by the warm greetings, hugs and handshakes they received from the LTTE leaders.”

“When the LTTE left with their new goodies, large stockpiles of weapons, courtesy Government of Sri Lanka, their arrogant, mocking smiles and body language seemed to be saying: One day we hope to aim all these weapons at you.”

And indeed, the now well armed LTTE, did become arrogant almost immediately.

“Our officers were subject to threats, due to shortfall of weapons. They would insist that quantities of weapons delivered were less than the quantities promised by the government and accused the officers of stealing. One can imagine the utter disgust and revulsion these soldiers and officers felt, having to hand over truck loads of brand new weapons and ammunition imported from China, still wrapped in polythene and grease proof paper, to the very enemy who would not hesitate to kill you.”

The weapons give by Premadasa enabled the LTTE to strike at the IPKF “with renewed vigor and more effectively increasing the death toll and the casualty count of the IPKF.” It impacted the government of India “severely,” leading to the withdrawal of the IPKF in March 1990.

Gopalaswamy Mahaththaya, the Deputy Leader of the LTTE, who was heading the team talking to President Premadasa, acted the true politician, always in a white dhoti and sporting a broad smile. While the army knew that this was a façade, President Premadasa was completely taken in.

“Mahaththaya is a real gentleman, Premadasa would say. We all know that Premadasa trusted Mahaththaya one hundred percent,” Gen.Gunaratne says.

As expected, Eelam War II broke out immediately after the IPKF left the island in March 1990.

Mixed Feelings About IPKF

About the IPKF, Gen.Gunaratne says that the reason why they suffered heavy casualties (1500 dead and 3000 wounded) between October 1987 and March 1990, was that its officers were fighting a conventional war against a guerilla group. They “thoroughly underestimated the capability of the LTTE,” unlike the Sri Lankan army which never did that.

For example, it was the World War II vintage thinking which led to the use of parachuting troops against the LTTE in the Jaffna University campus where Prabhakaran was holed up. The parachutists could easily be picked up by LTTE snipers as it was a full moon night.

The LTTE was fully prepared for the airborne assault and Prabhakaran had quit the campus because his men had snooped into the IPKF’s unsecured radio communications .The IPKF was using the same frequency it was using during its honeymoon with the LTTE.

However, while being sorry for the slaughtered Indian commandos, the Sri Lankan army was happy with the fighting taking place between the LTTE and the IPKF.

“It was a source of comfort for many of us. I should admit that seeing the LTTE terrorists dying at the hands of the IPKF brought me immense happiness. And on the other hand, IPKF members dying at the hands of the LTTE also made me happy to a certain extent. Some readers would find this to be unacceptable, coming from a senior military officer. However, when I think of the way India supported the Tamil terrorists, breeding and training them, the manner in which India applied pressure on the government of Sri Lanka and the low treatment that was meted out to the members of the Sri Lankan forces by uneducated Jawans on our soil, I think I should have been happier than I was,” Gen.Gunaratne writes.

IPKF soldiers getting back to India. Insets show President R.Premadasa and Lt.Gen. A.S.Kalkat , the last commander of the IPKF. | Express Photo Service

Relations between the Sri Lankan army and the IPKF become worse after President Premadasa ordered the IPKF out in 1989 and the IPKF would not leave. The IPKF became arrogant in its dealings with the Sri Lankan army.


“Having to put up with humiliation from the Jawans of the IPKF was totally demoralizing and too bitter a pill to swallow.”

However later, when he met some officers of the IPKF at the School of Combat in Mhow in India, they “spoke with respect about the Sri Lankan forces who had displayed unending patience and discipline in the face of humiliation from some of the IPKF members.”

One of the officers pointed out to Gen.Gunaratne that despite the high casualties suffered by the IPKF, India had not thought it fit to build a memorial for it on its soil ,while Sri Lanka had built one adjacent to its own war memorial in Colombo courtesy the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

“When he made this comment, I was watching his eyes very carefully and felt it was a sincere and heartfelt statement.”

https://twitter.com/x/status/775226560097816577

http://www.newindianexpress.com/wor....-Gen-Gunaratne/2016/09/12/article3619364.ece


@PARIKRAMA @SpArK @Levina @nair @ranjeet @MilSpec @Abingdonboy @hellfire @Spectre @AUSTERLITZ @scorpionx @Joe Shearer @Nilgiri @SrNair @third eye @Roybot @Water Car Engineer @Skull and Bones @Robinhood Pandey @gslv mk3 @thesolar65 @IndoCarib @Soumitra @arp2041 @Rain Man @ayesha.a @Vergennes @Taygibay @WAJsal @waz

 

[anant_s]

A bit about India Sri lanka Peace Accord

Sri Lanka, India sign Indo-Lankan Peace Accord (ISPA)

The agreement signed between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R. Jayewardene, on the deployment of Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka.

Sources
Ethnic Politics and Constitutional Reform: The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, M. L. Marasinghe, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1988);J.R.Jayewardene of Sri Lanka, vol.2 (1956-1989), K.M.de Silva and Howard Wriggins (1994); Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF), Kumar Rupesinghe (1988), International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

Quotations

J R Jayawardena, I have never mistrusted India, interview with India Today, published in Lanka Guardian, 15 September 1987:
Q. “If the accord has led to the end of violence in the north and east, then why has it not been welcomed by the Sinhalese?
A. Violence never lasts long. It has now – died down. There was some opposition to the accord in certain parts of the island. It was activated by the Sinhalese terrorists. During the opposition to the agreement, voiced by the Buddhist clergy and the SLFP, they found that the JVP was taking active interest in the violent activities. Others have backed out of the anti- accord agitation, but the JVP is still continuing.

Q. Don’t you think you will find it difficult to sustain this accord if your Prime Minister and minister for notional security are opposed to it?
A. In a democracy you have these freedoms. But when I bring legislations for the accord to Parliament, they will have to support them or they have to leave. I have signed a treaty and under the Constitution, I have the right to make treaties with any country. I need not to get cabinet support or approval for it. But when I have to go to the Parliament for legislative measures, they will all have to support them. …

Q. In the wake of opposition, how are you going to implement the accord?
A. Most of it has already been implemented. The terrorists have surrendered arms. Laws are almost ready for the devolution of powers to the Provincial Council and subsequent elections. The referendum for the merger of the east with the north will take place. For all these, I need parliamentary approval. We will have interim administration for north and cast.

Q. Are you sure that the Sri Lankan people approve of Indian forces?
A. That is immaterial. The only way they can question it is by votes. And that will be clear during the elections. There are ways in the democracy of seeking the people’s support for one’s actions as President. If we go to the people for every action, then the Government can’t function. Unfortunately, the Opposition is not opposing this government by democratic means. They are resorting to violence and this should be suppressed.

Q. What is the specific role given to the Indian peacekeeping forces?
A. They are acting under my supervision and directions and they will carry out those instructions. They have to supervise the surrender of arms by terrorists maintain law and order with our troops. They have to take part in all peaceful operations.

Q. What is the specific role given to the Indian peacekeeping forces?
A. They are acting under my supervision and directions and they will carry out those instructions. They have to supervise the surrender of arms by terrorists maintain law and order with our troops. They have to take part in all peaceful operations.

Q. Will they be present till the accord is fully implemented?
A. Well, that will take a long time. Provincial elections will take place at the end of the year. Till normalcy is restored not only the Indian but also our forces are necessary. But if there is peace, the forces are not necessary. We have enough troops of our own during peaceful times. I would like the Indian forces to remain as long as there is trouble in the north and east.

Q. How are you going to deal with JVP? Weren’t they crushed by Bandaranaike with foreign support?
A. It is very difficult to give reasons for the revival of the JVP. Many people blame me for it. When I took over, I released a majority of their cadres and leader. For over five years they were quiet. And I was under the impression that they had accepted the democratic norm of behaviour. They contested the municipal and local elections. They contested the referendum and lost in all these elections. But in 1983, my security informed me that these people are again militarily active. They were preaching violence, I proscribed them. They had a hand in the 1983 riots in Colombo. Since then, they have been working underground amassing a lot of support. I don’t know how they’ve done this.”

“The handing over of arms only signifies the handing over, the transfer, of this responsibility of protecting our people….I wish to very firmly emphasize that by virtue of our handing over our weapons to it, the Indian government should assume full responsibility for the life and security of every one of the Eelam Tamils.” Velupillai Prabhakaran, LTTE Leader, quoted in The Hindu, 4 August 1987.

“Premadasa, an ultranationalistic Sinhalese, was so deeply opposed to the Sri Lankan-Indian accord that the final cabinet decision to sign the treaty was taken while he was on a trip to Japan. When he returned, he boycotted the signing ceremonies in Colombo.” A National Sigh of Relief, Newsweek, 3 October 1988.

“When President Jayewardene signed the Indo-Lanka Accord, Sri Lanka lost its sovereignty over its internal affairs too. Article 2.16 (e) of the treaty states, “The governments of India and Sri Lanka will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the northern and Eastern Provinces”. Dr. Amal Jayawardene has noted that, in this respect, the Indo-Lanka Accord circumscribes Sri Lanka’s sovereignty more comprehensively than what the Indo-Bhutan Accord does to Bhutan’s sovereignty. Fools who have no clue as to the nature of international treaties will, not doubt, continue to indulge in their ranting about Sri Lanka’s sovereignty; and in so doing erode it by alienating more of its people from whom that sovereignty should flow voluntarily. Here I shall not go into an undertaking that the Sri Lankan state appears to have given India as the unwritten part of the treaty because it is unwritten. It continues to be honoured by Sri Lankan heads of state much to the puzzlement and chagrin of Sinhala nationalists. This was not the first time that Sinhala leaders bartered away their nation’s sovereignty without compunction to look after their selfish interests.
Dharmeratnam Sivaram, Is Sri Lanka Truly Sovereign? 4 February 2004

“As Rajiv Gandhi was about to depart for India, he was invited by the Commander of the Navy, Ananda Silva, to inspect a guard of honour. Gandhi obliged. As he was moving past the men, something totally unexpected happened. Vijithamuni Rohana de Silva, a naval rating from the South, suddenly lifted his rifle and brought it onto the visiting Prime Minister of India. Neither Ananda Silva nor Gandhi’s security men responded fast enough either to push Gandhi away from the sailor, or to immobilize the attacker.”
Rohan Gunaratna (1993), Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies.

“Rajiv Gandhi himself narrowly escaped serious injury, if not death itself, when an enraged sailor swung his rifle butt at him at the guard of honor ceremony prior to his departure from Colombo on 30 July. Pictures of the assault on the Indian Prime Minister were flashed around the world in newspapers and on television screens.” K.M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins (1994), J.R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka Vol.2 (1956-1989).

Extracts from articles and publications
Source: The International Dimensions of International Conflict, Michael E. Brown (1996):
“The primary task of the IPKF was to supervise the disarming of the LTTE in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, thereby helping to implement the terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. Although sent to act as a neutral force between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE, the IPKF quickly became embroiled in the civil war was the LTTE, for a number of complex reasons, refused to abide with the terms of the accord.”

Source: Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, Elizabeth M. Cousens (2002):
“After the watershed represented by October 1987, the chances of implementation of the ISPA were next to non-existent, as the energies of the IPKF – whose combat strength rose to 70,000 by early 1988 and peaked at 105,000 in early 1989 – were almost entirely consumed by the Vietnam-style guerilla war being waged throughout the north and east by the LTTE.

“In the Autumn of 1988, the Indians made on last, desperate attempt to resurrect the ISPA [India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord] and to marginalize the Tigers, by holding elections to constitute the autonomous NEPC (North East Provinvial Council). This proved counterproductive, and actually delivered the last nail in the coffin of the ISPA. The only Tamil participants – in addition to some Muslim and Sinhalese parties in the eastern province – were two anti-LTTE former guerilla groups whose members had acquired a particularly unsavoury reputation as the IPKF’s local torturers and executioners. Members of these groups, whose sole political principle seemed to be a pathological loathing of the Tigers, were “elected unopposed” in most instances and placed by the Indians in charge of an NEPC that, non surprisingly, proved as farcical during the next year and a half as the “election” that had brought it into being. It expired more or less simultaneously with the IPKF withdrawal from Sri Lanka in early 1990, and its leaders fled to India.

“As president, Premadasa who had openly harboured reservations about the IPKF intervention from the outset, immediately found himself confronted with a truly dire situation. In the north and east the Tigers had clearly succeeded in stalemating, that is, from the point of view of the guerrillas, checkmating – close to 100,000 soldiers of the Indian army. In other words, Jayewardene’s overriding motive for agreeing to the ISPA – the hope that the Indians would if necessary do the Sinhalese elite’s dirty work for them and crush Tamil insurgency – had not been realized at all. But what made matters far worse was that the IPKF intervention had set off a vicious civil war among the Sinhalese. … In short the ISPA had brought disaster to Sinhalese and Tamils alike, and to the fractured island of Sri Lanka as a whole. The logical course for the Premadasa government was to get rid of the IPKF as soon as possible since that alone would take the steam out of the JVP insurgency and create a breathing space for the government.

Extracts from the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, 29 July 1987
1.1 Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka;

1.2 Acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a “multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society” consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers;

1.3 Recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured;

1.4 Also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups;

1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi ethnic, multi lingual and multi religious plural society in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfill their aspirations;

2. Resolve that
2.1 Since the government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as outlined below:

2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e. from the date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.b to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3) the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected Provincial Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.

2.3 There will be a referendum on or before 31st of December 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether:

a) The Eastern Province should remain linked with the Northern Province as one administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the Northern Province as specified in para 2.2 or:
b) The Eastern Province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial Council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers

The President may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum.

2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence or other reasons, will have the right to vote in such a referendum. …

2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the referendum. …

2.9 The Emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by August 15, 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the Island within 48 hours of the signing of this Agreement. All arms presently held by Militant Groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the government of Sri Lanka. …

The process of surrendering of arms and the confining of security personnel and moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect. …

2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency Laws, and to Combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these Laws. …

2.14 The government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and co- operate in the implementation of these proposals. …

2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the government of India taking the following actions if any Militant Groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely,

a) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.
b) The Indian Navy/Coastguard will co-operate with the Sri Lanka Navy in preventing Tamil Militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.
c) In the event that the government of Sri Lanka requests the government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the government of India will co-operate by giving to the government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.
d) The government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident here, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
e) The government of Sri Lanka and India will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces. …

2.18 The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official languages.

Annexure to the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement
…
2. Similarly, both Heads of Government agree that the elections to the Provincial Council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed and all para military personnel will be withdrawn from the Eastern and Northern Provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the Council.

3. The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such para military forces, which came into being due to the ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka. …

5. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that a Joint Indo Sri Lankan Observer Group consisting of qualified representatives of the government of Sri Lanka and the government of India would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July 1987.

6. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India also agree that in terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16 (C) of the Agreement, an Indian Peace Keeping Contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required. Source: University of Western Sydney Library

http://pact.lk/29-july-1987/

 

[Tshering22]

Now that we have all of it behind us, we can look forward to working towards a common goal together.

Sri Lanka and India can only prosper together.

I wish the Lankans good luck and will happily help them in their progress.

 

[Talwar e Pakistan]

Wasn't there a similiar issue in Nepal?

 

[monitor]

Interesting never knew Sri Lanka had armed ltte to fight Indian peacekeeper..I knew ltte fought their mentor/creator with whatever they got from India and collected from eleswhere.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Well General it was the infantrymen of the SIKH Regtt who got slaughtered..The commandos survived 24 hours with low ammo and food.

 

[freeskylord]

Why such a revealtion at this point of time?

 

[GR!FF!N]

For example, it was the World War II vintage thinking which led to the use of parachuting troops against the LTTE in the Jaffna University campus where Prabhakaran was holed up. The parachutists could easily be picked up by LTTE snipers as it was a full moon night.

Well,this is clear inaccuracy as India never used "Paradrop" but rather it was a heli borne operation.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaffna_University_Helidrop

 

[wiseone2]

Now that we have all of it behind us, we can look forward to working towards a common goal together.

Sri Lanka and India can only prosper together.

I wish the Lankans good luck and will happily help them in their progress.

I am glad Rajiv Gandhi cut the LTTE loose. I lost his life. I suppose payback for mommy decision to poke her nose

 

[Gibbs]

Why such a revealtion at this point of time?

He released a book on his experiences as an Army officer, Indian media is just highlighting certain parts of it's memoirs attributed to the IPKF

Every single thing what was mentioned is justifiable

 

[Gandhi G in da house]

Must read for those Pakistanis and few Lankans who comment about the bygone Sri Lanka - India - LTTE issue without any understanding of the subject.

 

[wiseone2]

Must read for those Pakistanis and few Lankans who comment about the bygone Sri Lanka - India - LTTE issue without any understanding of the subject.

not a pakistani but i will sure read on it

 

[cloud4000]

LTTE was a vile organization led by a megalomaniac who didn't give a damn about who he killed, whether they be military or civilian, Sinhala or Tamil. Nevertheless, it was an impressive organization in tactics, discipline, fund raising, etc. Many other liberation movements the world over copied their techniques, including the use of suicide bombers.

 

[Gibbs]

Must read for those Pakistanis and few Lankans who comment about the Sri Lanka - India - LTTE issue without any understanding of the subject.

Not sure about Pakistani's but every single Lankan is quite aware of what happened in their country, Including the Premadasa regime arming the LTTE for us it's not a grand revelation, It's the Lankans that suffered immensely through 30 years of bloodshed due to Indian architectured terrorism, so we very well know every single aspect of it, No need for outsiders to lecture us on our own recent history.. So please keep your condescension to yourself

 

[Omega007]

A general doesn't know the difference between para-dropping and slithering!!And in any case, the paras did just fine, it was the ill fated Sikh LI platoon which got wiped out to its last man, mostly because their choppers landed on the wrong LZ, not really their fault.