Analysis by Ijaz Hussain
Former Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri has counselled that resumption of talks should not become a daily mantra, especially when India does not appear to be keen about them; and that the government should conduct itself with dignity and restraint
The other day, a shocking incident took place when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while meeting Pakistani President Asif Zardari on the sidelines of the recently held Shanghai Cooperation Organisation conference in Russia, insulted him. On entering the room, instead of extending friendly greetings, he reprimandingly declared: I am happy to meet you but my mandate is to tell you that the territory of Pakistan should not be used for terrorism.
Rather than pay Manmohan Singh back in the same coin, Zardari pocketed the insult perhaps out of sheer expediency or suddenness of attack. He asked the journalists covering the event to clear the room and took Singh to the other room where, according to the Indian media, he sought more time to deal with the issue. Subsequently, the Indian prime minister agreed to resumption of talks at the level of foreign secretaries but with terrorism as the sole item on the agenda. The scandalous episode raises a number of questions that we propose to address here.
To begin with, why did Singh deem it necessary to insult the President of Pakistan? Some analysts in Pakistan think that he did so to recast the entire dialogue process to get rid of the Kashmir issue. However the real explanation is to be found in Indias domestic politics. Ever since the Mumbai incident, the Singh government was reluctant to resume talks till the Zardari government eliminated terrorist network and punished perpetrators of terror attacks.
The Pakistani government however failed to satisfy it on both counts. It failed to indict the principal accused Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and released the mastermind Hafiz Saeed. In the meantime, the Singh government was under pressure from Washington to resume talks with Pakistan. To oblige the Americans without getting the Zardari government to do something about terrorism would have been politically suicidal for the Indian government. Therefore, it mounted the one-liner drama as a face saving device to resume talks with Pakistan. Incidentally, it later admitted that it stage-managed the said incident.
Why did the Zardari government, victim of the insult, fail to win the international communitys sympathy? The explanation for this seems to lie in the latters perception about the Zardari government being soft on LeT. The perception goes back to the Mumbai incident when, despite irrefutable evidence to the contrary, the Zardari government went into denial about the nationality of Ajmal Kasab and the use of Pakistans soil for the Mumbai terrorist attack. Evidence included the fact (as provided by the Observer and Pakistani electronic media sleuths) that Kasabs family had disappeared from their village and intelligence agencies were trying to stop villagers from speaking to reporters. Besides, Kasabs father confirmed his sons involvement in the terrorist attack and Faridkot residents acknowledged that Kasab came from their village.
Notwithstanding these incontrovertible facts, the Zardari government remained in utter denial of Pakistans involvement. That explains the international communitys scepticism about Zardari governments commitment to fight terrorism.
This impression seems to have further deepened following the Zardari governments inability to bring the alleged perpetrators of the Mumbai attack to justice. For the international community the litmus test of Pakistans sincerity in the matter was the handling of mastermind Hafiz Saeeds case. In its opinion the Zardari government failed the test when the court dealing with the case released him. The Zardari government blames India for this as in its view it failed to provide hard evidence in the matter. The Singh government on its part accuses Pakistan of being insincere in prosecuting the accused.
The Pakistani government on balance may have a point because if the court has let Hafiz Saeed go for lack of sufficient evidence, this is nothing new. Courts have earlier ordered the release of individuals accused of trying to kill Pervez Musharraf and Shaukat Aziz on the same grounds. In this perspective, it seems that the Zardari government, despite being in the right, has failed to convince the international community of its case. That explains why the latter is not sympathetic towards to it despite it being the victim of Singhs insult.
The SCO incident brings out the fact that the Zardari government is ready to suffer any humiliation for talks with India. The Foreign Office spokesperson has attributed this impression to the Indian medias propaganda. It has also suggested that if talks resume it should not be seen as a favour by one country to the other.
Notwithstanding this explanation, the fact remains that we are begging India for talks all the time as testified by the frequency with which our leadership issues statements on the matter and the pressure that we seek the US and other Western countries to mount on India to come to the negotiating table.
Recognising this sad reality, Pakistans former Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri has counselled that resumption of talks should not become a daily mantra, especially when India does not appear to be keen about them; and that the government should conduct itself with dignity and restraint. However, the Zardari government has adopted a couldnt-care-less attitude. It gives the impression that we need peace more than India. Is that the case?
Peace is as much the need of one country as that of the other. Consider the following. Pakistan needs peace with India because that would allow it to fully focus on domestic problems, which are enormous and which need its undivided attention for their resolution. In case of a thaw in relations, foreign investment could be expected. It may also lead to less Indian interference in Balochistan and FATA.
However peace is not a one-way street. India too needs it. If there is tension with Pakistan, particularly with threatening war clouds, foreign investment will flee from India. This is the lesson that India learned from the mobilisation of troops against Pakistan after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. Peace with Pakistan will have a salutary effect not only on the situation in Indian-administered Kashmir but also India itself, because one needs to remember that if Pakistan succumbs to terrorism India cannot be far behind. Besides, if India wants access to Central Asia, which it needs if it wants to be a major player on the global scene, then peace with Pakistan is imperative.
Despite the above balance sheet, which shows that both countries need peace equally, the Zardari government gives the impression that peace is our need and not Indias. In fact, on close scrutiny one discovers that in the present context, when Pakistan refuses to move its troops to the Western border to fight the Al Qaeda and Taliban threat because of the presence of Indian troops on the Eastern borders, it gives Washington the jitters. Washington then puts pressure on India not only to move its troops to peacetime positions but also resume talks with Pakistan. Incidentally, Indian strategic thinkers are agreed that not talking to Pakistan is not an option for India. However, instead of fully exploiting the American weakness on this score the Zardari government becomes panicky and keeps begging India for talks.
What is the lesson of the SCO incident? It is that we should realise that whereas we need India and the international community, they need us too. In fact, at the present juncture they need us more than we need them. We should play our cards keeping this reality in mind. Confucius said that if you run after a butterfly it will elude you, but if you do not care about it, it will come to you and then you can easily catch it.
The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com
Former Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri has counselled that resumption of talks should not become a daily mantra, especially when India does not appear to be keen about them; and that the government should conduct itself with dignity and restraint
The other day, a shocking incident took place when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while meeting Pakistani President Asif Zardari on the sidelines of the recently held Shanghai Cooperation Organisation conference in Russia, insulted him. On entering the room, instead of extending friendly greetings, he reprimandingly declared: I am happy to meet you but my mandate is to tell you that the territory of Pakistan should not be used for terrorism.
Rather than pay Manmohan Singh back in the same coin, Zardari pocketed the insult perhaps out of sheer expediency or suddenness of attack. He asked the journalists covering the event to clear the room and took Singh to the other room where, according to the Indian media, he sought more time to deal with the issue. Subsequently, the Indian prime minister agreed to resumption of talks at the level of foreign secretaries but with terrorism as the sole item on the agenda. The scandalous episode raises a number of questions that we propose to address here.
To begin with, why did Singh deem it necessary to insult the President of Pakistan? Some analysts in Pakistan think that he did so to recast the entire dialogue process to get rid of the Kashmir issue. However the real explanation is to be found in Indias domestic politics. Ever since the Mumbai incident, the Singh government was reluctant to resume talks till the Zardari government eliminated terrorist network and punished perpetrators of terror attacks.
The Pakistani government however failed to satisfy it on both counts. It failed to indict the principal accused Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and released the mastermind Hafiz Saeed. In the meantime, the Singh government was under pressure from Washington to resume talks with Pakistan. To oblige the Americans without getting the Zardari government to do something about terrorism would have been politically suicidal for the Indian government. Therefore, it mounted the one-liner drama as a face saving device to resume talks with Pakistan. Incidentally, it later admitted that it stage-managed the said incident.
Why did the Zardari government, victim of the insult, fail to win the international communitys sympathy? The explanation for this seems to lie in the latters perception about the Zardari government being soft on LeT. The perception goes back to the Mumbai incident when, despite irrefutable evidence to the contrary, the Zardari government went into denial about the nationality of Ajmal Kasab and the use of Pakistans soil for the Mumbai terrorist attack. Evidence included the fact (as provided by the Observer and Pakistani electronic media sleuths) that Kasabs family had disappeared from their village and intelligence agencies were trying to stop villagers from speaking to reporters. Besides, Kasabs father confirmed his sons involvement in the terrorist attack and Faridkot residents acknowledged that Kasab came from their village.
Notwithstanding these incontrovertible facts, the Zardari government remained in utter denial of Pakistans involvement. That explains the international communitys scepticism about Zardari governments commitment to fight terrorism.
This impression seems to have further deepened following the Zardari governments inability to bring the alleged perpetrators of the Mumbai attack to justice. For the international community the litmus test of Pakistans sincerity in the matter was the handling of mastermind Hafiz Saeeds case. In its opinion the Zardari government failed the test when the court dealing with the case released him. The Zardari government blames India for this as in its view it failed to provide hard evidence in the matter. The Singh government on its part accuses Pakistan of being insincere in prosecuting the accused.
The Pakistani government on balance may have a point because if the court has let Hafiz Saeed go for lack of sufficient evidence, this is nothing new. Courts have earlier ordered the release of individuals accused of trying to kill Pervez Musharraf and Shaukat Aziz on the same grounds. In this perspective, it seems that the Zardari government, despite being in the right, has failed to convince the international community of its case. That explains why the latter is not sympathetic towards to it despite it being the victim of Singhs insult.
The SCO incident brings out the fact that the Zardari government is ready to suffer any humiliation for talks with India. The Foreign Office spokesperson has attributed this impression to the Indian medias propaganda. It has also suggested that if talks resume it should not be seen as a favour by one country to the other.
Notwithstanding this explanation, the fact remains that we are begging India for talks all the time as testified by the frequency with which our leadership issues statements on the matter and the pressure that we seek the US and other Western countries to mount on India to come to the negotiating table.
Recognising this sad reality, Pakistans former Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri has counselled that resumption of talks should not become a daily mantra, especially when India does not appear to be keen about them; and that the government should conduct itself with dignity and restraint. However, the Zardari government has adopted a couldnt-care-less attitude. It gives the impression that we need peace more than India. Is that the case?
Peace is as much the need of one country as that of the other. Consider the following. Pakistan needs peace with India because that would allow it to fully focus on domestic problems, which are enormous and which need its undivided attention for their resolution. In case of a thaw in relations, foreign investment could be expected. It may also lead to less Indian interference in Balochistan and FATA.
However peace is not a one-way street. India too needs it. If there is tension with Pakistan, particularly with threatening war clouds, foreign investment will flee from India. This is the lesson that India learned from the mobilisation of troops against Pakistan after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. Peace with Pakistan will have a salutary effect not only on the situation in Indian-administered Kashmir but also India itself, because one needs to remember that if Pakistan succumbs to terrorism India cannot be far behind. Besides, if India wants access to Central Asia, which it needs if it wants to be a major player on the global scene, then peace with Pakistan is imperative.
Despite the above balance sheet, which shows that both countries need peace equally, the Zardari government gives the impression that peace is our need and not Indias. In fact, on close scrutiny one discovers that in the present context, when Pakistan refuses to move its troops to the Western border to fight the Al Qaeda and Taliban threat because of the presence of Indian troops on the Eastern borders, it gives Washington the jitters. Washington then puts pressure on India not only to move its troops to peacetime positions but also resume talks with Pakistan. Incidentally, Indian strategic thinkers are agreed that not talking to Pakistan is not an option for India. However, instead of fully exploiting the American weakness on this score the Zardari government becomes panicky and keeps begging India for talks.
What is the lesson of the SCO incident? It is that we should realise that whereas we need India and the international community, they need us too. In fact, at the present juncture they need us more than we need them. We should play our cards keeping this reality in mind. Confucius said that if you run after a butterfly it will elude you, but if you do not care about it, it will come to you and then you can easily catch it.
The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com
