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Air-To-Air Tactics & Combat Formations

•Dogfighting over Europe

Dogfighting was very prominent in the skies over Europe. The air force in France, while a major force during the first world war, was inadequate and poorly organized, and quickly fell to the German onslaught. Hitler believed that the British government was on the verge of collapse, and offered them a choice between peace and war, being quite astonished when Winston Churchill opted, without hesitation, for war. As the first battles began, the awesome power of the German’s anti-aircraft artillery became readily apparent, with 88 millimeter shells capable of firing 50,000 feet in the air. General Wolfram von Richthofen noted that these guns were equally destructive when used for ground fire, when they were not preoccupied with destroying airplanes. The German ME-109 and the British Spitfire were some of the most common fighters used in the European theater.


•Soviet fighters

During this time, three new Russian fighters, the LaGG-1, the Yak-1, and the Mig-1 were just coming off of the production line. The Soviet Air Defense Force had been fraught with problems since World War I. The German Barbarossa offensive on June 22, 1941, destroyed more than 2000 Soviet aircraft on the first day, and more than 5000 before October. With great desperation, the Soviets fought in dogfights over Leningrad, Moscow, and the Ukraine for more than a year. It became common practice at this time for Soviet pilots to simply ram an opponent.

Struggling with morale problems, the Soviets slowly and methodically began to regain air supremacy after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943.

•USA and Japan

After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, in the Hawaiian Islands, the United States entered the war. The Japanese used the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, an extremely lightweight fighter known for its exceptional range and maneuverability. The U.S. military tested out an A6M2, which was captured intact in 1942, advising "Never attempt to dogfight a Zero." Even though its engine was rather low in power, the Zero had very low wing loading characteristics, a small turn radius, a top speed over 330 MPH, and could climb better than any fighter used by the U.S. at that time, although it was poorly armored compared to U.S. aircraft.

A pilot who realized that new tactics had to be devised was Lieutenant Commander John S. "Jimmy" Thach, commander of Fighting Three in San Diego. He read the early reports coming out of China and wrestled with the problem of his F4F Wildcats being relatively slower and much less maneuverable than the Japanese planes. He devised a defensive maneuver called the "Thach Weave", (named by Lieutenant Commander James H. Flatley, another fighter tactician and contemporary of Thach). Lieutenant Commander Thach reasoned that two planes, a leader and his wingman, could fly about 200 feet apart and adopt a weaving formation when under attack by Japanese fighters. He later faced the A6M Zero during the Battle of Midway, in June 1942, for the test of his theory. Although outnumbered, he found that a Zero would lock onto the tail of one of the fighters. In response, the two planes would turn toward each other. When the Zero followed its original target through the turn it would come into a position to be fired on by the target's wingman, and the predator would become the prey. His tactic proved to be effective and was soon adopted by other squadrons. The Thach Weave helped make up for the inferiority of the US planes in maneuverability and numbers, until new aircraft could be brought into service. The usefulness of this strategy survives until today. Another effective maneuver used by the U.S. Pilots was a simple break, which consisted of turning sharply across an attacker's flight path, which worked well because the large nose of the Zero tended to obstruct the pilot's view. Still another good tactic was to dive upon the Zero, shoot in one pass, and use the speed to climb back above the fight to dive again. By 1943 the U.S. technology began to produce planes that were better matched against the Japanese planes, such as the Grumman F6F Hellcat, and the Vought F4U Corsair.
 
•Korean War

After World War II, the question began to rise about the future usefulness of fighter aircraft. This was especially true for the U.S., where the focus was placed on small, fast, long range bombers capable of delivering atomic bombs. The Korean War began in June 1950, and the North Koreans were outmatched by the U.S. Air Force. The war was nearly over by October, with the surrender of North Korea when, on November 1, Chinese Mig-15s attacked. The Chinese began supplying North Korea with troops and provisions, and the war quickly resumed.

At 100 MPH faster, the Mig-15 was more than a match for the U.S. F-80 Shooting Star, using the same dive and shoot tactic that the American's found so useful against Japan. The U.S. jets had inferior weaponry, and suffered from problems with production and parts. The U.S. resorted to using mainly the more maneuverable propeller driven fighters during the war, such as the P-51 Mustang and the P-47 Thunderbolt, which were both carried over from World War II.

The F-86 Sabre was one of the most common jets used by the U.S. at that time. The U.S. pilots had one major advantage over the Chinese, the G-suit. Chinese fighters were often seen spinning off out of control during a hard turn because the pilot had lost consciousness. The Chinese were very competent in a dogfight, and large swirling battles were fought in the skies over Korea.

The U.S. pilots, however, managed to adapt their tactics to defeat the Chinese in the air. By the time the war ended in 1953, 792 Migs were downed by the F-86 squadrons, which only lost 78 planes of their own.


•Modern air combat

Even in the jet age, modern air-to-air combat can develop into dog fights. A fighter can evade a missile by abrupt maximum-performance turns and employing countermeasures—such as chaff and flares—provided he can detect the missile via a radar warning receiver (RWR) or visually. If beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles can be defeated, pilots can press the attack and very quickly arrive at the within-visual-range (WVR) arena. This will typically result in a high-speed neutral pass (or merge) from which the opposing pilots must decide to turn and continue the fight with their opponent or continue straight and 'bug-out'. The turning fight that develops can be commonly called a dog fight, or air combat maneuvering (ACM).

Superiority in a dog fight can depend on a pilot's experience and skill, and the agility of his fighter when flown at minimum air speeds approaching loss of control (causing a danger of stalling); the winner typically plays to the strengths of his own aircraft while forcing his adversary to fly at a design disadvantage. Dogfights are generally contests fought at low airspeeds, while maintaining enough energy for violent acrobatic maneuvering, as pilots attempt to remain within air speeds with a maximum turn rate and minimum turn radius: the so-called "corner speed" that often lies between 300 and 400 knots, depending on the aircraft's design. Therefore a dogfight has nothing to do with supersonic speed, but much to do with the engine power that makes supersonic flight possible. The F-22 Raptor can stand on its steerable nozzles at less than 100 knots airspeed, yet quickly maneuver to bring its M61 Vulcan cannon to bear on a nearby evasive target, while an F-15 Eagle is more likely to use its thrust to maintain its relatively high corner speed, working to counter the drag caused by tight turns.

The continued importance of maintaining dogfighting proficiency was demonstrated during the Vietnam War. American pilots flew aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom II, equipped with long-range AIM-7 Sparrow missiles and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. However, air crews were required not to fire any missiles without having visually identified the target first, to make absolutely sure they were not an ally, thus losing this technological advantage. The AIM-7 missile was also not very reliable, making heavy use of delicate components such as vacuum tubes, which could not endure tropical climates, carrier takeoffs, and high-G maneuveres. Also, they had semi-active radar homing, meaning that they used the carrier plane's radar signals to home in on the target. The missiles themselves did not have a radar system, but "listened" to the pings of the attacker's radar and used the reflection of the prey aircraft to home in on it. AIM-9 missile were heat-seeking fire-and-forget missiles, meaning that once they had a lock on a heat source, they would attempt to hit it. They were only useful in short range, and in many cases failed, due to a number of factors, including delicate instruments and false heat sources (such as the sun). Additionally, early versions of the F-4 (prior to the E model) relied solely on missiles, having no guns nor lead-computing Gyro gunsight, and were therefore very vulnerable in the gun-range combat that could ensue.

Lightweight, short-endurance, point-defense fighters such as the MiG-17 and MiG-21 are typically far more agile than heavy, long-range, fighter-bombers (see the F-105 Thunderchief). Still, using superior tactics, the AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range missiles, and cannon fire, American pilots were able to gain significant victories in the air over North Vietnam, especially after the 1969 establishment of the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) to restore dogfighting ability to its pilots. At this school, pilots learned to exchange airspeed for altitude, using maneuvers like the Immelman turn and the Split-S, and to master tricks that put him behind an enemy fighter, where the enemy is vulnerable to heat-seeking Sidewinder missiles.

Referring back the previous section, which focused on tactics developed during World War II, the North Vietnamese MiG-17 resorted to use of the Lufbery maneuver on occasion when cornered by faster F-4 Phantom fighters. Whereas the Thach Weave is used as aircraft move towards a point in space, the Lufbery is employed over a fixed point.

With modern air-to-air AMRAAM guided missiles greatly extending the general engagement range of jet fighters, some experts hypothesize that dogfighting may be headed toward extinction, but others cite the occurrences in Vietnam as evidence otherwise. However, it is worth noting that there have been a great number of Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) kills occurring during and after Operation Desert Storm. This was due to the improved reliability of BVR missiles, radars, and most importantly, the integration of C3I assets such as AWACS aircraft into the realm of aerial warfare. This provided Coalition forces with a superior picture of the battlefield and in conjunction with airspace management allowed utilization of BVR weaponry.

Despite this the improvement of all-aspect IR, missiles coupled with helmet-mounted sights, has reduced the necessity of tail-chase attacks. In addition, Russian development of tail-mounted radar and rear-firing missiles has reduced Russian planes' vulnerability to tail-chase attacks.

Yet because this feature is only present on the most modern jets, and missiles are a finite resource, the US Navy (TOPGUN) and the US Air Force (Red Flag) continue to teach postgraduate-level classes in air-combat-maneuvering engagements. Russian aircraft manufacturers heavily emphasize supermaneuverability and dogfight capabilities in fighter design, with aircraft such as the Su-37 or the Su-30MKI demonstrating advanced thrust vectoring systems to achieve these goals, pushing the aircraft to its limits to give it an advantage in combat. USAF fighters, such as the F-15 and F-16, tend to favor higher speeds, because of their emphasis on high power-to-weight ratio and low wing-loading; although the F-22 has supermaneuverability with its own vectored thrust.

http://www.tititudorancea.com/z/dogfight.htm
 
Rules of engagement (ROEs) set the conditions under which an unseen target can be attacked. They vary from situation to situation, under political constraints, but a basic principle is that the target should be 'declared' by multiple independent channels. This, in part, explains why F-15s claimed the overwhelming majority of air- to-air kills in Desert Storm. The F-15 was equipped with modern identification friend-or-foe (IFF) equipment and had a non- cooperative target recognition (NCTR) mode in its radar. The latter used jet engine modulation (JEM) processing to detect a characteristic beat in the radar return, associated with the target's spinning compressor blades, and is effective over a limited range of aspect angles. F/A-18s had similar NCTR but no equivalent IFF and F-14s had IFF but no NCTR, so they could not shoot without clearance from Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). (Similarly, recent export-model F-16s have a Northrop Grumman IFF which is superior to that fitted to most USAF aircraft.)

This used to be a deep secret. The early NCTR was a fabulous addition to the F-15, and worked remarkably well. The only issue was that some engine JEM thumbprints were identical to others, so on occasion there was ambiguity. For example, sometimes an F-5 would be identified as a B-1! We weren't too concerned with friendly-friendly mismatches, and there were a lot more of those than friendly-enemy ambiguities, but even when there was one, other clues could tell you the I.D. For example, if it says "MiG-17 or MiG-25" and the target is doing mach 1.8, it's obviously a -25.
 
The other reason the F-15 was used so much in Desert Storm (vs Navy, USAF F-16's) was the simple truth that it was a much better A-A platform than anything else in the U.S. inventory at the time. Thankfully this was recognized, and after many years of U.S. Navy dominance in air combat, the USAF had its chance, and did very well.
 
Would the fact the viper was also an excellent bomb truck in every form it flew in... and was the body puncher in the conflict. (the F-15E is a different beast in my view compared to the C model). I suppose the F-111 vark also has its final yeehaw in the storm.
Yet..the star of the show was the nighthawk.. and precision weapons.. even though they only accounted for 20% of the ordnance dropped methinks.

There was an eagle tactic I read about in .. clancy's book.. called the wall of eagles..
F-15's stacked in two's on top of each other from 20k to 35k.. I think.. like an aerial net.. nothing comes through it...
except.. one to two jets than make it through the top..
 
Would the fact the viper was also an excellent bomb truck in every form it flew in... and was the body puncher in the conflict. (the F-15E is a different beast in my view compared to the C model). I suppose the F-111 vark also has its final yeehaw in the storm.
Yet..the star of the show was the nighthawk.. and precision weapons.. even though they only accounted for 20% of the ordnance dropped methinks.

At that time, the F-16 did not have AMRAAM, but even if it did, the Eagle was the better choice for A2A, because it's radar was much superior, and those of us who flew it (the F-15C) did nothing except A2A. When you specialize, you become better at it. The F-16's gave excellent performance in their A2G role, but were irked that the F-15C was given the A2A mission.

There was an eagle tactic I read about in .. clancy's book.. called the wall of eagles..
F-15's stacked in two's on top of each other from 20k to 35k.. I think.. like an aerial net.. nothing comes through it...
except.. one to two jets than make it through the top..

The "wall" was (and remains) a standard F-15C formation. It was particularly good for pre-strike sweep. The 4 to 8 F-15's could cover a vast volume of sky, and not risk fratricide. But the main purpose of the wall was to simplify radar sorting, the bread-and-butter of the F-15, which is the allocation of available targets among the flight. Without good radar sort discipline, you'd often end up with 6 missiles on one obvious target, leaving many untargeted bandits in the area.
 
Did'nt JTIDs solve that??
the target sorting problem that is??
Or is that still done by .."the one on the left is yours and the others mine" way?
 
Did'nt JTIDs solve that??
the target sorting problem that is??
Or is that still done by .."the one on the left is yours and the others mine" way?

I'm sure pilots still train on voice sorts and standardized methodologies, because data-linking won't always work or even be there, but I have no doubt that with modern data exchange, it's truly simplified things. Which in a way is a shame, because a good sort was a real art, and takes a lot of practice.

We had standardized call-outs for sorting depending upon the formation we saw, and in the end, the flight lead was responsible for this. We had azimuth sort, range sort, box, diamond, even a "gorilla" sort. Everyone knew what to do without a lot of chatter.
 
BVR Training
Barry “Toad” MacDougall
72nd Virtual Fighter Wing

you can google it to check out some terminologies-- its free--
 
Introduction to the Geometry of Air Combat


Angle-Off
Angle-Off is the difference, measured in degrees, between your heading and the bandit's. This angle provides information about the relative fuselage alignment between the pilot's jet and the bandit's. For example, if the Angle-Off between you and a bandit were 0°, you would be on a parallel heading with the bandit, and the two fuselages would be aligned. If the angle-off were 90°, your fuselage would be perpendicular to the bandit.

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Range
Range is the distance between your jet and the bandit. In most HUD's, range is measured in feet, out to one nautical mile (6,000 feet). Outside one nautical mile, range is measured in miles and tenths of miles. For example, a range to the target of 9,000 feet would be displayed as 1.5 nautical miles.

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Aspect Angle
Aspect angle is the number of degrees measured from the tail of a target to your aircraft. Aspect angle is important because it indicates how far away your aircraft is from the target's 6 o'clock position. Aspect angle has nothing to do with your heading. Note that the aspect angle stays the same, regardless of which way your aircraft is heading. Along with a measure in degrees from the target's tail. In order to determine if the angle is left or right aspect, start at the target's 6 o'clock facing the target. If your aircraft is in the right hemisphere, you have right aspect; in the left hemisphere, you have left target aspect. Aspect angle is important because, if you know the aspect angle and range to the target, you then know his lateral displacement or turning room from the target-and lateral displacement is very important in BFM.
Aspect Angle

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Attack Geometry

Attack geometry describes the path that the offensive fighter takes as he converges on the bandit. When you start an attack on the bandit, there are three distinct paths or pursuit courses you can follow. These pursuit courses are lag pursuit, pure pursuit and lead pursuit. If you are pointing your aircraft behind the bandit, you are in lag pursuit. If you are pointing directly at the bandit, you are in pure pursuit. If you are pointing in front of the bandit, you are in lead pursuit.

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Lag Pursuit
Lag pursuit is used primarily on the approach to the bandit. Lag is also used any time an attacking fighter maneuvers out of plane (that is, not in the same plane of motion as the fighter under attack). You must have the ability to out-turn the bandit in order to fly lag pursuit for any length of time. The reason? In order to shoot a missile or the gun at the enemy, you must pull your nose out of lag. If the bandit can turn at a higher rate, he can keep your nose stuck in lag and keep you from shooting him.

Pure Pursuit
Pure pursuit is used to shoot missiles at the enemy. Flying a pure pursuit course all the way into the bandit will lead to an overshoot. For this reason, you should only point at the bandit when you are going to shoot. This image shows how holding a pure pursuit course will lead to an overshoot.

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Lead Pursuit
Lead pursuit is used to close on the bandit and is also used for gun shots. Flying a lead pursuit course is the fastest way to get to the bandit because you cut him off in the sky. The problem with establishing a lead pursuit course too early is that you will overshoot the bandit when you get in close unless you have a significant turn rate advantage. If you are fighting a similar aircraft, such as the MiG-29, you will not normally be able to stay in lead and will be forced into an overshoot. It is important, however, to establish lead pursuit at the proper time in the fight because it is the only way that you can get into the gun envelope.
 
Determining the Pursuit Course
If the attacker is in the defender's plane of motion, the velocity vector of the attacker determines the pursuit course.

air_038a_6.gif


The velocity vector, for the sake of our discussion, is the nose of the aircraft and represents the direction that your jet travels through the air at any given time. From the cockpit, the velocity vector is depicted by the flight path marker.

What if the attacker is not in the same plane of motion as the defender? How do you determine the pursuit course for out-of-plane maneuvering? When the attacker is not in the same plane as the defender, pursuit course is deter-mined by the lift vector of the attacker. An aircrafts lift vector is simply a vector that sticks directly out of the top of the jet, perpendicular to the aircraft's wings. At high G, an aircraft moves along its lift vector. You position the lift vector by rolling, and when you pull G's, the nose of the jet tracks toward the lift vector. The image below shows a fighter's lift vector.
Lift Vector

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---------- Post added at 09:23 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:22 AM ----------

If an attacker pulls out of plane with a bandit, his pursuit course is then determined by where his lift vector is taking him. When the attacker pulls out of plane with a bandit, he is, by definition, flying lag pursuit. As he pulls back into a bandit, he may be flying lag, pure or lead pursuit, depending on the geometry of the fight. (The image below does not show a recommended maneuver but rather illustrates the effect of out-of-plane maneuvering on the pursuit course.)

air_038a_8.gif

In this image, the F-16 immediately goes to lag pursuit when he pulls his nose out of plane in position B. At the top of this maneuver, he initiates a pull back down into the defender at position C. In this position, the F-16 is in pure pursuit. Notice at position D, when the F-16 enters the MiG-29's plane-of-motion, his nose is on the Fulcrum and he is again flying a pure pursuit course.

Where you position the nose of the aircraft is very important when a pilot attacks the bandit. The use of attack pursuit geometry will be explained later on in detail, and we will talk in specific terms about where to place the jet in relationship to the bandit. For now, just make sure you understand what each of the pursuit courses are and what they do for you.
 

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