sohailbutt
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 24, 2008
- Messages
- 653
- Reaction score
- 0
Shortly before George W. Bush left office, Harvard historian Sugata Bose told me that strengthening U.S. relations with India "may turn out to be the most significant foreign-policy achievement of the Bush administration." It is an achievement that Indians greatly appreciate: In mid-February, a spokesman for the ruling Congress party said that Bush deserves India's top civilian award, the Bharat Ratna ("Jewel of India"), an honor rarely conferred on non-Indians.
"The people of India deeply love you," Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Bush last September. In the 2008 Pew Global Attitudes survey, India was one of only three countries out of 24 in which a majority of respondents expressed "a lot" or "some" confidence in Bush to "do the right thing regarding foreign affairs." (The others were Tanzania and Nigeria.)
Unfortunately, Indian officials have notably less confidence in Barack Obama than they had in Bush. And so far, Obama has done little to assuage their worries. "There's no question that the Indians are uncertain about this administration," says a Democratic Senate aide who works on foreign-policy issues. "They had such a good relationship with Bush, and [Obama] ran as the anti-Bush." Since Obama's election, an accumulation of perceived slights -- some more trivial than others -- has intensified New Delhi's anxiety and fostered an atmosphere of "deteriorating trust."
The most historic element of Bush's India policy was a bilateral civilian nuclear agreement, which received final approval from U.S. lawmakers in the fall of 2008. Last June, when the agreement was stalled, an Obama adviser told the Financial Times that his candidate was "highly ambivalent" about it, even though Obama had backed the nuclear deal in a 2006 Senate vote. A month later, Obama told an Indian magazine that despite his initial concerns over how the nuclear pact would affect the global nonproliferation regime, he supported it because "India is a strong democracy and a natural strategic partner for the U.S. in the 21st century."
Yet Indians still had their doubts about Obama. They knew he had sought to modify the nuclear accord in 2006 to limit India's access to nuclear fuel. Indian foreign-affairs scholar C. Raja Mohan has written that Obama's proposed amendment "almost wrecked the nuclear deal." Daniel Twining, who worked on South Asia policy at the State Department in 2007 and 2008, says it was a "poison-pill amendment."
Though the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the U.S. and Indian governments have taken the necessary steps to permit bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation, policymakers must negotiate key aspects of that cooperation. Obama has tapped veteran State Department hand Robert Einhorn to be the senior arms-control official at Foggy Bottom. Einhorn has been a sharp critic of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement. In November 2006, he was one of 18 signatories to a letter urging the Senate to "address serious flaws" in its India nuclear-trade bill.
On the other hand, Joe Biden is highly regarded in India. Hillary Clinton is also well liked, partly due to her husband's popularity -- his five-day trip to India in 2000 generated enormous good will -- but also thanks to her own efforts. During her time in the Senate, Hillary co-chaired the India Caucus, promoted a more robust U.S.-India partnership, and established close links with the Indian-American community. At a May 2005 dinner celebrating Sikh-American heritage, she facetiously labeled herself "the senator from Punjab."
But on her recent tour of Asia -- her first foreign trip as secretary of state -- Hillary did not visit India. Needless to say, the Indians noticed that her itinerary included Tokyo, Jakarta, Seoul, and Beijing, but not New Delhi. They were also miffed that after his election, Obama called a litany of other world leaders (including the president of Pakistan) before dialing Singh. And as Twining points out, the page on the White House website that outlines Obama's foreign-policy agenda fails to mention India.
Some of this may seem like small beer, but it has heightened India's qualms about Obama. Indian officials fear that their country is not a top priority for the new administration, and that Obama is less committed to the bilateral partnership than Bush was. In fairness to Obama, Bush devoted an extraordinary amount of political energy to India, and he may have created unrealistic expectations. "The Bush administration did so much to move the relationship forward," says Twining. "You could make a case that George Bush was actually the India desk officer."
Obama has hardly neglected South Asia, but India has not been his chief focus. "As things stand," writes Xenia Dormandy, former South Asia director at the National Security Council, in the Christian Science Monitor, "Washington's bandwidth for India seems to be overwhelmed by concerns about its neighbors to the west, Afghanistan and Pakistan." Obama has authorized a formal review of U.S. policy toward those two countries -- in addition to green-lighting a big troop increase in Afghanistan -- and has made Richard Holbrooke a special envoy to the region.
When Holbrooke's appointment was first announced, the Indians thought it might signal a new U.S. push to broker a settlement over Kashmir. India ardently opposes such foreign interference in the Kashmir dispute. In an online column posted on January 23, Laura Rozen of Foreign Policy reported that "India vigorously -- and successfully -- lobbied the Obama transition team to make sure that neither India nor Kashmir was included in Holbrooke's official brief."
Twining argues that "significant parts of the U.S. establishment have gone back to a Pakistan-centric South Asia policy." On Afghanistan, Indian officials hope that the U.S. policy review produces an unambiguous, long-term American security commitment. They are worried that short-term "peace" deals with the Taliban will embolden radical elements in Pakistan.
Amid a global economic crisis, the Indians are also concerned about Obama's stance on trade. Obama has repeatedly bashed "companies that ship jobs overseas." Economist Jagdish Bhagwati, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, says that India will "surely" retaliate against the "Buy American" provision in the economic-stimulus package. Meanwhile, India is nervous that the Obama administration will pressure it to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which President Clinton signed in 1996 and the Senate rejected in 1999.
Though Obama is off to a shaky start with India, his presidency is barely two months old. "With a little effort on the part of the Obama administration, a lot of these uncertainties and doubts about his commitment to the relationship can fall away," says the Democratic Senate aide. "The president should also think about going to New Delhi, sooner rather than later." Secretary of State Clinton had a positive meeting with her Indian counterpart in mid-March, and New Delhi knows that she and Biden were solid advocates of India in the Senate. Moreover, pro-India sentiments run deep among both Republicans and Democrats.
It's easy to see why. The U.S. and India share a host of values and interests. Both are wary of China, and both are fighting Islamist terrorism that emanates from Pakistan. The Indian diaspora has bolstered cultural linkages, and in recent years bilateral economic cooperation has flourished. Stephen Cohen, a South Asia specialist at the Brookings Institution, reckons that U.S.-India economic connections are "so strong that they stabilize the overall relationship."
This does not mean that the relationship will always be harmonious. For example: India enjoys relatively warm ties with Burma and Iran (though also with Israel), and it has clung to steep agricultural tariffs, which helped scuttle the Doha trade talks last summer. Nevertheless, there are major structural forces pushing the U.S. and India closer together. In June 2005, U.S. and Indian officials signed a joint defense framework that stated, "As the world's two largest democracies, the United States and India agree on the vital importance of political and economic freedom, democratic institutions, the rule of law, security, and opportunity around the world. The leaders of our two countries are building a U.S.-India strategic partnership in pursuit of these principles and interests."
Bush's India outreach was part of a broader Asia strategy that involved engaging China while boosting relations with democratic powers such as India, Japan, and Australia. The latter three countries conducted a joint relief mission with the U.S. following the 2004 Asian tsunami. In 2007, these four democracies (along with Singapore) held multilateral naval exercises.
In the decades ahead, India's global clout will increase considerably. Goldman Sachs has projected that India could have a larger economy than the United States by 2050. At that point, the South Asian giant will have eclipsed China to become the most populous country on earth, according to the United Nations Population Fund.
In his 2008 book Rivals, former Economist editor (and fierce Bush critic) Bill Emmott writes that Bush's "bold initiative" to enhance U.S.-India relations "may eventually be judged by historians as a move of great strategic importance and imagination." Obama now has an opportunity to build on that initiative. He should seize it.
SOURCE: Duncan Currie/NATIONAL REVIEW
.:: SAMAA - ANALYSIS: Bush's India triumph
"The people of India deeply love you," Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Bush last September. In the 2008 Pew Global Attitudes survey, India was one of only three countries out of 24 in which a majority of respondents expressed "a lot" or "some" confidence in Bush to "do the right thing regarding foreign affairs." (The others were Tanzania and Nigeria.)
Unfortunately, Indian officials have notably less confidence in Barack Obama than they had in Bush. And so far, Obama has done little to assuage their worries. "There's no question that the Indians are uncertain about this administration," says a Democratic Senate aide who works on foreign-policy issues. "They had such a good relationship with Bush, and [Obama] ran as the anti-Bush." Since Obama's election, an accumulation of perceived slights -- some more trivial than others -- has intensified New Delhi's anxiety and fostered an atmosphere of "deteriorating trust."
The most historic element of Bush's India policy was a bilateral civilian nuclear agreement, which received final approval from U.S. lawmakers in the fall of 2008. Last June, when the agreement was stalled, an Obama adviser told the Financial Times that his candidate was "highly ambivalent" about it, even though Obama had backed the nuclear deal in a 2006 Senate vote. A month later, Obama told an Indian magazine that despite his initial concerns over how the nuclear pact would affect the global nonproliferation regime, he supported it because "India is a strong democracy and a natural strategic partner for the U.S. in the 21st century."
Yet Indians still had their doubts about Obama. They knew he had sought to modify the nuclear accord in 2006 to limit India's access to nuclear fuel. Indian foreign-affairs scholar C. Raja Mohan has written that Obama's proposed amendment "almost wrecked the nuclear deal." Daniel Twining, who worked on South Asia policy at the State Department in 2007 and 2008, says it was a "poison-pill amendment."
Though the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the U.S. and Indian governments have taken the necessary steps to permit bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation, policymakers must negotiate key aspects of that cooperation. Obama has tapped veteran State Department hand Robert Einhorn to be the senior arms-control official at Foggy Bottom. Einhorn has been a sharp critic of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement. In November 2006, he was one of 18 signatories to a letter urging the Senate to "address serious flaws" in its India nuclear-trade bill.
On the other hand, Joe Biden is highly regarded in India. Hillary Clinton is also well liked, partly due to her husband's popularity -- his five-day trip to India in 2000 generated enormous good will -- but also thanks to her own efforts. During her time in the Senate, Hillary co-chaired the India Caucus, promoted a more robust U.S.-India partnership, and established close links with the Indian-American community. At a May 2005 dinner celebrating Sikh-American heritage, she facetiously labeled herself "the senator from Punjab."
But on her recent tour of Asia -- her first foreign trip as secretary of state -- Hillary did not visit India. Needless to say, the Indians noticed that her itinerary included Tokyo, Jakarta, Seoul, and Beijing, but not New Delhi. They were also miffed that after his election, Obama called a litany of other world leaders (including the president of Pakistan) before dialing Singh. And as Twining points out, the page on the White House website that outlines Obama's foreign-policy agenda fails to mention India.
Some of this may seem like small beer, but it has heightened India's qualms about Obama. Indian officials fear that their country is not a top priority for the new administration, and that Obama is less committed to the bilateral partnership than Bush was. In fairness to Obama, Bush devoted an extraordinary amount of political energy to India, and he may have created unrealistic expectations. "The Bush administration did so much to move the relationship forward," says Twining. "You could make a case that George Bush was actually the India desk officer."
Obama has hardly neglected South Asia, but India has not been his chief focus. "As things stand," writes Xenia Dormandy, former South Asia director at the National Security Council, in the Christian Science Monitor, "Washington's bandwidth for India seems to be overwhelmed by concerns about its neighbors to the west, Afghanistan and Pakistan." Obama has authorized a formal review of U.S. policy toward those two countries -- in addition to green-lighting a big troop increase in Afghanistan -- and has made Richard Holbrooke a special envoy to the region.
When Holbrooke's appointment was first announced, the Indians thought it might signal a new U.S. push to broker a settlement over Kashmir. India ardently opposes such foreign interference in the Kashmir dispute. In an online column posted on January 23, Laura Rozen of Foreign Policy reported that "India vigorously -- and successfully -- lobbied the Obama transition team to make sure that neither India nor Kashmir was included in Holbrooke's official brief."
Twining argues that "significant parts of the U.S. establishment have gone back to a Pakistan-centric South Asia policy." On Afghanistan, Indian officials hope that the U.S. policy review produces an unambiguous, long-term American security commitment. They are worried that short-term "peace" deals with the Taliban will embolden radical elements in Pakistan.
Amid a global economic crisis, the Indians are also concerned about Obama's stance on trade. Obama has repeatedly bashed "companies that ship jobs overseas." Economist Jagdish Bhagwati, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, says that India will "surely" retaliate against the "Buy American" provision in the economic-stimulus package. Meanwhile, India is nervous that the Obama administration will pressure it to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which President Clinton signed in 1996 and the Senate rejected in 1999.
Though Obama is off to a shaky start with India, his presidency is barely two months old. "With a little effort on the part of the Obama administration, a lot of these uncertainties and doubts about his commitment to the relationship can fall away," says the Democratic Senate aide. "The president should also think about going to New Delhi, sooner rather than later." Secretary of State Clinton had a positive meeting with her Indian counterpart in mid-March, and New Delhi knows that she and Biden were solid advocates of India in the Senate. Moreover, pro-India sentiments run deep among both Republicans and Democrats.
It's easy to see why. The U.S. and India share a host of values and interests. Both are wary of China, and both are fighting Islamist terrorism that emanates from Pakistan. The Indian diaspora has bolstered cultural linkages, and in recent years bilateral economic cooperation has flourished. Stephen Cohen, a South Asia specialist at the Brookings Institution, reckons that U.S.-India economic connections are "so strong that they stabilize the overall relationship."
This does not mean that the relationship will always be harmonious. For example: India enjoys relatively warm ties with Burma and Iran (though also with Israel), and it has clung to steep agricultural tariffs, which helped scuttle the Doha trade talks last summer. Nevertheless, there are major structural forces pushing the U.S. and India closer together. In June 2005, U.S. and Indian officials signed a joint defense framework that stated, "As the world's two largest democracies, the United States and India agree on the vital importance of political and economic freedom, democratic institutions, the rule of law, security, and opportunity around the world. The leaders of our two countries are building a U.S.-India strategic partnership in pursuit of these principles and interests."
Bush's India outreach was part of a broader Asia strategy that involved engaging China while boosting relations with democratic powers such as India, Japan, and Australia. The latter three countries conducted a joint relief mission with the U.S. following the 2004 Asian tsunami. In 2007, these four democracies (along with Singapore) held multilateral naval exercises.
In the decades ahead, India's global clout will increase considerably. Goldman Sachs has projected that India could have a larger economy than the United States by 2050. At that point, the South Asian giant will have eclipsed China to become the most populous country on earth, according to the United Nations Population Fund.
In his 2008 book Rivals, former Economist editor (and fierce Bush critic) Bill Emmott writes that Bush's "bold initiative" to enhance U.S.-India relations "may eventually be judged by historians as a move of great strategic importance and imagination." Obama now has an opportunity to build on that initiative. He should seize it.
SOURCE: Duncan Currie/NATIONAL REVIEW
.:: SAMAA - ANALYSIS: Bush's India triumph
