Akbar Bugti Killed | Bughtis announce end of Sardari system

[sigatoka]

1. Situation in Balochistan is totally different from East Pakistan, Balochistan is actually interlinked with Pakistan, its unseperable!


2. Its only feudalism we need to kill.

1. Thats what they said back then as well.

2. Feudalism wasnt ended with fiat in europe or the rest of pak. It wasnt ended with sending in the troops and it wont be ended in Baloh. with tanks or legislation. What is needed is improvement in the basics that the Pak. should be providing in the region.

 

[sigatoka]

1. all the parties in pakistan created on the base of color language religion should be banned.and there leaders should be neutralized.

2. smuglers costing pakistan economy billions of dollars a year

1. Ah yes, supporting liberalism by illiberally banning everything you dont support.

2. Its the other way around, taxes and restrictions on imports cost the economy billions of dollars a year. (you confuse "the economy" with government finances.) Smuggling lowers the cost of these restrictions on imports to the economy.

 

[sigatoka]

1. We are not paying them enough? Is that what your trying to say? Why should we pay them? What have they done to get paid? What kind of rights do they want?

2. They have the rights! They want the money? They should earn it!

1. I think they want more autonomy and greater right of self determination. A bit similar to the rights Indonesia accords its provinces.

2. Rental Incomes (of which Oil and Gas resources are a classic eg of) are frequently earned and lost by the gun. Indeed they are attempting to "earn" it by the gun. There is no economic reason why Baloh. should be given more revenues from Gas then they are now, rental incomes do not change by distributing it differently. In fact in Sakhalin province of Russia (that Island abov Japan) the central govt. has taken 100% of revenue from the new investments. However for them there is no likelihood of rebellion (the place is still booming). In Baloch. case its different, these people have the guns, the place is not booming (in fact its mired in poverty) and unless some agreement can be reached, all the rental income will be dissapated in fighting (or competing for its right).

Giving a greater portion of income may be "cheaper" than fighting.

 

[Cheetah786]

1. Ah yes, supporting liberalism by illiberally banning everything you dont support.

2. Its the other way around, taxes and restrictions on imports cost the economy billions of dollars a year. (you confuse "the economy" with government finances.) Smuggling lowers the cost of these restrictions on imports to the economy.

Iam speechless.i give up man u top them all .i cant find words to respond to this.:disappointed:

 

[A.Rahman]

Iam speechless.i give up man u top them all .i cant find words to respond to this.:disappointed:

but you did found the words to respond to it

..contradiction?

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Daily Times
Wednesday, August 30, 2006 E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version

VIEW: Bugti killing and the echoes of history —Dr Akmal Hussain

The inflammatory political consequences of the recent military action in Balochistan are apparent in the riots in Quetta, Nushki and Karachi. Worse still, the seething sense of deprivation in Sindh could take the form of alienation from a polity in which the writ of the state is seen to be established through not political consensus but the barrel of a gun

“Tonight I can write the saddest lines”. — Pablo Neruda

The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, president of the Jamhoori Watan Party, in a military operation has cast a pall of gloom. Echoes of history amplify the tragic significance of this moment. Like the case of the East Pakistan crisis in 1971, an essentially political problem has been dealt with military means. Once again the attempt to establish the writ of the state may have unleashed forces that could eventually further weaken it. Clearly the creation of a martyr has intensified Baloch sentiment for greater provincial autonomy. The need for understanding the nature of nationalism and the imperative of urgently granting genuine autonomy to all provinces in order to strengthen the state cannot be overstated.

Sentiment is the defining feature of nationalism. In his seminal work, Max Weber defines the term nation: “The concept undoubtedly means... that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups”. W Connor, similarly, suggests that “...nations are self-differentiated ethnic groups at whose core is an intensely subjective psychological identification which exists beyond reason”. It is this sentiment at the core of Baloch nationalism that may have been re-ignited by the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti and the delay in handing over his body for burial. Sardar Mengal’s statement in this context is significant: “Nawab Bugti was a fighter for the rights of the Baloch... his death has drawn a line between Balochistan and Pakistan”. (Daily Times, August 27). The delay in handing over Bugti’s body is further reinforcing the perception that the values and norms the Baloch share with all Pakistanis are being violated. Senator Shahid Hassan Bugti is reported to have said, “two days have passed since the tragic incident... the government should hand over the body to heirs in accordance with Islamic teachings, tribal traditions and human values”. (Dawn, August 28).

In Pakistan, developing an overarching identity as citizens besides the multiple provincial, cultural, and religious identities has been the principal challenge for stability. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah articulated this challenge precisely when he said:

“You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the state... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens, and equal citizens, of one state... Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the state.”

The integrity of the state signified in the concept of citizenship in such a pluralistic society requires a structure of governance that nurtures each specific “creed” and cultural identity within a polity that is decentralised at the provincial level. It is precisely the confidence of having a voice in governance and in the distribution of economic resources that would crate cohesion amongst the provinces and give each individual a stake in Pakistani citizenship.

Let us now consider the concept of the “writ of the state” the establishment of which has been explicitly used as a justification for the recent military action in Bhambor. The writ of the state is based not on armed force but on justice. Underlying the “writ” is an unwritten social contract between the citizens and the state, in terms of which the state is granted monopoly over the use of force in return for guaranteeing certain basic rights to citizens. If the state is seen to be depriving the citizens of a particular province of their rights or using force without justice, the underlying social contract that is vital to sustaining the writ of the state is violated. In such a circumstance the state is pitted against its own citizens as a militant provincial nationalism emerges and the state loses its monopoly over military force. The response to this confrontation must be to establish the writ of the state by re-establishing the underlying social contract. Military action cannot be a sustainable basis for determining the relationship between a state and its citizens. General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, the GOC commanding East Pakistan in the early stages of the crisis, wrote in his letter to General Yahya Khan that a war with the people of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) cannot be won. (He was promptly transferred back to Rawalpindi).

The inflammatory political consequences of the recent military action in Balochistan are apparent in the riots in Quetta, Nushki and Karachi. Worse still, the seething sense of deprivation in Sindh could take the form of alienation from a polity in which the writ of the state is seen to be established through not political consensus but the barrel of a gun. Re-establishing political negotiations with Baloch representatives and promptly granting the necessary autonomy to Balochistan — and indeed to all the provinces — is therefore an urgent need of the hour. The question is: if this requires a constitutional amendment, how can this be done? Now as never before a government of national unity is required. Such a government could bring about a political consensus regarding the changes in the structure of governance and provincial autonomy that need to be achieved after the next elections.

The military action in Bhambor and the consequent widespread rioting in Balochistan signify a challenge to the writ of the state that is drawn from a break down of the underlying social contract. As Douglas North has argued when institutions fail to maintain the consensus of the actors within them and come into conflict with their norms, then it is a gridlock that requires institutional change. In Pakistan today, there is a crisis of the authority of the state. Overcoming it through institutional change will make Pakistan stronger.

A viable democratic structure in Pakistan would need to meet at least three conditions: (a) Subordination of the military to the elected civilian government. (b) Devolution of power to the provincial level and granting provinces a level of autonomy that meets the aspirations of the smaller provinces. (c) Setting into motion a people-centred economic and political process, which ensures to all citizens justice, human rights, basic services, and equitable participation in economic growth. These are necessary conditions for a vibrant federation whose unity is nurtured by its diversity. Only a democratic polity and economy can achieve an enlightened, tolerant and dynamic Pakistan.

Dr Hussain is a leading economist and author and co-author of many books. This is the first article in a three-part series based on a paper read by the author on May 16, at the SAFMA Conference on Evolving the South Asian Fraternity

Tht Quote of Jinnah is very pertinent

This article has some valid suggestions.

Time has come to quit the divisions being created. Ideally, states should not be on linguistic or ethnic but on administrative convenience basis so that the subnational feeling that is the cause of all the problems everywhere vanishes.

 

[Srirangan]

There is a theory, that Musharraf didn't actually order the killing, but someone down lower in the hierarchy did. Does any Pakistani member know more about this angle?

^^ I read this on Asia Times (atimes.com) A Pakistani Author

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Most extraordinary.

I wonder which "friendly" Gulf country is training the militants!

One official said the biggest shock came when the interrogation of a group of militants revealed they had been trained in a friendly Gulf country, which allegedly feared it could lose its status as the region's biggest trading port.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5289910.stm

This thread has been converted to a "sticky"?

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

I find it extraordinary that the bodies could not be recovered, but millions of rupees and weapons were recovered.

Rather odd that the keep the money (millions of rupees) in the show window all set to be recovered and they cannot be recovered.

Rather difficult to believe since it is like a housewife keeping her jewellery in the front door for thieves to come and rob her!

Pakistan military spokesman major general Shaukat Sultan told a press conference in Rawalpindi, a garrison city near Islamabad, that it would take another four or five days to retrieve the body of Bugti from the rubble.

Sultan said it was not clear what caused the blast and denied that Bugti was the target of the strike.

"Our basic purpose is to retrieve the bodies from the cave," Sultan said.Troops found two boxes in rubble which contained 100 million rupees (1.6 million dollars) and 96,000 dollars, some cheque books and a Thuraya satellite phone, Sultan said.


http://news.lycos.co.uk/int/060829183123.5oztafbt.xml.html

 

[Lahori paa jee]

Most extraordinary.

I wonder which "friendly" Gulf country is training the militants!



This thread has been converted to a "sticky"?

These can be either Dubai or Iranian ports. Bugti had ties with Iran.

But its interesting to note that Gawadar port which Mush often claims to be one of his achievement was made a part of Pakistan by the efforts of Sardar Nawab Akbar Bugti himself

 

[Lahori paa jee]

Nawab Akbar Bugtis body has been found

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Daily Times

Thursday, August 31, 2006 E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version

Mobs block highways to Karachi and Iran

QUETTA: Angry mobs protesting the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti cut off the main highway connecting Quetta to Karachi at four points and another heading west to Iran on Wednesday as the number of arrests in four days rose to nearly 700, said Balochistan IG Chaudhry Yaqub.

Meanwhile, suspected militants blew up a railway line in Mastung district while protesters set fire to a government savings office and half a dozen shops in Khuzdar.

About 200 people blocking a bridge with trucks on the highway to Karachi lifted their siege after eight hours following talks between protest leaders and government officials. Boulders and crudely erected barricades blocked another road linking Karachi with Gwadar.

The blockades prevented many workers from entering Quetta, forcing markets, banks and shops to close. Dozens of buses were parked at a terminal in Quetta unable to leave for Karachi and Lahore, according to an AP cameraman at the scene.

Baloch National Party chief Attaullah Mengal warned in a statement that the strikes would continue until the government handed over Bugti’s body to his family. But police chief Yaqub said life was returning to normal and witnesses said some shops were open in Quetta although traffic was thin. Authorities also extended the closure of schools for three more days in Quetta, officials said.

The authorities have arrested 670 people for inciting violence and for attacks on public and private property since late Saturday, said Yaqub. Police arrested 40 people from various areas following a blast in a Hub hotel.

Meanwhile, a strike was observed across Sindh, particularly in Baloch-populated areas. Pakistan Railways Quetta Division said that rail traffic remained functional in Balochistan on August 28, 29 and 30. Also, the army flew a group of reporters to the cave by helicopter to brief them on work to retrieve Bugti’s body. agencies

Thursday, August 31, 2006 E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version

ARD calls strike tomorrow
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\08\31\story_31-8-2006_pg1_2

Daily Times
Thursday, August 31, 2006 E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version

Decision to quit govt on Sept 5

PESHAWAR: MMA President Qazi Hussain Ahmad said on Wednesday that his party was considering withdrawing from the Balochistan government, following the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti at the weekend. Addressing a press conference after his party’s provincial Shura meeting at Markaz-e-Islami, he said that a formal decision would be taken during the MMA Supreme Council meeting scheduled for September 5. Describing the late nawab as a national hero, Qazi said that Bugti’s killing “had put the very existence of the country at stake”. staff report

Things are getting worse.

I am sure they will brought under control.

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Daily Times

Thursday, August 31, 2006 E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version

Delay in recovering body deepens suspicions


KARACHI: The delay in the recovery of Nawab Akbar Bugti’s body is deepening suspicions about the circumstances in which the tribal chief was killed last Saturday.

Sources close to the Bugti family have challenged the military’s claims that the Nawab was killed when the cave he was hiding in collapsed after a blast. The sources said the family believes the government story is a “piece of creative fiction” meant to give it an excuse for not handing over the Nawab’s body.

The family believes that the Nawab was shot dead by security personnel, and the body would never be handed over, because a bullet-ridden body would contradict the government’s claims about how he died, the sources said.

“The family suspects it might be handed some highly mutilated human remains bearing no wounds to substantiate the government claims over his death,” the sources said.

The sources said Inter Services Public Relations had not explained how the bodies of Nawab Bugti and the others had not been found while it had claimed to find a large amount of cash from the same collapsed structure. The ISPR had claimed that the money and ammunition were recovered from the mouth of the cave. Independent observers said the ISPR should not have disclosed the alleged finding of the money and ammunition until the recovery of Nawab Bugti’s body.

Army engineers are continuing to dig up the cave to retrieve the bodies, with some sources stating Bugti’s body could be recovered in the next 48 hours. It would then be handed over to the family for burial, which is likely to take place in his hometown of Dera Bugti. staff report

Indeed it is unusual!

Such huge amount of money just waiting to be found, but the bodies deep under the debris. Atleast the bodies of one or two guards should have been found with this huge cache of money of a million rupees and nearly a lakh of dollars, if I remember correctly!

I also don't understand the suggestion as to why the finding of so much of money should have been kept secret till the body of Akhnar Khan Bugti was found!

One could now conjecture that all this money is but a "plant" to indicate he had some connection with foreign funding!

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Worse than a Mistake
By Frederic Grare

Page 1 of 1
Posted August 2006
How Pervez Musharraf is endangering himself, Pakistan, and the war on terror.

GENERAL CONFUSION: Musharraf is causing problems for himself and his allies.
General confusion: Musharraf is causing problems for himself and his allies.

Guang Niu/Getty Images

The Bush administration does not know it yet, but Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have just outlived his usefulness. He has already failed to confront the Taliban fighters who have made Pakistan a staging area for their attacks in Afghanistan. He has delayed and postponed promises to shore up his country’s democratic freedoms. He has even walked away from symbolic pledges to remove his own military uniform. And last weekend, the Pakistani strongman may have finally tipped the scales too far. On his orders, Pakistani security forces killed Nawab Akbar Bugti, the tribal leader and former governor of Baluchistan. The elimination of the leader of one Pakistan’s most strategically important border regions threatens the country’s territorial integrity, the war on terror, and Musharraf’s own political future. In one deft stroke, Musharraf has made himself an ally no longer worth the effort.

On August 26, Bugti was killed by Pakistani forces in a firefight close to his mountain hide-out. For 60 years, Bugti was a Baluchi nationalist leader and a key figure in the various insurgencies that have gripped Pakistan’s largest and most mineral-rich province. The Baluchis feel they are exploited by a central government they view as a colonial vehicle for Pakistan’s most populous region, the Punjab. They want more political autonomy and a greater share of their region's lucrative gas revenues.

Bugti commanded a sizable force, and he has long been a thorn in Islamabad’s side. But, unlike other leaders in Pakistan’s unruly border areas, he always deployed his forces with politics in mind and an eye on the future. Just last year, he proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, a compromise peace based on a proposal from Pakistan’s Muslim League leadership. His own stature, combined with the fact that he was in charge of the tribe controlling most of Baluchistan's natural gas reserves, made him unacceptable to the military leadership—even though he was Islamabad’s most credible partner for peace in the region.

Some argue that because the insurgency is essentially tribal, the removal of this tribal leader cuts the head off the snake. But that is a fundamental misreading of the insurgency. A prolonged, low-intensity conflict is now likely. With Bugti’s death, the insurgency will be led by far more radical elements, many of whom, including the largest tribe in Baluchistan, the Marri, will settle for nothing less than independence.

Baluchistan’s strategic location, bordering Iran, Afghanistan, and the Arabian Sea, as well as its wealth of minerals and hydrocarbons, means that Baluchi independence will always be unacceptable to Islamabad. So, the army will be ordered to redouble its efforts to crush the insurgency. But the military will struggle to control a province representing some 43 percent of the country’s territory. More forces will likely be redeployed to the region from the Afghan border. Such a move will further thin the army’s presence along the Afghan border and weaken the help it can offer NATO in the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants.

Indeed, the army is already paving the way for a drawdown from the Afghan border, which would free up soldiers for Baluchistan. The Pakistani press reported several days ago that a truce is being negotiated with the Taliban in the frontier area of Waziristan. Such a move would result in the army's withdrawal from all border posts and effectively allow the Taliban to cross the border at will.

If the consequences of Bugti’s death on the ground are still difficult to predict, some of them are already apparent in the political arena. Every political party, even Musharraf’s own political allies, has condemned the killing. The division between the civilian leadership and the military is widening—a frightening trend in any country where the military has such a stranglehold on political life. If this rift continues to widen, the Pakistani military might demand that Musharraf, who is still simultaneously—although unconstitutionally—the army’s chief of staff, choose between his two positions.

The killing of Bugti has exposed a Pakistani president both unable to fulfill his commitments in the war on terror and only able to act decisively against his own people. Musharraf’s actions have reversed decades’ worth of slow progress toward national integration. Reporting restrictions will guarantee that we will not hear much from Baluchistan in the coming months. But the next thing we hear might well be an explosion that reverberates as far as Washington.

Frederic Grare is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Musharraf's Dangerous Highwire Act
Tim Lister | Bio | 30 Aug 2006
World Politics Watch Exclusive

Pervez Musharraf is no stranger to a welter of competing pressures -- domestic and external. His government remains under international pressure to root out al Qaeda and Taliban elements in frontier areas; Pakistan's Islamic parties are well-organized and growing in influence; separatists in Baluchistan are making parts of the province ungovernable just as the government tries to exploit its mineral and hydrocarbon potential. Pakistan's political institutions are weak and Islamic extremists have several times tried to assassinate the General. Set against these problems, there is one shaft of light. Pakistan's economy is now one of the fastest growing in Asia -- thanks largely to a government of technocrats that is pursuing privatization and foreign investment.

Amid these pressures, Western governments (and India) continue the clamor for more aggressive action from Pakistan in the "War on Terror." It's a clamor that's understandable -- but counter-productive.

War on Terrorism

In her provocative piece for World Politics Watch earlier this month, Bridget Johnson asked whether conflict in the Middle East would push Musharraf to abandon his "fine line" between a liberal state and a theocracy and maybe "stop offering any bit of comfort or shelter to Islamofascist elements." Setting aside the fashionable term of "Islamofascist," the choice is simplistic; there is a gulf between a theocracy and a liberal state, not a fine line. Ms. Johnson suggests that "if [Musharraf] uses the lives he has left to seriously quash radical Islam in Pakistan, he may leave a significant mark on the region." Indeed he might -- he might set off the sort of sectarian war in Pakistan that has engulfed Iraq, plunging a nuclear-armed state into chaos, with consequences well beyond its own borders. Radical Islam can't simply be quashed, by mobilizing a couple of battalions. Addressing Pakistan's manifold problems also has to take account of incendiary Sunni/Shia relations (Iraq, anyone?) and the vital role of the army as the only functioning national institution.

There is no doubting that Musharraf needs the West and needs to show the international community that he is serious in containing Islamic extremists in Pakistan, whether home-grown or of the multinational al Qaeda variety. The 9/11 Commission and others have legitimately complained that Pakistan remains a breeding ground for terrorism. Offering solutions is more problematic.

It is not as though Musharraf's government is doing nothing -- especially against al Qaeda militants. The army has lost scores of soldiers in remote and rugged Waziristan pursuing foreign fighters. Pakistan has tracked down plenty of important al Qaeda figures -- including Abu Zubaida, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Sheik Mohammed. Altogether it has probably arrested some 700 people allegedly linked to al Qaeda. There is also evidence of a new drive against Taliban leaders who have long gone unhindered in using the rugged territory of Baluchistan as a rear base for operations across the border. A recent raid on a hospital in Quetta netted several Taliban operatives, and a Taliban commander, Mullah Hamdullah, was also arrested.

But an overly aggressive pursuit of Islamic radicals might backfire with disastrous consequences. Trying to eradicate (as opposed to contain) militants in Waziristan and tribal areas is not feasible; it could also exacerbate ethnic tensions and cause dissension in an overstretched military. The government suffered a popular backlash after the abortive U.S. missile strike earlier this year on the border village of Damadola, which missed its intended target -- al Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri -- but killed several civilians. Recently, a more subtle approach has taken hold, to try to peel away tribal leaders from foreign elements while using Special Forces to target the latter more precisely rather than risking civilian casualties. A similar state of affairs exists in Baluchistan, home to more than 200,000 Afghan refugees, smuggling routes, grinding poverty and hardline madrassas. It is truly the wild west, where eradicating support for the Taliban is a pipe dream among a well-entrenched network of Sunni Deobandi groups.

Some might describe the government's less than whole-hearted approach as appeasement; others as a prudent cost-benefit analysis. That analysis includes two elements of self-interest. Pakistan had close ties to the Taliban while it ruled Afghanistan and retains some influence over events there by allowing the organization to survive as a thorn in the Karzai government's side. (Not that Pakistani officials would ever admit to such realpolitik.) Musharraf is also aware that if western financial aid and credits are to continue, it is the ongoing nature of the struggle that preserves his and Pakistan's strategic "currency." Since 9/11, America has dismissed $1.5 billion in debt and provided Pakistan with more than $3 billion in military assistance. Its strategic value -- and status as a nuclear power -- helps to preserve Pakistan's primitive parity with India. A similar dynamic informs negotiations with India. Musharraf wants to be seen to be making progress, but not too fast. Important constituencies at home would not tolerate compromise on Kashmir, and as a "process" the relationship attracts greater attention and financial help from the West.

Home-Grown Trouble

Musharraf's action against Pakistani Islamist groups has been less consistent than operations against al Qaeda and fellow travelers. His government has taken highly visible initiatives against radical Islamic groups -- especially after the 2001 attack on India's Parliament and the July 2005 attacks in London. But these crackdowns are not sustained. For example, the order that foreign students at madrassas leave Pakistan in the wake of the London attacks in July 2005 has been defied by many of the schools and quietly dropped. There are probably still several hundred foreign students at the religious schools. One group, Lashkar-e-Taibam, has been outlawed (and also is on the U.S. State Department's list of terrorist organizations) and held responsible for several attacks on India. But it has adopted a "shell" as a charitable organization (Jawaat ud Dawa) and it maintains - openly -- a large compound near Lahore.

A broader sweep against groups like Lashkar would be possible, but unlikely to bear fruit. Their memberships are fluid and dispersed among Pakistan's teeming cities and remoter corners. They include some adherents who want to liberate Kashmir and others who migrate to a broader jihad. Some enjoy protection from powerful elements of military intelligence (ISI) as a stick with which to beat India. Mass arrests could have the effect of radicalizing opposition to Musharraf's regime, like poking a stick into a wasps' nest. Instead, the government's policy has been to target individuals with known links to terrorist acts or plots -- such as the murder of Daniel Pearl or the London subway attacks. This month Pakistani al Qaeda suspects were detained in Karachi in connection with a suicide bomb attack against a U.S. diplomat earlier this year. Not pursuing these groups and their sympathizers wholesale is designed to keep social peace in a country that is a sectarian and religious cauldron. A virulent Sunni purism retains its grip in the grimy towns of southern Punjab, stoked by firebrand preachers who have persuaded more than a few to become al Qaeda's foot soldiers. Pakistan's deep-seated religious culture won't be changed overnight. (The democratic experiment in Iraq may be instructive in this respect.) Witness the timidity with which the Musharraf government has approached the reform of Islamic laws on rape and marriage, which constitute abhorrent discrimination against women.

It's important to distinguish between underground Islamist groups like Jaish e Mohammed and Lashkar e Taiba and the "mainstream" Islamist opposition, represented by the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). By western standards, the MMA is extremely conservative -- but it does represent the values of many Pakistanis. It has benefited from Musharraf's assault on the old "dynastic" parties, led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, who both probably would face criminal charges should they return home. As Bhutto's PPP and Sharif's PML(N) have suffered, so the Islamic opposition alliance continues to grow in influence. It doubled its vote in the 2002 elections, and now has more parliamentary seats than Sharif's party. Once promoted by Musharraf as a counterweight to the other parties, the MMA has won a majority in North West Frontier Province and is already introducing legislation based on Sharia law. Now it decries Musharraf as a "creature" of Washington and coordinates anti-American protests whenever the opportunity arises.

The popularity of the MMA -- like that of Hezbollah and Hamas -- has as much to do with its role as a social welfare provider as its politics. Its grassroots presence fills a vacuum left by the state. In Lahore, for example, the MMA has converted old movie sets into a clinic and hospital. (The symbolism is not lost on its leaders.)

But does the MMA seriously threaten Musharraf? Bridget Johnson asks: "Will the people go for a hardline regime?" The reality of Pakistani politics is that they won't have the option. The military is the only functional entity and Musharraf's command of it appears as secure as anything in Pakistan can be. Pakistanis joke: "Most countries have an army; here the army has a country." The MMA may burn effigies of Musharraf, but venting on the streets and making decisions in Islamabad are poles apart.

Economy

Musharraf's government is pinning substantial hopes for containing Islamic opposition and popular discontent on improving living standards. Held back by a bureaucratic straitjacket and poor infrastructure, Pakistani business has until recently been left in the dust by more competitive regional economies. That is beginning to change following the appointment of former Citibank executive Shaukat Aziz as Prime Minister. In 2005, Pakistan registered one of the fastest growth rates in the world (8.4 percent) as red tape was cut and foreign investment attracted. Some Pakistani expatriates are returning to invest at home, less out of a sense of patriotic duty than because of new opportunities.

There are massive challenges. Trade negotiations with India proceed at glacial pace. Most trade is still indirect through Dubai, and a visit last year to the only road crossing open for trade (at Wagah) revealed nothing more than a few truck loads of Indian potatoes and garlic crossing the border. Potentially, an open trading relationship with India could bring capital and markets to Pakistan, but not at this rate.

Pakistan has to sustain and learn to handle high economic growth if is to meet the challenge of a young and increasingly urbanized population, many of whom are without regular work. In the interest of transparency, the government has to tackle the fabulous perks enjoyed by the military and its interests in the commercial and agricultural sectors. Unless handled astutely, economic growth could bring about as many problems as it solves, accelerating the rush to the cities and the growth of an underemployed, unskilled "proletariat" exposed to but unable to attain wealth. Above all, massive investment and political resources need to be plowed into overhauling education, where the curriculum is dominated by religious education with little vocational instruction.

Succession

This is the greatest near-term imponderable in Pakistan. Musharraf has avoided grooming a successor and despite multiple promises has not shed his uniform for civilian garb. The pro-military PML-Q party -- the largest in parliament -- has no outstanding leaders but is rather a vehicle for the General's 2007 election bid. Musharraf has hand-picked his immediate circle of military chiefs; no one in the largely technocratic government has a power base. But in reinforcing his rule he has enfeebled Pakistan's already moribund political institutions. It's unclear whether in the run-up to the elections he will seek favor from the more secular parties (rehabilitating the Bhutto or Sharif dynasties) or the Islamists. Whichever direction he tilts will constrain his room for maneuver.

Many observers in Pakistan have a grudging respect for Musharraf's ability to bring stability (especially when compared with the chaos and corruption of the previous governments). But there is also anxiety that he is beginning to develop a "cult of indispensability." Increasingly, Musharraf compares himself to Pakistan's revered founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah. At the Independence Day rally in Lahore last year, he was flanked by two enormous portraits of Jinnah -- partly to underline his secular credentials, but also to portray himself as the indispensable father of modern Pakistan; so indispensable that there was a well-guarded 50-yard gap between him and his audience.

Few Pakistani analysts regard Musharraf as a visionary who can refashion Pakistan in the style of Ataturk (his hero) into a modern, secular state. The best they hope for is that his instinct for tactical advantage, his talent for steering between the Scylla and Charibdis in pursuit of "enlightened moderation" provides stability, which in turn limits the appeal of the Islamic opposition and entrenches economic improvement. The alternative, that al Qaeda gets lucky in one of its assassination attempts, is not one they wish to entertain.

Tim Lister has covered international news for 25 years as a producer and reporter for the BBC and CNN. He has lived and worked in the Middle East, and has also worked in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2004, he produced the award-winning documentary "Between Hope and Fear: Journeys in the New Iraq" for CNN. He is now an independent writer and producer.

http://worldpoliticswatch.com/article.aspx?id=150

From both the above articles, it appears that it is getting difficult, but nothing is unsurmountable!