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Al Qaeda hierarchy in a pocket?
Thursday, November 26, 2009
Ikram Sehgal
In six weeks of intense fighting the Pakistani Army has killed 600-700 militants while capturing an undisclosed number, probably disrupting the Al Qaeda worldwide network, if not damaging it substantially. Guerrillas are not supposed to stand and fight unless they have substantial reason to do so. In many of the locations in South Waziristan they did just that. One may well ask why they were they fighting so hard?
Athar Abbas maintains that many melted into the countryside and into North Waziristan. This rather contradictory ambiguity tends to muddy some unpalatable truths, that the foreigners have nowhere to go while their paid Mehsud "army" will take their chances as "guests" of their Waziri cousins. Since the impending operations in South Waziristan was public property for months, interdicting their routes and possible havens should have been catered for.
As winter sets in and the army restricts itself to the localities, a classic guerrilla campaign may be in the offing against the tough militants in the area. One can only pray for the forces presently engaged in operations in South Waziristan. Those include my unit of which a mechanised infantry company carries my name, bestowed on it during the 1971 War in the Thar Desert on Sanohi Ridge overlooking Chhor on Dec 13, 1971, by the-then commanding officer, Lt Col (later Brig) Muhammad Taj (SJ & Bar). Luckily, from the major general to the common soldier, this army has come a long way because of their "acid test" in Swat.
Too much detail is being given about the counter-insurgency operations when bland statements could suffice. We are not the US and South Waziristan is not Vietnam, we have to keep a lid on things rather than look good and grandstand in the media while others are doing the actual fighting.
On Oct 23, 2004, I had written, "One should certainly 'embed' journalists with units in peacetime and (maybe) during conventional war, to allow the media access to the area of operations during a counter-guerrilla warfare campaign is nothing less than madness, if not outright propaganda 'hara-kiri'! the Pakistani Army is engaged in a bloody cross between classic guerrilla warfare and pure terrorism, excesses can be complicated by misreporting, the political and geopolitical merits and demerits (and sensitivities) of indulging in counter-guerrilla operations notwithstanding." Nobody listened to me then, no one is likely to listen to me now either.
After the Afghan War was over by the late 1980s, a substantial number of foreign volunteers had nowhere to go. Five years ago, on Jan 27, 2005, I wrote, "To go back to their own countries would have meant instant incarceration, and maybe even instant death. In the 90s decade the foreign militants in South Waziristan lived in relative peace. This changed after the army entered South Waziristan in 2004."
To quote my article of Oct 23, 2004, "A largely rocky and barren country with walled tribal villages, each with one or more watchtowers, South Waziristan has poor soil, with only small patches of cultivation around the villages. The main source of survival for the locals has been banditry and smuggling--i.e., till the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Both North and South Waziristan thereafter became staging areas for the Afghan Mujahideen, this spurred some economic activity, and even sparse affluence. With the advent of US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and the rout of their Taliban mentors, there was an fresh influx of foreign fighters as elements of Al Qaeda found a safe haven in this no-go (self-imposed by the government) territory, operating at will on both sides of the Durand Line.
"With plenty of cash from the foreigners, with religious sentiments decrying the occupation of Afghanistan by western powers and with a heritage of spurning laws that are not essentially tribal in nature, besides being a safe haven this became an ideal recruiting ground from among the youth of the area. Before the Afghan War reliance was on generally obsolete weapons. Their weapons and equipment are now at par with the modern armed forces, on-the-job 'training' has made them sometimes even tougher. While modern communications and intelligent exploitation of the media are major force-multipliers to their potency, the use of IEDs as a terror weapon adds a new dimension." Common knowledge since 2004, it is appalling that our own intelligence agencies (and others with far more sophistication) could not capitalise on telltale signs about the "safe haven" for the Al Qaeda hierarchy.
Going into South Waziristan in 2004 without adequate manpower or firepower, and given the stakes for Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Army had to get a bloody nose. To quote my article of Oct 23, 2004, "According to Comd 11 Corps, Lt Gen Safdar Hussain, 246 militants have been killed during the course of military operations in the last few months in South Waziristan, at least 100 foreigners (Uzbeks and Chechens among them). He claimed that 579 militants have been arrested. And then came the shocker, 171 of our Pakistani soldiers (regular and paramilitary) have also died during the operations, 21 because of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). As a company commander of an infantry battalion (44 Punjab now 4 Sindh) which suffered (and inflicted) the maximum casualties (some of it in hand-to-hand fighting) during counter-guerrilla operations in Balochistan in 1973, even for me the high casualty rate is alarming. Ruling out the presence of Osama Bin Laden in the area, he confirmed indications that Tahir Yuldash, a leader of the Independent Uzbekistan Movement (IUM), could be operating with the hostiles. What this successor of renowned Uzbek Mujahideen leader Juma Namangani (killed fighting with the Taliban in Konduz in Oct/Nov 2001) is doing in Pakistan is anyone's guess!"
Why not bring to book those that sent the army into Kargil (1999) and FATA (2004) without proper planning or logistics? Don't the Shaheeds have a right to hold accountable those who sent them to their deaths without reason and/or adequate support?
The militant ORBAT (order of battle) in South Waziristan had an inner circle of Uzbeks, Chechens, Arabs, etc., guarding the core comprising the Al Qaeda hierarchy, with an outer mercenary circle of Mehsud tribals, short on ideology but long on rhetoric about it. The inner core almost never comes into view, beefing up the various sub-units of the outer circle during actual fighting whenever required. This was a perfect arrangement. For the benefit of the outside world, while Al Qaeda remained incognito, the Mehsuds naively revelled in the publicity and got duly knocked over from time to time, one Mehsud cousin happily taking over from the other.
The momentum of the present operations must be continued and the remaining militants captured or killed. The next two weeks before the first flurries of snow are crucial. The army most scour the countryside to locate and deny hideouts for the militants. The Al Qaeda hierarchy is definitely in a pocket in South Waziristan. Now is the opportunity and the time to take them out!
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
Al Qaeda hierarchy in a pocket?
Thursday, November 26, 2009
Ikram Sehgal
In six weeks of intense fighting the Pakistani Army has killed 600-700 militants while capturing an undisclosed number, probably disrupting the Al Qaeda worldwide network, if not damaging it substantially. Guerrillas are not supposed to stand and fight unless they have substantial reason to do so. In many of the locations in South Waziristan they did just that. One may well ask why they were they fighting so hard?
Athar Abbas maintains that many melted into the countryside and into North Waziristan. This rather contradictory ambiguity tends to muddy some unpalatable truths, that the foreigners have nowhere to go while their paid Mehsud "army" will take their chances as "guests" of their Waziri cousins. Since the impending operations in South Waziristan was public property for months, interdicting their routes and possible havens should have been catered for.
As winter sets in and the army restricts itself to the localities, a classic guerrilla campaign may be in the offing against the tough militants in the area. One can only pray for the forces presently engaged in operations in South Waziristan. Those include my unit of which a mechanised infantry company carries my name, bestowed on it during the 1971 War in the Thar Desert on Sanohi Ridge overlooking Chhor on Dec 13, 1971, by the-then commanding officer, Lt Col (later Brig) Muhammad Taj (SJ & Bar). Luckily, from the major general to the common soldier, this army has come a long way because of their "acid test" in Swat.
Too much detail is being given about the counter-insurgency operations when bland statements could suffice. We are not the US and South Waziristan is not Vietnam, we have to keep a lid on things rather than look good and grandstand in the media while others are doing the actual fighting.
On Oct 23, 2004, I had written, "One should certainly 'embed' journalists with units in peacetime and (maybe) during conventional war, to allow the media access to the area of operations during a counter-guerrilla warfare campaign is nothing less than madness, if not outright propaganda 'hara-kiri'! the Pakistani Army is engaged in a bloody cross between classic guerrilla warfare and pure terrorism, excesses can be complicated by misreporting, the political and geopolitical merits and demerits (and sensitivities) of indulging in counter-guerrilla operations notwithstanding." Nobody listened to me then, no one is likely to listen to me now either.
After the Afghan War was over by the late 1980s, a substantial number of foreign volunteers had nowhere to go. Five years ago, on Jan 27, 2005, I wrote, "To go back to their own countries would have meant instant incarceration, and maybe even instant death. In the 90s decade the foreign militants in South Waziristan lived in relative peace. This changed after the army entered South Waziristan in 2004."
To quote my article of Oct 23, 2004, "A largely rocky and barren country with walled tribal villages, each with one or more watchtowers, South Waziristan has poor soil, with only small patches of cultivation around the villages. The main source of survival for the locals has been banditry and smuggling--i.e., till the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Both North and South Waziristan thereafter became staging areas for the Afghan Mujahideen, this spurred some economic activity, and even sparse affluence. With the advent of US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and the rout of their Taliban mentors, there was an fresh influx of foreign fighters as elements of Al Qaeda found a safe haven in this no-go (self-imposed by the government) territory, operating at will on both sides of the Durand Line.
"With plenty of cash from the foreigners, with religious sentiments decrying the occupation of Afghanistan by western powers and with a heritage of spurning laws that are not essentially tribal in nature, besides being a safe haven this became an ideal recruiting ground from among the youth of the area. Before the Afghan War reliance was on generally obsolete weapons. Their weapons and equipment are now at par with the modern armed forces, on-the-job 'training' has made them sometimes even tougher. While modern communications and intelligent exploitation of the media are major force-multipliers to their potency, the use of IEDs as a terror weapon adds a new dimension." Common knowledge since 2004, it is appalling that our own intelligence agencies (and others with far more sophistication) could not capitalise on telltale signs about the "safe haven" for the Al Qaeda hierarchy.
Going into South Waziristan in 2004 without adequate manpower or firepower, and given the stakes for Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Army had to get a bloody nose. To quote my article of Oct 23, 2004, "According to Comd 11 Corps, Lt Gen Safdar Hussain, 246 militants have been killed during the course of military operations in the last few months in South Waziristan, at least 100 foreigners (Uzbeks and Chechens among them). He claimed that 579 militants have been arrested. And then came the shocker, 171 of our Pakistani soldiers (regular and paramilitary) have also died during the operations, 21 because of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). As a company commander of an infantry battalion (44 Punjab now 4 Sindh) which suffered (and inflicted) the maximum casualties (some of it in hand-to-hand fighting) during counter-guerrilla operations in Balochistan in 1973, even for me the high casualty rate is alarming. Ruling out the presence of Osama Bin Laden in the area, he confirmed indications that Tahir Yuldash, a leader of the Independent Uzbekistan Movement (IUM), could be operating with the hostiles. What this successor of renowned Uzbek Mujahideen leader Juma Namangani (killed fighting with the Taliban in Konduz in Oct/Nov 2001) is doing in Pakistan is anyone's guess!"
Why not bring to book those that sent the army into Kargil (1999) and FATA (2004) without proper planning or logistics? Don't the Shaheeds have a right to hold accountable those who sent them to their deaths without reason and/or adequate support?
The militant ORBAT (order of battle) in South Waziristan had an inner circle of Uzbeks, Chechens, Arabs, etc., guarding the core comprising the Al Qaeda hierarchy, with an outer mercenary circle of Mehsud tribals, short on ideology but long on rhetoric about it. The inner core almost never comes into view, beefing up the various sub-units of the outer circle during actual fighting whenever required. This was a perfect arrangement. For the benefit of the outside world, while Al Qaeda remained incognito, the Mehsuds naively revelled in the publicity and got duly knocked over from time to time, one Mehsud cousin happily taking over from the other.
The momentum of the present operations must be continued and the remaining militants captured or killed. The next two weeks before the first flurries of snow are crucial. The army most scour the countryside to locate and deny hideouts for the militants. The Al Qaeda hierarchy is definitely in a pocket in South Waziristan. Now is the opportunity and the time to take them out!
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
Al Qaeda hierarchy in a pocket?
